

~~SECRET~~

W  
FILE

SUBJ.

DATE

SUB-CAT

# USMACV

8/67


S-5759-75-14

AC of S J-2

82121

J2/D007098/67

August 1967



LIBRARY  
ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
PERIODICALS  
OCT 19 1967

COPY 1

LIBRARY  
OCT 11 1967  
ARMY WAR COLLEGE

# PERINTREP

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
EXCEPT DOCUMENT RELEASABLE TO RVN  
AND FMAF ONLY  
BY AUTHORITY OF COMUSMACV  
DATE AUGUST 1967

COPY NO. 491 of 560

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ORDER  
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

~~SECRET~~

821214

~~SECRET~~

PERINTREP NO: MACV J2 8-67

S0103933

PERIOD COVERED: 010001 August - 312400 August 1967

REFERENCE: AMS 1306 Sheets 1 and 2

1. (S) GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

a. (S) Out-of-Country:

(1) (S) North Vietnam: North Vietnamese Regular Army (NVA) strength was estimated to be over 450,000 as of 31 August, including 54,800 NVA troops in South Vietnam. Major NVA formations, including the 324B, 325th, and 341st Divisions, remained in the DMZ-Quang Tri-Lao border area.

(C) Interpretation of 6 August photography disclosed three PT-76 amphibious tanks located approximately 12 kilometers north of the northern boundary of the DMZ. This is the first confirmed deployment of PT-76 tanks near the DMZ.

(S) North Vietnamese aircraft losses in August included one MIG-17, two MIG-21's, and one possible MIG-21, all shot down during air engagements. An NVN air defense unit accounted for an additional MIG loss in August.

(2) (C) Cambodia: On 20 July, the NVA 103rd Battalion reportedly was located at Dak Sor, approximately four kilometers south of Nam Lyr mountain. This unit is not identified in the current NVN order of battle. The unit, consisting of 350 Vietnamese and 50 Montagnards, was armed with two 81mm mortars, five 60mm mortars, ten .30 caliber machine guns, one 57mm recoilless rifle, and 100 automatic rifles. Historically, this area of Cambodia has been used as a staging area and infiltration corridor.

(C) Platoon Leader PHAM VAN RU, a returnee who rallied in early July at Duc Hoa, provided information on VC facilities in Cambodia. PHAM states that after he was wounded in 1963 he was evacuated to a large hospital located within Cambodia. He remained in the hospital for three months. PHAM stated that soldiers who are seriously wounded are still taken to Cambodia for treatment. In early July, VC facilities in Cambodia included the Binh Tan District Headquarters, located in Ba Thu village.

(S) In early June 1967, Radio Phnom Penh announced the VC recognition of Cambodia's borders and territorial integrity. The Cambodian government and the VC Central Committee Presidium, by mutual consent, decided to install a permanent VC representative in Phnom Penh. Cambodian conservatives are disturbed by Cambodia's recognition of the

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ORDER  
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

~~SECRET~~

821214

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

VC Front. Sihanouk recognized the Front only after it had recognized Cambodia's borders.

(3) (C) Laos: During August in the Lao Panhandle, military activity was adversely affected by heavy rains. Road watch teams and aerial observers reported approximately 125 trucks per week. The majority of the trucks were noted moving in a northerly direction. Most routes were not completely motorable, but those portions which were motorable were utilized as much as possible. Road repairs continued especially on Routes 912, 92, 922, and 110.

b. (C) In-Country:

(1) (C) I CTZ: Enemy activity in I CTZ was at a relatively low level throughout the early part of August, but increased progressively from mid-month as the enemy attempted to counter the early September presidential elections. In the DMZ area, enemy units commenced a build-up. The NVA 803rd, NVA 812th, and NVA 90th Regiments, NVA 324B Division, the NVA 29th and possibly NVA 101st Regiments, NVA 325th Division; the 270th Independent Regiment; and elements of the NVA 31st Regiment, prob resubordinated to the 270th, all operated in the area from Gio Linh to ten kilometers west of Con Thien. West of Camp Carroll and Ca Lu, the 8th Battalion, NVA 29th Regiment and elements of the NVA 95C Regiment, NVA 325th Division, were operating east of the Khe Sanh area. Friendly artillery, tactical air, and B-52 strikes disrupted enemy plans north of Con Thien; however, these forces continued to threaten friendly bases and installations at the end of the month. The enemy reinitiated heavy attacks by fire on 28 August and continued to deliver large quantities of ordnance as the month ended. Included in attacks on Gio Linh, Con Thien, Cua Viet, Camp Carroll, and Dong Ha were 85, 100, 105, -130, and possible 152mm artillery; 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortar; 122mm and 140mm rockets. In the Tri Thien MR (Northern Front) enemy units remained relatively inactive following major defeats in July until the last week in August, when Hue received mortar fire and Phu Bai was attacked by fire and maneuver. Probing attacks in the Quang Tri City area, combine with frequent contacts by ARVN sweep operations, indicated planned enemy offensive action in that area. Returnees and detainees confirmed one organization change in Tri Thien with the newly infiltrated 1st Battalion 9th Regiment, NVA 304th Division, replacing the VC 802nd Battalion under the 6th Regiment and assuming the designation NVA 802nd Battalion. The former 802nd relocated to Phu Loc District, assuming the designator 804 In Central I CTZ, detainees and captured documents provided information that the 368th Artillery Regiment with two battalions of 122mm rockets and one battalion of 140mm rockets infiltrated through Ashau into Quang Nam during April-June 1967 and conducted the rocket attacks on Danang. Enemy activity in Quang Nam was at a high level during the pre-election period with light rocket attacks on Danang and Marble Mountain, and sapper/ground attacks on Dien Ban and Hoi An.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED OF  
SEC ARMY BY TAG PER

821214

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Friendly operations against the NVA NT 2 Division near Hiep Duc and in Base Area 117, Quang Tin Province, continued to reduce this unit's strength despite evidence that the division was being reinforced. Over 750 enemy troops of the NVA NT 2 Division were killed by U.S. Marine, U.S. Army, and ARVN forces. The enemy initiated one successful counter attack in northeast Quang Tin against Thang Binh District Headquarters as a pre-election measure, employing flamethrowers to advantage. In Quang Ngai Province, the enemy executed one successful ground attack which released over 1,000 prisoners from the provincial jail. Throughout the provincial coastal areas, Task Force OREGON continued to reduce enemy forces and neutralize base areas. Detainees, returnees, and documents indicated that elements of the NVA NT 3 Division, the 38th LF Battalion, and associated LF companies had food and ammunition shortages and that morale was at an all time low. At least two battalions of the VC 2nd Regiment, NVA NT 3 Division, were driven out of Quang Ngai into Binh Dinh. Earlier in the month, the VC 1st Regiment, NVA NT 2 Division, had relocated to Quang Tin. Enemy strength in Quang Ngai was reduced to four combat effective battalion equivalents. The enemy has seven combat effective battalion equivalents in Central I CTZ; four in the Tri Thien MR; and 10-16 in the DMZ-Camp Carroll area. Of a total of 52-59 maneuver battalions in I CTZ, the month ended with from 25-31 combat effective equivalents.

(2) (C) II CTZ: In the western highlands of II CTZ, enemy plans to conduct large scale attacks in western Kontum and Pleiku were preempted while he increased activity in Darlac Province. During the first week of August, elements of the NVA 174th Regiment attacked both Dak Pek and Dak Saang SF Camp by fire daily. A 6 August contact west of Dak Saang between the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion and the probable 2nd and possible 1st Battalions, 174th Regiment resulted in 184 enemy killed. This engagement probably disrupted enemy plans to attack Dak Saang in August. Throughout the remainder of the month, there was evidence of enemy surveillance and battlefield preparations, particularly in the Dak To area. There was no significant contact. In the western Pleiku/south-western Kontum area, there were indications that major B-3 Front elements relocated from west of Duc Co to Base Area 702 contiguous to the Plei Trap valley in Cambodia. Probable elements of the NVA 66th Regiment, reinforced with a DKZ-B unit, attacked Le Thanh Fire Support Base on 23 August with an estimated 50 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. This was a probable enemy attempt to gain a significant psychological/propaganda victory prior to the September elections. The enemy continued heavy mining of highway 19 near Duc Co SF Camp, but confined his attention to redeployment and probable battlefield preparations in the Plei Trap valley, Plei Djereng/Plei Mrong area. Enemy activity throughout the remainder of Pleiku Province was characterized by small unit activity and attacks by fire, probably conducted by the 4th Battalion, NVA 95B Regiment, in the northwest and the 5th Battalion in southeast Pleiku Province. The enemy conducted attacks by fire on Plei Mrong, Edap Enang, Phi Nhon Sub Sector Headquarters, and Plei Do Lim SF Camp. In Darlac Province, enemy offensive

CONFIDENTIAL

# CONFIDENTIAL

activity increased. Agent reports, a detainee's statements, and a captured document indicate that the B-3 Front is infiltrating supplies and food through Base Area 238 in North Central Darlac. A 3 August sighting of 200 enemy in western Darlac indicates that the enemy possibly is infiltrating personnel. Increased enemy propaganda and terrorism in Darlac, and a 27 August attack by fire on an ARVN airport near Ban Ma Thuot indicated enemy attempts to disrupt the September elections. Trang Phuc and Buon Blech CIDG Camps received 35-60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire respectively on 30 August, indicating enemy attempts to gain unobstructed access through northern Darlac. In the coastal provinces, enemy harassment and attacks increased sharply, probably reflecting attempts to disrupt the elections. The relocation of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, VC 2nd Regiment, approximately 10 August to the Cay Giap mountain area east of Bong Son, and enemy attacks by fire on the 1st Air Cavalry Division Landing Zones in northeast Binh Dinh indicate NVA NT 3 Division attempts to regain control of the population and area for the coming September rice harvest and to disrupt the elections. The relocation of the VC 2nd Regiment indicates that the NVA NT 3 Division probably will attempt to regain control of northeast Binh Dinh during the coming Delta Monsoon Season. In Phu Yen enemy offensive activity in the Song Cau/Tuy Hoa areas sharply increased. On 9 August, probable elements of the 30th MF Battalion overran an RD Campaign Headquarters south of Tuy Hoa. During the last week in August, enemy sapper elements attempted to destroy two bridges south and southeast of Tuy Hoa. Company and multi-company forces attacked a VN prison west and ARVN forces southwest of the city. Attacks by fire on an RD Campaign Headquarters south of Tuy Hoa, and a company size contact north of the city indicated enemy attempts to disrupt the elections. On 17 August in Khanh Hoa, enemy terrorists destroyed two polling places in Nha Trang; however, other expected enemy activity did not materialize. In the southern provinces of II CTZ, the enemy initiated increasing, but sporadic attacks. On 10 August south of Dalat in Tuyen Duc Province, a VC company attacked a Truong Son Montagnard Training Group. A contact south of Dalat on 27 August and an explosion in a GORDS building on 20 August in the city indicate enemy attempts to disrupt the election. On 11 and 15 August, ARVN forces contacted probable elements of the C-210 LF Company and the 145th MF Battalion west of Di Linh and on highway 20 in southwest Lam Dong Province. In Ninh Thuan, enemy forces sabotaged the POL pipeline near Phan Rang on three separate occasions. In Binh Thuan, enemy attempts to disrupt the elections were characterized by attacks on RD hamlets and ARVN forces north of Phan Thiet on 14 August and a 31 August attack by fire on a sector headquarters in the city.

(3) (C) III CTZ: In August, main force elements conducted one major attack. The 165th Regiment was identified in the attack of Tong La Chen Special Forces Camp. The NVA 141st Regiment, subordinate to the NVA CT 7 Division, probably has returned to northern Tay Ninh province. The NVA 101st Regiment remains in northeast Tay Ninh, in the vicinity of Base Area 353. Relocation of some elements is probable in

# CONFIDENTIAL

the VC CT 9 Division in central III CTZ. From northern Binh Long Province to southern Phuoc Long, the VC 271st, VC 272nd, and VC 273rd Regiments are deployed to provide a security screen for enemy activity in MR 10, or to pose an offensive threat to the Route 13 axis. This division has avoided contact throughout August. The division's current dispositions pose a threat to friendly installations from southern Binh Long north along Route 13 and extends to special forces camps in northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. The VC CT 5 Division remains deployed in Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. The headquarters and support elements are presently in eastern Phuoc Tuy, with the VC 274th Regiment deployed in the western Phuoc Tuy-eastern Bien Hoa area, with some elements in southwestern Long Khanh. In central Long Khanh, the VC 275th Regiment poses a threat to Route 1 and Route 20. Local forces attempted to generate widespread anti-election activity. Their accomplishments were limited largely to conduct of propaganda incidents, interdiction of LOC, and terrorism.

(4) (C) IV CTZ: During August, the VC continued efforts to disrupt the presidential election by interdicting LOC, acts of terrorism, propaganda, and an indiscriminate shelling of Can Tho City. In Dinh Tuong Province, Operation CORONADO II and CUU LONG 64, which terminated on 3 and 4 August respectively, resulted in cumulative enemy losses of 657 KIA and at least 500 detainees. One agent report (C-2) indicates the 263rd MF and 514th LF Battalions are completely disorganized. On 13 August in Kien Phong Province, possible elements of the 502nd LF Battalion attacked the base of the 1/16 ARVN one kilometer northwest of Cao Lanh City. The VC have conducted indiscriminate mining and shelling of the civilian population. On 26 August in Kien Hoa Province, a civilian bus detonated a mine on highway 26, killing 22 civilians. On 27 August in Phong Dinh Province, an unidentified enemy force, possibly elements of the Tay Do Battalion, attacked Can Tho City by fire, killing 46 and wounding 228 civilians.

## 2. (C) SELECTED ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD

a. (U) Strengths and Dispositions. (See MACV Monthly OB Summary dated 31 August 1967).

b. (U) Order of Battle. (See MACV Monthly OB Summary dated 31 August 1967).

d. (C) New Enemy Tactics, Weapons and Equipment.

### (1) Tactics:

(a) Allied air strikes are bringing about changes in enemy tactics. A CMIC source stated that in January 1967 his unit, located in Quang Tri Province, began using bombed and defoliated areas as base emplacements. This tactic was witnessed 14 times by the source and was

# CONFIDENTIAL

successful on each occasion. The unit would wait at least 24 hours if a "small area" (dimensions unknown) had been bombed, before moving into it. The unit waited at least a week before using "large areas" (dimensions unknown), because these areas were more likely to be bombed two or three times. They used bombed areas as "safe areas" because the VC had noticed that reconnaissance aircraft seemed to pay little attention to them. The same reasoning applied to the use of defoliated areas. In the case of a defoliated area, they felt that the area would be untouched for about three months before being sprayed again.

(b) Another CMIC source, who was a member of a unit located in Pleiku Province revealed that the official policy of his company provided for canceling all offensive attacks or actions for a 48-hour period after any kind of an air strike, especially attacks from tactical bombers, or when PAC aircraft were circling overhead in their vicinity. Source remembered four occasions when plans of ambush within Pleiku Province were cancelled because of either an air strike within 8 to 10 kilometers of their position or suspicion of detection by aircraft.

## (2) New Weapons and Equipment:

(a) The V-25 Fuze (140mm Rocket): This fuze has an arming distance of 130 meters and three settings:

1. Superquick Arming. Acceleration causes two spring loaded longitudinal locking detents to set back, unlocking the two firing pin retaining weights. Centrifugal force causes the two firing pin retaining weights to move outward. On termination of acceleration, the primer detonator collar moves forward under spring tension into position, locking the retaining weights in the outward position. Upon impact, the firing pin impinges the primer detonator, causing function of the booster lead-in and, in turn, the booster and the main charge.

2. Delay Arming. Selection of the "short delay"-option turns the cam shaft to block the "superquick" flash channel and open the "short delay" flash channel. Selection of the "long delay" turns the cam shaft to block the "superquick" and "short delay" flash channels. The "long delay" pellets are initiated on all options and function as a back-up for both the "superquick" and "short delay" options, in addition to their primary function of "long delay".

(b) The DKZ-B Fuze (122mm Rocket): The "DKZ-B" is set-back armed. When accelerated, the zig-zag arming sleeve, retarded by a governor, sets back, permitting a locking pin relay. The arming primer flashes through the firing pin relay to ignite an explosive detent, holding the detonator rotor out of alignment. A weight, having set back on initial acceleration, permits the rotor to align. The fuze is then armed. On impact, the nose cup is crushed, and force is transmitted to a distance piece which shears the striker assembly from the governor, allowing it

# CONFIDENTIAL

to impinge the detonator. Dependent on delay selector setting, the applicable delay flasher to the relay detonator detonates the tetryl booster. The DKZ-B fuze is armed as soon as it leaves the launcher tube.

f. (U) Administrative Units. (See MACV Monthly OB Summary dated 31 August 1967).

m. (C) Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, Electronic, or Radiological Warfare. MSG Do Tien Thanh, a detainee from the NVA 174th Regiment, reported that the regiment is equipped with gas masks for defensive use. He stressed that the masks were particularly effective against white phosphorus fumes. Thanh also reported that the NVA 174th Regiment is supported by a chemical platoon, consisting of three chemical squads. The strength of the platoon is 50 personnel.

n. (C) Engineers. Task Force OREGON elements, operating in southern I CTZ, captured four detainees who identified their unit as the 406th Sapper Battalion. Further interrogation revealed that the 406th Battalion was formed in Quang Ngai Province in the vicinity of Son Kon Hamlet about February 1967. It was formed from elements of the NVA 262nd Battalion, which started infiltration from NVN in November 1966. The unit traveled through Laos into RVN where elements of the unit separated and continued on to the Son Kon Hamlet area, Quang Ngai Province, to form the backbone of the newly formed 406th Battalion. The remainder of the battalion was formed by the reassignment of the 30th Company, 409th Sapper Battalion, MR 5, in March 1967. The 406th Battalion is composed of the 30th, 40th, 50th, and 60th Companies. The 40th and 60th Companies are reportedly composed of all new NVA personnel. Weapons and ammunition were issued after infiltration was completed. Communications by the battalion is conducted by messenger.

### 3. (C) OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS

#### a. (U) Enemy Identifications:

(1) Confirmed. (See MACV Monthly OB Summary dated 31 August 1967).

(2) Unconfirmed. (See MACV Monthly OB Summary dated 31 August 1967).

#### d. (C) Personalities Identified:

(1) No new identifications were made in COSVN; MR's 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 10; or 10th Special Region.

(2) Tri-Thien MR:

7  
CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME</u>
Tri-Thien MR	OIC, MR Party Committee	<u>LT GEN Bay</u>
	1st Dep Cmdr	SR COL Kinh
<u>NVA 6th Regt</u>	CO	MAJ Thu
	XO	CPT An
	PO	MAJ Dan
VC 800th Bn	CO	SR CPT De
	XO	CPT Duy
	PO	CPT Tam
VC 802nd Bn	CO	SR CPT Chu
	XO	Kanh
	PO	Dung
NVA 806th Bn	CO	SR CPT Nguyen Van Chu
	XO	1LT Thanh
	PO	CPT The
<u>NVA 5th Regt</u>	NVA 416th Bn	SR CPT Le Van A
		CPT Nguyen Ngoc Quy
		SR CPT Ha Duc Duc
	NVA 814th Bn	CPT Thanh
Ha		
An		
NVA 808th Bn	CPT Van Kien	
	Le Van Hat	
	CPT Le Niem	
NVA 804th Bn	CPT Nhon	
	Phuong	
	CPT Hay	
<u>MR 5</u>		
B-3 Front		
NVA 174th Regt	CO	LTC Dam Van Nguy or Ngui
	XO	MAJ Ly Long Quan

**CONFIDENTIAL**

107th AD Bn	CO XO PO Rear Services Staff Medical	CPT Hoang Tam Thanh CPT Nguyen Uc SR CPT Le Minh Khan Aspirant Tuc LT Dao Chi Aspirant Nguyen Van Son
1st Co	CO XO	SR LT Lai Anh Ton LT Huu or Hiu
2nd Co	CO XO PO	SR LT Nguyen Van Te LT Van SR LT Long
3rd Co	CO XO PO	SR LT Nguyen Dinh Canh LT Vu Van Thuong SR LT Le Phi Thuong

e. (U) Casualties. (See Annex B).

j. (U) Weather. The following table reflects specific data for the month of August from representative CTZ weather stations:

	Danang	Nha Trang	Pleiku	Qui Nhon	Saigon	Binh Thuy	Soc Trang
Mean Daily Maximum Temperature (*F)	94	89	77	93	87	87	85
Normal	93	91	80	94	89	87	87
Mean Daily Minimum Temperature (*F)	79	78	69	81	76	76	76
Normal	77	76	67	79	75	76	76
Number of days with Fog	2	0	30	1	12	2	7
Normal	1	1	27	1	19	1	0
Number of days with Thunderstorms	4	4	2	2	1	2	7
Normal	7	4	6	4	9	8	8
Number of days with Precipitation	10	8	31	9	20	26	28
Normal	12	8	23	6	22	18	19
Total Monthly Rainfall (inches)	<u>8.9</u>	3.1	16.9	<u>1.5</u>	6.2	10.2	16.0
Normal	4.6	2.2	19.3	1.9	10.5	7.6	10.4
Ceiling and Visibility Frequency below 1,500 feet and/or 3 miles (% of Time)	0.6	0.7	70.8*	1.3	4.8	2.6	2.7
Normal	0.7	0.5	49.0*	0	8.0	7.2	5.9

# CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: \* - Frequency of airfield minimum criteria of 1,500 feet and/or 5 miles.

## 4. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. General: Early in 1967, the Viet Cong of Go Mon District of MR 4 announced a new overall strategic policy under the title of the "Three Front Plan". This plan was intended to be a guide for all VC activity in the district for the remainder of the year. The plan covers military activity, deep penetration into Government of Vietnam (GVN) controlled areas, and consolidation of "white" or "liberated" areas.

Military activity is concerned basically with the efforts of the district military units, 2nd Battalion (165A) and 67A Special Action Unit, to fight pitched battles and conduct raids and forays against Allied outposts and GVN centers. Included are plans to attack Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the POL area in lower Go Vap, the Rural Development (RD) teams at Tan Thant Dong Village, Phu Hoa District, Hoc Mon Town District Headquarters, police and village offices, and the Quang Trung Training Center.

The deep penetration phase is by far the most ambitious. This phase covers the establishment of guerrilla forces, increased civilian and military proselyting, espionage and sapper activities in GVN controlled areas. During this phase, village Party representatives (secretaries) are to be sent into the villages to establish or re-establish the Party organization. (Soi, aka Am, was doing this as Political Chief of Vung III, -- an area comprising a number of villages -- when he was arrested in June). Under this phase, espionage agents, particularly bar girls, are to be trained and sent into areas as deep as Saigon. A call has gone out for each cadre to recruit at least two more people to the cause. Other actions such as the blowing up of the Tan Son Nhut fuel line, the railroad line explosion in Gia Dinh, and the attempt to place a bomb outside the 519th BEQ are to be included in this phase, along with VC propaganda activities outlined in the Nhi Binh/Thanh Loc Region.

Consolidation of the "white" or "liberated" areas, the last part of the plan, is concerned with strengthening defenses in the area already under the control of the VC (basically in Trung An and Binh My Villages). The call has gone out for each cell to construct its share of tunnels, bamboo spike pits, and booby traps. Also included in this portion is the political consolidation of "liberated" areas by organizing VC political structures in the villages and hamlets. To this end, Party Chapters have been established down to hamlet level in Trung An Village.

The plan is quite flexible and any one phase can be adapted to the current situation in any particular area. At this time, military activities are confined to Vungs IV and V, basically Trung An, Tan Thanh Dong, Dong Thanh and Nhi Binh. The penetration portion covers Vungs I,

## CONFIDENTIAL

III, and the remainder of Vung IV. The consolidation part is concerned mainly with Trung An and Binh My. The VC were attempting to move into the consolidation phase in Nhi Binh in May 1967 when Allied forces in Operation FAIRFAX moved into the area, forcing the VC to switch to the military phase. This basic strategy influences all VC planning in the district.

### b. Espionage:

(1) Several recent reports from U.S. and RVN intelligence agencies indicate increased use by the VC of female agents as intelligence cadre and proselyting cadre. In addition, there are indications of females being used to target individuals for assassination.

(a) An OSI IR dated 31 July 1967, evaluated F-6, reported that 4 young female VC intelligence agents were infiltrated into Can Tho from "Tronoc", a hamlet near Can Tho, Phong Dinh Province, dressed in the uniforms of female ARVN and National Police personnel. The female agents reportedly were assigned the mission of cultivating the friendship of officers of the RVN Rural Development Program and the ARVN Ranger unit in the Can Tho area with the objective of gaining information on the movement of RVN forces and activities directed against the VC. They were also assigned the mission of spotting targets for assassination in Can Tho and Cai Rang Village, Phong Dinh Province and, allegedly, already have had one woman killed (NFI).

(OSI COMMENT): Numerous recent reports have indicated increased emphasis on penetration of RVN and U.S./FVMAF agencies and installations in the Can Tho area for purposes of espionage, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism. By successful penetration of the RVN forces who provide external security for Binh Thuy Air Base, the VC could secure knowledge of the disposition and strength of RVN units deployed around the base. The spotting of potential targets for assassination would also pose a serious threat to the numerous U.S. personnel billeted in the Can Tho area.

(b) A 4 August 1967 report, information evaluated C-2, from the Saigon, Cholon, Gia Dinh Combined Security Committee concerns an unknown number of trained female VC agents who have been assigned the mission of penetrating GVN and U.S./FVMAF installations in the Saigon area. The females were also instructed to attempt to elicit information from U.S./FVMAF personnel through casual conversation.

(c) It is possible the VC believe females may be allowed more freedom of movement and access in and around RVN and U.S./FVMAF installations than males and therefore may be able to provide more useful information.

## CONFIDENTIAL

c. Sabotage: A USNAVINSERVO report (B-3) describes a method the VC used to smuggle grenades into the Saigon Port area for sabotage and terrorist purposes. The information was obtained from an informant who received the grenades from a VC messenger in the following manner:

(1) On 13 July 1967, the informant was approached by a VC messenger (NFI), and given a cookie can of Chinese origin. At the bottom of the container, separated from the cookies by a paper partition, were two hand grenades of Russian origin.

(2) The informant was given instructions to infiltrate to the Saigon Port area on or before the 20th of July (celebration of the Indo-China Cease Fire) and to place the grenades as follows:

(a) One grenade was to be placed under a CONEX locker. The pin was to be removed and the grenade set with the spoon portion on the ground so that the grenade would be tipped over and detonated by the forklift used to move the CONEX locker.

(b) The second grenade was to be thrown into any port area bar heavily patronized by Americans.

(NIS COMMENT): Infiltration of weapons and explosives into the Saigon area in this manner is not at all uncommon. Detection of these materials is extremely difficult as it would entail searching every vehicle and every person entering the Saigon area.

e. Propaganda and Rumors: USNAVINSERVO, Vietnam and OSI have recently reported unsolicited copies of "The Bond" being received by servicemen in Vietnam.

"The Bond" is a weekly newspaper which began publication in early June 1967, in Berkeley, California. The objective of the group publishing the newspaper reportedly is to organize U.S. servicemen opposed to the war in Vietnam.

The editor makes an appeal for money and material and also warns that the publisher expects legal action, under federal law, to be taken against the publication.

f. Miscellaneous: A USNAVINSERVO report (F-6) concerns information on VC use of U.S. Overseas Mission Hospital in Danang, RVN, to obtain treatment for wounded cadre. This information was obtained from the interrogation of SUM, VO aka SON, a VC cadre captured on 25 May 1967 in Danang.

SUM stated that he was wounded in December 1964, while escaping a U.S. operation in the vicinity of Binh Trung Hamlet, Binh Giang Village, Thong Binh District, Quang Nam Province. Shortly after the completion

# SECRET

of the military operation, he was transported by boat to the Danang City docks. SUM then proceeded by "cyclo" to the U.S. Overseas Mission Hospital in Danang and obtained treatment.

SUM stated this method of obtaining treatment of wounded cadre from the Binh Giang Village area is still in use and furnished the following details:

Wounded VC cadre are transported aboard a boat owned and operated by A, Nguyen (NFI). This boat is approximately 60 feet long and eight feet wide. The center portion of the boat is covered and wounded cadre are concealed under vegetables and other products. The boat usually departs Binh Trung Hamlet at 1800 and arrives at Danang City dock at approximately 0100 the following morning.

(NIS COMMENT): This report is not intended to imply that the USOM Hospital, Danang has furnished treatment to a great number of wounded VC cadre. At the time of SUM's alleged treatment in this hospital, he was 48 years old and because of his age could easily have infiltrated the stream of wounded Vietnamese, who are civilian victims of the war. Most members of the VC infrastructure fall within this age group (40-55). The U.S. has probably unknowingly furnished medical care to several of these individuals over the years.

The VC from this area are reportedly short on medical supplies and personnel, and friendly military operations in the area have forced the VC continually to shift medical facilities and sick and wounded cadre to evade capture or destruction. The VC will probably continue to make use of this means of obtaining medical treatment for wounded cadre, when possible, especially for those in the 40-55 age bracket.

## 5. (S) ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES

### a. Capabilities:

- (1) The enemy can attack at any time selected targets in widely separated areas in SVN in up to multi-battalion strength.
- (2) The enemy can defend from present positions in the DMZ area; elsewhere he can delay on successive positions.
- (3) The enemy can reinforce in SVN by infiltrating additional personnel and units from NVN and by in-country recruitment.
- (4) The enemy can withdraw forces into Cambodia, Laos, and NVN and can evade friendly forces.

# SECRET

## b. Discussion and Analysis:

(1) Attack: The enemy can attack, at any time, selected targets in widely separated areas in SVN in up to multi-battalion strength. He is not likely, however, to favor a course of action which would require him to mass large forces, unless prospects of success were very high. The enemy's doctrine of attack calls for careful selection and preparation of the battle area, followed by attack only when there is a high probability of success. He is quick to seize opportunities to attack small, isolated units. In recent months, the enemy has relied more and more on small-scale ground attacks and stand-off attacks by fire, utilizing mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles.

(2) Defend: The enemy can defend in strength in the DMZ area. Elsewhere he is unable to conduct a sustained defense but is capable of delay on successive positions. Aside from the DMZ area, the enemy is unlikely to consider any single position a base area worth a determined defense.

(3) Reinforce: The enemy can reinforce in SVN by infiltrating a limited number of additional personnel and units from NVN and by limited in-country recruitment. To continue his protracted war of attrition it is essential that he continue the overall reinforcement in SVN to counter-balance the friendly build-up. Because of his lack of tactical mobility, he does not usually reinforce on the battlefield; attack forces are positioned in advance. When required to defend he will fend off and extricate rather than reinforce.

### (4) Withdraw:

(a) Strategically, the enemy's doctrine for insurgency warfare ("peoples' war") encompasses both guerrilla action and action by conventional formations simultaneously. Intensification of guerrilla-type actions, including the use of guerrilla tactics by main force elements, is not in itself an indication that Main Force elements and their control systems are being broken up, that they have ceased to pose a threat, or that the enemy no longer intends to employ these forces when ready. There are no present indications of NVA or VC Main Force strategic withdrawal.

(b) Tactically, whenever the enemy considers it necessary or advantageous to him, he will break contact and withdraw from the immediate area of combat. The enemy has on numerous occasions withdrawn forces across the border into the DMZ and NVN from northern Quang Tri Province in I CTZ, into Cambodia from Pleiku and Kontum Provinces of II CTZ, and from Tay Ninh, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long Provinces in III CTZ. These tactical withdrawals occur when he has been pressed, and for purposes of resupply, refitting, training, and to conserve his own strength.

# SECRET

## c. Relative Probability of Adoption:

(1) Conduct acts of terrorism, sabotage, harassment, and propaganda, with emphasis on the RD Program, and continue interdiction of LOC with the objective of increasing VC control over the population and denying GVN and U.S./FVMAF use of water, rail, and highway LOC.

(2) Conduct attacks by fire against friendly military positions, airfields, and logistics installations.

(3) Withdraw forces into base areas, Cambodia, Laos, or NVN whenever he deems it necessary for retraining, resupply, or rest.

(4) Continue to attempt to increase his strength in SVN by adding new units and replacements through infiltration and in-country recruitment.

(5) Conduct attacks in up to multi-battalion strength against friendly forces and installations, with the exception of IV CTZ, where up to reinforced company size attacks are likely to be carried out.

(6) Defend critical installations with forces locally available.

## d. Vulnerabilities:

(1) Enemy forces are vulnerable to air, artillery, and naval gunfire attack and to vertical envelopment by airmobile forces.

(2) Because of limitations in the enemy's logistical system, those units located geographically in SVN where the sanctuaries of Laos, Cambodia, and NVN can be denied them are vulnerable to sustained friendly operations.

(3) The enemy's logistical system is vulnerable to ground, sea, and air interdiction because of the length of LOC and dependence on the local populace for labor and security.

(4) Enemy main force extensive attack preparation and inflexibility in execution are vulnerable to preemption by spoiling actions.

(5) Enemy base areas and supply caches are sometimes logistically interdependent and are subject to destruction in detail.

(6) The VC are dependent upon the people. Continued pressure on the enemy will increase VC pressure on the people who will become more susceptible to psychological warfare operations.

*Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.*  
PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR. *for*  
Brigadier General, USA  
ACofS, J2

SECRET

**ANNEX A. (C) LARGE SCALE SIGNIFICANT AND LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS**

**1. (C) Large Scale Significant Attacks:**

On 7 August in Binh Long Province, the NVA 165th Regiment placed 4 82mm mortar and 57mm Recoilless rifle rounds on and attacked Tong Le C SF Camp which was manned by four CIDG companies. Twenty CIDG and one LLDB were KIA and four USSF and 66 CIDG were WIA. The enemy suffered 116 KIA and lost the following equipment: three 12.7mm machine guns, five AK-47 rifles, 24 K-50 submachine guns, one U.S. carbine, seven USSR rifles, four M-1 rifles, one 57mm recoilless rifle, one CHICOM radio, 20 anti-tank mines, and 10 satchel charges. This was the first identified contact with this regiment since 14 January 1967, when it was contacted in Phuoc Long Province.

**2. (C) Enemy Initiated Incidents by CTZ during August:**

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Attacks	77	45	43	35	200
Harassment	573	160	338	315	1,386
Terrorism	81	43	54	27	205
Sabotage	22	24	27	61	134
Propaganda	17	56	5	12	90
AA Fire	685	87	173	231	1,176
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,455</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>640</b>	<b>681</b>	<b>3,191</b>

**ANNEX B. (C) ENEMY LOSSES**

**1. Enemy KIA by CTZ during August:**

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	2,725	1,354	938	776	5,793

**2. Chieu Hoi Returnees during August:**

	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>POLITICAL</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	1,401	581	149	2,131

**3. Captured Enemy Weapons during August:**

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
C/S	67	51	43	6	167
IND WPN	773	418	518	276	1,985
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>840</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>561</b>	<b>282</b>	<b>2,152</b>