Box 14 / WAR HIST 68 TET

FILE	SUBJ.
W	HIST
DATE	SUB-CAT.
1/68	68 TET

PREPARATION FOR 1968 TET OFFENSIVE - TRAINING ACTIVITIES

CADRE NOTES ON THE TET 1968 OFFENSIVE MADE PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 1968

22 January 1968

Daily record notebook

Signed
Xuân Sơ

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Cadre about to attend the training course at Thanh Khoát.

Re-organization.

C4 [4th Company]. Send six trainers to the B's [Platoon] that are at full strength. To the B's [Platoons] that are undermanned, send trainees from two B's [Platoons].

Strength : 51 comrades
C [Company] Cadre: 6 comrades
B [Platoon] Cadre: 9 comrades

Reserve:

Thang: Assistant Political Officer, Luong: C [company Executive Officer
Phong: B [Platoon] Leader
Hinh, Ty, Ban, Sanh: Assistant B [Platoon] Leaders.

BI [1st Platoon]
Lâm: B [Platoon] Leader
Hiên Assistant B [Platoon Leader

BII [2d Platoon]

Phong: B [Platoon] Leader
[one word illegible]: Assistant B [Platoon] Leader

A [Squad] Leader: Cao, Xuong, Hông, Hùng

A [Squad] Leaders: Bao, Trương Quây, Nhân.

Four comrades will depart at noon bringing along with them a one day ration of a pressed rice ball.

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Activities.

Enthusiastically make great efforts, endure hardships, and overcome difficulties, so as to successfully carry out our assigned missions.

- Maintain a serious attitude and strictly observe discipline.

- Try to use spare time for training.

- Properly comply with all policies, especially those concerning the newly liberated areas and civilian proselyting. No comrade is allowed to depart from the above policies.

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- Carefully maintain weapons and keep them clean at all times. Heighten one's sense of combat readiness.

- Never be separated from our weapons

- Heighten our vigilance.

- All combat orders must be strictly complied with and those who fail to observe them will be subject to disciplinary measures.

- Promote solidarity among all members of a unit, including newcomers, without discrimination as to rank.

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News on our victories.

North and south of Tây Ninh.

- 1000 enemy soldiers, one artillery D [Battalion], 18 artillery pieces, one mechanized D [Battalion], 85 GMC trucks, 10 aircraft.

+ During five days, from the third to eigth [unspecified month], we killed 133 enemy soldiers, downed three planes, destroyed one vehicle, attacked seven bridges and disseminated many leaflets near posts and camps.

North. The spirit of laborers was high. They made all efforts to transplant rice before Tết.

- Preparations for this year's Tet were made with enthusiasm.

Phong stayed behind.

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24 January 1967.

Activity schedule for the 1968 Tết.
Celebrate Tet from 27th to the afternoon of 28th [poss Jan 1968]. After that all comrades must be in a state of combat readiness. I Significanse of the New Year [Year of the Monkey]. Push the development of the Revolution, strive to gain many great victories and conduct continuous attacks. The enemy has been on the defensive and his defeat is imminent.

+ During the days of Tết, our E [Regiment] and F [Division] will conduct operations to gain great victories by destroying the 3d [US] Airbone Brigade [poss 173d US Abn Bde] as a prelude to the Winter-Spring Campaign in accordance with the resolution of the Central Office.

+ We will greet the advent of Spring, which will witness a historical troop departure, with an uprising to restore the power to the hand of the people. It is the glorious Spring of our people.

- Specific matter: We must defeat the ring-leaders to end the sufferings of our people, to achieve national reunification, which our

fill the pages of world history and achieve international solidarity. It is also the most honorable Spring for cadre and soldiers who are determined to raise high the flag of revolutionary heroes, and promote the tradition of resisting foreign aggressors. This fact reminds us of the events of 200 years ago, when, under the skillful command of hero Nguyen-Huê, 10,000 soldiers drove away 20,000 Chinese Manchu soldiers, liberated Thăng Long capital, and unified the country in the shortest period of time (from the 30th of the 12th month to the 7th of 1st month of the Lunar Calendar). This also happened at the advent to Spring.

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+ With the advent of Tet, the unit is urgently preparing to enter a Spring of determination to fight and to win; thus, it is a reason for continual attacks. We will promote the revolutionary and emulative spirit to achieve merits in order to celebrate the 2d of March and pay honor to uncle Ho.

+ Characteristies: All cadre and soldiers must be cheerful and optimistic. Tet must be celebrated cheaply and simply.

Requirement of leadership: The preparation for Tet must focus on the assimilation of the coming mission, the promotion of the revolutionary spirit, increase of victory, and enthusiastic achievement of merits. All obstacles, to the performance of missions, must be overcome.

+ During the days of Tết, all units will strengthen their determination to fight, so as to ensure that the troops will go to battle with confidence. Motivate the soldiers so that they will readily make sacrifices in order to achieve victory for the Revolution. We will go to battle during Tet with a spirit of trampling the American and puppet troops and of braving all dangers and rigors of war.

We should dash forward to score the victory and to maintain the tradition of our unit and our CT [sic].

+ Ideology.- Pay attention to the newly assigned comrades, we should help them realize that this New Year will be a glorious one. Desertion and reluctant attitudes must be avoided.

+ Always be extremely vigilant and in a state of combat readiness. The guards should be vigilant and pay attention to smoke and fire. All the troops must be ready to move during bivouac (throughout the movement to the objective). Oppose all enemy schemes of propaganda, heighten the sense of discipline, seriously observe the orders of higher echelons and internal regulations and policies.

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+ Properly protect your health. Pay attention to messing.

+ Take into account the following points while performing civilian proselyting tasks:

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+ Promote solidarity among the people during Tet and emulation while gaining victory.

+ Be always vigilant and maintain security together with the troops.

+ Propagandize the significance of victory and achievement of the people in both South and North VN, and the concern of Uncle [Ho] and the Party for the NVN and SVN people.

- Study Uncle Ho's letter, write slogans to motivate the people to increase the production output to do one's part in defeating the American invaders.

* Do not violate the customs of the people (Never criticize them about their ways of eating).

Respect their freedom of creed (such as the cult of ancestors) (join local jubilees).

* Form: Organize entertainments.

* Contents: From the afternoon of the 27th to the afternoon of 28 January (it means on the 28th and 29th days of the Lunar calendar): On the morning of the 27th clean houses, kitchens, mess halls, entertainment and recreational rooms (hang banners with slogans).

- During the afternoon of the 27th, from 1400 to 1600 hours, after season greetings to the Commander of CT [regiment-size unit], (conduct entertainment) instruct unit members to put on full gear and stand ready to go to battle (upon receipt of orders). Assemble the newly recruited soldiers for a talk.

- At night, conduct entertainment, recite Uncle Ho's poems, comment upon the newspapers, reward meritorious comrades, read Nguyen Hue's story and Uncle Ho's speech.

On the morning of 28 [January] hold a meeting, troop the colors, and read the season's greeting letter of Uncle Ho and Military Region addressed to D [Battalion] and E [Regiment] personnel and Unit Commanders on the occasion of the Lunar New Year.

Conduct emulation and various forms of entertainment until noon.

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Put on a neat, clean uniform.

+ So to the people: Visit the local authorities, the families of dead heroes and families with sons active in the Revolution. Repair the dead soldiers' tombs. Enjoy the entertainment.

Slogans

- Four verses of Chairman Ho. We enjoy the Tet celebration happily and should be ready to move.

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- We must be determined to fight and to defeat the American aggressors during the New Year.

- Our troops advance valiantly and will gain the final victory in Spring.

- To depart is to win, to fight is to completely destroy the enemy.

- Annihilate the "Blue dragon" [2d ROKMC Bde], kill the American invaders and destroy the puppet forces to achieve victory in Spring.

- Increase victory, emulate in achieving merits in the beginning of Spring as a season greeting to Uncle Ho and to celebrate the memorial day of the 3d of February.

- For the eternal glory of the country, of the people, of the working class, of the Revolution and of the Party, we are ready to make sacrifices.

Recapitulation of achievements gained in SVN during 1967:

+ Three hundred and sixty - five thousand (365,000) enemy soldiers were killed or captured, including 17,000 US and allied soldiers.

We annihilated 53 D [Battalions], 378C [Companies] and 680 B [Platoons]; downed 3,201 planes, set ablaze 8,500 military vehicles; destroyed 736 artillery pieces, wrecked 200 ships and boats, sabotaged 500 bridges, captured thousands of weapons.

North Viet Nam 27 [sic]

In comparison with the enemy's losses in 1965 (208,500) his losses were one and a half times as great in May 67.

Particularly, the American casualties increased by 9 times (1900)

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In comparison with the enemy losses in 1966 (26,800), his losses increased by one third while the American losses doubled (18,000).

When the US had 400,000 American troops in VN, it lost one fourth killed or wounded. When this figure reached 470,000, it lost one third killed or wounded. The number of enemy casualties increased by 100,000 as compared with that of last year.

3c b [sic] D8 [poss 8th Battalion] 11 machine guns D9 [poss 9th Bn] departed at 14 hours.

A3 [3d squad] Party member Tho A5
A4 [4th squad]

Party Cell

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10 Group members

D7 [poss 7th Battalion] 3 comrades 14

D9 [poss 9th Battalion] 1 5

B [Platoon] Leader Tuân Party member
2 Lam

Cadre Asst. B [Platoon] Leader An B [Platoon] Leader.
Decrease in strength: 1 asst B [Platoon] Leader. Special action unit Former B [Platoon] Leader

BIV [poss 4th Platoon] 16 persons equipped with 3 machineguns
B3 [poss 3rd Platoon] 14 persons equipped with 3 machineguns
B2 [poss 2d Platoon] equipped with 2 12.7 mm heavy machine guns
B1 [poss 1st Platoon] equipped with 2 12.7 mm heavy machine guns

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Elements of BII + IV [poss 2d and 4th Platoons]. Advantages [Our troop are] enthused [about the imminent] attack on the enemy.

- [Our main target is US troops. Make preparation and protect health; the enemy is demoralized, he has to replace his troops. The People support us. The troop's spirit of attacking the enemy is high. (Reinforcements from North VN are expected.)

- Terrain features: lowland; weather: appropriate.

Disadvantages:

- Must fight independently is accompanying D [Battalion].

US, puppet and South Korean troops have replenished their forces and increased air strike and artillery fire. The majority of the people are merchants (secrecy is kept properly).

Requirements.

- Implement the four great policies.

- Observe discipline well. Be in a state of combat readiness during movement and fight the enemy whenever we meet him.

- The movement must be brief and quick.

- There should be a specific combat plan. Fortifications should be camouflaged.

Duties:

- CT [regiment size unit] moves first to serve as a spring-board for the implementation of important missions.

- Attack and pin down the enemy.

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- Fight independently.

- Main targets are the Blue Dragon [2d ROKMC Bde] as well as the U.S and puppet troops.

In brief; D [Battalion] should move in the planned direction.

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Additional awards:

Determined town heroes	Bao Hieu - Quay Pho, Bao-Thang - Quyen.
Certificate of	Truong-Ben-Nham-
Commendation	Hinh-Quay-Pho
Letter of Appreciation	Nhan - Tan - Ngoan Cang - Dinh-Bao-Hien.

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Number of outgoing personnel.

B1 [poss 1st Platoon]	Ban	16
B3 [poss 3rd Platoon]	Tuan	11
B5 [poss 5th Platoon]	Cu	4

C [Company] Headquarters

A [Squad] Leader : Tran - My - Lam Ban - Chieu - Xuan

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Went to D9 [poss 9th Battalion]: 2C [Company] cadre and one Party Committee member and two group members.

BII [2d Platoon]: Three B [Platoon] cadre including party member in charge of a party cell B4 [poss 4th Platoon]: Two B [Platoon] cadre who are both party members - one A [Squad] Leader (Party Members): three party members. Comrade Tho went to A [poss. North VN theater of operations].

B3 [3d Platoon] equipped with two 12.7 mm heavy machineguns and 1,000 rounds, four AK [assault rifles], three CKC. B4 [4th Platoon] equipped with two machineguns and 1,000 rounds, two AK [assault rifles] and one garand rifle. [From the beginning of page 13 to this point has been crossed out in the original text.]

30 personnel, including 18 soldiers, 14 A[Squad] cadre, 5 B[Platoon] cadre, 2 C[Company] cadre, departed on 27 January 1968

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/ 22 Group members, 4 party members /

Total Unit strength: 98

On mission. Attend the training course conducted by E [Regiment] Attend the training course conducted by F [Division]

1 Comrade 4 Comrades 1 Comrade

6 Comrades

Combat Personnel

Remained in unit: 92 comrades including: six C [Company] cadre + 16 B [Platoon] cadre + 28 A [Squad] cadre + 32 soldiers + 10 service personnel.

Reserve: 2 [poss C [Co] cadre + 6 [poss B [Platoon] cadre]
(92 - 8 = 84) Sick = 4 = 8 [sic]

20 Party members 3 Party committee members
56 Group members

Party Cell members:

Lam + Hoa + Tuan + Ba

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27 Jan 68

Personnel in Unit transferred to other unit or remained

Line Number	Strength	Transferred to other units					Remained			in unit			Remarks				
		Party	[member]	Group [member]	Civilian	C [Co] HQ	Party	[member]	Group [member]	Civilian	C [Co]	HQ	Party [member]	Group [member]	Civilian	Soldier C/[Co] HQ	
C/[Co] HQ							2				C						
B1								1	1		b						
B2	23	1		19	3	5b		1	1	1	b						
B3	14																C [Co] HQ: 6
B4	16																
	11	2		8	1	2											Remained: 1A [Sqd] 6

A [Sqd] Ldr Tho - 5d [sic] (Oanh's Gun Crew remained)

Trien 4d [sic]

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Resolution of Công Trường [Regiment size Unit]

I. Evaluation of enemy activities during the recent Winter Campaign.

- Nông Trường [Division size unit] completed missions successfully during the Winter Campaign. It defeated two enemy [FWMAF/RVNAF] brigades of which one combined brigade was annihilated. This is an unmatched success.

Significance.- Nông Trường [Division size unit] displayed a high determination to defeat the enemy. We inflicted losses on two brigades in a short period of time. Presently, with such determined spirit, we [VC] shall accomplish mission T25 [sic] successfully.

- We maintained the initiative from the beginning to the end of the campaign including the preparatory period. This could not have been done in any similar situation. We implemented the four split and one destroy [sic] tactics.

We initiated many methods of shooting at airplanes, ambushing and attacking tanks.

Experiences. + Fully understanding the tactic

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and strategy of higher echelons. We must promote determination to fight the enemy in the coming days.

- We must be determined to know our [51st Regiment] target.

- The more we attack the enemy, the higher our determination to defeat him. We will never feel tired and our enthusiasm will never die out even when the battles have come to a stop.

- Destroy enemy war facilities (made of iron and steel).

- To avoid heavy casualties, we should attack the enemy closely and avoid areas where we know he is strong.

(II To properly implement the plan of coordinated action, the orders from higher echelons must be strictly observed.)

(III) Attack continuously and use a small force against a large one, a medium size unit against a large size unit and a large size unit against a large size unit.

+ Weak points: - Bad attitude.

The Commander did not know the friendly and enemy situation accurately.

Orders were not strictly obeyed.

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+ The sense of discipline was poor

Reports were not made accurately and promptly.

We failed to take advantage of the opportunity to kill the enemy.

+ After winning a battle, we often became overconfident.

+ We could not achieve missions because of our bad attitude.

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II Actual mission:

The mission assigned by higher echelon is to substantially destroy personnel and war facilities of E51 [poss 51st RVNAF Regt, Quang Da Special Zone] and 7th Marine Regt [of 1st USMC Div] to create favorable conditions for the development of local movements.

Reasons: - E51 has oppressed the people's armed and political movements in its bivouac site.

- The 7th Marine Regiment has defended towns and suppressed the uprisings of the people.

* The Blue Dragon Brigade [2d ROKMC Brigade] is threatening the people.

We must destroy from one to two Battalions of the Marine Regiment and their war facilities, contain the 3d Air Cav Bde [of 1st US Air Cav Div] and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, annihilate from one to two Battalions of E51 and one or two Armored Companies.

* We must directly support the movement of the people to restore the the administration to the people. Therefore, we will attack the enemy [RVNAF] in various areas except areas under RVN administrative control.

- We must prepare to expand in the direction of "H", "a", and "x" [sic] and to move on orders from higher echelons and we must complete the mission of the main forces.

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- We must fight continuously and relentlessly for an extended period of time, and strengthen our forces. The more we fight, the higher our prestige becomes.

+ Characteristics: This phase of activity aims at achieving the revolutionary objective to restore the entire administration to the people. We must attack continuously for a long period of time until ordered by the Party to do otherwise.

+ This phase aims at defeating the enemy militarily, developing the political struggle and carrying out the General Offensive and General Uprising designed to restore the power to the hands of the people.

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+ Military actions in this phase play a decisive role in the implementation of the politically pressing missions. More than ever, military and political missions must be closely associated. Keeping this in mind, our armed forces will defeat the enemy and the heaviest blow will be dealt by Region 5. Therefore, military actions will continue while negotiating. There is an element in charge of negotiation.

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+ RVNAF and Ranger troops constitute the principle targets, however US troops are important targets.

+ We must attack the right targets, at the right time, in the right place. We should strictly obey orders from higher echelons, implement the Party's policy and conduct a two-front attack.

+ Considering its utmost urgency and decisive nature, this phase of activity is the last battle designed to restore the power to the people in spite of desperate efforts of the enemy to defend his dilapidated castle.

Advantages.- Our Nông Trường [Division] and Công Trường [Regt] have good tradition and are known as steel NT and CT of Military Region [5]. Our CT has casued many losses to the enemy.

Regarding the present historic mission, Nông Trường [Division size unit] has completed its mission in a highly commendable manner.

- The enemy has suffered successive defeats, their aggressive will has been shaken and they have been put on the defensive.

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- There exists unity between the Army and the people, and between armed forces. Therefore, prestige is increasing.

- The situation in our area is favorable for the (restoration of power to the people).

- All units have been strengthened. The morale of soldiers has been hightened. Soldiers gained many experiences from training courses.

- The direct leadership was from higher echelons and the large reinforcements from the Rear.

Difficulties: + The Mission is urgent and important. All personnel do not fully understand Mission T25 [sic].

+ The area of operations is complex and has many targets.

+ Personnel fail to accurately estimate the enemy strength and to realize the stubbornness of puppet South Korean troops. Fear of enemy air and artillery strikes still prevails.

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+ Overconfidence, self-complacency and fear of sacrifice and hardships have been noted. The sense of discipline is poor. Personnel lack mutual confidence.

+ There are many personnel and supply problems.

+ The sense of organization and discipline is poor. Leadership is lax.

+ The leadership is dispersed and time is urgent.

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It is requested that leaders of all echelons promote the sense of responsibility of Công Trường [Regiment], the determination of Party Headquarters and unity in order to overcome difficulties and accomplish missions successfully.

1.- Training mission:

Thoroughly understand the situation and mission T25 [sic] and make the troops realize the emergency of the situation and the determination to fight to the last battle.

- Determine the mission of armed units. Only by attacking can we restore the administration to our people forever.

- Inform personnel that the coming urgent and complicated mission is to attack and negotiate at the same time.

- Strengthen convictions and develop confidence and a voluntary spirit.

- Always receive difficult tasks without hesitation.

2.- Ideological leadership:

All ideological problems must be solved promptly. Cadre's and Party members' thoughts should be frequently checked and motivated. Personnel must be determined to fight the enemy without thinking of individual interests. Oppose hesitation and a shirking attitude. Observe the five do's and five don'ts principle and foster deep hatred of the enemy.

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3* Implementation of policy

- Properly implement the policy applicable to newly liberated areas. Lives and property of people should be protected.

Propagandize and explain to the people the discipline towards the civilian population.

- Law and civil rights should be respected in the newly liberated areas [VC].

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- The prisoners policy and enemy proselyting policy should be well understood to properly handle prisoners; especially enemy officers.

- Our weapons, equipment and captured weapons should be properly maintained.

- Policy for the wounded and war dead in newly liberated areas should be properly implemented. The punishment and reward policy should be properly carried out. The more we gain victory, the higher our sense of discipline is displayed.

4* Organizations:

Organizations must be closely linked. Strengthen and improve the people's organizations. Clearly specify activity patterns.

- Train sufficient command cadre for assignment to various positions.

- Permanently keep abreast of the combat situation, draw experience from past activities, praise accountability and develop the political task of the command echelon.

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- Constantly develop the Party and Group and strengthen the Party leadership.

- Enhance the prestige of various forces (organizations and local agencies).

- Step up the continuous emulation movement and realize the new year wishes of Chairman Ho.

- Encourage youths to join the liberation forces.

5. Combat tactics and techniques.

Assimilate the idea of continuously and boldly attacking the enemy. Attack the enemy with firm determination and decisiveness.

- Attack and annihilate the enemy and attack him from close quarters. Develop the "three strong's" tactic [attack strongly, assault strongly and pursue strongly].

- Know the strength of the unit and be ready to go to war in accordance with the political requirements.

- In each battle, Party Committee echelon should anticipate what will happen and take appropriate actions.

- Combat plans should be well carried out and improved accordingly.

- The target should be considered as the main point.

- The governement is created by the people and troops so the

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be developed among the masses. Strengthen convictions and take the initiative in attacking the enemy. Perform mission T25 [sic] in coordination with local authorities. Criteria of E [Regiment] in the activity phase: Destroy: Two or three D's [Battalions] and two or three [crossed out in original text] C [Companies] of US and Puppet forces.

- 15 to 20 mechanized vehicles (completely destroy one armored company).

- Down 10 to 15 aircraft (3 jets and 3 AD6's).

Destroy:
Four to six artillery pieces.

Capture:
100 weapons of various types.

Capture: Six US soldiers, three Korean soldiers and 60 puppet soldiers.

- Machinegun 2 to 3 = 12 to 8 [sic]
  4 to 5 = 16 to 20 [sic]
  28 - 38 [sic]

Tuan Lam: 26 to 30 [sic]
1 to 2 vehicles

Departed at 1600 hours, after dinner, bringing along hammocks, tents, nylon sheets and bandages.

Two thirds of Dien Ban was seized - 80 soldiers
Que Son - Da Nang: Downed 18 aircraft [poss]

- Hue Quang Tri - Thua Thie were liberated and controlled by our forces.

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1 January 1968.

Fully understand "mission T25" [sic]

Mission:

Be aware that the unit is on the move and never bivouacs in one place for a long time.

- Equipment must be light and compact. The sense of organization is not high. Mission T25 has not been well understood. Be aware of the present task of Nông Trường [Division size unit].

- All cadre should understand Mission T25 and strengthen their determination to perform it.

- Promote unity and discuss it in a democratic manner.

- Implement the civilian proselyting task, maintain security, engage in trade, build combat trenches and shelters.

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- Administration of weapons, equipment and installations

Casualties on 31 January 1968

B1 - 2 Killed in action:
- Kha
- Thieu

Wounded in action
- Dao
- Quyen
- Ky
- Chanh

B2 + 4 = 28 [sic]

b1 + 3 = 34 [sic]

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- On the night of 31 January, the army and the people of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Hue provinces attacked Pho Trach District, Tri Phu sub-sector and many US and puppet positions. The people in Hue town and rural areas continued to march in demonstration, punished the tyrants, encircled and attacked the enemy and controlled many sections of towns, villages and roads. On the night of 31 January 1968, the people and our troops attacked Lam Dong Province.

On 1 February 1968, at noon, our people and our troops strongly attacked and controlled Da Lat town.

During that time our forces in Binh Thuan, Yen Thuan Province, Phan-Thiet, Phan Rang towns also strongly attacked the enemy.

At 0200 hrs on 31 January, the people's armed forces and people in Ca Mau Province were divided into many elements to penetrate deeply into enemy administrative and military areas and attack the Police Office, the Sector, the Military Training School, the Command post of the 32d Regiment subordinate to the 21st Division and the airfield in Ca Man town. We caused heavy damage to the enemy. The people in village, town and rural areas made demonstrations and our forces controlled these towns.

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On 31 January at 0200 hrs the Liberation forces in Thu Dau Mot Province simultaneously attacked the bases, agencies and post of the US and puppet government.

In Lai Khe, our forces shelled the airfield, parking lot, artillery position and Headquarters of US units which resulted in the destruction of an artillery ammunition depot, a P.O.L depot and in the death of many U.S aggressors.

- In Ben Cat town, after a 40 minute fire fight, the Liberation forces succeeded in controlling the town and leveling the base of the 8th Regiment, subordinated to the 5th Puppet [ARVN] Division, to the ground. They burned two armored vehicles and occupied the enemy administrative areas. Many enemy soldiers returned to our people.

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The Province unit headquarters appealed to the people to join the general offensive to destroy the US and puppet forces.

According to the Liberation Press, on 31 January 1968 the SVN Revolutionary patriotic Association contributed its part to the General Offensive intended to overthrow the puppet government and to gain independence for the people.

The general attack against the Thieu-Ky clique has already occurred. Our revolutionary forces have strongly attacked the enemy.

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We are determined to overthrow the Thieu-Ky traitorous government and annihilate those who have savagely tortured the people. Our main objective is to achieve independence, peace, democracy and happiness for the people. Furthermore, we have emphasized the building of a government of the people and for the people. In order to achieve these objectives, it is requested that the people support the armed forces so that they can accomplish their missions and pursue the U.S and Puppet troops. We pledge to exert all efforts to gain victory for the fatherland. After that the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front warmly hailed the successes of the Southern people and the army.

On 1 February 1968, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, in a special meeting, hailed the patriotic people and personnel of the puppet authorities who had profited from the recent successes to dash forward. The Presidum also appealed to the Northern people to stand ready to frustrate the US's plan of escalating the war and to improve the production mission.

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5 February 1968.

Concerning the general situation, since 31 January, we have successfully controlled thirty cities and over thirty towns including Hue and Saigon city. Liberation Coalition Front was established in these cities.

- The Puppet authoritieshave been facing a lot of riots.

* At present we have to attack five key bases defended by 750 enemy troops. Our E [poss Regiment] is stationed in the area where there are villages and clearings and the enemy usually conducts night patrols. Its mission is to support the urgent political movement. Mission T25 should start from here. Requirement: We must conduct successive attacks, and use many combat tactics such as coordination of armed activities with enemy and troop proselyting. Difficulties. The Heroic spirit of making sacrifice was not high due to a lack of proper ideological indoctrination.

D9 [poss 9th Battalion] at first planned to destroy tyrants. Technical skill was not improved. Mission T25 was not understood by the majority of troops. In addition various units did not enthusiastically implement their missions.

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Subjects of indoctrination:

All men must be indoctrinated on the spirit of making sacrifices for the country. In addition we have to infuse them with the heroic spirit of Điện Biên Phủ combatants as exemplified by comrades Phạm Đình-Giot and Bế Văn Đan.

- All men must strengthen their confidence in the Party and fully understand "Mission T25". They must be instructed to use ammunition sparingly and properly implement policies using self-determination.

Confirmation:

We have many advantages and disadvantages in the performance of important tasks. Fear of enemy fire still exists. We should strengthen the concept of searching for the US and Puppet troops to annihilate them and properly assess the enemy and friendly situation.

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We should determine the position of the Party Chapter and cadre and Party members.

We should have such factors as courage, sagacity, initiative and energy to accomplish coming missions in the critical situation.

- On 31 January, we occupied over 33 cities and 31 towns, 32 provinces in the South and 53 Key installations of the US and Puppet troops. We attacked 24 airfields including Vĩnh Long, Chu Lai and Đà Nẵng Airfields and destroyed from 60 to 300 enemy troops. We also attacked 130 units of the US and Puppet authorities, occupied five radio stations and destroyed two mechanized E's [Regiments] and six D's [Battalions] of the US and Puppet authorities. Especially in Sóc Trăng, enemy soldiers of E33 [33d Regiment] and D3 [3d Battalion] rose up and rallied to the people's ranks with weapons.

----------END OF TRANSLATION----------

NOTES ON THE ATTACK ON SAIGON MADE FOLLOWING TET OFFENSIVE

(DOI: March 21, 1968)

Brother Tu's [Comments]

- The Directives were issued by Tu [Central Executive Committee of NVN Lao Dong Party] and T4 [poss Saigon - Gia Dinh Region].

- Sub - Regions 2 and 3 were informed of the time and date for action. Tu [Central Executive Committee of NVN Lao Dong Party] issued the order [of attack] in a very urgent manner. A number of units (Security, Troop Proselyting and Military Units) either received the order in time or late, or did not receive it at all.

The attack was conducted in a decisive manner, with determination and bravery. However, the maneuvering of troops was not as successful as planned.

Sg [Saigon] had a number of objectives to be attacked and seized. Except for the General Directorate [of National Police], the Capital Military District Headquarters, and the Chí Hoà Jail for which [VC troops] failed to meet the requirements, they attacked Chi Hoa and Phu Tho Hoà, destroying 3C [companies] of US and puppet troops, and attacked [the enemy around] An Quang Pagoda. The D [battalions] belonging to Sub-Region 3 did not receive the order [of attack] in time.

In the 7th Precinct, there were 3 US C's [Companies] and 4 C's [Companies] of [police] field force.

Five (5) of our units fulfilled the prescribed criteria. They launched a penetration attack into the [RVNAF] Joint General Staff, held the School [poss. the Armed Forces English Language School] for two and one half days and destroyed 2 US C's [Companies] and 600 puppet troops. The Independence Palace:

The Independence Palace: After opening the gate, [we] realized that the enemy had taken precautionary measures [we] then coordinated with the fifth columnists to completely annihilate the Security and Guard Company, capture the Colonel [Commanding] the Secutity and Guard Force, and hold [the ground] for two and one half days.

The American Embassy: [The attack] was planned by the agency [sic]. [Friendly forces] penetrated into it by opening two breaches and killed 200 Americans. The attack on the US Embassy was a surprise. Even now, the enemy still suspects that there had to be some traitor from among the personnel of the Embassy.

The Radio Broadcasting Station: Friendly forces succeeded in occupying it and killed a number of enemy soldiers. They held

the [Radio-Broadcasting Station] until 9 o'clock the following morning. They succeeded in siezing the recording tape but were not able to use it.

The [RVNAF] Navy Headquarters.

The Security and Guard units are always on the alert to provide protection [for the Navy Headquarters] with semi-automatic rifles and machine guns.

- The second phase commenced on 17 February [1968]. The main activities were to deliver Artillery shellings to destroy a substantial part of the enemy potential. Artillery sheelings were delivered into the General Directorate [of National Police] and the [Directorate of] Capital [National Police], killing 60 [policemen]. After attacking the [RVNAF] Joint General Staff, [friendly troops] moved to the Capital Military District [Hqs] and shelled the area where there were many staff officers, documents and facilities. At the Race Track [friendly troops] killed many enemy combat support troops. The Phú Lâm Radar Station was paralyzed for two days, where [VC] friendly forces annihilated one enemy C [Company]. Phú Lợi D [VC Battalion] countered and enemy sweep operation, killing 500 enemy soldiers.

Friendly D's [Battalions] held the ground and expanded their [occupied] areas.

[Enemy] tanks were not very effective; [enemy] infantry troops were very poor.

[The enemy] was effective in launching counter attacks by using helicopter and strafing [lit sniping] from the air.

Our troops entered X12 [sic] and exerted a very great political effect. We let the enemy run away, but annihilated anti-revolutionary elements. Yet we were able to arm only a very small number of people.

Regarding the attack [General Offensive] on Sg [poss Saigon] in general, [The participating units] failed to meet the prescribed requirements, however they did succeed in occupying their assigned objectives for a short period of time.

Coordination: At Tân Sơn Nhất, the Western element consisting of units of Sub-Region 2 killed and destroyed many [troops], attacking the airfield from 2 sides. When the time to attack came they concentrated their troops on two-thirds of the airfield.

After attacking [Tân Sơn Nhất], they attacked the [RVNAF] Joint General Staff.

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[Points to be considered]
- The position of attack
- Support provided for the attack
- Objectives to be attacked.

We must instigate spontaneous [uprisings], making great leaps forward in order to create favorable conditions for the next phase.

Weak points:

- We could not, as yet, destroy the main element.
- We could not see the materialization of our second goal: A coalition government.

- Coordination was loose; and so we could not make the most of our strength in attacking and annihilating the enemy.

- Few people joined the [general] uprising. So it did not meet the requirements of the situation. The basic themes used for inciting the people to revolt contained many questionable points.

- Troop proselyting activities could not keep pace [with the requirements].

- Leadership and guidance were not provided in a correct manner, even in the beginning.

- The task of providing ideological guidance was not carried out properly. In some fields, we underestimated the enemy. In general, we overestimated him. This affected the morale [of the troops].

- The entire rear service did not provide timely support to combat troops. There was a shortage of cadre in some fields of activity.

- Areas of operation were not reconnoitered and studied by commanding cadre. As a result, they were isolated by the enemy. This adversely affected the troops who were trying to secure victories and take advantage of those victories: It is mandatory for us to overcome these shortcomings in the future.

SG [poss Saigon] area:

In 2 precincts, we launched attacks on enemy nerve centers, dealing staggering blows to the enemy. We intended to seize and occupy them or encircle them. But the enemy succeeded in blocking us and driving us out of the city. He tried to stabilize the situation, resorting to psychological warfare; but he could not cover up his defeats.

The people were deeply resentful and expected us to attack the

enemy continuously. The enemy was afraid of being attacked by us and his morale was shaken at the beginning.

In the areas bordering the Capital, our forces incessantly attacked the reaction forces of the enemy. His forces drew back and were fearful of the pressure exerted by our forces. Puppet mobile main force [units] set up defenses against us.

Our rear did not yet have the capability to mount large-scale attacks. [GVN] Special Forces troops used leap-frog tactics in an attempt to harass us.

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Requirements:

Military: In the city's core area, we must endeavor to maintain incessant firing, thus preventing the enemy from bringing the situation under control and restoring city activities to normal. We must harass the enemy constantly, deliver artillery shellings, and prepare our troops to fight the enemy continuously.

- We must muster all our armed forces (special action units, local troops, armed forces of various branches), all cadre and all material resources to make preparations for the forthcoming phase.

- Our forces which stay outside must be determined to hold the [city] border areas and fight back the enemy's counter-attacking forces. Additional new forces must be developed for the General Uprising and intensive preparations must be made to meet the requirements of the forthcoming action. The forces outside will provide replacement personnel and reinforce "front line" forces.

Political: We must quickly muster and arm our forces. We must consolidate and develop them if they are disorganized. We must re-deploy them in order to meet the requirements of the forthcoming offensive. Leadership and guidance must be provided to draw on the participation of the people. It is necessary to prepare the people's thinking with a view to inciting them to armed uprising, to kill the enemy and to establish our administration. The theme of armed uprising must be inculcated upon the people.

It is necessary to consolidate the organization and leadership systems of various Party Committee echelons, to use armed forces to destroy a substantial part of the enemy potential and, if possible, to occupy [areas], thus creating favorable conditions for the [general] uprising.

Politically, we must wipe out the entire enemy administration system and disrupt his oppressive control over the population.

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Troop Proselyting: In fostering the General Uprising , we must make sure that it will involve the entire population in three areas [mountains, lowlands and towns]. The organization of leadership [in the past phase] was loose. As a result, cadre encountered difficulties.

Ideological task: Cadre must thoroughly understand the concept of attacking [the enemy] continuously; they must thoroughly understand the attack in phase 1 and make preparations for the following phases.

The combat requirements will be greater in order to establish a firmer position for the attack. The requirements for the following phase will be greater and the determination of cadre higher.

2d Precinct= Tam, Ba Quoc, Hai Thanh, Tam Son
4th " = Hai, four tasks of Hai Tien, Bay Tram.
7th " = Ba Tam, Sau Quang, [and] three new comrades.
8th " = Hai Thanh Son, Tu Chau

4th Precinct: Three main areas.

The area covering the Cau Ong Lanh bridge, Calmette Street and the Swing-bridge was assigned to Hai Phong.

The warehouse area [poss in the Commercial Post] was assigned to Tam Ha.

The administrative area was assigned to Nam Tan.

Comrade Hai was responsible for the Administration.
Comrade Chin Hai was in charge of propaganda.

2 Chien Thang [2 victories] [one word illegible] [sic]

- Cay Bang Party Chapter; Cadre in charge: Hai Yen

  In case there were no [guerrilla], the Ly Nhon [Party Chapter] would provide them.

- Ly Nhon Party Chapter: Cadre in charge: Chin Hai.

The writing of reports on the roleplayed by hamlets should be approved by Party Committee echelons.

The Cay Bang Party Chapter remained intact. Nine additional members (draft-dodgers, youths) were recruited.

The signal Platoon: 1 member missing; 2 members went to Loc Ninh; 4 members remained. Comrade Ba Quoc attacked 6 police agents and 2 police vehicles.

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Armed reconnaissance element: 2 members were killed; 1 member was wounded; a few members remained; while Nam Tu Du [?] was sick.

4th Precinct: Hai Y, Hai Truong, and four women cadre. At the Xóm Chiếu Market, the 4th Precinct Police Station was reinforced with US troops and one battalion of police. Another battalion stayed at the rear. This battalion had just left the [Police] School where it had attended the IE Police Training Course.

Eight tanks were positioned on Tôn Thất Thuyết Street. US troops advanced on Trịnh Minh Thế Street They positioned themselves in alleys. Four of them took up positions in houses.

They laid barbed wire across the street; grouped themselves and waited. Some of them took their weapons, occupied high positions and waited in ambush.

- Our force was less than one C [company], with 4 sappers.

We counter-attacked [the enemy] from the 4th Precinct to Cholon and broke the enemy's oppressive control. We sould make the people have firmer and firmer confidence in the Revolution.

- We opposed the enemy's oppressive control, and broken the enemy's defense. Everywhere we went, we [incited the people] to boycott the enemy.

- We should maintain the spirit of the people.

8th Precinct:

- Ba Van of the Sub-Region Propaganda and Training Section, acted as Deputy Secretary.

- Tu An, having a number of forces, assigned 4 youths.

- Hai Thanh Són stayed outside the Police Station of the 8th Precinct.

- Hai Thiên.

- Bay looked for the [unspecified] house on Pham The Hiên street.

- Hai Thiên was reportedly arrested by the enemy, but succeeded in escaping.

- Bay Ôm did not know that the block on which he lived was on fire. He might have been arrested or have run somewhere else.

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2d Precinct

1/ 30 puppet troops [stationed in the Capital]
70 American and satellite troops

2/ The people set up defenses [?]

3/ The number of people of the laboring-class was small.

1. Repression:

-Attacked and occupied [possibly the RVN agencies in the 2d precinct]
-Released prisoners [?]

2. Management of political affairs:

-Formed proselyting sections to strengthen the people's ideology
-Announced regulations
-Conducted reconnaissance activities for military movement
-Organized men to guard public places and offices and maintained an orderly flow of traffic.

3. Internal security:

-Always carried out inspections.
-Properly managed internal affairs
-Encouraged various cadre men and troops to strengthen their spirit of enduring difficulties and hardships, and a spirit of sacrifice, and not to desert the units or be affected by the enemy "Chiêu Hôi" [Open-Arms] activities.
-Complied strictly with the regulations for compartmentalizations for secrecy and security maintenance.
-Effectively protected friendly [VC] agencies and storage facilities and also stayed close to the enemy.

4. Strengthening our forces:

-Developed specialized branches and assigned duties to them for action.
-Security agents were the principal force
-The personnel strength of the security section was inadequate
-Each leadership committee included one Party Committee Member

The armed reconnaissance unit of the sensitive zone included one leader and 4 A's [squads]. Two of these 4 squads were sent to operate in the city [Saigon].

The "political" reconnaissance unit was composed of 5 cadremen: 1 city penetration cadreman, 1 correspondence cadreman, 2 "legal" [to the GVN] commo-liaison personnel and comrade Tam Son (he was to be

- Hai Thanh Son had a number of agents.

The Catholic priests of Binh An quarter where [Father] Hoang Quynh resided, said that when the VC arrived, they set up fences and armed [the people in their parish] with knives and spears to resist the VC.

The enemy deployed his troops as follows:

+ 1 US D [battalion] at the garbage dump.

+ 1 Marine D [bn], 1 Ranger D [bn] and police elements positioned on both sides and ends of the streets.

- One of the three agents at bf [sic] was admitted to the Party.

- There were more than 30 people who sympathized with us and joined the uprising.

- 3 persons should be trained to become Party members.
- Characteristics and requirements to be met for coping with the enemy situation.

Internal security:

- Emphasis should be placed on the mission of heightening vigilance against the enemy when entering the capital.
- Safety should be ensured, and cadre should be incorruptible.
- Strictly observe the regulations for the entering of cities.

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7th Precinct

- Binh Tây [area] was formerly part of the 7th Precinct and but now belongs to the 5th Precinct:

On the night of 1 [February], we captured one policeman at Cây Cham [?] and attacked the police station at the "3-kilometer stone" in the 7th Precinct. This station was manned by several score of recently recruited policemen.

The Vi-Quang post was defended by approximately one company, but we were not able to overrun it.

We captured 2 Americans, 1 Australian and 2 Vietnamese laborers working in Tân Son Nhat Airbase.

The working people in Binh Tây were organized to arrest the cruel administrative personnel of the puppet government and security agents. However, they succeeded in running away and escaping. The masses also evacuated the area, therefore only 20 persons were left to be gathered for the meeting.

On the following day, we arrested and then released 2 enemy personnel. In addition, many suspected elements were detained but no cadre carried out an investigation or the necessary formalities.

At Binh Tiên area, our cadremen arrested many puppet troops and several score NCO's. They were carried off, and the wicked tyrants were killed on the spot (3).

The total of tyrants killed as of 20 February was 40. Ba Son was wounded in action.

Only one [VC] squad was operating in the areas of Hang Thai, Binh-Dông and Cây Sung. Comrades Tu My, Tu Chánh and also Tu Ngai took charge of the Self-Defense Unit and its subordinate elements.

An element was sent from Cau Sap to the rear of the last block of Ben-Da quarter for operation.