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7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Alvin W. Lotz</i> ALVIN W. LOTZ, LTC; USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:  
(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 30 May 1970, and concerns a report, dated 4 December 1968, which pertains to the situation of Z ((possibly Vietnam-Cambodia border area)) during late 1968. Document makes reference to an after-action report, dated 28 November ((possibly 1968)), which mentioned the capture of a US pilot and his escort to a hospital in Phnom Penh by an A ((Cambodian)) unit.

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(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 30 May 1970 in Cambodia (XT013898; Kompong Cham Province) by B/1/27th Inf, 3/25th US Inf Div. The document was received at CDEC on 1 June 1970, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 34,405, dated 3 June 1970, under CDEC Document Log Number 06-1214-70. Translation was requested by Strategic Research Analysis, Headquarters, MACV.

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----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

((Page 1 of O.T.))

((This letter was)),  
sent by Brother Sau  
Huân on 8 Dec 68

4 Dec 1968

Dear Brother Sau Huân,  
in care of Brother Ba Thành.

This is to report to you the following  
information concerning the situation in Z  
((possibly Vietnam-Cambodia border area)),

((Marginal notes:))  
Christmas, 1 Jan  
((aic, possibly 69 ))

1. Ta Suc area

According to a report from Unit 6 (which was sent to section Z on 2 Dec), the 69 A ((possibly Cambodian)) authorities forbade the shipment of merchandise to Z beginning 5 Dec 68. However, merchandise has so far continued to flow as usual and the merchants come in large numbers.

Regarding the harassment of our agencies, there were no indications of such action. Upon hearing of my arrival down here and my sickness, some officers ((possibly Cambodian authorities)) came to see me. They, and even those at Ta Sun Post, did not mention the harassment and the prohibition of shipping goods. It was heard only from the merchants; and so far, no difficulties have been caused to them.

At the present time, many unit members have been moving back and forth between Lo Go and Trang Trau. The movement has been easy.

However, it has cost us much labor to maintain security and order. With regard to military activities, A ((Cambodian forces)) launched operations from Cây Dấu to Ampil, then stationed themselves at Kra Bau in order to deploy troops and protect the life of Prince Sihanouk at the dedication of the hospital at Kra Bau.

((This problem)) must be  
studied to prevent difficulties  
which may occur due to care-  
lessness.

Puppet ((RVNAF)) and US military activities: US forces landed troops and established a post at Cầu Vĩnh. They repaired roads from Watchtower Two to Cầu Vĩnh.

Sihanouk went  
to France?

On 27 Nov 68, they fired hundreds of artillery shells from Trang Trau to Bến Thap, Cambodia, wounding two of our people. On 29 and 30 Nov 68, helicopters fired five rockets near Taos and Taset, causing no casualties.

On 3 Dec, helicopters fired at our main objectives ((sic)), and at 2100 hours on 3 Feb, they fired hundreds of artillery shells on our territory along the Vam Cò River from Lõ Gõ to Crossroad 5.

Comments on the Tã Sua situation: According to the general restriction orders, our goods may be delayed for a few days, but later the situation will be normalized. There is nothing to disturb our living conditions, but our movement must be reorganized.

The C9A ((possibly Cambodian authorities)) did not inform us of the prohibition on shipping goods. We have only heard merchants talking among themselves about it. However, they have continued to move freely.

((Page 2 of O.T.))

Let me check the situation on 5 Dec and report it to you.

Phù in Cáy Dấu told me that there is no danger to the living, moving, and purchasing activities in Tã Sua. I also believe that this area is safe.

Especially in Tráng Trau, the C9A ((Cambodian)) authorities were pleased to see that we had activated a Z ((border security)) unit to take care of security and order and establish relations with them in these areas. Because of the lack of security in this area, the Cambodian administrative personnel did not dare enter it. They feared the Red ((Communists)) agents. Moreover, our cadre have created tension with their daring actions. (For instance, they tied up Chep Veng, etc. ((sic)) ).

They suggested that we move the agencies located along the road from Kompongmen to Tã Sua to the other side of the river, because sweep operations ((possibly by Cambodian troops)) were expected in the upper forest area. These agencies should move away for a few days and return to their former areas after the sweep operations ended. I am trying to convince them not to conduct sweep operations through our areas.

Recently, they announced that they have captured Red Khmers ((Cambodian Communists)) in areas close to Cáy Dấu. They stated that these men wore the same uniforms as our Liberation troops, with identical sandals and hats.

On 29 Nov ((68)), it was reported that five Liberation troops were captured in Pacham and were escorted to Cáy Dấu. After our intervention, they were released to Q1, CT9 ((possibly 271st Regiment, 9th VC Division)).

Although the US has continued to conduct airstrikes and artillery activities on A ((Cambodian)) territory, the situation was still at a standstill.

Our relationship with the ((Cambodian)) posts had been fair.

Areas Z5 and Z4 :

The enemy has shelled the Tã Nót area since 26 Nov ((68)). At present, he has halted his activities. We have protested strongly about this affair.

The situation in this area is not safe. The relations between our agencies and the people who came from the other side of the border as refugees were full of suspicion and complicated. Upon returning to your area, I will make a detailed report to you.

The merchants in Z5 told us that on 5 Dec ((68)), the King ((possibly Prince Sihanouk)) would come to dedicate a hospital. They would stop moving for some days in order to facilitate the work of the Cambodian troops in providing protection for him.

We have not received any comment from the Cambodian authorities in regards to moving our agencies.

How mysterious they are ! We are unable

((Page 3 of O.T.))

to guess their intention. We need to find out promptly what they really want and report it to Brother Tam Lai in Phnom Penh, so that he can ask for the intervention of our ((VC)) embassy in case they (the Cambodian authorities) take some action against us.

We learned of this information through Sâu Khâm's letter.

((Page 4 of O.T.))

Generally speaking, according to what I learned from the post chiefs whom I contacted and our agents in Cay Dâu District, I have realized that the situation in these areas did not create many difficulties for the friendly forces. The ((Cambodian)) authorities were deeply worried about the revolutionary movement in their own country which is becoming stronger. For this reason, they are watching the situation and seem to suspect us ((of instigating the movement)). . . .

The US and Puppet forces have increased aircraft reconnaissance. Their air and artillery activities were carried out deeper in A ((Cambodian)) territory than before, and they have deployed agents disguised as merchants to collect information. They may conduct sweep operations into Kom Giua.

With regard to our activities, our units are stabilizing the messing and billeting situation in compliance with the Command Committee's order.

We have exerted every effort to win the sympathy of the post chiefs, Cambodian authorities, and the people of this country in order to create favorable conditions for our personnel and cadre to move, receive goods, and conceal troops.

Along with the above mentioned activities, I am now preparing to locate a Z unit in the Tráng Châu area and am ready to draft plans to counter enemy ((RVNAF)) sweep operations conducted into Kom Giua.

Right after I arrived here, I suffered from enteritis. Since then, I have eaten soup instead of rice. Later, I was examined by Sister Thuy Ba who advised me to take care of my affairs before going to the hospital for treatment. However, I had much work to do; so I was unable to take her advice ((sic)).

In the near future, if I feel better, I will try to come to your area in order to report on the situation and request your instructions.

Respectfully,

/S/ Sanh

P.S. According to Sau Kham's letter on 28 Nov ((possibly 68)), we attacked Ben Cau, annihilated two enemy D ((battalions)), shot down two helicopters, and captured a number of prisoners, including one wounded US pilot, with the rank of captain. When we took him to Z, an A ((Cambodian)) unit stationed at Svay Rieng proposed that we hand him over to them to be taken to Svay Rieng Province for interrogation. They then escorted him directly to Phnom Penh ((Capital of Cambodia)) and later told us that they had placed him in a hospital. They promised to send him back to us upon his recovery.

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----