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COSVN

RESOLUTION No 9

JULY 1969

R E S O L U T I O N
ISSUED BY THE 9TH CONFERENCE OF
C O S V N

(July 1969)

The General Offensive and Uprising of our army and people has been going on for more than one year and has scored extremely glorious successes. At present our people are facing a new situation which is infinitely favorable for us.

In order to carry out the Resolution of C, the 9th Conference of COSVN, held in early July 1969, reviewed all aspects of the situation in our war theater in the recent past, especially since the issuance of Resolution No. 8 of COSVN, and set forth the mission, direction and major operations designed to advance the General Offensive and Uprising of our army and people toward the glorious fulfillment of our immediate mission: the winning of a decisive victory, which is the very fundamental condition* for progress toward the realization of the objectives of the Revolution in the South, namely independence, democracy, peace and neutrality, as a step toward the reunification of our country.

P A R T I

EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION

1. The 9th Conference of COSVN fully agreed with the Resolution of C, which assessed the extremely great successes by our people and the historic turn of our people's anti-U.S. resistance war for national salvation since the launching of the General Offensive and Uprising.

As the year 1968 began, while the U.S. imperialists' limited war was at its peak, our army and people, on the impetus of their successes and with a firm hold of the

* [Underlining throughout is as in original document.]

opportunity, switched their offensive strategy to a new phase, that of General Offensive and Uprising, and inflicted the heaviest defeat ever on the enemy, causing the Americans to lose more men and war materiel than in any preceding period, defeatism to permeate the puppet war and administration, the U.S. imperialists and Thieu-Ky-Huong to be extremely isolated at home and abroad, their internal contradictions and division to be increasingly acute, and the Americans' will of aggression to be strongly shaken. They were compelled to terminate their phase of strategic counter-offensive in order to definitely revert to a strategy of passive defense; they were forced to cease totally and unconditionally the bombing of North Viet-Nam, and sit with the National Liberation Front -- presently the delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government -- at the four-sided Paris talks. Their "limited war" strategy has met with bankruptcy. They are caught in a most serious crisis over strategy and have been forced to de-escalate the war step by step and adopt the policy of de-Americanizing the war, beginning with the withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops, hoping to extricate themselves from their war of aggression in our country. This is the heaviest failure ever known in the U.S. imperialists' history of aggression and is exerting extremely profound effects on the overall political, military, economic, and financial situation of the U.S.A., and upsetting the Americans' global anti-revolutionary strategy.

As for us, since entering the new phase, we have scored unprecedently great and complete successes in the military, political, and diplomatic fields, both in the North and in the South, at home and abroad. In the South, the General Offensive and Uprising has created a basic turning point in the war. We have developed the offensive strategy of Revolutionary Warfare to a new pitch, creating an increasingly stronger stance of strategic attack and encirclement in all three areas, urban, rural lowlands, and jungle-and-mountain areas. The combined strength of the politico-military struggle concerted with the diplomatic offensive is being developed to the utmost. We have created a new change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy, developed our military and political forces which become bigger and stronger than they were in any previous

period, promoted among our entire Party, army, and people a revolutionary spirit and a strong determination to fight and to win continuous successes, and produced a profound repercussion among the intermediate social classes, thus boosting the prestige of our Revolution higher than ever before. In the North, after four years of heroic fighting, our army and people have completely defeated the U.S. imperialists' war of destruction by air, and simultaneously endeavored to build Socialism and wholeheartedly fulfill the great home front's obligations toward the great front line. On the basis of military and political successes achieved in both zones [North and South Viet-Nam -- ed], we have vigorously stepped up our diplomatic offensive and have successively won increasingly bigger victories. Our people's prestige and position in the world have grown greater than ever before.

In short, in the one year and more that we conducted the General Offensive and Uprising, we gained very great successes under extremely difficult, harsh, and complicated conditions; we forced the enemy to go from a policy of escalation to one of gradual de-escalation and to sink deeper into a defensive and deadlocked position; we defeated him while he escalated the war; we continue to defeat him during this first phase of his de-escalation, and are exploiting our victories, intensifying our offensive posture, and creating the bases and increasingly riper conditions for our advance to the decisive victory.

The above conclusion has once again been all the more confirmed by the events of recent days. After the great victory of the [1969] Spring Campaign, our army and people launched a new large-scale offensive in the military, political and diplomatic fields: we pushed our summer offensive while introducing the 10-point peace solution at the Paris Conference and proceeding with the convening of the National Congress of People's Representatives which elected the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Thus the Nixon administration, already beaten by our staggering attacks of the 1969 Spring Campaign, was dealt additional very heavy blows. Because of these new defeats on the battlefield and at the conference table, Nixon is under heavy attack by the people of the U.S. and of the world, demanding

an end to the war of aggression in Viet-Nam. Nixon has clumsily tried to defend himself, but is all the more stymied and encountering very many difficulties. The fact that Nixon was forced to issue the eight-point program, organize the meeting with Thieu at Midway, and begin to withdraw 25,000 troops, reflects the obduracy and guile of U.S. imperialism; on the other hand, it indicates that the crisis and impasse in which the Nixon administration finds itself is developing to a new degree. This is a new opportunity which demands that we make greater efforts in all fields of operations in order to win a great victory.

The unprecedented success of our army and people in the year past is first of all the success of the Party's revolutionary policies and guidelines -- manifested most concentratedly in the leadership of the war by the Party's Central Committee headed by our beloved and venerated President Ho -- not only in the normal course of the war but also in the most highly developed phase of the war, the General Offensive and Uprising. This is also the success of the incomparable determination and bravery of the entire Party, army, and people, and our people's unsubmissive traditions and revolutionary heroism. That success is also linked to the sympathy and strong support of all Socialist countries and all the peoples of the world -- including the American people -- who love peace and justice.

2. Our war theater. Using the Resolution of C as the basis for reviewing all aspects of the situation in the [recent] past, the Conference of COSVN unanimously agreed on the following assessment:

a. Since the war switched to the new phase, under the clear-sighted and timely leadership of the Party's Central Committee, the entire Party, army, people, all war theaters, all localities, all echelons, all branches and units have made numerous sacrifices, endured many hardships and strived to carry out the strategic determination of the Party's Central Committee. They have unceasingly developed their strategic offensive, vigorously pushed forward the General Offensive and Uprising and created developments of strategic significance both

in the military and political fields in the major theater [Saigon], in the Mekong delta and in the jungle-and-mountain area, thus contributing significantly to the great victory of the whole Mien [South Viet-Nam] and the whole country [North and South Viet-Nam].

Particularly, from the end of 1968 to date, in implementing COSVN's Resolution 8, the entire Party, army, and people, have made the highest endeavor, overcome all difficulties and hardships, defeated the enemy's insane counter-offensive efforts, and at the same time brought the General Offensive and Uprising to a new height. We continued to destroy and wear down U.S. and puppet troops and war materiel; inflicted heavy losses to their elite units and high-ranking officers; caused their defensive posture to be more passive and confused; frustrated their accelerated pacification program in its initial phase; created difficulties for the puppet army to find personnel replacements; drove the puppet administration into an increasingly serious ideological and political crisis; and strongly undermined the morale of U.S. and puppet troops. In short, we have greatly contributed to defeating a further strategic step of the enemy -- the "clear and hold" strategy -- and the initial step of the U.S. imperialists' scheme of de-Americanizing the war.

On our part, the outstanding point is that, on the basis of thoroughly understanding the Central Committee's strategic determination, we have achieved obvious progress since the Spring of 1969 to date in applying the guidelines and methods of struggling and building, both in military and political fields, and making them more fitting to the rules of the General Offensive and Uprising; especially, we have applied and developed the direction and method of fighting with high efficiency which caused very heavy losses to the enemy at very light cost in friendly casualties; we have applied and developed the guidelines and methods for operations in the three areas designed to win and hold control of the weak areas, the areas bordering the cities and parts of the cities and municipalities. This is an improvement in the quality of our Party body's leadership and guidance aimed at securing a more thorough understanding of the Central Committee's lines, policies, and resolutions and fully applying them in a most fitting way to the practical realities of the General Offensive and Uprising in our war theater. This [improvement]

has opened up vast possibilities for our army and people to fight strongly and sustainedly, to become stronger as they fight, to win bigger victories as they fight, to launch strong military attacks at the same time as they launch strong political offensives in the cities and countryside, to firmly hold and expand the liberated areas, to widen our mastership, to secure our strategic positions, and to keep up and develop our offensive position and our encirclement of the enemy, especially on the major battle-field under extremely fierce and complicated [fighting] conditions of our war theater.

b. However, taking into consideration the heavy requirements and mission of our war theater, and the increasingly advantageous opportunity [opened to our cause], we have not yet produced any leaping development of decisive significance in our struggle against the enemy. Beside the big victories and strong points, we still have many weak points, shortcomings and difficulties. At present, the obstacles which most impede the progress of the General Offensive and Uprising in our war theater are: We have failed to promote a strong political high tide suitable to the requirements of the General Offensive and Uprising phase and the great political opportunity now prevailing; our military proselyting spearhead is still weak and has not taken full advantage of our great opportunity to accelerate the collapse of the puppet army and administration; querrilla warfare has developed slowly and unevenly; our territorial forces at provincial and district levels, and even some units of our main forces at region level did not fight in good directions and according to good methods, and their combat efficiency is still low; the replenishment of forces, especially for units at region level and even for many provincial units, is still beset with prolonged difficulties; the building of political forces, especially Party Chapters, Youth Group Chapters and masses' associations at the infrastructure level is making slow progress; the operations ensuring material support to the front lines are deficient and many areas still have difficulties [in getting material supplies]. Those are problems which had been discussed at the beginning of the General Offensive and Uprising; although we had made efforts to overcome them and had scored some progress, this progress was still very slow compared to our requirements.

c. This last COSVN conference placed special emphasis on the situation of various battlefield areas. The conference affirmed that in our war theater, the pattern of the three strategic areas is reflected in three major battlefields: Saigon and a number of major cities, the Eastern [Nam Bo] battlefield, which includes the rural area surrounding Saigon; and the jungle-and-mountain area running from Eastern [Nam BO] to Region 6; and the Mekong delta area. Each area not only has its own importance as a battlefield but also enjoys a special position which is organically related to the general war theater in the course of achieving the decisive victory as well as in the period after.

Since launching the General Offensive and Uprising we have taken the initiative on all battlefield areas, brought our military and political offensive to a further step of development, and achieved unprecedentedly great and all-sided successes. Concerning Saigon, the focal point battlefield of the whole Mien [South Viet-Nam] and of the whole country [South and North Viet-Nam] we have created significant developments in the military as well as political fields, in the struggle movement as well as in the guidance and leadership of the movement; prospects of the present situation are very promising. The Eastern [Nam Bo] battlefield, especially the rural area surrounding Saigon, has been firmly held despite unprecedented difficulties and war fierceness, and is increasing its offensive and encirclement pressure on the enemy's nerve center [i.e. Saigon] thus contributing greatly to the frustration of the enemy's defense plan and becoming a very important enemy-killing battlefield. Regions 10 and 6 have made tremendous efforts in overcoming difficulties to keep pace with the general situation. In the Mekong delta, although the situation has not developed evenly, we have won greater successes in all aspects since the beginning of the General Offensive and Uprising than in any previous period; we have kept up constant offensive against and encirclement of enemy municipalities, towns, military bases, and strategic communication lines. The movement in the areas of religious and ethnic minorities is undergoing new evolution; the general situation in this area is increasingly favorable day after day.

However, considering the special position of each area, the movement has not properly developed to keep pace with the

requirements of the General Offensive and Uprising; for this reason, there has been a lack of good coordination and mutual support between the various areas. Each battlefield area has its own shortcomings, weak points, and difficulties as mentioned above which are at varying degrees of acuteness depending on the characteristics of each area. Each battlefield area is influenced by objective and subjective factors; particularly, while our struggle against the enemy is developing under increasingly fierce and complicated conditions, practical reality has indicated that there are the war theaters where the fighting is fierce and bitter but where the movement not only survives but also progresses steadily; conversely, there are war theaters where the situation is more favorable than in other areas but where the movement is slow in all aspects; worse still, the movement there is beset with difficulties which could have been avoided. For this reason, the problem of strengthening the leadership and guidance for every battlefield area is one of our most urgent concerns.

3. Concerning the reasons for our successes, shortcomings and weak points.

It is obvious that we have won unprecedented successes; beside the basic reasons for these successes, reflected in the correct revolutionary lines of the Party and the courage and determination of our army and people, the direct reason for these successes lies in the fact that our Party body, from upper to lower levels, has made great efforts and progress in leadership and guidance. It can be said that throughout the past year and more of the General Offensive and Uprising our Party body has held fast to its strategic offensive ideology [sic], firmly seized the opportunities, launched continuous attacks and repulsed the enemy step by step in order to achieve the strategic determination [sic] of the Central Committee, and thoroughly comprehended and unceasingly developed the guidelines for military and political struggle with the three-pronged tactics in all the three areas concerted with the diplomatic offensive; at the same time, this was the period during which our Party body became increasingly aware of the objective laws governing the General Offensive and Uprising and applied them to the realistic leadership and guidance of our army's and people's struggle in the military and political fields, in fighting and building, in various areas and in various tasks.

However, the General Offensive and Uprising is a phase which marks a leap forward of our people's revolutionary warfare; it requires more than ever a strong impulse and improvement in leadership and guidance. Yet the reality of the recent past indicated that the leadership and guidance of our authorities at various echelons did not meet these objective requirements; worse still, in some places and at times, this leadership and guidance evolved too slowly.

a. The key issue which is the origin of all shortcomings and weak points in the leadership and guidance of our authorities at various echelons during the recent period lies in the fact that we did not thoroughly comprehend the basic problems of the General Offensive and Uprising and problems relating to [Party] policies and guidelines; worse still, in some places and at times we made serious mistakes both in ideological concepts, viewpoints, and standpoints, and in the supervision of policy execution. A few of our cadres and Party members, including those at Region and Province Party Committee levels, are usually superficial and narrow-minded in assessing our strength and the enemy's; they only see the manifestations [of things] and fail to see their nature, they overestimate the enemy and underestimate the revolutionary capacities of the masses; therefore, when faced with difficulties, they become skeptical and lack resolution vis-a-vis the Central Committee's strategic determination; and they lose interest in attacking, which is the highest principle of the General Offensive and Uprising. Because they are not firmly anchored in the working class standpoint, they lack absolute determination, and their thinking is subjective and superficial; therefore, they usually have an erroneous conception of the transitional nature of the General Offensive and Uprising, now thinking it is a one-blow affair and consequently lacking vigilance against the enemy plots, now thinking it is a period of protracted struggle and consequently lacking boldness and a sense of urgency; worse still, they become right-leaning and shrink back from action.

b. Understanding the policies and guidelines is not an abstract, rigid concept; it should be manifested in a concrete way in leadership and guidance. First of all, it should reflect in the combination of the highest adherence to principles with

the fullest creativeness and flexibility. Our Party body formerly had a strong point in this aspect. As it entered the General Offensive and Uprising, which is the highest developmental phase and the most fierce and complicated phase of our resistance against America for national salvation, the struggle between ourselves and the enemy did not develop according to a stable pattern; on the contrary, it was motion-packed (the enemy striving to pacify and saturate the areas bordering the cities and sensitive areas with sweep operations). This situation demands of our leadership a higher combination of [adherence to] principles and flexibility. Yet in the recent period the leadership and guidance of various echelons did not catch up with the objective requirements of the situation. This shortcoming is manifested in many aspects but in most is obvious in the guidance of the three-pronged attack in the three areas, and in the application of guidelines and methods of struggling and [force-]building in each area. Particularly, the execution of COSVN directives regarding the areas bordering the cities, and the weak areas is usually simplistic, rigid, and unilateral. Conversely, some areas when seeing the emphasis on the matters of guidelines and methods would lower the requirements and separate the guidelines and methods from the mission and strategic objectives.

c. A major problem still prevailing and having a durable character, in our movement, is the fact that our Party Chapter and mass associations are generally weak in comparison to the requirements of the mission. This is a weak point, a shortcoming, and also an important cause which limited our past successes. It prevented the Party's policies and guidelines, and our superiors' resolutions from profoundly permeating the vast majority of Party members and the masses and becoming revolutionary acts by the broad masses, especially in the decisive phase of the Revolution. One thing which deserves our deep thinking is the fact that the absolute majority of our Party members and the masses are very revolutionary, very brave, very confident in the Party and very ready to accept missions assigned by the Party, while our Party Chapters and mass associations in the cities, municipalities, towns, rural areas still under enemy control, areas bordering the cities, and even in the liberated areas, are, generally speaking, very weak.

Therefore, there is no other way to justify the above situation than to confirm, with severity, the shortcoming of our subjective leadership, the deep-rooted cause of which lies in the fact that our various echelons have not yet profoundly assimilated the Party's lines regarding the masses and viewpoint regarding Party building.

d. This last COSVN Conference also gave special attention to the problem of organizing policy execution, considering it as the weakest link which is directly affecting the reception and implementation of the Party's policies and guidelines. Besides the basic weaknesses relating to the Party's Chapters and mass associations, progress in other aspects such as the organization and implementation of plans, the tidying up of the working machinery and procedure, the regime and contents of [Party] activities, the system of submitting reports and requesting instructions, the understanding, study and analysis of the situation, the adoption of policies and measures to cope with the situation, particularly the attitude of superiors in maintaining close contacts with subordinates and providing concrete guidance to subordinates, etc., was slow in comparison to leadership and guidance requirements in the phase of General Offensive and Uprising.

P A R T II

FUTURE ENEMY SCHEMES AND OUR IMMEDIATE TASKS

I. THE ENEMY'S STRATEGIC SCHEMES

1. The Resolution of C assessed the enemy's present strategic schemes in Viet-Nam and anticipated the following possible developments of the situation.

a. Due to their heavy defeats in all aspects, their will of aggression being strongly shaken, the U.S. imperialists have been forced to de-escalate the war step by step; it would be very hard for them to continue their aggressive war at the present scale for a long period and it is certain that they will be defeated. However, they are very obdurate by nature, they still have [war] potential and a large force on the battlefield, and they still hold important positions and areas; therefore, they hope to de-escalate in a strong position so they can settle the war through negotiations on conditions favorable for them.

For this reason, their present plan is to de-Americanize and de-escalate the war step by step, to preserve their manpower and material as they de-escalate, especially to preserve U.S. troops, and to compete with us in territory and population control so as they can end the war on a definite strong position.

Specifically, they will strive to consolidate and strengthen the puppet army and administration, and as an immediate objective, they will maintain the U.S. troops at an essential level and for an essential period of time; go on with their "clear and hold" strategy; reinforce their defense setup; strive to hold major strategic positions in South Viet-Nam; accelerate the pacification program in order to gain control of the people and territory; seek all means to weaken our military and political forces; cause difficulties for us; create conditions in which they could gradually withdraw American troops while keeping the puppet troops strong; and on this basis, find a political solution [which would allow them] to end the war while still maintaining neocolonialism in South Viet-Nam to a certain extent and under a certain form; to create a "neutral" South Viet-Nam whose

real nature is pro-American and in which the U.S. lackeys still keep a strong force and hold advantageous positions [which enable them] to compete with us economically and politically after the war; to maintain by all means their position in Southeast Asia without affecting the U.S. influence and prestige over the world.

The Americans' subjective intention is to carry out the precept of de-escalating [the war] step by step; to strive to seize the initiative in a passive position; to win a strong position on the battlefield as they de-escalate; to de-escalate in order to "de-Americanize" the war but not to immediately end the war; to reinforce the puppet army as American troops are withdrawn; to have necessary time for having appropriate de-escalation steps; and at every de-escalation step, to strive to launch partial counter-offensives in fierce competition with our forces.

b. At present, there is very little possibility that the enemy will carry out a massive troop build-up and expand the limited war to the whole country; however, we still need to keep our alertness. There are two possible developments to the war as follows:

One: In the process of de-escalating the war, the Americans may suffer increasing losses and encounter greater difficulties; therefore they may be forced to seek an early end to the war through a political solution which they cannot refuse. Even in this case, there will be a period of time from the signing of the agreement ending the war until all American troops are withdrawn from South Viet-Nam. During this period of time, our struggle against the enemy will go on with extreme complexity and we will have to be extremely alert.

Two: If our attacks in all aspects are not sufficiently strong and if the Americans are able to temporarily overcome part of their difficulties, they will strive to prolong the war in South Viet-Nam for a certain period of time during which they will try to de-escalate from a strong position of one sort or another, and carry out the de-Americanization in a prolonged war contest before they must admit defeat and accept a political solution.

In both these eventualities, especially in the case of a prolonged de-escalation, the Americans may, in certain circumstances, put pressure on us by threatening to broaden the war through the resumption of bombing in North Viet-Nam within a definite scope and time limit, or the expansion of the war into Laos and Cambodia.

Whether the war will develop according to the first or second eventuality depends principally on the strength of our attacks in the military, political and diplomatic fields, especially our military and political attacks, and on the extent of military, political, economic and financial difficulties which the war causes to the Americans in Viet-Nam, in the U.S.A. itself, and over the world.

2. On our theater of war, in order to carry out the general scheme mentioned above, the enemy will apply the following policies and measures in the coming period:

Our theater of war includes Saigon city, the Mekong delta and the jungle-mountain area running from Eastern [Nam Bo] to the South of the Western Highlands. It occupies a strategic position which is particularly important militarily, politically and economically in the enemy's immediate schemes and post-war intention. For this reason, the enemy will contest with us decisively on this battlefield. He will concentrate to a high degree all his forces, facilities, tricks and schemes to confront us in all aspects of the military, political, economic and espionage war. He will concentrate on his immediate objectives while gradually preparing the ground-work and conditions for competing with us when a political solution is reached. We must clearly see this problem in order to exercise a high degree of effort and foresight in the exercise of our leadership and guidance.

Generally speaking, the enemy will carry on the "clear and hold" strategy, and vigorously push forward the rural pacification program, regarding this program as an extremely important part of his "clear and hold" strategy and his plan to de-escalate in a strong position. In particular, the enemy will concentrate on the following major problems:

a. He will strive to hold Saigon by deploying troops to defend the city and surrounding area, carrying out pacification and contesting decisively with us in the bordering area and striking heavily the intermediate area in order to push our forces away. Concurrently, he will reinforce his inner defense set up so as to be able to repress all popular movements and wipe out our military and political forces.

In conjunction with the defense of Saigon, the enemy will also beef up the defense of other major cities, municipalities, military bases, strategic communication lines, and logistics installations.

b. The enemy will strive to contest with us in the Mekong delta. He will concentrate mainly on pacifying and controlling people and territory in sensitive and populous areas, and in political, military, economic, religious and ethnic [minority] centers.

In the jungle-and-mountain area, as an immediate objective, the enemy will strive to hold his existing positions; concurrently he will use air power and artillery, chemical poisons, commandos and spies to strike our base areas and liberated areas; he will enforce an economic blockade of our areas, sway the ethnic minorities, and take the people away from areas we cannot hold or where our defense is deficient.

c. Politically ... in our war theater, and particularly in Saigon and religious and ethnic minority areas, the enemy will contest with us decisively in order to serve his immediate and post-war objectives. He will maintain and consolidate the puppet administration, strive to preserve its constitutional wrapping, rally the reactionary force, and at the same time intensify the repression of progressive tendencies and opposition factions, especially the popular uprising movement demanding a better life, peace, independence, neutrality and the establishment of a peace cabinet.

d. The enemy will step up espionage, appeals to rally and surrender, and psychological warfare activities to serve his de-Americanization scheme, strike at our Party's internal organization and our armed forces, and sow confusion and a

decadent way of life among our people in the hope of undermining or diminishing the offensive strength of our army and people; concurrently he will make preparations for competing with us in the future political struggle.

e. In the economic field, the enemy will increasingly exploit and rob the people in the urban area and plunder the people's food in the rural area, especially in the Mekong delta, in order to solve part of his current problems; parallelly, he will enforce an economic blockade of our base areas while stepping up deceptive demagogic measures (such as "distribution of land", cash loans, aid in the form of farm implements, fertilizers, seeds, etc.). In the coming period, the Americans will increasingly coordinate actions with their satellites, especially the Japanese monopoly capitalists, to carry out an economic infiltration [in SVN] for the purpose of helping the Saigon puppet regime preserve its facade of false prosperity and realizing their economic domination of South Viet-Nam.

3. As analyzed in the Resolution of C and COSVN Directive No. 88/CTNT, the de-Americanization scheme on one hand reflects the obdurate nature of the American imperialists, but on the other hand, and this is most important, it is a scheme conceived in a defeated and deadlocked situation; therefore, it is beset with insurmountable contradictions and weak points:

a. Being defeated and weakened, the Americans have been forced to de-escalate in a passive position, withdraw their forces and reduce their war expenditures; therefore, they can never create a strong position; the more they de-escalate the weaker they become, the heavier blows they will suffer and they will end up in defeat.

b. The puppet troops' vital support is American troops; now with the de-Americanization and withdrawal of American troops, the puppet troops face certain collapse; they can in no way become stronger, as the Americans subjectively wish them to be.

c. The situation is compelling the Americans to pull out troops as soon as possible in order to reduce casualties and war

expenditures; however, in order for the puppet troops to grow stronger, the Americans have to prolong the war, and if the war is prolonged, U.S. war casualties and expenditures cannot be reduced, and the U.S. failures and difficulties will reach an unbearable level.

d. If the Americans cannot withdraw troops, internal conflicts between the U.S. rulers and between the American people and their rulers will increase. But if U.S. troops are pulled out, the puppet army and administration will face a greater danger of collapse and contradictions between the Americans and the puppets as well as internal contradictions among the puppets will become more acute.

These contradictions lead to a critical impasse in the U.S. strategy as the Americans are seeking a way out of the limited war which has reached the highest level and still sees the Americans suffering heavy defeats and facing difficulties in all fields. This is the greatest weak point of the Americans at this time. These contradictions also accentuate the basic weaknesses of the enemy, namely the demoralization, the political isolation, the decay and ineffectiveness of the puppet army and administration, and of their passive defense strategy; and bring out new gaps and weaknesses; in particular, the puppets' ideological and political situation faces a greater danger of sudden collapse provided we know how to step up our military, political and proselyting activities.

The COSVN Conference fully agrees with the conclusion of the Resolution of C affirming that although the enemy still has some relative strong points such as a large force, strong firepower and good mobility, the occupation of important strategic positions, and the possession of latent economic and military power, due to his defeated position and his de-escalation, his weaknesses are developing and his relative strong points cannot be utilized. The enemy wanted to de-escalate in an active position but due to repeated defeats he was compelled to de-escalate in a passive position. The enemy wanted to de-escalate step by step but if he suffers heavy defeats and has no other way out, there is the possibility that he will be compelled to de-escalate by sudden leaps.

On the impetus of our victories and with our all-out offensive picking up momentum, we will certainly defeat the enemy's new strategic scheme; we are determined to inflict a heavy defeat on the enemy, force him to de-escalate quickly and prevent him from prolonging his aggressive war.

II. OUR IMMEDIATE MISSIONS

The General Offensive and Uprising which has been in progress for more than a year has achieved an important victorious step and is now entering a decisive phase. Our army and people are facing a great opportunity to march forward on the impetus of our victories, step up our all out and continuous offensive, make a new and most fundamental step forward, defeat the U.S. imperialists' aggressive will, force them to withdraw troops; bring about the collapse of the puppets, and win a decisive victory, which is the basic condition for the achievement of the revolution's objectives in South Viet-Nam.

Based on the Resolution of C and the situation of our war theater,

1. Our immediate mission is:

To motivate the entire Party, army and people to make outstanding efforts in developing the success already gained; resolutely overcome shortcomings and weak points; seize opportunities to vigorously push forward the General Offensive and Uprising with the three-pronged attack to the highest point in coordination with the diplomatic offensive; quickly build up our military and political forces; develop our all-out offensive in a vigorous and continuous way in the three strategic areas in order to defeat the enemy's clear-and-hold strategy, pacification policy and other defense set-ups, and defeat his scheme to end the war in a strong position and his plan to de-Americanize the war. We should fight to force the Americans to withdraw troops, cause the collapse of the puppets and gain the decisive victory, which is a very basic condition for achieving independence, democracy, peace, neutrality for South Viet-Nam and progressing toward national reunification; at the same time, we should be determined to fight and defeat the enemy if he prolongs the war.

The essence of our decisive victory, as defined by Instruction 11-68 [poss. Nov. 1968] of C is as follows: that the Americans must withdraw all troops from South Vietnam, that our military and political forces must be stronger than the remaining forces of the puppet army and administration, that our military and political forces must be master of the major part of the rural area, the important strategic areas, the areas bordering the cities, and some parts of the cities, principally at the basic level, and that [we be in a position to] achieve the immediate objectives of the Revolution in the South.

2. Based on our immediate mission and the essence of decisive victory as described above, we must strive to achieve the following strategic objectives prescribed by the Resolution of C of April 1969:

a. Fiercely attack American troops, inflict very heavy losses on them, cause them increasing difficulties in all fields, and prevent them from carrying out their "clear and hold" strategy and their plan of de-escalating step by step and prolonging the war in order to secure a strong position. We must fight to force the Americans to withdraw troops. The strong attacks launched against the Americans at this time have an important significance: they crush the U.S. imperialists' aggressive will.

b. Strongly strike the puppet army, annihilate the most obdurate elements of the puppet army and administration, paralyze and disintegrate the remaining elements, and cut off the source of personnel replenishment of the puppet army, thus preventing the latter from fulfilling its mission in the "clear and hold" strategy, and reinforcing itself in order to replace the Americans. We must fight to force the collapse of the puppet army.

c. Strive to build up our military and political forces and deploy them on an increasingly strong strategic offensive position. We must defeat the enemy's rural pacification campaign, dominate the major part of the rural area, and control the important strategic positions in the jungle-and-mountain area and on strategic communication lines, and especially in areas bordering the cities and some parts right in the cities, particularly at the basic level.

d. Continue to destroy and weaken the puppet administration at various levels; especially, defeat the enemy's pacification plan; wipe out the major part of the puppet administration and its control grip at the infrastructure level; at the same time we must establish and strongly consolidate the people's revolutionary administration at various levels, especially at the infrastructure level, and promote the role of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.

e. On this basis, smash the Americans' will of aggression; force them to give up their intention of ending the war in a strong position, and to end the war quickly and withdraw troops while the puppet army and administration are still too weak to take over the responsibility of the Americans; force the Americans to accept a political solution, and recognize an independent, democratic peaceful and neutral South Viet-Nam with a national, democratic coalition government working toward reunifying Viet-Nam.

3. Our immediate task and requirements are large in scope and urgent in nature; the situation may evolve rapidly. For this reason, more than ever, the problem of improving our subjective leadership at various levels has a direct and decisive significance. First of all, we must improve our understanding of the lines, precepts and basic problems related to the General Offensive and Uprising and apply them to the reality of the fierce and decisive struggle against the enemy; we must do this in our ideological perception, and in our leadership and implementation of policies.

In particular, we must firmly grasp the following basic matters:

One: We are facing a great opportunity; therefore, more than ever, we must highly concentrate our efforts to win a decisive victory within a relatively short period of time. We must, on the basis of firmly grasping the precept of protractedness and the policy of pushing back the enemy step by step, and winning victory bit by bit, strive to build up our military, political, economic and financial strength, unceasingly improve the application of precepts and methods in a flexible way which is fitting to the practical reality and through this, to ensure that we are able to fight vigorously and for a sustained period of

time, to become stronger as we fight and to win greater victories as we fight.

We must firmly grasp the rule of winning victory, which is a process of developing the strategic offensive, attacking the enemy with resolution, and attacking in all fields with continuity and vigor in order to win victory step by step while at the same time seizing the opportunity with creativeness in order to accomplish leaps forward. At present, the enemy is being forced to de-escalate in a passive position, the combat efficiency of the U.S. and puppet troops has diminished, and their ideological and political motivation is collapsing; therefore the above-mentioned rule will exert a strong influence on the development of the Americans' and puppets' political and military situation, driving the latter into a grave all-sided crisis from which they have no way out. For this reason, we must accelerate activities in all fields with creativeness so that when the opportunity comes, we may rush forward quickly, and in a timely manner, to win greater victories.

The above principle and guidance are not only very necessary, but also fully consistent with our war theater. Due to the decisive and complex nature of our war theater, we cannot afford to be simplistic, impatient, or rigid, especially in the application of struggle and force building precepts and methods. However, we should clearly see another important aspect of our war theater, which is the place where enemy contradictions are most concentrated and where a great majority of our revolutionary masses are gathered, both in cities and in rural areas; therefore, our leadership at various levels must have a high sense of responsibility in seizing, creating and taking advantage of opportunities in order to produce leaps forward.

Two: In order to develop our offensive strategy to a high point in the coming period, we must make outstanding efforts to bring to the highest point of development the combined strength of our three-pronged attack, coordinated with a diplomatic offensive, in the three strategic areas, including the cities, rural low lands and jungle-and-mountain areas.

a. At present our people's revolutionary war has reached its highest stage. For this reason, more than ever, we must improve

military leadership to ensure that our military offensives meet the highest requirements in destroying the enemy, defeating enemy defense strategies and tactics, coordinating with political struggle and military proselyting activities and contributing to the popular uprising in the cities and rural areas. In joint action with the [popular] uprising, we must fight to force the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the collapse of the puppets.

Parallel to improving our military leadership, we must make great efforts to bring the political struggle to a high point. Similar to the military struggle, the political struggle should be firmly conducted according to the principles and guidance mentioned above. We must realize that the political opportunity at the present time is a great one, therefore our political struggle should be waged in accordance with the opportunity and coordinated with the military offensive, military proselyting and the diplomatic offensive. We must develop the [political] offensive vigorously from the lower level to the upper level and from partial uprising in the cities and rural areas to the general uprising.

b. We should firmly grasp the position of and interrelationship between the three strategic areas comprising the cities, rural lowland and jungle-and-mountain area in the new phase in order to provide corresponding and appropriate guidance. As concerns our battlefield, we must firmly grasp the strategic position of, and close relationship between, the three battlefield areas: Saigon and major cities, the eastern battlefield running from the area surrounding Saigon to Region 6, and the Mekong delta area.

We must see clearly that the urban front is, generally speaking, an important strategic area. We must specially concentrate and strengthen our leadership in the Saigon area which is our major battlefield for the whole of South Viet-Nam. We must resolutely maintain and develop the continuous attacks against, and siege of, Saigon and other cities, using both military and political means. We must resolutely prevent the enemy **from** breaking out of our encirclement and defeat his pacification work around the cities. Depending on the balance of forces in each time and place, we should set forth appropriate steps of

action, requirements, precepts, methods aimed at winning the highest success and creating conditions for coordinating military offensive with popular armed uprising to win great victories when the opportunity comes.

The rural area is for us an extremely important strategic area at the present time and in the future; therefore we must strengthen our leadership in the rural area, especially in the Mekong delta. The enemy is striving to pacify the sensitive populous rural areas, especially the areas surrounding the cities, and to invade the areas which we have just liberated. However, in these areas the enemy is basically weak and shows many deficiencies. Therefore, while we perseveringly attack and encircle the cities we must also resolutely wage a vigorous military and political offensive in the rural area, liberate and control the major part of the rural area, liberate entire zones in a number of battlefields including a number of towns and municipalities, and build the liberated areas into perfect revolutionary bases to serve as the firm, direct rear of the resistance.

The jungle-and-mountain area has always occupied an important strategic position because it is our stable base linking us to the great rear [i.e. North Viet-Nam]. At the same time it is the effective operation ground of our main force units. For this reason we must strive to develop and strengthen our liberated jungle-and-mountain areas and build them into solid bases capable of meeting our immediate and long-range requirements.

Three: In order to ensure progress in the reception and application of the Party's lines and precepts, we must urgently improve the working procedure and strengthen the leadership in the implementation of [Party] policies. Our most important requirements are:

- To ensure that the Party's lines, policies, resolutions, instructions be thoroughly understood by all echelons, especially those directly in charge of implementation, and by the masses.
- To promote aggressiveness, creativeness, willingness to work closely with the people in order to ensure that the methods

and measures adopted for implementing the Party's policies and missions are positive and suitable to the reality of the locality concerned.

- To pay attention to heightening the sense of organization and discipline, to correctly observe the Party's procedures concerning the submission of reports and requests for instructions and the inspection and prodding [of personnel].

- To consolidate and strengthen the weak links in the leadership machinery, especially the Party Chapter operation, the civilian proselyting operation, the organization and implementation of plans, the understanding and assessment of the situation, and the task to ensure normal activities for personnel at various levels, etc...[sic]

P A R T III

THE MAJOR TASKS

I. INTENSIFYING MILITARY OFFENSIVE AND BUILDING UP ARMED FORCES

1. On the basis of our great victories won in 1968 which marked an historic turning point in the war situation, we have launched since early spring of 1969 two phases of the military offensive in coordination with political and diplomatic offensives, and we have successively won extremely great successes. In the military field, we enjoy many strong points and have made new progress; at the same time we still have many deficiencies and weak points which we must strive to overcome:

- We have developed an offensive position in the three strategic areas; especially we have developed guerrilla warfare in the cities, destroyed and worn down many enemy forces and war facilities, annihilated many companies and battalions and inflicted heavy losses on many U.S. and puppet brigades, regiments and divisions; we have broadened the high-efficiency fighting method which enables us to fight continuously, repeatedly and strongly for a sustained period of time, forcing the enemy to be stuck on the city battlefield while he is stretched thin on other fronts, causing the U.S. and puppet troops to become weaker and weaker, and driving the "clear and hold" strategy into another step of defeat. However, our military offensives were not well coordinated on various fronts, and guerrilla warfare has not developed to the proper extent; in some places, our offensive was not continuous, strong and incisive, the combat effectiveness of our three types of forces was not high, we did not succeed in destroying the enemy neatly and on a large scale, our ability to attack strong fortifications has not met the requirements... [sic] for these reasons our capability to destroy the enemy was limited and the enemy still had the ability to consolidate his forces and launch attacks which caused us some definite difficulties.

- Through the offensive launched under very fierce conditions, our people's armed forces have generally developed

quantitatively and qualitatively, and our cadres and combatants have gained more combat experience and showed better understanding of the Party's lines and precepts. However, our biggest weak point in strength buildup is the fact that we have not yet achieved a just balance between quality and quantity, between the three types of forces, between the infantry and other armed branches, between combat troops and support troops, between our development requirements and our manpower and material resource availability. Many of our main force units and provincial and district regional force units are understrength, the militia and guerrillas have not reached the desired proportion, the sappers and army engineering units have not been broadly organized among the three types of forces and have not been properly utilized or allowed to develop their full capability.

- The Party and ideological operations in the three types of forces, especially in the main force, are getting organized. However, they are not thoroughly and timely carried out in some places and at given times, and they are weak and loosely coordinated in many regional and guerrilla units.

- The rear service has made tremendous efforts. However, a widespread and grave deficiency still prevails: it is the fact that despite repeated instructions, various units still allow a large quantity of weapon and ammunition to be lost or damaged; they are weakly motivated in the saving of ammunition in combat and in the use of captured weapons against the enemy.

- The leadership of various levels has become reliable and flexible as a result of accumulated experience. However, generally speaking, the implementation [of plans] is still slow, the military guidance in a number of places has not become a good routine, the assessment of the subordinates' state-of-mind is not reliable and the reports to superior authorities are not timely; the command apparatus at various levels is clumsy and not effective.

2. Considering the general mission mentioned above, our military mission in the coming period is as follows:
To resolutely develop good points and overcome shortcomings

and weak points; to continuously attack the enemy in the three strategic areas in simultaneous and stronger phases coordinated with our regular activities conducted under close supervision; to strive to destroy and decimate enemy forces and war facilities while at the same time to expand the liberated area, build up our armed forces in coordination with our political struggle and diplomatic offensive in order to rapidly secure a stronger position, defeat the enemy's "clear and hold" and "accelerated pacification" strategies, foil the enemy's plot to end the war in a strong position and "de-Americanize" the war; to win a decisive victory in the coming days and to be ready to promote the role of the armed forces in the political struggle and at the same time to be ready to fight and defeat the enemy in case the war is prolonged.

While studying this military mission, it is necessary to grasp the following six basic requirements:

a. To destroy and decimate enemy forces and war facilities, to neatly wipe out many enemy units as a step toward defeating large American and puppet units; to destroy many enemy depots, bases, material reserves; to prevent the American and puppet troops from carrying their "clear and hold" strategy, the Americans from implementing their scheme of de-escalating the war step by step and prolonging the war for the purpose of gaining a strong position; to cause the puppet troops to collapse and be unable to replace the American troops.

b. To defeat the enemy's rural pacification scheme, smash his psywar tricks, espionage, and appeals to rally and surrender; to maintain and expand our position of master [sic] in a large part of the enemy-controlled area, especially the sensitive rural areas, the springboard areas [sic], the areas bordering the cities, the strategic bases and important communication axes.

c. To maintain and develop our continuous offensive against, and encirclement of, the cities, municipalities and military bases, especially Saigon-Cholon by combining military and political approaches to confuse the enemy's rear base nerve center, to gradually destroy the enemy control apparatus, to win control at the grassroots level, and to promote the [revolutionary] movement in the cities in order to tie up a large enemy force on this battle-front.

d. To intensify the military and political offensives in the rural lowland and mountainous areas, especially in the Mekong delta, forcing the enemy to stretch thin his forces and creating conditions for us to annihilate the enemy and expand the liberated area, thereby broadening our human and material resources while drying up the puppets' replenishment sources.

e. To launch continuous military attacks on important communication axes, cut off and seize control of sections of communication arteries for definite periods of time, and proceed toward seizing control of entire communication arteries for a long period of time, thereby reinforcing our encirclement of the cities.

f. While fighting, to strive to improve the three types of forces quantitatively and qualitatively to ensure that our main force has a strong punch, our regional force has sufficient strength, our militia, guerrillas and covert self-defense guerrillas are broadly and firmly developed; the deployment and utilization of each type of force should be rational and appropriate to its nature and capability; at the same time, ammunition reserve and food supply should be strengthened. All this is aimed at creating a strong position which will ensure the successful implementation of all Party missions under any circumstance.

3. In order to fulfill the above mission and meet the above requirements, we have the following big military plans for the coming days:

On the basis of rationally deploying and coordinating the three types of forces on all war theaters, we will on one hand strive to annihilate, decimate and hold up a large U.S.-puppet force on the urban battlefield while on the other hand we will stretch enemy forces over the rural and mountainous battlefronts. We will concentrate our strong main force on the most advantageous battlefield and draw the enemy [out of his strongholds] in order to annihilate him and expand our liberated area; as an immediate objective, we will make the most concentrated efforts to combine military attacks with political and diplomatic offensives in order to win the biggest victory as dictated by our

requirements, upset the enemy's strategic deployment and at the same time create a strong position and a new opportunity to win a decisive victory in the time to come and ensure that we can defeat the enemy in any circumstance.

Specifically:

a. In the major war theater of Saigon-Cholon, we must strive to develop our in-place force, firmly hold and expand our springboard in the three areas [sic], apply appropriate fighting and operating methods, step up guerrilla warfare inside the capital, continuously attack the enemy in the bordering area and on the intermediate [battle] lines, annihilate and decimate a large part of enemy forces and war facilities, create conditions for the advancement of the urban population's political struggle and uprising, thus causing a permanent confusion in the enemy's rear, up-setting the enemy's [troop] deployment, holding up a large U.S.-puppet force in a passive position; we must be determined not to let the enemy extricate himself from this position; meanwhile, we must be ready to launch attack on the city if the situation changes suddenly and dramatically or when an extremely advantageous opportunity occurs; such a move is designed to create a major evolution in the military and political situation.

Concerning the other cities and municipalities, we must resolutely maintain our continuous attacks and encirclement, using in-place forces and forces from outside. Through military and political means, we must strive to annihilate and decimate the enemy forces, confuse the enemy's rear and hold up his main force; where feasible we will attack to destroy the enemy main force and liberate a number of municipalities.

b. In the rural lowland war theater, especially in the Mekong delta, we must urgently step up guerrilla warfare, forcing the enemy to stretch thin his forces and annihilate and decimate his forces on a broad scale. We must initiate an offensive campaign combining the three-pronged attacks with simultaneous and continuous attacks aimed at annihilating entire puppet companies and battalions and

knock down large puppet units in a definite period of time. These military activities should be coordinated with the political offensive and military proselyting activities in order to annihilate or subdue a large number of enemy military posts, district capitals, military sub-sectors and open up large areas [for infiltration]; at the same time, we must intensify our attacks against, and encirclement of, municipalities and provincial towns as a step toward liberating a number of places when conditions permit; step up attacks against enemy bases, land routes and waterways; strive to build our forces while attacking the enemy; rapidly build up a strong position; and produce dramatic changes in the war situation in the lowlands which will deeply influence the situation in the major war theater.

c. In the jungle-and-mountain war theater, we should strive to overcome difficulties in ensuring adequate material supplies, concentrate our main force in directions and areas favorable to us, combine this force with local forces to launch continuous attacks against the enemy, lure the enemy [out of his strongholds] in order to annihilate him, and coordinate many different fighting methods in order to knock down large-size U.S. and puppet units and upset the enemy's defense. We must be resolute in expanding and perfecting our highland bases in order to build up a strong position for both our immediate and long-range struggles.

4. Party Committees at various levels must improve their leadership over the armed struggle and the building of armed forces and firmly grasp the military tasks; specifically they must improve leadership in the following fields:

a. Combat leadership: they must make Party authorities at various levels and the armed forces thoroughly understand the concept of attacking the enemy continuously and resolutely, attacking the enemy from a strong and victorious position, and the concept of using a small force to defeat a larger enemy force; on this basis, they are to provide close guidance to the phases of large-scale attacks as well as to the regular activities in order to ensure the greatest successes dictated by our requirements.

It should be understood that the target of our combat activities in the present situation is the American troops. At the same time we must also strongly attack the puppet troops. Attacking the U.S. troops strongly, our aim must be to destroy their headquarters and commands at various levels in order to inflict heavy casualties on their officers and technical personnel, to neatly wipe out whole U.S. infantry and armored companies and battalions, inflict heavy losses on a number of major units, and put out of action U.S. brigades and divisions; strong attacks on the U.S. troops at the present time have a particular significance: they will produce serious political and psychological repercussions on the U.S. troops and even in the United States. Strong attacks against the puppet troops must be aimed at destroying their headquarters and commands of various levels. We must neatly wipe out whole puppet companies, infantry battalions, armored squadrons and brigades, and knock down and put out of action puppet brigades, regiments and divisions; attention must be paid to strongly attacking the puppet strategic reserves and those puppet units slated to replace the retreating U.S. troops. We must annihilate the puppet forces that oppress the people, the cruel tyrants, the pacification personnel; we must coordinate these activities with military proselyting activities to break up, bit by bit, the puppet local forces, at the same time we must strongly attack the training centers and the officer and NCO training schools and actively oppose the puppet conscription program to deny the puppets access to their source of replenishment personnel, to make it impossible for the puppets to replace the American troops, and thus to defeat the U.S.' de-Americanization plot. Concurrently, we must strongly attack the network of enemy depots, bases, logistic installations. We must constantly wear down, on a strategic scale, the technical and material bases and the material reserves of the Americans and puppets.

We must firmly grasp and more properly apply the combat method which combines small-scale attack with medium-scale and large-scale attacks, including large-scale attack conducted with small forces. We must always take the initiative in attacking the enemy; we must strive to develop the method of defeating a large enemy force with a small force composed of

elite elements of the three types of arms such as sappers, light mortar units and army engineering corps which deal the enemy telling blows that hurt him. Main force units subordinate to the Mien [South Viet-Nam] and Khu [Region] commands must properly apply the principle of concentrating forces, in order to neatly wipe out enemy units and combining the destruction of enemy forces with the expansion of the liberated area. The provincial troops, sub-region troops and elements of the main force must properly apply the principle of troop concentrating and dispersing. When concentrated, they will wipe out enemy units and fight the battles of a definite spectacular nature; when dispersed, they will support the [revolutionary] movement, motivate the people to rise up to eradicate the cruel tyrants, pacification agents, wipe out the spies, disband the civilian self-defense personnel, defeat the enemy's pacification scheme, seize control of the population at the grass-roots level and expand the liberated area. There should be close coordination between combat and military proselyting activities.

b. Leadership in armed forces building: the general policy is to improve quality [of troops], meanwhile to pay attention to increasing the number of troops where human and material resources are available. Step by step, to achieve the balance between the quality and quantity [of troops], between the three types of forces, between the infantry and other armed services, between our troops' development needs and our human and material resources availability. We must pay attention to giving our main force a strong punch. First of all, we must ensure that our battalions are full strength, successfully carry out the recruiting task in order to timely replenish our units, improve the training of our small units and improve the management of our troops [numerical strength and other administrative matters]. We must strive to improve the combat efficiency of the provincial and district regional troops and make sure that they effectively play a key role in the guerrilla and anti-pacification movement in the local areas. We must develop the militia-querrilla and in-place armed forces in the cities and bordering areas in order to double or triple their present numerical strength. We must build up the various armed services in the three types of forces, especially the sappers, light mortar units and army engineers specialized in attacking communication lines, the combat reconnaissance force and the communication-liaison units. The strengthening of armed forces in the coming

period is the key factor ensuring the successful accomplishment of our military tasks and guaranteeing our victories under any circumstance. Therefore, we must motivate the entire Party, and the entire people to effectively take part in the building of our armed forces. Party members and Youth League members should volunteer to set an example; the popular organizations should serve as a firm base for the mobilization movement and the building of the militia and guerrilla force. Party committee authorities at all levels must constantly and closely guide this movement.

c. Leadership in rear services: We must make the entire Party, people and army understand that our highest requirement at this time is "all for the front line, all for the complete defeat of the U.S. aggressors;" they should understand the Party's viewpoint on the people's rear service and firmly grasp the precept of "fighting for a long period of time and relying principally on our own strength." On this basis, we will motivate the masses to increase production and direct the forward supply councils and military rear services to have on hand enough material supplies, food, medicines to ensure that our troops can fight continuously for a relatively long period of time under difficult and complex circumstances. We must indoctrinate our cadres and combatants on the concept of saving property, funds, weapons, ammunition, using few supplies to kill many enemy troops, resolutely preserving weapons and ammunition and positively using captured weapons to fight the enemy; at the same time efforts must be made to increase the production of basic home-made weapons. We must improve leadership in the corridor and transportation activities and the protection of our storage depots. Attention must be paid to the requisition-purchase and stocking of food; troops must be encouraged to produce part of their own food.

d. To improve leadership in Party tasks and political tasks concerning the three types of forces, especially the regional force and militia-guerrilla force, in order to turn the people's armed forces into an effective tool of the Party with absolute loyalty to the Party's revolutionary undertaking and to the worker-peasant masses. They must successfully carry out all military and political missions assigned by the Party.

We must intensify the indoctrination of our troops so as to make them thoroughly understand the Party's lines and precepts, the new situation and [our] new missions; we must teach the troops the working class' viewpoint, unceasingly promote the revolutionary army's [fine] traditions in order to raise higher the absolute revolutionary spirit, the will and determination to fight tenaciously, the spirit of fighting the enemy uninterruptedly until total victory. We must firmly grasp and thoroughly understand the Party's class policy in the task of organizing the army, improve the training of Party members and the building of "Four-good" chapters, unceasingly heighten the Party's class quality and vanguard quality among our cadres, Party members and Party body within the army. We must firmly grasp and thoroughly understand the Party's class policy in the task of organizing the cadres, increasing solidarity among the cadres, training and improving the body of cadres in the army in order to meet the immediate requirements of our fighting and the long-range requirements of our force building, our military and political requirements. We must improve the guidance of the troops' civilian proselyting activities, arrange the participation of the troops in local community work and achieve a closer relationship between the troops and the masses. Attention should be given to the guidance of the armed forces' security and enemy proselyting activities. It is necessary to improve the guidance of political tasks concerning the regional force, militia-guerrilla force and the army's rear services personnel.

e. We must perfect the military organs at various levels and improve the guidance of guerrilla warfare in the local areas. The guerrilla [units] organization must be compact and light; the quality and virtues of military leaders must be perfected to ensure that the latter are able to grasp thoroughly the situation of their subordinates and report in a timely manner to their superiors; we must build and train the military organs at various levels so they become able staff organs of the various Party committees. On the other hand, the Party committee authorities must constantly build up and develop the military organs, and through the Party Military Affairs Committees and military organs, provide guidance to all aspects of military activities in the local

areas so that the system of military command can operate smoothly from the region to the district and village levels.

The military responsibility in the coming period is a heavy one. In order to fulfill this responsibility, Party committee authorities must improve the overall leadership of the people's war, closely combine military offensive with political offensive and military proselyting, properly coordinate actions of the three types of forces in the three strategic areas, ensure the realization of simultaneous attacks during the phase of big offensive as well as during the regular activities, in accordance with the plan of strategic coordination already set forth. At the same time, they must closely combine attacking the enemy with building our forces, strive to develop the armed forces and political forces and build revolutionary bases which are strong in every aspect and which ensure that we are able to fight strongly and for a long period of time, to become stronger as we fight, and to win bigger victories as we fight.

II. INTENSIFY THE CIVILIAN PROSELYTING ACTIVITIES TO CREATE A FIRM BASE FROM WHICH TO PUSH FORWARD THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROSELYTING MOVEMENT IN ORDER TO KEEP PACE WITH THE NEW SITUATION.

A. Since early Spring of 1968 until now we have achieved tremendous political successes, especially following the 1969 Spring-Summer phase; the 10-point overall solution and the emergence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government have, in conjunction with the attacks and uprisings in the battlefield, considerably heightened the political prestige of our people. Everybody sees that the Americans are the losing aggressors, and that the puppets are the collapsing traitors who should be overthrown.

The struggle movement opposing the [enemy's] pacification program, territory encroachment, herding of the people [into centers], and conscription activities has spread widely in the rural area. The struggle movement demanding better living conditions, peace and democracy has developed in the urban areas and has won the sympathy of a growing number of upper-class people, causing the puppet administration to be

increasingly divided, weakened and isolated. The people's guerrilla warfare and [struggle] to win mastership has developed a further step in many cities, [city] bordering areas and areas under enemy temporary control. The defense of the liberated area, the mobilization of human and material resources for the support of the front line, the building of the revolutionary real forces, etc., have scored successes under fierce fighting conditions.

The guidance of Party committee authorities and [popular] organizations has made some progress in the application of precepts and methods of struggling and building political forces in all the three strategic areas.

However, the political and military proselyting movement has developed slowly and has not matched the requirements of the General Offensive and Uprising period and the present favorable opportunity. We have not yet motivated a strong and widespread movement to break up large chunks of the enemy control apparatus in the rural area and heightened the movement in the urban area; we have not yet disintegrated on a large scale the puppet army which is now very much confused. All this has restricted our combined strength in the recent period. The cause of this comes from long-standing shortcomings which are being overcome too slowly:

One: Our civilian proselyting activity is still weak; especially, the Party chapters and popular organizations have not sharply understood the class standpoint and mass viewpoint in carrying out civilian proselyting activities and building revolutionary forces.

Two: The Party committee authorities have not thoroughly guided and promoted the role of the revolutionary organizations, and have not provided close and positive guidance to the political struggle and military proselyting activities.

Three: The popular organizations have not closely associated their activities with the requirements of the common movement; they have not responded to the interests of the masses and have not made good use of their own vertical line of command.

Although suffering repeated military, political and diplomatic setbacks, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are very obdurate. They are striving to intensify activities in pacification, territory encroachment, herding the people [into resettlement centers], and conscripting [youths], and to strengthen their grip on the rural and urban areas by resorting to very savage and wily schemes; at the same time, they are striving to gather the forces of the reactionary parties as a political support designed to hamper the people's struggle and uprising movement, prevent the collapse of the puppet administration and prepare a political force with which to compete with us when a political solution is enforced in South Viet-Nam. However, the mental and political crisis is growing sharply within the puppet army and administration, causing their internal contradictions, their isolation and their weakness to be more acute.

For this reason, the immediate mission of the political movement is to resolutely intensify the civilian proselyting activities from the upper [Party] level down to the Party Chapter level; consolidate and develop the revolutionary organizations as a base for the promotion of a high tide of uprising, political offensive and military proselyting activities; intensify the three-pronged attack with the aim of defeating the enemy's pacification program, break up large chunks of the enemy's oppressive apparatus in the rural area, especially in the Mekong delta and in the jungle-and-mountain area, liberate and control the major part of the rural area, gain control of the basic layer of the population in the urban area, especially in Saigon and other major cities, on the strategic communication axes, and in the areas bordering the cities; broaden the united action front demanding better living conditions, peace, democracy, the overthrow of Thieu-Ky-Huong and the establishment of a peace cabinet; realize the worker-peasant-soldier coalition, and coordinate action with the military and diplomatic offensive in order to win the decisive victory. At the same time, we must be ready to develop our people's strong political enthusiasm when we switch to political struggle and be prepared to struggle tenaciously and decisively in case the enemy obdurately prolongs the war.

B. Activate the political struggle and building of political force in the urban and rural area.

1. Cities and municipalities:

The reality of over one year of General Uprising and Offensive, especially from the 1969 Spring up to now, has brightly demonstrated the big capability and latent strength of the popular movement in the urban area. This movement exists under the surface, in a pre-uprising state. We must resolutely and step by step promote the popular struggle movement into a broad revolutionary high tide, create a new opportunity, and specifically, march forward to win new victories.

a. In order to maintain and develop our continuous attacks against, and encirclement of, the urban area, especially Saigon, by both military and political means, and create conditions for a combined action of military attack and popular armed uprising aimed at winning a big victory when the opportunity comes, it is necessary to firmly grasp the following general requirements and present requirements of the political struggle in the urban area:

- To strive to develop the guerrilla warfare movement in the urban area, considering this as a strategic mission; to make sure that guerrilla warfare becomes a form of partial armed uprising of the people aimed at breaking up the enemy's oppressive yoke step by step.

- On this basis, to intensify the masses' three-pronged attack in coordination with military attacks from the outside in order to seize control and broaden our mastership, in varying degrees, at the grass-roots level.

- At the same time, to intensify the political struggle movement from the lower to the upper level, using the slogans demanding practical rights to democracy and better living conditions in combination with current political slogans, in order to cause permanent political unrest in the urban area, create conditions for the emergence of a broad political high tide which would attract the workers, laborers, urban poor people, school pupils and university students, youths, women, small traders, small owners,...[sic] and even the people of the upper class, the religious forces and the ethnic minorities, especially the Buddhists.

We must win over and divide any force which can be won over and divided, including the pro-French and pro-U.S. elements who want to end the war; we must take advantage of all enemy internal contradictions and isolate to a high degree the most obdurate pro-U.S. puppet officials in order to weaken and overthrow the puppet administration step by step.

- In the process of struggling, to strive to consolidate and develop our political and armed strength in the urban area.

b. At the present time, the struggle in the urban area proceeds following two general directions:

- Concerning the majority of cities, especially large cities, we must intensify military and political attacks in combination with our phase activities in order to cause permanent unrest to the enemy and create conditions for the development of a revolutionary high tide which attacks the enemy both militarily and politically; we must motivate the grass-roots masses to rise up and use the three-pronged attack to smash the puppet administration and seize control at the grass-roots level, thus creating a situation where two administrations are running the cities. At the same time, we must launch a broad political movement attracting patriotic people of all classes and strata, take absolute advantage of all enemy internal contradictions, isolate the most obdurate pro-U.S. puppet officials, weaken the latter and force them to reform step by step, then proceed toward bringing them down.

- Concerning medium-sized and small towns, especially provincial towns in a number of areas in the Mekong delta or in the jungles-and-mountains area we may, relying on the guerrilla warfare movement and permanent political struggle, launch military attacks in combination with popular armed uprising in order to occupy or liberate a number of places.

c. We must further concentrate on the movement of the workers and laborers, the urban poor people, and the small traders and small owners. We must grasp the principal point which is to understand thoroughly the class problem and to take into consideration the workers' and laborers' personal rights and interests in the process of educating, organizing and leading

the latter in their struggle, and in the process of training worker and laborer cadres. Concerning the matter of organization, beside taking advantage of the overt and semi-overt [activities of the workers and laborers] we must actively build up the system of secret labor unions in the cities, boldly recruit sympathizers from the positive masses [sic] and train them to be cadres for the grass-roots labor unions, promote the independent and active qualities of the labor unions, and boldly give work assignments to the labor unions' executive committees or cadres along with reinforcing the leadership of the Party committees and Party Chapters in the horizontal chain of command. We must properly promote the role of the youths, students, pupils and women. At the same time, we must pay attention to the expansion of our force among the upper class and the broadening of the united action front.

d. The central slogan at the present time is still geared toward demanding peace, independence, democracy and better living conditions. The transitional slogan at this time will specifically demand the restoration of peace, the overthrow of Thieu-Ky-Huong, the establishment of a peace cabinet. The use of this transitional slogan should be flexible, practical, and properly adapted to each place, each time, each [social] class and each [political] circle. When the situation develops [as we wish] we will put forth another slogan of a higher [political] scope.

At the present time, we must firmly grasp the question of legal open struggle with the slogan demanding better living conditions, peace and democracy, because this form of struggle has the capacity to mobilize a large following; at the same time, it generates the possibility of using semi-legal transitional methods to broaden the movement and provoke a vigorous uprising of the masses.

e. We must intensify the propaganda and organization operations and develop our revolutionary strength in the cities. Especially, we must carry out the propaganda activities continuously, tenaciously, vigorously and broadly among the masses, using every form and method such as word-of-mouth, public opinion, open press, urban public activities, in order to guide the masses to march forward uninterruptedly.

We should be determined not to let the movement stand still at a low form of struggle. Concerning the matter of organization, we must strive to build up a political struggle assault group in every street, enterprise, market, school ... [sic] which would act as core elements to attract the intermediate class people and the large masses in the political struggles.

g. To further improve the leadership of urban operations, especially operations in large cities, we must provide constant guidance, prepare [our personnel] ideologically, and ready our force and plan so as to be able to rush forward to win greater victories when the opportunity comes. We must firmly grasp the situation in order to be able to provide correct, timely and effective guidance to the [struggle] movement. We must strive to reinforce and improve the body of cadres operating in the cities.

2. Areas bordering cities:

At the present, the bordering and intermediate areas have an increasingly important position, and have become areas of most decisive conflict between our side and the enemy. Winning over the bordering and intermediate areas is a pressing requirement to develop our strategic offensive position, to defeat the enemy strategic defensive measures and schemes, to create solid conditions to go forward to win decisive victory and to be ready to defeat all enemy schemes when there will be a political solution.

a. The most essential tasks of the [struggle] movement in the bordering areas at the present are motivating and organizing the people to push strongly forward the political, military proselyting, and guerrilla warfare offensives, along with strengthening the building of forces with the determination to have a foothold at any cost in the bordering areas, to defeat the enemy schemes to pacify and occupy the bordering areas, to build the bordering area into firm steppingstones from which to attack and encircle the cities, to actively contribute to the development of our strategic offensive position and our strategic encirclement of the enemy on the entire battlefield, and to defeat the enemy's "clear and hold" strategy.

The political struggle in the bordering areas must co-ordinate the three-pronged offensive constantly and broadly, aiming at defeating the enemy schemes of pacification, population re-grouping, troop drafting, building up local puppet administration and civilian self-defense, especially in the areas bordering Saigon and other places. We must strongly push forward the movement [of people] to break out of the concentration areas, strategic hamlets, etc..., in order to produce and fight, to fill up the white areas, to fight against the bulldozing and destruction of the terrain, to fight against banditry and oppression, terrorism and murder directed against the people.

b. In the application of [the Party's] precepts and methods in the bordering areas, it is necessary to maintain and to make use of organizations composed of both overt and covert elements, to make both these forces thoroughly understand the requirements and tasks in the bordering areas, and at the same time it is necessary to have plans to make each element appropriate, and to give it proper guidance. The organizations composed of overt elements mainly operate in accordance with illegal methods while the organizations composed of covert elements must thoroughly grasp the methods of open and legal activities. Both the covert and overt elements must be organized separately and have separate ways of activities (controlled either by Party Chapters or cells), they are directly subordinated to the village Party committees or the Party Chapter committee, in order to be under a unified command, but it is necessary for them to realize that the internal movements and forces are the most important, that on-the-spot leadership is of the utmost importance. Effective aid from outside is very necessary but it should not do the job for the internal forces. The precept and method of building [forces] and operating in the areas bordering the cities might be summarized as follows: For a common task and common objective, we must build two separate forces with two separate methods of operation.

c. To win [political] control of the areas bordering the cities is the pressing and necessary requirement to change the balance of forces in the areas bordering the cities. As soon as the puppet administration is overthrown in one place, we must immediately put the masses in a position of control in that place.

To get control of the areas bordering the cities, or the contested areas, and the weak areas, it is necessary to have good Party chapters, to vigorously kill the tyrants and destroy the enemy control apparatus, to build up organizations which get a firm hold of the forces of the masses, to have solidarity and mutual aid, to struggle for the defense of the personal interests of the masses, to have on-the-spot mass movements to maintain the three-pronged struggle from the low level to the higher level, and to have the necessary external forces to give support, but not to have external forces come in to control. It is on this basis that we gauge whether the degree of control is high or low. In the process of increasing the degree of control, it is necessary to organize appropriate forms of government.

d. If we wish to have widespread and strong movements in the areas bordering the cities, it is necessary to have organizations which have a firm hold on the masses. However, the introduction of the masses into our associations in the areas bordering the cities must not be done in a simplistic manner, tailored to our subjective wishes. It is necessary to strive to develop the Party and the Youth League and make them stable and strong. Concerning the mass associations, on the one hand, it is necessary to give much attention to the building of secret revolutionary associations (workers' unions, peasants' associations, women's associations), and concentrate on improving their quality; efforts to broaden these associations must be accompanied by efforts to maintain tight secrecy and compartmentalization; on the other hand, it is necessary to make thorough use of associations in disguised forms, or open and semi-open associations, in order to rally and mobilize the masses, such as the groups of newspaper readers, the professional mutual-aid associations, etc...

e. Between the areas bordering the cities and the intermediate areas, there exists a close relationship; therefore, while strengthening the leadership in the areas bordering the cities, it is necessary to pay close attention to the intermediate areas. Depending on the changing situation of the enemy and of our side, and depending on different specific places and times, a correct solution to the relations between

the areas bordering the cities and the intermediate areas is to be adopted.

3. The contested areas and other areas still under enemy oppression:

At present, the enemy is still maintaining his control grip on a number of densely-populated rural areas, especially the concentration areas of religious and ethnic minorities, and the refugee settlement areas, in the Mekong delta and in the jungle and mountainous areas.

It is necessary to have a patient and centralized leadership with determination to transform these areas into areas of struggle against enemy oppression, for the purpose of winning political control, liberating the people from the enemy schemes to take control of religious and ethnic minority groups, destroying the enemy sources of manpower and material resources and turning these enemy sources into ours, broadening the liberated areas and areas where we have political control, and creating a new position of encirclement and pressure against the enemy.

It is necessary to organize many operation teams, and armed propaganda teams, which will be given responsibility for specific areas and be composed of cadres experienced in civilian proselyting work. These teams will be specialized in armed propaganda, the killing of tyrants and the building of revolutionary bases. They must be carefully indoctrinated on all lines and policies appropriate to each specific area, and instructed on concrete plans and methods for each given time.

On the basis of propagandizing and motivating the masses to struggle for their own pressing interests, we must enlighten their class and national consciousness, and group them into the various organizations which suit their aspirations; it is not necessary to enlist them immediately into the liberation associations.

In the areas of religious people and ethnic minorities it is necessary to understand thoroughly and constantly inspect

the implementation of the Party's policy concerning the religious people and ethnic minorities; it is necessary to connect directly the interests of the religious and ethnic minorities to the class and national interests. In the missions of recruiting agents and training cadres, it is necessary to pay careful attention to the basic elements among the youths, women, the religious and ethnic minority groups. At the same time, it is necessary to win over the local progressive leaders of these groups, and divide and isolate their obdurate elements. In dealing with the progressive leaders whom we firmly control, it is necessary to know how to make use of their reputation to create favorable conditions for us to broaden our movement and revolutionary bases. The missions of eliminating the traitorous elements among the religious and ethnic groups must be carried out carefully and must have the support of the religious and ethnic masses; otherwise, they would produce adverse consequences, and would create difficulties for our efforts to build up [revolutionary] bases and movements.

Within a definite time, these armed propaganda teams must build up revolutionary bases and organize and lead the masses in their struggle; on that basis, we must transform the masses into participants of guerrilla warfare and win mastership in the villages and hamlets and exercise control, in various forms and at varying degrees depending on the concrete situation of each specific place.

In the areas where we already have bases and movements, where we have the capability to destroy a number of enemy units and exert pressure on the enemy troops, we must resolutely promote the uprising movement in coordination with military attacks in order to liberate large blocs of villages and hamlets or to change them into fiercely contested areas.

In the future, it is necessary to further concentrate leadership on the movement in the religious and ethnic minority areas, especially in the delta of the Mekong River.

4. Liberated rural areas:

Our operations in the liberated areas in the recent past

have achieved some progress, but this progress is still too slow considering our requirements; the liberated areas and our bases in general have not yet become strong and stable, the revolutionary impetus of the masses has not yet been strongly promoted, and the mobilization of manpower and material resources, especially the mobilization of fighting troops, has not yet met the requirements of the frontline. The main reasons are that our leadership in some places and at some times has been loosely exercised in the liberated area, and that we have failed to carefully study the situation in order to provide guidance which is consistent with the new developments in the rural liberated area.

The major characteristic of our liberated rural area, especially in the Mekong delta, is that the peasants have been distributed land; therefore, their living standards have been improved in comparison to the pre-revolutionary period. The feudal economic relations have been eliminated, but because we are still waging a resistance we have only organized the low-level forms of work rotation and labor exchange for mutual aid. The enemy constantly uses economic measures, psychological warfare, decadent culture, etc., to influence and dominate all political, economic and cultural aspects in the rural areas.

Therefore the key problem now in the liberated zone is that we must motivate and unify the peasant bloc, making the peasants aware that they must be determined to fight unceasingly, continue to advance with the Party of the working class; and be resolved to wage the Revolution to the end, and that only by so doing can one keep freedom and livelihood and avoid falling into slavery again. One should rely upon all this to overcome any expression of satisfaction, negative attitude, or delay which have now and then appeared in some places in the countryside, especially in the deep liberated areas. Generally, the peasants' mobilization must aim at:

- Continuously motivating the peasants' ideology and at the same time building up a spirit of absolute and uninterrupted revolution among the peasants and overcoming all the negative aspects of the peasants' thoughts. It is necessary to develop the peasants' revolutionary capability. The thoughts and

standpoint of the working class must be taken as a basis for launching the peasants' indoctrination and motivation movement. The educational slogan "there is nothing more precious than independence and freedom" must be tied up with instilling the working class ideology and viewpoint to the peasants.

- Closely combine mobilizing and leading the peasants to increase production and improve their living standards with leading the peasants in serving the battlefront. Struggle against the enemy's plots to monopolize the economy, and at the same time pay special attention to guiding and organizing the peasants step by step into collective living; first of all, strive to develop and improve the work rotation and work exchange teams, regarding them as the most significant form of organization helping the peasants to progress on the road of collectivization.

- Lead the peasants, particularly the young ones, to resolutely oppose the enemy's enslaving, decadent culture, and to defend the development of our healthy national culture.

- On the basis of motivating peasant solidarity, push strongly forward guerrilla warfare, the construction of combat villages, the movement of killing the enemy to defend our villages, and the defeating of all enemy maneuvers of pacification, sabotage, espionage, psywar and appeals to rally and surrender.

- Make all-out efforts to strengthen the revolutionary administration, promote the role of the revolutionary administration in the mobilization and leadership of the masses to fight, to produce, to improve the living standards, to repress and contain the enemy, to realize the people's political control, and to guard against authoritarian and mandarin-like behavior.

In the above-mentioned tasks, at present the problem of motivating the peasants' ideology is most basic and at the same time most urgent.

On the basis of the requirements for motivating and uniting the peasants as stated above, we must push forward

the building of Party Chapters, Youth Group chapters, guerrilla units, peasants' and women's groups and the establishment of [revolutionary] administrations at every level in the countryside.

C. Strive to strengthen leadership in civilian proselyting activities.

Strengthening leadership in civilian proselyting activities is the foundation for stepping up the political struggle and troop proselyting movements; it is a very urgent and basic requirement in the present period for developing to a high degree the very large revolutionary capability of the masses in the fields of combat and production in order to secure a decisive victory; and it creates basic conditions for increasing our strength when the war ends and prepares us to defeat all enemy plots in the political struggle.

To strongly step up the forthcoming civilian proselyting activities, it is necessary, first of all, to produce a real evolution in the leadership and guidance provided by Party authorities at various levels in the field of civilian proselyting. Such evolution must affect viewpoints and standpoints, substance of the leadership, organization for [project] implementation, and behavior in the performance of duties.

1. The General Offensive and Uprising requires that the Party's task concerning the masses must be further heightened and more thoroughly conducted than in any previous period in order to exploit the inexhaustible force of our people. However, many cadres and Party members have not thoroughly understood the [Party's] class and mass viewpoints and the five basic steps of the civilian proselyting task. Because of that, in the task of propogandizing and motivating as well as organizing and leading the masses in their struggle, there are still deficiencies [such as]: failure to care seriously about the masses' living conditions; failure to closely bind the interests of the masses with those of the revolution; poor and unimaginative methods of rallying the masses; not using the mass associations to mobilize the masses and develop the independent and active role of various organizations; and not developing the mass associations unceasingly.