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7. SOURCE:	CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:	<i>Thomas B. Lynch</i> THOMAS B. LYNCH, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY: (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 28 July 1969, and concerns a memorandum originated ((poss by)) Sub-Region ((5)) providing guidance for study on the significance of the ((1969)) Summer Campaign.

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52 i. Guidance for study of significance of '69 Summer Campaign

(C) Following is a full translation of a captured enemy document. This document was captured on 28 July 1969 in South Vietnam (XT869314; III CTZ) by C/1/16 Inf (M), 3/1st US Inf Div. The document was received at CDEC on 30 July 1969, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 23, 436 dated 2 August 1969 under item 2 of CDEC Document Log Number 08-1071-69.

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----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

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Training document for low level cadre
(equipment to District Party Committee level)
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This document consists of three parts.

- I. Basic concepts of General Offensive and General Uprising.
- II. Significance of the great victory of the spring phase.
- III. Missions, requirements and forthcoming specific tasks.

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I. Basic concepts of General Offensive and General Uprising.

1/ Evolution of the situation:

In 1954, the U.S. rooted up the French ((from Vietnam)) and brought his henchman Ngô Đình Diêm into power in an attempt to realize a neocolony with a dictatorial regime.

In 1960, the spontaneous movement of our people frustrated his attempt, and he had to abandon the scheme of "advance North" to counter the Revolution in South Vietnam which led to an unconventional war.

1965, the unconventional war proved a failure and shifted to a limited one. This was marked by the heavy failure of the two dry season offensives; one in 1965-1966 and one in 1966-1967; and the replacement of the "search and destroy" strategy by the "destroy and pacify" method.

- The simultaneous General Offensive and General Uprising during the 1968 early spring frustrated the enemy "search, destroy and pacify" strategy, and subsequently his "clear and hold" strategy was carried out unsuccessfully.

Results:

- * The U.S. will of aggression is shaky
- * The plan to achieve victory with a military solution has been smashed. The enemy had to stop bombing of the North and accept the four-sided conference at Paris (with the

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attendance of the Front).

* At present the enemy has to face the problem concerning the de-Americanization of the Vietnam war.

2/ The Party policy:

Defeat the enemy systematically; achieve victory step by step: then advance towards the final victory.

The evolution of the situation has proved that the Party policy is correct and sound.

Successes of the policy:

We have achieved many great victories throughout the country.

The General Offensive and General Uprising in the 1968 early spring has opened a new phase favorable to our side and unfavorable to the enemy.

From the highest degree of the war's escalation (in the latter part of 1967), the enemy has had to deescalate this limited war. This has led him to the failure and deadlock of the "clear and hold" strategy.

3/ Strategic determination to conduct General Offensive and General Uprising.-

The strategic determination of the Party is very sound.

a/ Since the General Offensive and General Uprising, the balance of forces between us and the enemy has changed rapidly (already mentioned in the above part).

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b/ Our Party has planned the General Offensive and General Uprising movement based on the balance of power and the favorable opportunities that exist in the country and abroad.

This has advanced the Revolution to a new degree.

- Our military and political forces have been developed both in strength and skill.

- The enemy's strength is increasingly worn down.

In the military field, his strategic defensive systems have weakened, His fighting spirit is seriously lowered.

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In the political field, the Puppet government loses its authority over the people. It is isolated from the people and from the world.

- There exists a deep dissension within the internal organization of the Puppet government and between the Puppets and the U.S.

Neutrals incline to the Revolution.

Such a situation provides good opportunity for our struggles to move forward to a new phase, which is the General Offensive and General Uprising.

c/ Struggle for the decisive victory.

The fundamental objective of the Revolution is to achieve the People's Revolution and carry out democracy and the reunification of the country.

Our immediate objective is to achieve decisive victory. Our Party's determination to reach this objective is well founded and based on the balance of power between the enemy and us.

4/ How to gain decisive victory:

- The main purpose of the revolution in South VN is to achieve the People's Revolution and carry out democracy and the reunification of the country.

- Decisive victory does not mean total or complete victory. It can be attained systematically. However, we should be determined to attain the final achievement.

In this connection, we must defeat the Americans.

All U.S. troops must withdraw from SVN. Our military and political forces must be stronger than those of the Puppet government. Our forces must control a major part of the rural areas, important strategic areas, areas surrounding towns and cities, and a few designated cities.

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This is the prerequisite factor that will pave the way for the establishment of a peaceful, democratic, independent, and neutral SVN.

Basically, there is no change in the achievement of this

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task as prescribed in resolution 8 by N.T ((poss Nam Truong, COSVN)).

However , the effort of strengthening our forces and the assessment of the situation must be more substantial.

5/ Characteristics of the General Offensive and Uprising.

The General Offensive and Uprising is a phase of activity.

This phase should be carried out in such a manner that we will fight the enemy, and at the same time build up our forces.

This will result in rapidly changing the balance of forces and turning the situation in our favor.

By accomplishing this, it will provide favorable conditions for us to achieve a decisive victory in a relatively short period of time.

* The main activity during the phase is to conduct the three-pronged attacks in mountainous and lowland areas.

This is the initiative of our Party. We should coordinate political and military activities during the General Offensive and Uprising, in order to create a powerful force to attack the enemy. (General Offensive and Uprising is not a purely ((military)) general counteroffensive, nor is it a general uprising, such as the 1945 revolutionary uprising).

* The phase ((of activity)) is extremely fierce and complicated, since it is a phase, during which we should attack the enemy continuously and the enemy will continuously counterattack us.

He will try to reoccupy important strategic positions. The situation on our battlefield will be more complex because of the following:

* It is one of the most important battlefields surrounding Saigon-Gia Dinh area.

* Due to the importance of this battlefield, and in face of his recent defeats, the enemy may increase and concentrate his troops to attack us. He may resort to many other schemes and launch fiercer attacks.

* The duration of the phase ((of activities)) will depend on our efforts.

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II. The Success of the Spring Phase of Activities:

A. Significance of the success: (See attached Circular 13)
((TN: The Circular is missing)).

1/ Within a short period of time, we conducted simultaneous attacks, destroying a greater number of U.S. and Puppet forces and war facilities, as compared with the achievements gained in the early spring of 1968.

2/ The enemy's rural pacification plans were unsuccessful in numerous areas. Many enemy local authorities and civil defense force members were suppressed. His oppressive control over the population was broken.

We enlarged our areas of operation and destroyed the enemy's security, police, "Chieu Hoi", and psychological warfare forces, even in some province capitals and cities.

We also intensified our activities to kill tyrants, break up the enemy's oppressive control over the population, and disorganize his local authorities.

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We built up our revolutionary force and controlled hamlets and villages.

3/ The people rose up and coordinated their activities with those of the armed forces in local areas to break the enemy's oppressive administration and control of the rural areas and towns and cities.

4/ We improved our leadership, heightened our determination, complied with policies and carried out the General Offensive and Uprising successfully.

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5/ Our uprising was unrelentingly conducted and the enemy intensified his sweep operations, especially in the spring phase. It is now possible for us to initiate the next offensive on a larger scale.

B. Victories Scored by our Sub-Region During the Winter-Spring Phase:

1/ We succeeded in destroying a large part of the enemy forces and war facilities. We also killed a great number of enemy terrorists and administrative personnel, especially in areas surrounding the city.

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2/ The enemy's accelerated pacification scheme was systematically neutralized.

- The enemy could not reestablish his oppressive control system. In some areas his pacification teams were established but they were ineffective.

- Our agents continued to hold on to areas they controlled, in order to fight the enemy,

3/ The movement of breaking the enemy's oppressive control and killing tyrants continued to progress. Control over a number of hamlets was regained and maintained. In addition, we intensified our activities in many hamlets in Chau Thanh, midland areas, front areas, areas surrounding cities and adjacent to province capitals. Besides these successes, we also destroyed the enemy's forces and smashed his pacification activities in many areas. We encircled the enemy and drove him into a defensive position and succeeded in launching unremitting attacks against him.

4/ We improved our leadership and knowledge of the policy guidelines.

Our troops were brave and always displayed determination to hold on to the ground we controlled and fight the enemy.

However, we still experienced many weaknesses:

1/ The development of revolutionary forces was still slow and did not meet the requirements.

2/ The political and military proselyting movement was weak in comparison with armed activities. Therefore, our victories were limited.

The three-front attack was not closely coordinated.

Attacks on enemy pacification personnel were still weak and the guerrilla warfare was carried out on a small scale.

- The uprising movement was not simultaneously carried out in various areas which were not capable of supporting each other.

- The movement was not uniformly carried out in various villages of a specific area.

- Control was not extended to all areas surrounding the cities.

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4/ Our forces were small and still weak. However, the basic ideological viewpoint was improved.

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Our troops were brave and displayed a high determination ((to fight)). However, the level of knowledge and the assessment of the enemy's situation left much to be desired.

Concerning the ideology of our troops, they still shrank from their duty, displayed "wait and see" and rightist attitudes and relied on the higher echelons.

The leadership and operating methods left much to be desired.

Cadre's knowledge was still poor.

5/ Our troops failed to continuously motivate the people on a broad front.

6/ Combat plans were not properly carried out, Cadre did not thoroughly understand ((their missions)).

The liaison, from higher to lower echelons, was not successfully maintained.

Our forthcoming plans and activities:

a/ Enemy troops:

- The enemy troops have been seriously defeated, especially during the 1969 Spring Phase. Their "clear and hold" strategy came to a standstill.
- The Puppet government and troops are demoralized.
- Their accelerated pacification program has not been successfully carried out.

The above failures have caused the enemy to fail in carrying out his de-Americanization scheme of the war in VN.

Dissensions exist between the U.S. and allied forces, and between the U.S. and Puppet army, and within the Puppet army itself.

In view of this situation, ((President)) Nixon's government has made a hasty decision for a ((new)) future policy, ((sic)),

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b/ Friendly troops:

Although we meet many difficulties, the situation is favorable to strengthen and expand the struggle movement.

- Cadre, Party members, and soldiers are brave and never fear making sacrifices.

c. Based on such a favorable situation, our forthcoming activities will be very important and significant. (This problem must be carefully discussed).

III. Our forthcoming missions:

(see resolution and plan of the Sub-Region).

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