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7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Thomas B. Lynch</i> THOMAS B. LYNCH, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report is a full translation of a J2, Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam study of information pertaining to the start of an attack campaign on the first day of the lunar year (Ky Dau Tet). The study is a compilation of VC/NVA documents which were captured on 26 January 1969 at XT581023 by the 25th US Infantry Division. The individual documents used in this study have already been published by the Combined Document Exploitation Center. Interpretation of the documents by J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, has not yet been fully correlated with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam interpretation as set forth in this study and may differ in some specific areas. These documents were summarized under CDEC Document Log Number 09-0518-69.

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*P.H.F.'S
 SUPPLEMENTARY
 INFO. ON COSVHS
 RESOLUTION 8-
 (SEE CDEC'S
 COMMENTS)*

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APO 4.002, 3 Feb 69
VC DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

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No. 024/69

LVMH/01/2/69/STC

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
JGS, RVNAF
J2

No. 0399/TTM/2/TKITLHH

I. SUBJECT: Information on "the initiating of an attack campaign on the first day of the lunar year (Ky Dau Tet)."

Important supplementary information concerning Resolution No. 8 issued by the Central Office.

II. CIRCUMSTANCE OF CAPTURE:

Documents were captured by the 25th US Infantry Division on 26 Jan 69 in the vicinity of XT581023 (Binh Duong).

III. CONTENT:

Document is a notebook belonging to Phan Tung Sang, a cadre of Tan Binh District unit/Sub-Region 2 and entries are dated 7 through 11 Dec 68. They reveal the following information:

A. Information on "the initiating of an attack campaign on the 1st day the lunar year.

1/ Reference Documents:

On the back cover of the notebook Sang noted the dates considered by the Communists as red-letter dates in SVN:

The document read as follows

Explanatory notes by CDEC

-The 2nd Campaign started

-On 4 May 68

on 4 May.

- BTHBLMCLL ((sic)) was activated in May 68.

- The abbreviation of "National, Peaceful, Democratic Allied Force"

- Paris Conference on 11 May 68.

- The dates the probative conference ((in Paris)) was conducted.

- The US stopped bombing NVN on 1 Nov 68.

- The overall bombing halt over NVN.

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- The initiating of an attack campaign on the first day of the lunar year. - (see the "assessment" part below)

2/ Questionable Point:

There are two following hypotheses for the last sentence mentioned in the document: "the initiating of an attack campaign on the first day of the lunar year."

- Possibly, the document refers to a "future" attack campaign to be conducted on the first day of the lunar year or the first day of Ky Dau Tet.

- Possibly, it may refer to the last General Offensive launched on the first day of Mau Than Tet.

3/ Assessment:

- According to the dates mentioned in the document, the "first day of the lunar year" must have come after Nov 68 (the date the document was written). So it is possible that the first day of the lunar year means the first day of Ky Dau Tet (?).

- Based on the writing in the document, we also have arrived at the same conclusion. Since the four sentences in the document were written in red ink with a ball-point pen; this is the same ink used ((by Sang)) to take notes while studying Resolution No. 8 on 7 Dec 68. But the sentence "the initiating of an attack campaign on the first day of the lunar year" was written in blue ink with a ball-point pen. This was the same ink used to take notes after studying Resolution No. 8. This means that it was written after 7 Dec 68. So "the first day of the lunar year" can be understood as having a "future" meaning, i.e. the first day of Ky Dau Tet.

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However, due to the following facts we cannot conclude that ((the date mentioned in the document)) is referring to the first day of Ky Dau Tet.

- The order of attack has a strategic characteristic and if it is to be executed throughout the country (General Offensive), it is natural that such an order cannot be disseminated more than two months in advance (since Dec 68).

- Sang is only a cadre at district level, so it is impossible that he would have been informed of an order of attack which has such strategic characteristics. In addition, the times and dates of the attacks were classified as "absolute secret, under no circumstances will they be made known to cadre and troops as training materials, or as resolutions."

- Based on previously captured documents, it is known that the time and dates for conducting General Offensives throughout the country usually are made known 15 days in advance. Then they would be reaffirmed seven days

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before the General Offensive; and then the decision for conducting or postponing the general offensive would be given.

For these reasons if we consider that the ((date mentioned in the document)) is the first day of Kỳ Dậu Tet, it is not logical.

4. Conclusion:

The sentence mentioned in the document can be understood to mean that, the author ((Sang)) means the 1st Campaign of the General Offensive was conducted on the first days of Mậu Thân Tet and he wrote it at the bottom of the page as an N.B.

However, when analysing documents, it is necessary that we record that this deduction is a significant "fact."

B. Important supplementary information concerning Resolution No.8 of the Central Office.

In CDEC's VC Document Analysis No.21/69 (referring to the documents for reorientation in fall, 1968, based on Resolution No.8 of R ((COSVN)), prepared by the Political Departments, Headquarters, Liberation Army); we mentioned all significant points of Resolution No.8 issued by the Central Office. Following are some important details concerning this Resolution which were revealed in the document.

1. Characteristics:

The document clearly states that "this resolution refers to the achievement of the decisive victory and the ending" of (the war). The forthcoming battle will be the decisive one; therefore, efforts should be made to achieve victories within a relatively short period of time.

2. Features:

Exposed ideological weaknesses are "passive rightism, hesitation to fight, and reliance ((sic)).

✓ "Acceptance of making sacrifice" in the coming attack. The acceptance of making sacrifices is repeated twice in the document. So, it is evident that the Communists have decided to "sacrifice the lives of their troops" in the future General Offensive.

- They planned to launch attacks against cities, province capitals, district seats, and especially in the main battlefield, which is Saigon Capital, in order to destroy the central government and our key agencies.

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They conducted simultaneous offensives (throughout the country) in the three areas (mountains and forests; lowlands; and rural and urban areas).

They made elaborate preparations to insure successive and long term attacks against the prescribed objectives (in areas)

- Their policy was to defeat us in the main battlefield and to seize overall control of the three areas

IV CDEC COMMENTS:

1/ Communist strategic determinations through Resolution No 8, R:

In this Resolution, the Communists decided to conduct a General Offensive and Uprising which would be "decisive and end the war". These campaigns of attack were planned to be conducted with the 1968-1969 Winter-Spring Campaign. The main objective was Saigon, since they have planned to destroy the central government and our key agencies. So, it is obvious that the Communist still plan to attack Saigon, an objective which would give them a decisive victory if they succeeded.

2/ Characteristics of Resolution NO 8:

This is an important resolution. If it is expressed in correct VC terms it must be referred to as a resolution ((cover plan of)) of "attacks and assaults". This resolution covers the content of Resolution No 13 issued by the NVN Central Party in which the Communists have planned to initiate a General Offensive and Uprising, designed to achieve victories "within a relatively short period of time."

In addition, Resolution No 8 also covers main points of Resolution No 6 and 7 issued by the General Office. Resolution No.6 (referring to the conduct of the 2nd General Offensive) and Resolution No.7 (referring to the conduct of the 3rd General Offensive?) In these two Resolutions, the Communists planned to launch attacks against cities and occupy all the rural areas. Resolution No.8 also covers the same plan and it also states that attacks should be made against Saigon Capital and the whole country.

They are designed to achieve a decisive victory and to end the war.

In the propaganda field, Resolution No.8 was designed to promote the troops' determination to fight in the forthcoming phase. In the strategic field, Resolution No 8 emphasizes a plan to conduct a strong and decisive General Offensive in the winter-spring of 1968-1969. In the tactical field, Resolution No.8 reveals the Communist's intention to launch attacks against cities with emphasis placed on the attack against ((Saigon)) Capital. However, Resolution No.8 also mentions that guerrilla warfare activities conducted throughout the country be designed to liberate rural areas for the establishment of ((Communist)) hamlet and village governments.

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3/ Comments:

The supplementary details concerning Resolution No.8 are very important, since they reveal the communist's military intentions in the winter and spring of 1968-1969, especially the 1969 spring.

As regard to the sentence mentioned in the document "the initiating of an attack campaign on the first day of the lunar year" special attention should be paid to it. If a large-scale attack (General Offensive) will not be launched; then we may conduct military activities to commemorate the date on which the General Offensive was initiated.

-----END OF TRANSLATION-----