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NLF OPERATIONS VS. G.V.N. PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

September 1969

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1. (14) THE GVN'S CONCEPT OF AN UNPAID, VOLUNTEER CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PROPERTY AT VILLAGE AND HAMLET LEVEL ORIGINATED AS EARLY AS 1966. HOWEVER, THE IDEA WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED UNTIL AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968. VIRTUALLY ENLISTING THE ENTIRE POPULATION IN EITHER ITS ARMED OR SUPPORT GROUPS, THE PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE ORGANIZATION HAS SINCE THEN INCREASINGLY GROWN TO THE POINT WHERE, BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1969, IT HAD OVER TWO MILLION CITIZENS ON ITS MEMBERSHIP ROLLS. ALTHOUGH NOT ALL OF THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN EITHER FORMALLY TRAINED OR ARMED, THEY NEVERTHELESS CONSTITUTE A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE TO THE VC'S EFFORTS AT THE "RICE-ROOTS" LEVEL.

2. (15) BASED SOLELY ON ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM, THE LOGIC BEHIND THE VC'S TARGETING OF THIS ORGANIZATION CAN BE SEEN. HOWEVER, WHILE STATISTICS DO NOT TEND TO WHOLLY SUBSTANTIATE THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH TARGETING, BOTH AGENT REPORTS AND CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS DO. ON THE BASIS OF AN ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION, IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT THE VIET CONG ARE NOT ONLY TARGETING THIS PARAMILITARY ELEMENT OF THE GVN ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN, BUT ALSO THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE AT AN INCREASED RATE.

VIET CONG TARGETING
OF THE PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

1. (C) INTRODUCTION.

- a. The original concept of the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) was born of the overhauling of the Government of Vietnam's Revolutionary Development program in 1966. The purpose of the PSDF is to provide for the motivation, training, and arming of villagers in their own home defense. In June 1967, the Ministry of Revolutionary Development transformed this intention into action by publishing a document which provided for the creation of hamlet Self-Defense Forces in rural areas. This concept embodied the idea of organizing unpaid volunteer civilians to provide active and passive defense of hamlets throughout the Republic of Vietnam. However, due to lethargy in implementing this program and other circumstantial factors, little was accomplished prior to the Tet Offensive of 1968.
- b. During the VC/NVA Tet Offensive of 1968 and immediately afterward, a large number of Vietnamese citizens and civil organizations appealed to the GVN for arms to defend themselves, their families, and their property from any future attacks. Many of those who sought the assistance were city dwellers who, until Tet, had not experienced the full impact of the enemy's force. Responding to these appeals, the GVN initiated the People's Self-Defense Force Program with a provision in the Mobilization Law of 19 June 1968.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION AND GROWTH.

- a. Originally providing for the participation of all able-bodied male citizens within the 16 - 17 and 39 - 50 age brackets in armed groups and the voluntary participation of all other citizens in PSDF support activities, this program has since been modified to allow women from the ages of 16 to 50, boys and girls from the ages of 13 to 15, and men over 50 years of age to be organized voluntarily into PSDF Female Support Groups, Youth Self-Defense Groups, and Elders Self-Defense Groups, respectively. The primary objectives of this entire structure are to: (1) involve the maximum number of citizens in support of the GVN and its political and security objectives, (2) provide the people with the means to defend their families, homes, and villages, hamlets against enemy infiltration, subversion, and attack, (3) assist the National Police and the ARVN in maintaining security and public order, (4) promote community development activities for self-help and improvement of villages and hamlets in both rural and urban areas, and (5) assist the police in identifying and capturing the enemy.

b. Great success in organizing popular support for this program has been realized to date. After an initial surge of organizational activity, the size of the PSDF structure has gradually increased until by the end of September 1969 over two million persons have been enrolled countrywide under the provisions of the program. This figure represents a sum exceeding the goal set for the end of calendar year 1969. Of these people, over one million have received some degree of formal training and over 350,000 have been issued weapons. Only half of the PSDF members have been trained so far because the tremendous size of the organization slows the training process. Not all of those who are members are armed since not all are enrolled in the armed elements of the organization and those who are in armed groups rotate weapons among themselves.

c. The overall security contributions of the PSDF organization are considered to be rather modest. However, the political dividends it has accrued for the GVN are substantial in terms of the popular participation in the war. This fact has not in any way been lost on the Viet Cong. (See para 4c.)

3. (C) STATISTICS ON TARGETING OF PSDF MEMBERS. The question of whether or not the VC are actively and intentionally targeting members of the PSDF is open to some debate. The statistics on the number of PSDF personnel assassinated, wounded, and killed do not show a steady increase which corresponds with the rapid rise in the number of PSDF members. (See Annex B.) Nevertheless, the fact that the selective targeting of the PSDF organization is being conducted by the VC is indicated in captured documents. The lack of a substantial increase in the number of PSDF members affected by the selective terrorism should not be interpreted as a failure on the part of the VC to recognize the threat posed by this GVN organization to their ambitions. Rather, it is more properly interpreted as merely a failure of the VC to mount a successful campaign of neutralizing the force.

4. (C) LOGIC BEHIND VC TARGETING.

a. That the VC would target the PSDF is logical merely from the standpoint of an analysis of the objectives hoped to be attained by the GVN with its creation. Any program such as the PSDF, which is designed to involve the maximum number of citizens in the support of the GVN and of its political and security objectives is a natural object for neutralization by the VC. The VC cannot afford to allow the GVN to usurp them at the "rice-roots" level of the villages and hamlets, where they have traditionally derived their greatest support. If the GVN is able to make successful inroads into this base of support, the VC will find themselves deprived of necessary support for furthering their insurgency.

b. Prior to the inception of this program, the VC were capable of entering villages and hamlets almost at will and of terrorizing the rural populace, impressing troops and laborers, spreading propaganda, and extorting money and supplies. However, with the creation and successful implementation of the PSDF organization, the people have been given the capability of defending themselves, their families, and their property against such enemy incursions. Accordingly, the enemy capacity to roam the countryside has been greatly restricted. Thus, along with the successful implementation of the other aspects of the GVN Accelerated Pacification Campaign, this program is to a great extent responsible for the many reports from throughout the country that indicate the VC effort is faltering and that supplies are wanting.

c. The enemy's program to win the support of the populace by positive means has been successfully challenged by the community development aspects of the PSDF program. The GVN has been able to mobilize the people in a self-help program of public works, mass education, social relief, medical aid, and cultural advancement. By so designing this program, the GVN has been able to demonstrate to the people that it is concerned about them, but that, at the same time, it recognizes that only their participation can make the government's programs more meaningful. As a result, the government has reaped the reward of greater identification with the people. This support has come at the expense of the VC who are handicapped in their efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of the people by their lack of financial and material resources and who have been increasingly forced to resort to terrorist methods to obtain their logistics requirements. Except in the Delta, the enemy has been singularly unable to establish a comparable and competitive public services program.

d. The PSDF poses a further threat to the Viet Cong Infrastructure in its role as an extension of the GVN police forces. Where the PSDF is effective, VC cadre can no longer operate with impunity. The utilization of the PSDF to assist the police in identifying and capturing VC operatives as well as in the general maintenance of security and public order has forced the enemy to operate more and more in a covert fashion. The enemy's effort to proselyte the people has been handicapped.

5. (C) TARGETING OF PSDF AS INDICATED IN DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS.

a. The fact that the VC recognize the role of the PSDF is evidenced by a document captured in IV CTZ early in 1969. It describes the PSDF as a GVN "auxiliary troop" whose main function is to serve as an "armed force to protect the outskirts of cities or those areas bordering lines of communication still under their (GVN) provisional control."


Further, the enemy views this organization as a "growing opposition force" which has created "some significant difficulties" by effectively disrupting VC "possession of population, territory, and property." Admitting that this "clever plot" had gone undiscovered for a period of time and, when recognized, had been underestimated, the VC Tra Cu District Committee in Vinh Binh Province ordered its subordinate agencies to determine the best methods of combating the PSDF and to report those achieving any measure of success for further study and dissemination. This would, it was felt, aid the enemy's task of "overrunning the cities" and thereby continue their series of "successes."

- b. Tactics employed by the enemy have varied somewhat throughout the country. Several reports from Binh Thuan Province, however, are typical of those methods which have been utilized most frequently throughout the RVN. These include: (1) paralysis of the PSDF via the interjection of penetration agents into its structure; (2) propagandizing the people to "struggle against (the) 'GVN Pacification and Development Program'", (3) appealing to local PSDF members to make self-confessions and deliver weapons to the "Revolution", and (4) employing such measures as assassination, kidnapping, and impressment for indoctrination courses against those who do not respond to their appeals. The VC in Pleiku Province have even gone so far as to, in at least one instance, offer carbine rifles to all villagers who wish to "protect the villages from destruction by US and ARVN forces". In this case, the enemy is, in effect, organizing a VC PSDF.

6. (C) SUCCESS OF PSDF. Enemy attempts to combat the PSDF organization have been largely unproductive. The size of the structure has continued to increase and will do so for the foreseeable future. The GVN has devoted much time and effort to the creation and maintenance of PSDF elements, keeping in mind that each member is a current or prospective voter who will support the government's cause. For this reason, it will continue to emphasize this organization as a key element in its pacification program. Should a coalition government become a reality, it is at the village and hamlet level that its composition will be determined. Thus, both sides will attempt to gain the backing of the people at that level. As the GVN makes increasing progress in the organization of the PSDF structure, enemy attacks on it can be expected to increase.

7. (C) CONCLUSION. The enemy is targeting the PSDF, albeit unevenly. Although statistical data is at present rather inconclusive for use in producing trends with regard to such targeting, documentary evidence and agent reports verify that the enemy is giving new emphasis to the neutralization of the PSDF. The PSDF represents a great threat to the VC at the "rice-roots" level, where the war's outcome will eventually be determined. The VC feel that they cannot allow it to develop unhampered in its growth and unhindered in its extension into the VC "liberated" areas and the contested areas.


PSDF ORGANIZATION CHART



ANNEX A

ORGANIZATION CHART OF A PSDF COMBAT GROUP

(Number of Members in Each Element)



TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST PSDF MEMBERS

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ASSASSINATED					
JAN	7	20	2	8	37
FEB	6	23	8	25	62
MAR	14	34	6	23	77
APR	7	16	5	23	51
MAY	7	8	4	21	40
JUN	5	18	15	30	68
JUL	3	7	8	43	61
AUG	14	15	7	15	51
SEP	20	14	13	12	59
ABDUCTED					
JAN	3	0	43	7	53
FEB	0	14	140	89	243
MAR	3	23	60	35	124
APR	10	2	34	27	73
MAY	7	7	50	27	91
JUN	18	11	14	24	67
JUL	4	4	46	15	69
AUG	8	5	34	14	61
SEP	47	32	22	107	208
WOUNDED					
JAN	0	9	18	15	42
FEB	7	29	28	38	102
MAR	13	58	25	28	124
APR	9	17	20	16	62
MAY	11	17	16	44	88
JUN	9	24	59	36	128
JUL	21	8	26	52	107
AUG	14	26	7	35	82
SEP	13	21	14	36	84

ANNEX B

It is a safe area for our troops to rest and reorganize and is useful as a stepping stone ((VC term for a controlled area used to obtain access to uncontrolled areas)).

It is also an area useful for the storage of our materials, for construction of dispensaries, and for maintenance of certain agencies.

c. In the economic field

The border is the area supplying us with materials, food, and medicines, etc ((sic)).

II. THE IMPORTANT SIGNIFICANCE OF MISSIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER.

We should realize the necessity of winning Cambodia over to our side because Cambodia is not only of strategic significance to us and the enemy, but also of importance to the Communist Bloc in its fight against the Capitalist Bloc.

If the US succeeds in defeating us in Cambodia, she will have a foothold from which to attack our bloc and cause many difficulties for our Resistance.

Our cadre and soldiers should clearly realize the following points:

1. The voice of Cambodia has a definite effect because it is the voice of a neutral country. It exerts considerable influence upon the countries under colonialist domination. It can publicize our just cause in Kampuchia and all over the world.

2. The border is a place where the enemy collects important intelligence information.

The revolutionary activities of the friendly Party ((Cambodian Communist Party)):

(Attention: Be very skillful when lecturing on this part. Do not mention as if conditions are not favorable).

3. Kampuchia provides our resistance with manpower and material resources.

4. Cambodia accomodates our important elements.... etc ((sic)).

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III. THE REASON WHY WE LIVE ON THE FRIENDLY TERRITORY, OUR SHORTCOMINGS AND CAUSES.

1. Purpose:

The reason for us being stationed on the border is due to the practical requirements of our missions.

-----FULL TRANSLATION-----

((Page 1 of Item 1 of O.T.))

SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ARMY
POLITICAL SECTION, S22 ((possibly
Rear Service Group 82, Rear Service
Staff Department, SVNLA Headquarters))
No. 02/TS

OUTLINE OF A LECTURE CONCERNING THE BORDER AREA

Based on Directive No. 30/CT and 23/H of the SVNLA Party Committee concerning the ((Cambodian)) border problem, ((the political section)) A2 prepared this outline for unit commanders in the Group to indoctrinate their units to fully understand the above mentioned directives and to ensure good implementation of regulations concerning the border area.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF K ((CAMBODIA)) BORDER AT THE PRESENT TIME.

a. In the political field.

We have succeeded in persuading our friends ((Cambodia)) to counter the Americans, mobilize more forces for our support, strengthen the Indochinese Front against the Americans, and isolate the US and Puppets.

We have made the friendly people (the people of a bourgeois country which practices nationalism) realize the noble regime and ethics of our people.

Realizing our just cause, the friendly local government and people have effectively supported our troops to isolate the Americans. Our just cause was highlighted.

We have conducted propaganda activities on our successes and the enemy's failures.

We should respect the independence, national sovereignty, and the border of Cambodia.

We have understood our principles of peaceful co-existence.

b. In the military field.

The ((Vietnamese-Cambodian)) border is over 1,000 kilometers long. It provides us with manpower and material resources.

Attention: The Vietnamese residents who have joined the Resistance are numerous. The border is a safe area which is advantageous for our troops but disadvantageous for the enemy.

It is a source of supply and serves as a bridge linking us with the Communist Bloc.

This does not mean that we are afraid of the enemy and flee away from him or that we are not revolutionary soldiers. We should live up to the code of the revolutionary soldier.

Our attitude towards the Cambodian people and the sovereignty of Kampuchia (five principles of peaceful co-existence) is based on mutual support for the benefit of both parties.

2. Weaknesses:

Our personnel did not strictly observe the regulations concerning the border (such as those on the shooting of firearms and the schedule set for traveling to markets and hamlets).

Our personnel were unfair in their transactions with the Cambodia villagers.

They despised the Khmer people and were impolite to them.

They committed grave violations which compromised the soldier's prestige (such as: Theft, robbery, and seduction). Some of them did not observe the border regulations and were disarmed and imprisoned by the Khmer authorities. Others were arrested and beaten. This seriously hurts the prestige of the Liberation Army.

3. Causes:

The political indoctrination has not been regularly and continuously conducted by all echelons.

The main subjects of the indoctrination have been poor and have not been practical for the situation.

The organization was loose and did not meet the requirements of the situation. For instance, we did not have specific regulations on movements, messing, billeting, and social acquaintances.

IV. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION

1. The Party Committees should hold a meeting to study this outline and review the general situation of their units.

2. After the meeting of the Party Committees, all units should study this outline in one night and discuss it together on another. The discussion should be centered on the first two parts of the outline and on the review of strong and weak points. The units must submit reports on the strong and weak points of their personnel to A2.

3. All units must submit their reports to A2 no later than 25 May 69. Particularly, the units in the border areas must send their reports immediately ((to A2)).

20 Mar 69
For the Political Section of the Group
/S/ Nguyễn Chí Trung

((Handwritten note))

Requirements for platoon and company cadre and higher ((unspecified)): ((They should understand)) the strategic importance of this matter and realize that Cambodia is our base and also that of the Headquarters, SVNLA.

Requirement for combatants: They must bear in mind that complying with the border regulations is preserving the prestige and reputation of the Revolution and that of our army.

The indoctrination of this outline should be conducted in the form of a political reorientation.

((Page 1 of Item 2 of O.T.))

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

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Unit: NL 20.026, Group 94 ((possibly an element of 260th Bn, 94th Straggler Recovery and Replacement Regiment, Headquarters, SVNLA))

Full Name: Lê Văn Tâm

Cover Name: Lê Thanh Công

Commonly used name: Lê Thanh Công

Date of birth: 1935

Rank: Platoon Leader

Date of rank: Jan 65

Position: Company Executive Officer

Date of position: Jul 67

Date infiltrated B ((SVN)): ((blank))

Group: ((blank))

Armed service: Sapper engineer

Date and place joined the Revolution:

Apr 53 as a member of the Administrative Section in Long Thanh District, Bien Hoa Province.

Date enlisted: Apr 53

Date discharged: ((blank))

Date re-enlisted: ((blank))

Date and place admitted to the Party, Probationary: 7 May 63 at 207 NX ((unit))

Official: 7 May 64

Highest position in the Party: Party cell leader

Sponsor 1: Lê Văn Bó¹, Party member, Squad Leader 74 ((possibly Unit 74))

Sponsor 2: Phạm Văn Tét (207 NX ((Unit))) aka Tú Tét, Chapter Party Committee member and Company Executive Officer, Sapper 74 ((possibly 74th Sapper Unit)).

Social class:

Original: Middle Farmer

Present: Middle Farmer

Nationality: Vietnamese

Religion: None

Education: Three years of schooling.

Foreign language background: ((blank))

Area of operation: Y4 ((possibly former Saigón-Gia Binh Military Region)).

Number of battles participated in: I have participated in 13 battles froms platoon to battalion-size in Gia Binh.

Training courses attended (duration and school year): I attended a one-year sapper training course conducted by Kiến Tường Province in 1960, a three-month training course for Platoon Leaders conducted by K19/74 ((Unit)) in 1963, and a four-month engineer training course conducted by R ((COSVN)) in 1966.

Awards: (From E) ((possibly regiment and above))

One certificate of commendation and one Second Class Medal.

Discipline: (Mention the time, form of discipline, reason, and level of the organization which gave the punishment).

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The Party Chapter extended my probationary term for three months because of my refusal to attend an engineer training course.

Health and wounds: (Mention the battle, date, and present health status). I was wounded and my left leg crippled by a grenade of the US Special Forces during an attack on their troops while they moved to attack Trảng Bàng on Route 1. Presently, my health is fair.

Place of birth and residence: Phú Hữu² village, Long Thành District, Biên Hòa⁴ Province.

Residence: ((blank))

Summary of family and individual status, and wife's family and social relationship before the August Revolution ((1945)).

My family possessed four buffaloes, one pair of oxen, and 70 to 80 bushels of unhusked rice after every harvest. From 1945 to 1954, my family had only three buffaloes remaining and the oxen were sold. They were also only getting 40 to 50 bushels of unhusked rice from every harvest. When peace was restored, my family situation remained the same.

Father's Name: Lê Văn Chờn (alive).

Mother's Name: Luồng Thi Diêu (deceased)

Economic status: My father and my sister made their living by farming and obtained a yield of 150 bushels of unhusked rice each harvest. Each year, there were 30 extra bushels ((sic)).

Political background in the first Resistance: No one in my family worked for the enemy. I have three brothers who joined the Revolution in 1954. One of them was killed in action and the two others regrouped to NVN. I still continue to perform revolutionary activities in SVN. My uncle's son was also regrouped to NVN in 1954.

In 1963, my three nephews and my youngest brother-in-law enlisted in the army.

Wife's family: Two of my uncles joined the Revolution. They are now operating in the province.

Wife and children: (Mention their names, occupations, present residence, and living conditions).

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Wife's name: Pham Thi Suối is a farmer residing in Tân Phú Trung village.

Names of children: Lê Thị Tỏi

Lê Thị Trón

Summarize your activities from age 8 to the day you joined the Revolution.

From 8 to 10 years old I went to school.

From 10 to 17 years old I was a buffalo herder and farmer.

On my 17th birthday, I joined the Revolution and have continued to serve since.

Were you ever arrested or imprisoned by the enemy ? Clearly describe the reason with date and location of detention. Did you reveal any secrets ? Has the charge already been cleared or not ? Never been arrested.

Past activities from the day joining the Revolution to date:

	Time	Rank	Position and Unit	Position in the Party	Authorities
I returned to perform political tasks at Gia Binh till 20 Aug 58. I then transferred to serve in the Nha Be District Unit.	April 53	Soldier	Member of the Administrative Section of the Long Thanh District Unit	((blank))	Long Thanh District Unit
	20 Aug 58 ((crossed out in O.T.))	Assistant Platoon	Assistant Platoon Leader of 207 NX (Y4) Tinh Gia ((sic))	Party cell Leader	Commander of MR Y4
	1 Jul 61	Assistant Platoon	Assistant Platoon Leader of 207 NX (Y4) Tinh Gia ((sic))	Party member	Commander of MR Y4
	Jan 65	Platoon Leader	Platoon Leader NX, (Y4) Tinh Gia ((sic))	Party cell leader	Commander of MR Y4
	Jul 67	Platoon Leader	Company Executive Officer of 207 NX (Y4) Tinh Gia ((sic))	Party cell leader	Commander of MR Y4.
	26 Nov 68	Platoon Leader	Company Executive Officer, C2. Convalescence ((Unit)) 0.82 ((sic))	Cell leader	Huynh Hai, Cell Leader, C2

SELF-CRITIQUE STATEMENT

I always have a firm ideological concept. I am determined to fight the enemy to the end. When I operated in the Củ Chi and Gia Định battlefields, inspite of the enemies fierce attacks, I was not demoralized or confused. I guided the unit to attack the enemy and did not suffer casualties but achieved many victories.

Since the day I was wounded and transferred to the convalescence unit, I have always proven to be an outstanding cadre by enthusiastically participating in all types of activities.

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Weak points: I am hot tempered. Once, I disagreed with the working procedures of the Command Committee of C2 and resigned my position as a member of the ((military)) council.

Aspirations, requests, and suggestions:

Request that my Commission Certificate be given by a higher echelon. I will accomplish all missions assigned by the Party and unit.

Next of kin: Father, Le Van Chon, residing at Phú Hữu² Village, Long Thành, Biên Hoà.

Certified by the Unit Commander
((blank))

1 Oct 69
The declarant
/S/ Lê Thanh Công

Past activities

Time	Rank	Position and Unit	Position in the Party	Authorities
((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))	((5))
Apr 53	Soldier	Member of the Administrative Section, Long Thành District Unit, Biên Hoa	((blank))	District Unit
Sep 54		Transferred to operate at Phú Hữu, Long Thành District.	((blank))	Trần Bình Khe ¹ District Unit Leader
Jan 55		Returned to operate at Nhà Bè, Tân Thuận Village	((blank))	((blank))
20 Aug 58	Soldier	Member of the armed forces of Nhà Bè District ((unit))	((blank))	Năm Chút District Unit Leader

((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))	((5))
Oct 59	Assistant Squad Leader	Squad Leader of an assault platoon, C25 of Nha Be District ((unit)).	((blank))	Nam Chut District Unit Leader
1960	((blank))	Assistant Squad Leader of a heavy weapons squad of Unit 603, Gia Dinh Province Unit	((blank))	Hai Sang, a member of the Province Unit
1960	((blank))	Attended a Sapper training course conducted by Kiên Tường Province ((unit))	((blank))	I do not remember
Feb 61	((blank))	Cell leader of a Sapper Cell of Gia Dinh Province ((unit))	((blank))	Hai Phung Province Unit Leader

-----END OF TRANSLATION-----