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15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents captured on 12 May 1970, and concerns two activity plans, dated 1969 and 15 February 1970, signed by Le Xuan Chanh, Commanding Officer, Doan 86 ((possibly Group 86, Rear Service Staff Department, Headquarters, SVNLA)), which outline missions for all subordinate units in December 1969 and 1970. Both documents contain sections pertaining to the characteristics of the situation, friendly ((VC/NVA)) advantages and disadvantages, and future missions. The 1970 missions--aimed primarily at countering the harassment tactics of K ((possibly Khmer, aka Cambodian)) soldiers and the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) practice of sending Biet Kich ((Special Forces)) and reconnaissance units to VC/NVA base areas and corridor communication lines for target selection purposes--consisted of the reorganization of villages, the consolidation and camouflaging of combat fortifications and bases, the establishment of sentry and observation posts, and the more frequent use of patrols.

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THE SVN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
REAR SERVICE STAFF DEPARTMENT
GROUP 86

DRAFT ON

COMBAT AND DEFENSE MISSIONS
(By the end of Dec 69)

I. ASSESSMENT OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

A. The enemy schemes: The enemy still continued to attack and destroy our rear areas, interrupt our communication lines, and sabotage our installations so as to reduce our attacks during the Winter-Spring Campaign.

B. Attacking scale: The enemy's attacks can be as strong as or less strong than they are now. However, he has met more difficulties due to his defeats during the past months.

C. Attacking method: The enemy has intensively employed his Special Forces and reconnaissance units to harass our rear areas and guide his air and artillery activities, including B-52 aircraft. He also used chemical toxic agents for defoliation of our communications lines.

II. FRIENDLY ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.

Advantages: The movement of our troops is more favorable during the dry season.

Cadre and soldiers are accustomed to the rigors of war. Therefore, they have had more experience in taking precaution against enemy attacks, protecting their units, and avoiding casualties. The leadership and command from high to low echelons has matured. Those in command had a firm ideology and high determination in providing guidance.

Disadvantages: We have a large amount of work to be performed and our positions are not yet stabilized.

Due to enemy attacks, our areas of operation and infiltration routes are nearly exposed. This creates difficulties for us in moving from one place to another and in establishing depots and bivouacking sites.

The enemy attacks us from the outer-perimeter. Therefore, our rear areas are increasingly narrowed and our production installations and rear areas are greatly affected.

Our future difficulties are greater than those of past months, but we can overcome them.

III. FUTURE ACTIVITY PLAN.

A. Plan: We should be determined to frustrate the enemy's plan of attacks by using Special Forces and reconnaissance units.

Alter entirely our operating procedure and our messaging and billeting regulations in order to reduce to the minimum our personnel and equipment losses caused by B-52 aircraft.

B. Guidelines:

Pay particular attention to maintaining vigilance.

Be determined to destroy the enemy and protect our forces.

Fight separate and small battles for sure victories and attack the enemy from a distance.

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C. Specific missions:

1. Consolidation and organization tasks. Reorganization of hamlets and villages:

Hamlets and villages should be appropriately reorganized in accordance with the change of areas of operation and unit positions.

Villages are reorganized as follows:

Village 1 consists of the following units: V1, X20, T10 ((possibly T10 gun crew)) and three Border-Defense Units: 5, 6, and 7.

Village 2 consists of the following units: B7, Military Truck Unit 3, and Border-Defense Unit 8.

Village 3 consists of the following units: Convalescence Unit D4 of Đoan ((Group 90)).

Village 4 consists of the following units: Z28, Convalescence Camp, the dispensaries of Đoan (K66B), A1 (C65), Z48, and Border-Defense Units 9 and 10.

Village 5 consists of the following units: C65, Military Truck Units 1 and 2, and X30.

Village 6 consists of the following units: B5 Goods Transportation element of T6.

Village 7 consists of the following units: K66 and K79B.

Village 8 consists of the following units: K79A, H61, and (C47 ((illegible))).

Village 9 consists of a medical supply factory and headquarters of Đoan ((Group))90.

Village 10 consists of the following units: B8 and K65.

Village 11 consists of Đoan Headquarters ((Group)) 86.

In addition to the forces in the above villages, the mobile forces are assigned to each area to coordinate with various hamlets and villages in combat and reinforcement. They are deployed as follows:

H1 is in charge of the pack-bicycle communication line from A1 to V5.

H2 is responsible for the pack communication line from Suoi Máy to A1.

D44 is in charge of the truck communication line from U1B to A4. E62 ((possibly Transportation Battalion, Rear Service Group 86)) is in charge of the truck communication line from V1 to B9.

D234 is responsible for the communication line of Nam Bac T1 ((possibly North-Southern T1)).

The two engineer D's ((possibly Battalion)) are in charge of that part of the road cleared by them.

Each village must be appropriately divided into hamlets in accordance with the areas of operation.

Strengthening the combat forces:

Combat forces must be classified into categories: 1, 2 and 3. There must be at least one mobile combat squad in each village and one mobile combat cell in each hamlet.

Consolidation of the signal and liaison network.

All units should have an adequate number of messengers to carry emergency and normal messages in accordance with the regulations prescribed by Đoàn ((Group)).

In addition to main liaison routes, each unit should have an alternate liaison route leading from one unit to another and from one unit to Đoàn. Therefore, each unit can use the alternate liaison route when the main one is blocked.

The units should indoctrinate their liaison agents on responsibility and instruct them on conveying orders and making reports. Select a number of brave comrades as liaison agents who dare to carry messages while the enemy conducts fierce attacks.

Consolidation of combat fortifications and the drafting of combat plans:

a). Consolidation of fortifications:

All of the bivouacking sites must have enough underground shelters built in the shape of the letter A. Each of them should accommodate three to four people instead of a large crowd. By the end of December 1969, all units must have constructed trenches for half of their troop strength and for all seriously wounded soldiers. All units should have enough trenches by the first quarter of 1970.

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Combat fortifications with covers must be established in combat positions and battlegrounds (in open and cleared areas and on roads the enemy could possibly use).

Trenches must be constructed along pack-bicycle communication routes and in exposed areas where the enemy frequently attacks.

Shelter trenches should be built at the locations where goods are distributed, issued, and delivered; where wounded and sick soldiers are taken for treatment; at the duty places of GB ((possibly Postal Transportation and Communication Section)), and at dispensaries.

All units must have underground trenches to conceal their documents, personal items, supplies and equipment, medicines, and food provisions.

b). Establishment of bases: An area will be selected for a base when it attains the following criteria:

A hiding area far from rivers and large streams.

Located away from communication routes so as to maintain surprise factors.

Located over a large expanse of terrain so that the friendly forces can be widely dispersed to build fortifications.

While establishing a base, cadre and troops must strictly carry out the following regulations: Live apart from one another, avoid smoke, maintain the secrecy of the base, etc... ((sic)).

c). Drafting combat plans:

We should consider the bivouac sites of units and the reorganization of hamlets and villages before drafting an appropriate plan for each hamlet and village. The combat plans must be practical and accurately worked out (after our cadre have studied the situation).

All units should know that as soon as they have made combat plans, they must assign their cadre and troops to construct fortifications.

All units must make combat plans and have them sent to the district unit by 1 Dec ((69)). Fortifications must be completed by 15 Dec ((69)).

The main purpose of the combat plan is to attack the enemy's special, reconnaissance, and airborne forces and shoot down his aircraft. The plan of countering the enemy's sweep operations is implemented only by those units operating close to enemy strongholds.

Consolidation of the guard and patrol network:

Guarding and patrolling is a public activity which is aimed at reducing the enemy's reconnaissance activities and maintaining security and safety in our base areas and on communications lines.

Common and separate sentry posts are deployed by the Group as follows:

Common sentry posts:

One sentry post is located at the three-way intersection of VIA ((sic)) under the responsibility of VI.

One sentry post is located at Bridge 32 (new pack-bicycle communications line) under the responsibility of H2.

One sentry post is located at the ferry landing and on the truck communications line leading to A1 under the responsibility of C65.

One sentry post is located at the crossroads on the pack-bicycle and truck communications lines of A1 under the responsibility of C65.

One sentry post is located at the crossroads of the pack-bicycle communications line leading to K79 under the responsibility of H1.

Separate sentry posts:

According to the position and terrain of the unit, one to three sentry posts are established for each unit. Factories and depot areas should not fail to establish sentry posts.

The procedures and position of guarding should be carried out in accordance with the instructions of the staff section of Đoàn ((Group)).

Establishment of observation posts to observe hostile aircraft:

It is necessary to establish a number of observation posts in the base area to follow hostile air reconnaissance activities and to counter them in time. Specifically, the observation posts will be established as follows:

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One observation post will be established at V1, B7, B5, D4, C65, K79A, B8 and the headquarters.

Security measures taken for protecting movement, depots and base areas:

a. Movement: Men who do other ((than transportation)) work are absolutely forbidden to move along the pack-bicycle trails and truck routes in the rear base areas (north of T1). Trails must be available for persons travelling on foot. When a trail passes through a unit's area this unit is responsible for clearing it. Those who are authorized to use the routes must be issued a permit by the Đoàn ((Group)) Commanding Officer.

b. The establishment of depots:

Depots must be built at large intervals of 50 meters or more. Build small depots able to contain five to 10 tons of goods. Goods must be stored in trenches with covers. Trenches will be dug 300 meters or more from the communications line and will be away from rivers or streams.

c. Messing and billeting: Avoid dwelling on formal procedures and losing sight of the purpose. Correctly maintain the security procedures for the protection of bases as prescribed.

Conduct patrols to watch out for the enemy and insure the safety of the bases.

Guard missions must be conducted openly. ((But)) patrol missions must be conducted in secret to discover the enemy's situation, traces of the enemy and suspects.

The patrols will be conducted:

Around the base areas or unit,

In the villages or hamlets,

Along both sides of the pack-bicycle or truck communications lines.

Because we rely on hamlets, villages and areas of responsibility of each unit, the various units ((in those areas)) must coordinate with each other to perform the patrol missions. Basically, they must insure that there is no gap and no area is left unpatrolled. In particular, patrols will be intensified in the areas where the enemy is suspected to be.

The specific areas of activity in each village are indicated on the map. After returning ((from patrol)), the patrolling elements must make a specific analysis of the situation.

2. Preparation for attacking the enemy.

Assessment of the enemy situation:

We must study the enemy situation and our area of operation to plan our attack on the enemy:

a. The Biệt Kịch ((RVN Special Forces troops)) and reconnaissance elements who arrive by aircraft or are deployed from the enemy bases are our primary enemy.

b. The enemy's various types of aircraft:

L19, T28 observation aircraft and helicopters when they are conducting armed reconnaissance activities or air raids over our bases, depots or transportation lines.

c. Biệt Kịch ((RVN Special Forces troops)) when they arrive by helicopter to attack our bases or plunder our depots by surprise. (We must allow for the enemy's recklessness and our shortcomings in concealment and vigilance).

d. The enemy's small or large sweep operations (These are few).

Our countermeasures:

Each type of the enemy's troops will apply its special tactic in attacking us. Therefore, the proper organization of forces, the disposition of troops in combat, and tactics should also be varied. However, the basic requirement is the strengthening of our determination to fight and to annihilate the enemy, and the heightening of our vigilance and combat readiness.

Through many attacks against the enemy we have gained a number of experiences for various units to apply in combat as follows:

1). Attack against Biet Kich ((Special Forces)) and reconnaissance forces:
We must evaluate exactly

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the capabilities and activities of these elements. In particular, to attack the enemy's Biệt Kịch forces we must:

Constantly observe and follow the enemy's aircraft to see whether there are enemy troops or not. When we are in doubt of the enemy's presence, we must promptly send our forces to search for him.

Prepare comrades to endure, difficulties and hardship and to be skillful in searching for the Biet Kich forces.

Organize lightly-equipped elements with sufficient food to follow the enemy without interruption. When clashing with the enemy, cling to him and attack him from the rear. Prevent him from disengaging to call in supporting aircraft.

Anticipate the locations of the enemy's supporting units from which reinforcements may be sent; then closely coordinate with other elements to encircle and destroy the enemy reinforcement when it comes.

2). Attack the enemy's aircraft:

To be conducted in compliance with Directive 873 from R ((SVNLA)), and the specific air defense plan from Doãn ((Group)).

3). Attack against Biệt Kịch when they move in or land to plunder or destroy our depots.

Combat trenches must be dug in the clearing around the bases, depot areas, ferry landing and goods delivery and receiving areas.

Indoctrinate comrades and put them in combat readiness. Operational plans must be worked out and specific missions must be clearly assigned to each unit or combat element.

4). Counter the enemy's small or large sweep operation.

A combat plan must be worked out for countersweep operations. Anticipate the direction in which the sweep operation will be conducted by the enemy. Combat fortifications must be established at each portion of the road for this purpose.

5). Training troops:

Train troops in the use of weapons. Consider the quantity of weapons we have before training the troops on how to use them effectively.

Train troops how to attack the enemy, especially, the Biệt Kịch. Use small elements in combat such as cells or squads. Specifically, troops are trained in:

Individual combat

Three man cell combat

Squad combat

In addition, troops are trained to know how to apply the methods of:

Laying an ambush, conducting raids, and the pursuing attack.

Shooting at various types of hostile aircraft.

Conducting reconnaissance activities, staying close to the enemy, assessing the enemy situation, orienting and making their way through jungles.

The training time will depend on the mission and the situation of each unit and will be scheduled accordingly.

Trainees must study only the subjects which are not familiar to them.

IV. RIGHTS, MISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF VARIOUS HAMLET AND VILLAGE UNITS.

1. The Village Unit Command Committee has a right to:

Use the combat forces in the village, make preparations to attack the enemy, improve the operations plan, coordinate troops in combat and assign patrol on guard missions.

2. Administer, check, control and expedite the execution of regulations within the village.

3. Order the village unit to detain saboteurs.

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When the village unit has detained a guilty man, report immediately to Doãn ((Group)).

4. Maintain the living conditions and activities of the village unit and know exactly the organization, strength and combat activities of the hamlet units and the enemy's situation.

5. Regularly report on all activities to the district unit as prescribed.

Dated 1969

-Doãn ((Group)) Commanding Officer

Lê Xuân Chánh

SVN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
REAR SERVICE DEPARTMENT
GROUP 86

D R A F T

PLAN FOR DEFENSIVE TASKS IN 1970

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION.

The more failure the enemy suffered, the greater his cunning and malicious schemes and tricks became. He used B-52 bombers, various types of aircraft, and artillery fire to attack our base areas, depots, and transportation lines which was aimed at limiting our reinforcement from the rear areas to the frontline and opposing our attacks upon his strongholds.

The enemy dropped reconnaissance and Special Forces troops from aircraft to the strongholds of Bu Đóp, Phước Long, Phước Bình, Bu Na, Bu Đàng, and Đông Xoài which he used as stepping-stones ((VC term for a controlled area used to obtain access to an uncontrolled area)) to plant his Special Forces, reconnaissance, and intelligence agents into our base areas and transportation corridors to collect information and give directions for aircraft and artillery fire for attacking and disturbing our rear bases and transportation corridors.

He used the above strongholds as points of embarkation for his sweep operations against our transportation corridors in order to prevent us from transporting food supplies and for intercepting our attacks on his Bu Đóp, Bu Na, Phước Long, Bu Đàng and Đông Xoài Bases... etc ... ((sic)).

The Americans and Puppets join with the Cambodian reactionaries creating difficulties for us along the frontier. They took advantage of Cambodian territory to plant reconnaissance, intelligence, and Special Forces personnel in our base areas for sabotage purposes.

II. ADVANTAGES AND DIFFICULTIES.

a. Our cadre and soldiers have been trained and tested in combat and in the implementation of their missions. Therefore, they have a high determination to annihilate the enemy and protect our base areas, our transportation lines, and our wounded and sick soldiers. They have had experience in attacking the enemy's Special Forces and reconnaissance agents.

b. However, we still have the following weaknesses:

Our soldiers did not seriously execute the regulations of bivouacking, moving, cooking, drying their clothes, and firing within the base areas. Cadre failed to regularly motivate and indoctrinate their personnel to enhance their sense of responsibility.

They did not successfully perform their patrol and guard duties.

Their combat readiness was not high. As a result, they could not completely destroy the enemy's Special Forces and reconnaissance personnel.

Due to enemy attacks and use of chemical toxics, the forest became barren so that we encountered many difficulties in camouflaging our depots, base areas, and transportation lines.

III. GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE MISSIONS:

First of all, Doan wants to remind all subordinate units of the following security regulations which were disseminated in 1969 concerning the protection of base camps, depots, and transportation lines:

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a. Cadre of all echelons must regularly indoctrinate their troops to promote their vigilance and enhance their combat readiness and high determination to annihilate the enemy's Special Forces and reconnaissance personnel and shoot down his aircraft to protect our base areas, storage facilities, and transportation lines. All cadre and troops must properly observe the security regulations which were issued by the border ((possibly Border Base Area Section)) concerning messing and billeting, cooking, moving, and shooting.

b. Combat guidelines.

Cadre of all echelons must fully understand that our combat mission is to actively annihilate the enemy and protect our forces by using small elements to attack a large enemy force through independent operations. They should strive to attack the enemy using various tactics with the available weapons of the unit, as well as with rudimentary weapons, such as spikes, mines, and booby traps.

We should adopt surprise raid and ambush tactics to counter the enemy's sweep operations whatever the circumstances.

The reorganization of villages:

The arrangement of villages is based on their location and areas of operation.

Village 1 consists of V1 ((units)), T10 Entry and Exit Point, and Border-Defense Units 5, 6 and 7.

Village 2 consists of B7, 238, 228 and X20 ((Units)) and Border-Defense Unit 8.

Village 3 consists of D4 (Group 90) and Jeep Unit 4.

Village 4 consists of C65, K66 and 248 ((Units)), Convalescence Company 1, X30 ((Unit)), and Border-Defense Unit 9.

Village 5 consist of Group Headquarters 86 and Entry and Exit Point 21.

Village 6 consists of 79A ((Unit)) and Border-Defense Unit 1 (of Inter-Unit 97).

Village 7 consists of K79B, 238, and B8 ((Units)).

Village 8 consists of Group 90 Headquarters.

Village 9 consists of B5 ((Unit)) and depot areas A40 and 24.

Village 10 consists of V3 and H4 ((units)) and Units 2 and 3 of Inter-Unit 97.

Village 11 consists of V4 and Units 4 and 5 subordinate to Inter-Unit 97.

As for the units, their mission is as follows:

852 and 853 must use as a basis their assigned missions to attack the enemy in their areas of responsibility and deploy their troops in different directions when the need arises.

8729 and 8274 must conduct patrols, attack the enemy, and provide reinforcement for the depot units in their areas of activity. Pack-bicycle transportation units, such as 82, 83, 837 and 84, must conduct patrols, attack the enemy, and provide reinforcements for the depot area and units within their areas of activity.

864, 824, 825, 826, and 86 Units must establish close combat coordination with their nearest pack-bicycle transportation units to protect bases, wounded and sick soldiers, and draft activity plans to attack the enemy under the direct leadership of the Command Committee of Line 60.

Consolidation of combat fortifications.

By 30 Mar 70, all units in the rear base areas and transportation lines must complete the construction of underground shelters for their cadre, soldiers, and wounded and sick personnel.

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Various types of goods, such as K merchandise, gasoline, oil, medicine and transportation equipment must be concealed in underground tunnels.

All pack-bicycle transportation lines and ferry landings must have shelters to protect personnel against enemy air strikes and artillery fire. They should also construct fortifications for antiaircraft elements.

Establishment of bases and storage facilities.

Bases and storage facilities must be established in well camouflaged, secret, and unexpected places. The living quarters must be established in combat formation. The distance between two quarters should be a 15 to 20 minute walk, and houses should be from 50 to 100 meters apart. Each depot area should be a two-hour walk from the next, and each depot should be from 70 to 100 meters apart.

Each food provision depot should store from 10 to 15 metric tons only. The depot areas can be booby-trapped with mines, grenades, and spikes. However, reports on the mined areas must be submitted to Soño ((Group 86)).

Every unit must have an alternate location for use in case of emergency.

Combat plans:

All units must have prepared combat plans against the enemy's ground forces, reconnaissance, and aircraft activities to protect their bases and storage facilities. Plans for guarding and patrolling must be carefully drafted.

Establishment of sentry posts:

One sentry post located in the former base camp of 8131 ((Unit)) is to be set up by V1 ((Unit)). The sentry post located at Bridge 132

will be occupied by H2 ((Unit)). The sentry post located in the Luoi Uoi area will be occupied by H2 ((Unit)). The sentry post located at the crossroads of the pack-bicycle communication line will be occupied by C65 ((Unit)). One sentry post located at the former base camp of A1 is under the responsibility of the 1st Convalescence Company, 86 ((possibly Rear Service Group 86)).

The sentry posts in depots, ferry landings, bases, hospitals, bus stations, and dispensaries will be assigned by the commanders of respective units.

Establishment of observation posts:

One observation post located in V1, will be under the responsibility of V1 ((Unit)).

One observation post located at B7, will be under the responsibility of B7 ((Unit)).

One observation post located in K79A is under the responsibility of K79A.

One observation post located in K79B is under the responsibility of K79B.

One observation post located in the Group 86 headquarters will be under the responsibility of B63 ((possibly Reconnaissance Company, Rear Service Group 86)).

One observation post located in A4A, will be under the responsibility of B62 ((possibly Transportation Battalion, Rear Service Group 86)).

Units V4, V5, B8, C64, DS85, and D49 should set up an observation post within their respective areas to observe enemy aircraft activities.

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Main combat objectives.

At any cost, we must annihilate the enemy's Special Forces and reconnaissance agents which are dropped from helicopters or sent into our base areas and transportation corridors from enemy strongholds.

We must shoot at enemy aircraft which land or carry away his Special Forces and reconnaissance personnel or strike our storage facilities, bases, transportation lines, and areas that are far from our bases, depots and routes, such as H5, H6 ((sic)), the former area of the Group Headquarters, Cây Dầu Inter-section, Kh. Sinh, K1, K2, the 19 May Bridge ((possibly named by the VC)), Bũ Già Hấp and Bũ Già Lhúc, Villages 6 and 7, and the areas which are distant from the transportation routes by a 40 minute walk. (Line 09).

Based on this plan, all units must implement their missions immediately.

Special Order 1973, reports concerning implementation as mentioned in combat plans should be sent to Bõn ((possibly Group 86, K. Headquarters, Headquarters, etc.)).

7/ Lê Xuân Chiến