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15. SUMMARY: (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 26 May 1970, and concerns an activity plan for the fourth quarter of 1969, incomplete, undated, prepared by Section 4 of 180 ((possibly 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security Section, COSVN)), which reveals that the border area for which Doan 180 is responsible is 90 kilometers long and encompasses the ((VC)) base area in Tay Ninh Province. In addition to further delimiting the area of responsibility for Doan 180, the document describes the situation in A ((Cambodia)).

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Since Phum Tp. Sco is a recently resettled area, the enemy may take advantage of this to plant agents and White Khmers to coordinate with those already there. (Roumsel and P. Pdau). So far, the Cham people have not been influenced by the revolution. Phum Coki is inhabited by bandits who frequently loot the area. A number of the bad individuals on our side in Ta Pang Village ((Vietnam territory)) have participated in these robberies.

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The majority of the people in A earn their living by farming. In the area of Tp. Plong, the people have developed their cultivation deep in Z ((possibly the border area)). A small number of half-Chinese have cleared waste lands for cultivation, and some of the others are living along the ((border)) corridor working as small-businessmen. The latter established contact with our ((Vietnamese)) people and ((VC)) agencies to trade with our side ((Vietnam territory)). Route 22, Xóm Giũa ((Hamlet)) and the Tã Pãng area, are their trading centers. The political situation in these areas is complex.

In the dry season, when their harvest is over, the people in A often enter the forests to look for rattan, oil, and timber. (They usually penetrate the forests on our side) (and even those around our base area).

Most of the inhabitants in our hamlets are relatives of ((VC)) cadre and combatants. However, in the Hôa Hiệp and Tã Pãng areas there are a number of people who returned from ((enemy)) Special Force troops who now make their living in these areas. Therefore, the situation in these areas is very complicated. Contraband smuggling, robberies, gambling, prostitution, and contact with the enemy occurred frequently. We should try to reorganize the above densely populated hamlets, especially in Xóm Giũa and Tã Pãng, where a great deal of information concerning our situation was collected by enemy intelligence agents.

((VC marginal notes:))

23 AK's in ((VC)) dump were lost in area Lg ((sic)). These weapons could have been carried off by defectors.

(There were few similar cases in A2((possibly area))). During recent years A, ((Cambodia)), has had compulsory education and for this reason the majority of the Cambodians are literate.

They seldom read newspapers, but instead they often listen to the radio. This is why they clearly understand all the information broadcast by the PP ((possibly Pnom Pênh)) radio station. The officials in A are influenced by French culture and since they speak French, they are considered to be gentlemen. Most of the people in A are Buddhists and there are many pagodas along the area ((possibly the border area)), especially in the following hamlets: Sã Âm, Tp. Plong, Tã Âm (all bonzes ((French word meaning Buddhist Priest)) have left this pagoda), Tã Suá, Anlong Krës (this pagoda is small and has no bonzes)). Tros, and Coki. All the people and officials in A respect the Buddhist bonzes.

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Activity plan for the fourth quarter of 1969 prepared by Section 4 of 180 ((possibly 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security Section COSVN)).

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I. ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION

A. SOME FEATURES OF THE SITUATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ((VIETNAM - CAMBODIA)) BORDER:

Đoàn 180 ((possibly 180th Armed Security Regiment)) is responsible for a part of the ((Vietnam-Cambodia)) border area that is 90 kilometers long. It encompasses the ((VC)) base area in Tây Ninh Province.

The northern part is a continuous portion of forested land which is adjacent to Ponia Krek District of Kompong Cham Province ((Cambodia)) and Komchay Neas District of Prey Veng Province ((Cambodia)). The Vam Cồ Đông River acts as a border for the two countries on the southern part; and is adjacent to the northern part of the Romeashek District in Svay Rieng Province ((Cambodia)).

Political organization in area A ((possibly Cambodian territory)). This portion of the border area joins together the above three districts and three provinces subordinate to Military Region I. In the military field since May 69 A has assigned one battalion to this area to replace the troops in various former posts and unify the military command system. (The cover designation of the military system is PC 56. The civilian system remains unchanged). The military strength in the posts is as follows: Sã Âm, Tp Plong ((Trapeang Phlong)), Anlong Krès, Tã Sua and Cồki posts are commanded by either one aspirant or senior sergeant (sergeant with three stripes), one policeman as assistant chief, and between 10 and 15 soldiers.

The major, the battalion commander, is stationed in Krabas (Komchay Meas District); the captain, who is deputy battalion commander, is stationed in Tã Hiu (Ponia Krek District).

The densely populated areas in A are Phums ((Hamlets)) Sã Âm, Trā Peng Roumsel, Th Mãy, Tp. Plong, Trackhon, Bôchêk, Anlong Krès, Thloc Tracs, Tã Sua, Tros, Tã Sek and Cồki. There are two additional phums. They are Phum Prey Pdan, with a Cham ethnic minority, and Phum Trapeng Sco, which was recently resettled. The above two phums are located deep in the border area of the Z2 ((sic)) area. On our side there are many ((VC/NVA)) agencies located in the thinly populated Chang Riêc, Tam Phô, and Hoa Hiệp hamlets, and a small number of people from Trā Rãng village who are now living in the Trãng Trầu area.

Due to their previous trade relationship, the people on both sides ((Việtnam and Cambodia)) still maintain ties, despite the difficulties they encounter.

B. ENEMY SITUATION AND PLAN:

In an attempt to drive our units and agencies out of Area Z ((possibly the border area)), the enemy has increased their espionage activities in this area.

Enemy intelligence agents from the South have been planted in the area to force the people and our captured combatants to work for them. They also forced them to ostensibly go back and see their families in our ((VC)) area in order to investigate our locations. Enemy Special Forces troops disguised themselves as friendly troops and operated along the "border" corridors. Enemy air reconnaissance activities were also increased.

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Furthermore, enemy spies and reconnaissance agents have also been planted in K ((possibly Cambodia)) territory in order to establish an intelligence infrastructure network.

All the above enemy espionage activities are aimed at discovering our locations and storage facilities... and coordinating with B52 bombings and artillery shellings in order to wipe our troops out of Z ((the border area)).

C. THE SITUATION IN A ((CAMBODIA)):

During recent times our relationship with the officials and the people in A was sound. All small incidents were settled promptly so as not to cause any trouble.

At present the authority's policies in A remain unchanged. They shall continue to support our struggle against the Americans. However, they are afraid of being betrayed by us.

Furthermore, due to their present economical crisis, and the US oppression, they might allow the CIA agents to increase espionage activities and intensify the attacks on our base areas. We do not know who conducted the following espionage activities, A or the CIA: Intelligence agents investigated our installations, troop movements, troop strengths, and the cover designations of our agencies and units along the border area. They disguised themselves as traders or civilians and moved along the "border" corridors (along Route 22, Anlong Krēs and Xom ((Hamlet)) Giũa).

They persuaded our troops to sell them weapons and to desert their ranks carrying weapons along with them (along Route 22). They provoked our personnel to create dissension between the two peoples in an attempt to undermine their friendship and union.

They cleared the wooded areas along Z ((the border area)).

((VC Marginal notes)): ((Cambodian authorities)) have several times requested us to move A2 out of their territory. ((Another incident)) On 14 Sep ((69)) our medical evacuation unit was intercepted by the assistant chief of post at CTA ((sic)), who wanted to provoke

our personnel. He could have been provided with bad information by the CIA agents.

There were many other cases such as robberies, provocation and the burning of clearings to find our ((VC)) supply depots to steal the rice. One time, the personnel of the Rear Service fired at them.

Furthermore, there are many other activities conducted by the CIA personnel. They conduct air and artillery attacks deep inside ((Cambodia)) the rear area; disguise themselves as members of the International Control Commission to infiltrate and operate in deep areas; and plant spies in our installations (a spy was planted in our hospital at Memot).

They employ merchants as intelligence informants along the area from Bavet and to Ropon to Xóm Giũa (Some accurate information pertaining to our activities was leaked from Xóm Giũa area for their benefit).

((Additional notes:))

The enemy conducted military operations in BÉN RÀ ((sic)) while the TV ((possibly Current Affairs Committee)) cadre went to bv ((possibly hospital)).

They bribed the local Cambodian officials to employ them in different types of work, at various times, and in different local areas and positions.

((Marginal note:))

Dun Samdech military operation in 1968 ((sic)):

They dropped Special Force troops and reconnaissance agents along Z ((the border area)).

(See Sketch dated 22 Sep ((59)) concerning Z2 ((sic)) ((TN: no sketch is attached to the original document))). There were increased espionage activities, airstrikes and artillery shelling along Z.

Considering the above enemy activities and the complicated characteristics of the ((Vietnam-Cambodia)) border (contraband smuggling, espionage activities and so on...),

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we are now at a serious disadvantage because all our agencies, units, camps and movement routes are on A territory. Food and other supplies, are procured in A, too. In the past, some improvements were made in Party activities and in the observance of security maintenance. The following deficiencies still remain: Our personnel who deserted their units betrayed us by giving information to the enemy. Our security maintenance was poor.

The people in the villages are composed of various social classes. Our personnel were careless in their relationships and trading with the people.

The above deficiencies caused many difficulties to our efforts to achieve solidarity and friendship and with the Cambodian people. They actually favored the enemy's espionage activities.

Taking advantage of this situation the enemy intelligence agents operated openly under a legal status. It is probable that they have coordinated with the reactionaries in A to intensify espionage and military activities, and employ effective methods to attack us.

The ((border)) area is very important because it connects directly with our base areas.

It acts as a transportation corridor for the battlefields. Its condition will greatly affect the general situation of the Revolution.

Recently, our activities performed in the border area were satisfactory. However, in the coming days, we may meet additional difficulties. Therefore, we should take precautions and try to successfully carry out the following tasks:

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