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REPORTS ON RECENT PLAF ACTION IN S. VIETNAM

Attacks on Headquarters

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1000 GMT 24 Mar 69 S 3 - 4/6

[Commentary: "Accurately Hitting Enemy Headquarters; Outstanding PLAF Feats-of-Arms"]

[Text] During the recent exciting days of spring, paralleling their violent attacks on the enemy's combat units, airfields, storage facilities, ports, communications lines, and on the cruel, diehard pacification teams, the PLAF hit many U.S. and puppet command headquarters hard and accurately, annihilating an important part of the enemy forces.

According to the PLAF Command's 12th special communique, in 10 days alone, from the night of 22 February to 4 March 1969, the PLAF attacked with infantry and artillery, 35 enemy command headquarters from regimental level upward, including two divisional and six brigade command headquarters which were completely destroyed or heavily damaged. This was one of the PLAF's outstanding feats-of-arms in the recent period. It was also one of the new mortal blows to Abrams' "clear and hold" strategy, a strategy with which the latter has hoped to repel the PLAF's attacks and prevent his troops from taking heavy casualties.

Command headquarters are very important to the enemy's forces. They direct and control every military activity of the enemy while coordinating his strength. Therefore, in his defense in depth system, apart from setting up anti-rocket belts in the hope of preventing the PLAF from shelling from afar, the enemy has moved many combat and police units to guard his key organs and command headquarters while girdling these places with strong fortifications and fence barricades.

In addition, U.S. and puppet command headquarters have been protected by fire bases disposed in a circle and ready to cope with danger. By striking hard and accurately at enemy command headquarters, the PLAF thwarted to the root this defense in depth plan of the enemy while annihilating an important part of his personnel, including commanding, staff, and intelligence officers, technicians, and so forth, thus aggravating his already serious shortage of officers and technicians. Moreover, the strike at enemy command headquarters has restrained to the lowest level the coordination ability between the enemy's infantry and artillery and between his armored force and air force, thus rapidly decreasing the combat strength of the enemy's strategic units and adding confusion to his passivity in engaging in combat, especially in defensive combat. This is not to mention its great effect on the inherently weak and low morale of enemy troops who, like a snake hit on the head, become even more disintegrated and demoralized.

This was most eloquently evidenced by the consecutive and violent attacks on the command systems of the Americal Division in central Trung Bo at dawn on 23 February and on the U.S. 25th Division in eastern Nam Bo at the dawns of 23 and 25 February. For the Americal Division, with its command headquarters from divisional and brigade to battalion levels simultaneously attacked and, particularly, with the command headquarters of the 196th and 198th and two battalion command headquarters of the 11th Brigade swiftly annihilated, its entire command network was almost completely paralyzed.

With the command confused and annihilated, various units of the division, although still not much harmed in numerical strength, were nonetheless unable to carry out relief operations in time, much less parry the violent PLAF thrusts into almost all bases, airfields, and storage areas serving its combat role.

For the U.S. 25th Division, the defeat was even heavier. All its command headquarters from its divisional headquarters to those of the 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades were attacked on 23 and 25 February. Most hard hit were the command headquarters of the 3d Brigade in Dau Tieng and the divisional headquarters in Dong Du. In Dau Tieng, 800 U.S. troops were annihilated; in Dong Du, 1,270 U.S. troops were killed or wounded, 125 aircraft destroyed, and 179 military vehicles and five ammunition dumps burned.

The division's entire nerve system was disorganized. Tens of thousands of the division's soldiers were confused, demoralized, unable to coordinate their activities or help each other before the liberation troops' subsequent attacks.

Therefore, complete annihilation of two battalions of the 3d Brigade in Ben Tranh in two consecutive attacks by liberation troops--annihilation which greatly weakened the brigade--was unavoidable.

The PLAF's vigorous and accurate attacks against the enemy's command headquarters have clearly demonstrated their determination to fight and win and spirit of courageously sacrificing themselves and overcoming difficulties and hardships. The PLAF also demonstrated, by attacks against enemy defensive strongpoints, their quick and tremendous growth.

During these attacks, resolute and daring leadership over combat developed our potential power as well as our initiative and offensive position, aggravated the enemy's weaknesses in his passive and defensive position, and thoroughly exploited the factor of surprise with regard to time, locality, and target, thus causing the enemy to be caught by surprise, although he was on his guard, and to be unable to cope with the attacks efficiently, although he had sufficient soldiers at his disposal.

At the same time, these vigorous and accurate attacks against the enemy's command headquarters have demonstrated the PLAF's clever and resourceful fighting methods. Almost all attacks against the enemy's command headquarters were launched secretly, unexpectedly, quickly and neatly and resulted in an annihilation of a large number of enemy troops. All military branches have satisfactorily developed their combat capacity and have coordinated their actions very closely.

The artillery branch has shelled enemy targets accurately and provided effective support for infantry troops to fight the enemy under favorable conditions. Infantry troops, especially the seasoned ones, secretly bypassed the enemy, attacked him strongly when the order to attack was issued, encircled him, and cut his ranks into small groups when the fighting developed. Guerrilla forces also developed their great role of encircling and pinning down the enemy, thus creating good conditions for the main attacking units to achieve resounding victories. This has been admitted by both Western news agencies and the U.S. command.

When reporting the liberation combatants' attacks on the U.S. 25th Division headquarters at Dong Du, AFP detailed the liberation combatants' talented fighting method and admitted that they, that is, the liberation combatants, have chosen the most valuable objectives and attacked in a skillful, professional, and (?wary) manner and from good directions and that they have, therefore, inflicted heavy losses on U.S. troops.

U.S. Colonel (?Bicason) also admitted that the liberation forces' fighting spirit in the attacks on the 3d Brigade headquarters of the U.S. 25th Division in Dau Tieng was very high. As for Wheeler, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, he, when touring South Vietnam with Defense Secretary Laird, complained more sorrowfully: the communists' attacks were carefully prepared, and they launched these attacks effectively.

The U.S. aggressors' headquarters were dealt very heavy blows. They have lost a very valuable part of their potential and have been faced with increasingly greater difficulties in combat command and in (?eliminating) a defeatist spirit among their troops. With extremely barbarous, crafty war tricks, the U.S. aggressors are trying hard to check or resist our attacks and, especially, to seek every means possible to protect their nerve centers and headquarters. But our armed forces and people, taking advantage of their past victories to advance and, with their abundant experiences, know how to correctly assess the enemy through his hard appearing shell while realizing even more clearly that we have succeeded in developing our strongpoints and overcoming our weaknesses.

We will certainly not allow the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys to have time to recover their strength and we will resolutely advance and vigorously and accurately hit the enemy's dens, including his headquarters, in order to win even greater victories.

#### Saigon Area Attacks

LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (Clandestine) in English to East Europe and the Far East  
1559 GMT 24 Mar 69 B

[Text] South Vietnam March 24 GPA--Resolved to smash the US-puppets' accelerated pacification program, during the last 3 months the people in the surrounding areas of Saigon have continuously risen up to break the popular defence forces, wiping out or serving warnings to thousands of members of that repressive organization.

In Duc Hoa and Ben Thu districts of Long An Province and in Binh Chanh and Tan Binh districts, Gia Dinh Province, from early December 1968 to February 1969, the people disbanded more than 3,000 popular defencemen. In December 1968 alone, the people in 36 strategic hamlets in the four districts mentioned above captured and disbanded over 1,200 popular defencemen.

On the night of February 27 the people in a strategic hamlet in Ben Thu district broke a popular defence platoon, and captured all its 23 weapons. In two villages of Duc Hoa district, on the night of February 11, in coordination with guerrillas, the people completely annihilated one Civil Guard squad and inflicted heavy losses on two popular defence companies, and seized 16 weapons.

On the night of February 22, the people in many strategic hamlets in the same province rose up. Moved by the lenient policy of the NFL, a large number of "popular defencemen" have refused to serve as cannon-fodder for the U.S.-puppets.

In Hiep Hoa town quarter, nearly 300 members of the "popular defence" organization handed back their guns and went home.

In Nhi Binh area, Ben Thu district, 130 "popular defencemen" waged a collective struggle, demanding their release from guard duties.

In Duc Lap area, Duc Hoa district, more than 250 "popular defencemen" handed back their weapons and left for home after wiping out a "Civil Guard" squad and disbanding a "popular defence" platoon.

#### Quang Ngai, Khanh Hoa

LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (Clandestine) in English to East Europe and the Far East  
1608 GMT 24 Mar 69 B

[Text] South Vietnam March 24 GPA--In the small hours of March 20, the PLAF artillery bombarded Chu Lai airbase (Quang Ngai Province), hitting the jet plane parking ground.

According to first reports, 22 jet fighters were destroyed or damaged, and many GI's, including pilots and military technicians, were killed or wounded.

On the night of March 21, the liberation forces launched a violent attack on a position on Ong Sam hill defended by a unit of the U.S. "Americal" Division. Minutes after the attack started, the liberation forces overran the C.P. and signal centre, blew up five blockhouses and many billets, destroyed six artillery pieces and 45 military vehicles, and killed or wounded many GI's.

Also on the night of March 21, the PLAF in Khanh Hoa Province shelled the U.S. 92th [as received] Helicopter Company at Dong Ba Thin airbase near Cam Ranh; 15 U.S. helicopters were destroyed, first reports said.

#### Summary of Action

LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (Clandestine) in English to East Europe and the Far East  
1518 GMT 24 Mar 69 B

[Text] South Vietnam March 24 GPA--The PLAF at 0.45 a.m., March 19, opened up against a U.S. position in Kiem Lam area, northern Quang Nam Province, heavily decimating one artillery battery and one infantry company. It took the U.S. a whole day to evacuate its casualties.

In the afternoon, P.L.A.F. gunners pounded a U.S. position in An Hoa area, hitting the HQ's of the U.S. 5th Marine Regiment, the storage area, and other installations. That was the fourth time from the beginning of this month the PLAF shelled that U.S. position.

In Binh Dinh Province, on the night of March 10, the PLAF assaulted the U.S. logistical area in Mieu Lo, west of Quy Nhon town. First reports said that 16 ammunition and explosive dumps were blown up and many GI's were killed or wounded. The first [as received] lasted till the afternoon of the following day.

On the night of March 12, the PLAF launched a surprise attack on a fuel storage guarded by Pak Chong-hui troops near the Qui Nhon airfield. The place burned for hours. Twenty guards were killed.

In Quang Tri Province, the PLAF on the night of March 14, assaulted a mixed U.S.-puppet unit in Tan Dien, south of the provincial capital. According to initial figures, the PLAF put out of action hundreds of U.S. and puppet troops, destroyed 16 armoured cars, two cannon and 58 tents and houses, and incinerated a large quantity of war materiel.

#### Saigon Mutinies

LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (Clandestine) in English to East Europe and the Far East  
1526 GMT 24 Mar 69 B

[Text] South Vietnam March 24 GPA--National-minded troops of the Saigon army stationed in Quang Nam Province in January and February this year staged seven mutinies.

During their actions, the mutineers wiped out 26 GI's and cruel puppet agents, and destroyed one cannon, one armoured car, and one materiel storage of the puppet 5th Regiment.

A total of 585 puppet soldiers in the province deserted in the period under review. They either returned to their families, or went to the liberated areas and joined the PLAF. Desertions have also wholly depleted the ranks of four platoons and one squad of the puppet forces.