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SOLID LABOR FRONT IS CRACKING  
UP

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, another major defection has occurred in the hitherto firm AFL-CIO support of American policy in Southeast Asia. I refer to an editorial in the forthcoming June-July issue of the Butcher Workman, official publication of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, AFL-CIO. This is the second major defection of recent days, the other being the strong criticism of our Southeast Asian involvement by Jacob Potofsky, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union.

The critical Butcher Workman editorial notes that religious groups, fraternal orders, and bankers are opposing the war. Then the editorial asks:

Is everybody out of step except the AFL-CIO?

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Butcher Workman editorial, appearing over the name of Patrick E. Gorman, secretary-treasurer of the Meat Cutters Union, be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

WAR AND THE AFL-CIO

Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, in the estimation of trade union leaders, may not have the best voting record in the Senate of the United States. Time will prove, however, that he is one of the nation's best statesmen and will be remembered in history as a great humanitarian.

The Arkansas Senator had the courage to state that the AFL-CIO has become part of the military establishment of our nation. Such is a serious charge. In our opinion, however, the charge, to a great extent, is true.

We do not believe that the leader of our great American trade union family speaks for that family in supporting the President in the present war dilemma of our nation. We have never been out of the official family of labor since we received our International charter in 1897. We have never, however, followed blindly, and never will, every edict that emanates from the official headquarters in Washington, especially where war is the issue.

The AFL-CIO is not infallible, and many of us feel strongly that it is out of step with the thinking of the 13,000,000 members it represents.

No rational segment in the make-up of America puts the stamp of approval on our war involvements. Thirty-two Presidents of our nation's best-known universities are on record that our boys should be brought home from Southeast Asia. Our university students from coast to coast who feel they will have to fight this war have the same opinion.

Practically every church denomination in our nation believes our involvement is immoral. Fraternal orders and groups double and triple the numerical strength of the AFL have advocated the stopping of this human slaughter. Millions have marched in our streets expressing a longing for peace. And martyrs, like Martin Luther King, have died in opposition to what is going on.

Even Louis D. Lundborg, Chairman of the Board of the Bank of America, the largest bank in the United States, before our own Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that the war is bad for business. He also said that if anyone is to blame, it is peo-

It is quite true, as the President said, that the supply lines and sanctuaries in Cambodia across the border from Vietnam have enabled the North Vietnamese to prosecute the war in South Vietnam.

This has been so for about five years. Military men in Vietnam have wished for a long time to mount spoiling attacks across the border. Now the change of government in Phnom Penh has given the President the opportunity—and he took it.

At best, the results of the President's gamble would look something like this:

The ability of the North Vietnamese to carry on the war in South Vietnam would be seriously impeded. Their capacity to launch the "massive attacks" of which Mr. Nixon spoke would be severely retarded. In the meantime the South Vietnamese would have more time to improve their own situation.

If, as is argued by some responsible men, the North Vietnamese are now, really, stretched to the breaking point, this new evidence of American resolve might induce them to reach an agreement on the future of South Vietnam acceptable to the United States. The Soviet Union might be persuaded to bring about an international conference to settle the whole matter of Indochina.

In other parts of the world, most particularly in the dangerous Middle East, where the Russians have disturbingly raised tensions by sending their pilots to fly Egyptian warplanes; a show of American determination in Indochina might have a stabilizing, cautionary influence.

These considerations cannot be lightly dismissed. If such are indeed the results of the President's risky decision, it will turn out to have been the correct decision. We are certain the whole country hopes the President has made the right choice.

But the danger is that the President's decision will get the United States deeper into the war, and keep us there longer.

The whole experience of the war to date has been that there is never, at any time, an easy military solution. Suppose the North Vietnamese are able to draw back and avoid the brunt of trans-border attacks? Suppose their determination to carry on the war is not weakened, but strengthened, by the attacks? Suppose the American troops disrupt the border sanctuaries and withdraw, only to find that in several months the North Vietnamese have returned and the situation is basically the same as it is now? These are not idle suppositions. They are based on the history of the whole long war.

That history has shown us that the war is not a definable thing with fixed military boundaries, but an open-ended war, with all Indochina as the potential battlefield.

The North Vietnamese recently increased their pressure on northern Laos. Suppose they respond to the American action in Cambodia by trying to capture northern Laos? Does the United States then feel challenged to defend it?

We realize that the President spoke explicitly of confining American action in Cambodia to the border sanctuaries.

The risks of deeper involvement inescapably arise however, because of the rhetorical context in which he put his decision. He spoke, repeatedly, of the situation as a "challenge" to American will, American credibility, American power in the world. Dangerously, deplorably, he laid the prestige of this country on the line in Indochina in a way he had not done before, and a way President Johnson did not do after his decision to stop the bombing of North Vietnam.

We believe that American credibility abroad is better served by disengaging from Indochina—doing it carefully, not too fast, doing it very much as Mr. Nixon had been doing it—than by committing the nation more deeply in Indochina.

We believe that the people of this country simply will not sustain a deeper commitment.

We do not know what the future will bring. On balance, we believe that the chances for failure in the President's decision are substantially greater than the chances of success. But, like all Americans, we very much hope we are proven wrong, and he, right.

[From the Denver (Colo.) Post, May 1, 1970]  
CAMBODIA—A BLEAK PROSPECT

Richard Nixon admittedly laid his future as President on the line in his televised address Thursday night, but we would suggest that most Americans were less concerned with his political boldness than they were with his announcement of the extent of the new U.S. involvement in the Indochina war.

We were prepared for the argument and the rationalization in support of stepped-up military aid to Cambodia, an operation that has been officially under way for several days. Skeptical of its nature and worried about its potential, we nevertheless looked for no more than an explanation of its extent and purpose and perhaps a pledge of its limitation.

What we also got was the bleak news that "thousands" of American combat troops had joined with South Vietnamese forces in a joint attack on Communist strongholds across the Cambodian border, northwest of Saigon, and a pledge only that the troops would be withdrawn when those strongholds were secured from the enemy.

We find this revelation infinitely discouraging, no less so because the President attempted to justify this major military escalation and new territorial commitment in terms that have become all too familiar to Americans jaded by their country's involvement in a bloody and costly conflict that began as long ago as 1954.

It is the intransigence of the enemy, he said, that is prolonging that involvement today, and it is the "unacceptable risk" the enemy represents to our remaining troops that now has led to this further extension of that involvement. The President gave a blunt, aggressive impression in his brief address, using a map to explain his fateful decision to augment military aid to Cambodia with massive ground forces.

It is not to be considered an invasion, he said, but rather a move that is "indispensable for the continuing success" of the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. When the Communist sanctuaries across the border have been cleaned out, the forces will be withdrawn.

If we concede some strategic military logic in the attempt to "clean out" enemy concentrations, the more pressing questions would seem to concern the amount of risk we are assuming in pursuing the enemy into another country and committing untold thousands of American troops to the operation.

If the goal is still to bring the boys home, as the President maintains, it seems like stretching logic to the breaking point to permit ourselves to be sucked into another widening of the war. And the fact that our will and character are being threatened, as the President put it, and not our power, scarcely strengthens that logic.

We appreciate the reality of President Nixon's political courage, that he would rather, as he said, be a one-term president who turned out to be right in his decisions than a two-term president who let his country down.

In sum, we must be highly skeptical of this new extension of our military involvement in Southeast Asia. But like all Americans we will hope for the best. We pray that the new endeavors are as limited in scope as the President expects and that they will protect and speed our withdrawal from South Vietnam.

While waiting for the results of this stroke, we would hope it could be received with a minimum of political partisanship and a maximum of the national unity that has brought this country through such storms before.

[From the Miami (Fla.) Herald, May 2, 1970]  
RERUN OF A BAD DREAM—THIS TIME IN CAMBODIA

First the arms . . . next the military advisers . . . then the troops.

The script in Cambodia shockingly is the same as the story in Vietnam in the days of Kennedy and Johnson. We can hear Lyndon Johnson asking Congress for \$700 million in 1965 (this year the war will cost \$17 billion) when there were 30,000 Americans in the jungles and paddy fields and saying: "We have no desire to expand the conflict."

Reading yesterday of the loss of the first GI on official duty in Cambodia we can recall the days of 1963 when the death of a single American was a news event and the toll mounted alarmingly to eighty.

Then as now the host government opposed American involvement at first. The Vietnam government urged the withdrawal of American advisers. Cambodia, never consulted before 8,000 U.S. ground troops crossed its borders, "will protest."

So a nation that cannot realize its mistakes is condemned to repeat them. This, we regret to say, is what President Nixon has done in escalating the war in Southeast Asia.

The intrusion of Cambodia, alongside Vietnamese troops only lately regarded as shaky, is described as temporary—to clean out North Vietnamese and Viet Cong command posts before the monsoon season begins later in May.

But large bases are under construction. This makes a mockery of the national policy of withdrawal from the Vietnam war.

The credibility of Nixon policy also must fall in question. Cambodia has been a neutral. It wishes to remain a neutral. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have violated that neutrality. So, over the border, to help Cambodia "defend its neutrality."

To give Mr. Nixon his due, he is taking a military gamble which has enormous risks. If it fails he may indeed become "a one-term President." If it succeeds (whatever success in this instance really means) he will have spent more blood and treasure in the Asian morass.

For most of Congress, and, we believe, most Americans are opposed to any more military ventures in Asia. Neither Congress nor the people were consulted. American troops are engaged in yet another foreign country without a declaration of war against anybody.

"I promised to end the war," said President Nixon Thursday night. "I shall keep that promise. I promised to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise. We shall avoid a wider war. But we are also determined to put an end to this war."

We have heard it all before—endless times. Sadly, it is not just a bad dream: it is reality in all its folly.

[From the New York Post]  
THE NEW CASUALTY LIST

A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum. The action I take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish that goal.—President Nixon, April 30.

It was unclear at the time the President made that declaration how expanding a war could reduce casualties and it is even more questionable now. Last week more American combat soldiers were killed in Southeast Asia than at any time in the past eight months.

The figure given by the U.S. Command was 168 men lost. Assuming that the sudden

increase in casualties was due both to Cambodia and to related counterattacks in Vietnam—and no more reasonable explanations are at hand—the President's chief justification for the invasion is fading fast.

"To protect our men" was the stated objective. The superficial rationale is that some sacrifice now will avert more casualties later. But, in truth, there is no objective way of judging how many men are being "protected."

The President also recalled his pledge to withdraw troops and asserted firmly that "they are coming home." But that is in question as well. Actually, no troops are shipping out at the moment—as the Pentagon acknowledges—and there are 3200 more men in Vietnam than there were a month ago. The Administration is committed to withdrawing 150,000 over the next year, but that promise was made before Cambodia, and what it is worth now is painfully uncertain. The figures that have immediate meaning are the casualty statistics—endless, and intolerable. There is surely no solace in the news that South Vietnamese casualties were also grimly large.

#### ECHOES OF THE CAMBODIAN ADVENTURE

##### 1. BACK TO "TOTAL VICTORY"

Now "Operation Total Victory" in Cambodia has been accompanied by the renewal of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. Raids more extensive than any undertaken since the air war was largely suspended in November, 1968, are under way, officially described as "protective reactions" in behalf of reconnaissance missions. In short, when the North Vietnamese fire at planes surveying their territory, the wraps are off. Who knows what other semantic ingenuities may be devised to camouflage President Nixon's desperate gamble for a military decision?

Vice President Agnew, asked yesterday on CBS' Face the Nation why the great bulk of troops participating in the Cambodian expedition were American rather than South Vietnamese, replied solemnly that this was consistent with our effort to "keep the casualties down." He also said we must concede that we cannot win a "ground war" in Asia. Next question?

We are living in a nightmare interval in which truth may be a major casualty each hour of each day. Mr. Agnew said confidently yesterday that the North Vietnamese are "quite debilitated and decimated." At the moment the evidence must be described as no more convincing than it was when the same characterization was used one, two and three years ago by those pressing for an investment of additional manpower and muscle.

All that is clear is that the Nixon "peace plan" has proved to be the old blueprint of the Pentagon and its front-men in Saigon.

It is based on the premise that we can impose a negotiated surrender on Hanoi without provoking any dangerous escalation by Peking or Moscow. To describe so hazardous an enterprise as a "minimal" or "limited" adventure is to play cruel games with reality.

##### 2. THE PROPAGANDA MINISTRY

Herbert G. Klein, President Nixon's communications director, professes to hear only overwhelmingly favorable sounds in response to the Cambodian expedition. He says a "private poll" ran three to one in the President's favor and that mail, telegram and telephone have brought wonderfully affirmative messages. On Capitol Hill there are wholly different reports, with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, disclosing that it had received an unprecedented outpouring of wires with an 8-1 ratio condemning the U.S. moves.

Success, John F. Kennedy once remarked, has many fathers, and failure is an orphan. No public opinion verdict can be decisive at this juncture. But there is no visible dancing

in the streets and there are many evidences of deep apprehension. In this connection it is noteworthy that a Harris poll, taken shortly before Mr. Nixon acted, and released today, showed 59 per cent opposed to any broader involvement in Cambodia or Laos under any circumstances. Were the fears and war-weariness expressed in that survey overcome by the President's speech, as a CBS telephone poll—the least reliable technique—now partially purports to find?

Meanwhile, Republican Senate leader Hugh Scott, whose own credibility has been badly undermined in recent days by his insistence that no bombing expansion was contemplated, is lashing out against the media for giving too much "free publicity" to "loud-mouths" critical of the President. Does he mean Senator Alken (R-Vt.), whose break with the Administration has received widest attention? Should Sen. Fulbright be required to buy time? Is there a new drive under way to make the networks organs of government policy?

[From the New York Times, May 2, 1970]

#### CAMBODIAN QUAGMIRE

President Nixon's shocking decision to send American troops into Cambodia immediately raises the question: Can they get out?

Withdrawal from South Vietnam as well as Cambodia is cited by the President, as the chief reason for plunging deeper into Indochina. The President's own rhetoric is once again ambiguous. He describes the American military move as a decision "to go to the heart of the trouble . . . cleaning out major North Vietnamese and Vietcong-occupied territories, these sanctuaries which serve as bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam."

This is hardly a limited objective. The sanctuary areas now being used by Vietnamese Communist troops in Cambodia are far more widespread than the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak areas currently under allied attack. Talk of a six to eight-week operation, combined with Presidential language that indicates an effort to close out the Communist sanctuaries entirely, strongly suggests that more is intended than simply to shore up the Pnompenh regime and deter further Communist moves against it.

There is little reason to believe that the Vietnam war can be won by military operations in Cambodia, which cannot affect infiltration by sea, through Laos and across the demilitarized zone. There is little reason, furthermore, to believe that the Cambodian sanctuary can be closed. Similar bases have been cleaned out repeatedly within South Vietnam only to resume activity once allied troops withdrew; such operations are rarely attempted now in South Vietnam.

To pursue the objective of closing down Cambodia as a sanctuary assures a prolonged involvement of American troops and their likely entrapment in a quagmire as dangerous as that in South Vietnam, if Hanoi responds by escalating its own involvement there. The quicker the American action is terminated, the more likely it is that it can be terminated at a time of American, rather than Communist, choosing.

#### COMPULSIVE ESCALATION

With terrifying speed all the tragic errors of escalation are being repeated in Southeast Asia. Once again a President elected on a pledge of extricating the United States from the Vietnamese morass is embarked on a delusive quest for peace through widening the war. And each plunge down that road to disaster is followed post-haste by another and still another in a dismal replay of the futility ushered in by the initial escalation after Pleiku in February 1968.

The large-scale air attack on North Vietnam by American fighter-bombers this weekend did more than shatter the bombing halt ordered by President Johnson eighteen months ago. Coming just two days after the assignment of American troops to combat duty in Cambodia, the raid made it plain that the Pentagon is finding a receptive ear at the White House for its long campaign to strike at the enemy wherever its bases and supply lines may be.

This is a "domino" theory in reverse involving limitless risk and no discernible hope of success—a course rejected as to unpromising even at the height of the Johnson military expansion.

Unquestionably, the Nixon Administration is encouraged by the conviction that the Soviet Union and Communist China are so busy with their mutual animosities that they will refrain from stepped-up action in support of Hanoi and the other Communist elements in Indochina.

Yet the history of all past escalation in this area has been that it stiffens the Communist will to resist, pushes up the death toll, brings no serious move toward the peace table and drives both Moscow and Peking into more vituperative anti-American positions.

This is a two-way process of gambling with human destiny. Much of the inspiration for the President's stance in Cambodia obviously derived from concern that Moscow's increasing aggressiveness in the Mideast stemmed from a belief that the United States was a paper tiger.

What makes the current escalation doubly dismaying is its panicky pace. On April 20, from the relaxed setting of his ocean-front refuge at San Clemente, President Nixon gave the nation a reassuring report on the progress of Vietnamization and pacification. He was able to "say with confidence" that both processes were succeeding so well that another 150,000 American troops could be brought home.

Ten days later a much grimmer President was on television with a warning that the United States was in danger of battlefield humiliation that could topple it into the status of a second-rate power. Since then the area and extent of United States involvement have broadened so rapidly that even the defenders of the Administration's course have been left tongue-tied.

The first embarrassment was the disclosure that the Government Washington seeks to prop up in Cambodia was among the last to learn that American forces were en route to mop up Communist sanctuaries there. Comparable was the plight of such Administration stalwarts as Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott cut adrift with White House inspired statements that renewed bombing of the North was a remote contingency at the very time a hundred American planes were dropping bombs across the demilitarized zone.

The defeat in the Texas Democratic primary of Senator Ralph Yarborough, a Vietnam dove, will no doubt be taken by many around the President as evidence of popular approval of his new tough line. Mr. Nixon, characterizing far-out elements among his campus critics as "bums," already has provided additional fodder for fear that much of this sudden militancy in Vietnam stems from a desire to divert attention from inflation, unemployment and other difficulties as the Congressional election moves into high gear.

The need in the conferences the President plans to hold tomorrow with four key Congressional committees is to get the focus back on deceleration of a war that, as Vice President Agnew acknowledged yesterday, the United States cannot hope to win at that makes impossible the attainment of urgent national goals. Making the war bigger is a formula for calamity, not extrication.

## CAUTION IN CAMBODIA

Under the pressure of student and other protests, Congressional criticism and a worldwide clamor, President Nixon now has given the nation new assurances that his Cambodian incursion will remain limited in duration and character and, most important, will not be repeated later. His news conference commitments cannot undo all the disastrous consequences at home and abroad of this ill-considered adventure, but they do open the possibility of limiting the damage.

Mr. Nixon has promised categorically now to start withdrawing American troops from Cambodia this week and to get the great majority out by mid-June. By the end of June, he is pledged to remove all the rest, including the American advisers, air support and logistical aid provided the South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. As a result, he expects the South Vietnamese forces to withdraw at approximately the same time.

Mr. Nixon acknowledged the North Vietnamese could re-establish their sanctuaries in six or eight months, but he indicated that the South Vietnamese Army then would have to deal with the problem alone. Earlier, Mr. Nixon assured Congress that American troops would not penetrate more than nineteen miles into Cambodia without Congressional approval.

All these assurances are designed to counter the country's fear of becoming bogged down in an expanded war that would impede and perhaps reverse disengagement from Vietnam. That fear is not limited to Mr. Nixon's critics. Some of his highest advisers opposed the Cambodian decision. Secretary of State Rogers, on April 23, told a Congressional subcommittee in closed session: "We recognize that if we escalate and we get involved in Cambodia with our ground troops, that our whole program [of Vietnamization and American withdrawal] is defeated. . . ."

Despite such advice, Mr. Nixon evidently decided to invade Cambodia and to bomb North Vietnam to respond to what he considered a Communist test of American "will and character" in the Middle East as well as Southeast Asia. But Indochina is a poor place for such demonstrations, as the sorry history of Vietnam has shown.

Instead of reinforcing American "credibility" in the world, the escalating Vietnam involvement undermined it by arousing a tide of anti-war and neo-isolationist sentiment in the United States. Cambodia promises to do the same.

The course of wisdom now, in addition to terminating the invasion quickly, is to resume vigorous efforts to negotiate a solution in Paris or elsewhere. Neither Moscow nor Hanoi has rejected outright the French proposal of a new Geneva conference.

President Nixon himself signaled last month that he was prepared to accept limited Communist use of the Cambodian sanctuary in preference to a wider war. A return to this policy might facilitate the reactivation of negotiations in one of the several areas the President mentioned during his Friday night press conference.

Meanwhile, reassertion by Congress of its responsible role in the war-making process would help restore public confidence in the American constitutional system and reinforce President Nixon's pledges of disengagement.

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 14, 1970]

## AND NOW CAMBODIANIZATION?

Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam has never been lacking in gall, but he outdid himself in dropping into Cambodia to announce that his army expects to stay there a long time. Wearing a black flying suit adorned with silver stars, Ky held forth about

the Saigon military's plans to remain in Cambodia until the feeble Lon Nol government has the strength to fight the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese by itself. This means never.

The Vietnamese (all of them) and the Cambodians have been deadly enemies for centuries, and even now the Cambodians are driving Vietnamese civilian residents out of the country; many, who have lived in Cambodia for years, have been slaughtered. The Cambodian army has just about enough strength to do this sort of job. It is said that as many as 500,000 Vietnamese may be expelled.

The South Vietnamese military were swept into Cambodia by the American troops who suddenly invaded the country two weeks ago. President Nixon says all Americans will be out by the end of June. Ky's troops can easily manage the ludicrous Cambodian army if it should try to cause trouble, so it appears that the Americans have handed over Cambodians to their ancient enemies, the Vietnamese. Of course, there are also North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in Cambodia, and it remains to be seen whether Ky's followers can stand up to them.

An interesting situation may be developing. Not long ago President Thieu of South Vietnam said it would take the Communists only a few months after the American departure to regain all the ground they have lost in Cambodia due to the American invasion. So what does this mean for Ky's occupation force (or was Ky only talking through his black baseball cap)? Ky's talk means Cambodianization, and it will not work any more than Mr. Nixon's Vietnamization will work. And if, say in July, the South Vietnamese start to take a licking in Cambodia, will the Americans run back in to save them?

Not if Congress denies the Administration funds for military operations in Cambodia; it is a powerful argument for passage of the cut-off resolution pending in the Senate.

[From the Sacramento (Calif.) Bee, May 2, 1970]

## NIXON TRIES BUT FAILS TO JUSTIFY HIS ESCALATION OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

President Richard Nixon was more emotional than logical in his nationwide defense of his indefensible expansion of American military involvement in Cambodia.

His arguments were specious, flag-waving and nothing can obscure the fact Nixon has escalated the Vietnam war, that he has compounded the folly of South Vietnam, that he has taken an action directly contrary to the whole implication of his campaign promises.

Manifestly the generals have made Nixon a captive, albeit a willing one, who from the beginning, has been hawkish toward the war. Nixon completely disregarded the lessons which he should have learned from the escalation of the Vietnamese war.

In a guerrilla war, the enemy merely falls back when moved against, disperses and regroups again. This undoubtedly will be the response of the Communists to American invasion of Cambodia, unless it is the intention of the United States to stay in its enlarged battlefield indefinitely.

America now has two nations from which to withdraw. Moreover, Nixon recognized the danger of his action when he warned any power which came to the aid of the Reds that America stood ready to retaliate with proper responses. This was a warning to Red China and proved Nixon is reapplying the old theme of brinkmanship so closely related to the name of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

With star-spangled rhetoric Nixon sought to invest this nation's Southeast Asian misadventure with a high moral content it never has had. He donned the toga of self-righteousness when he said he would rather be a

one-time president than let American soldiers and morality be forfeited.

Emphasizing this theme, Nixon likened the American move in Cambodia to the two world wars and to the Korean War. The fact is, America's involvement in Southeast Asia almost uniquely departs from its roles in the wars he mentioned. It lacks the legitimacy of congressional sanction; it is not a war for principle, unless one equates the autocratic government in Saigon with democracy; it does not further American interests and safety, just the opposite.

Nixon merely defended discredited brinkmanship and escalation.

The whole mess in Southeast Asia has been stunningly worsened.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1970]  
THE NEW "LOW PROFILE" APPROACH IN CAMBODIA

From the very beginning of our effort in Vietnam we have rested our case on the sanctity of frontiers; North Vietnam had invaded South Vietnam, we argued, so it was aggression pure and simple. From this flowed our right to come to Saigon's aid, and bomb the North and all the rest. When North Vietnamese troops began in recent weeks to menace the new government in Cambodia, the refrain was the same; the White House wasted no time calling it "a foreign invasion" and never mind that the presence of large numbers of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia had been a fact of life which we had accepted, without doing anything about it, for several years.

So now, because we don't like the turn of events in Cambodia, we have lent ourselves, with combat support and moral backing, to a South Vietnamese invasion of that country, without the slightest evidence that this support has been requested by Pnon Penh.

This is a stupefying development, which makes you wonder where in the world this Nixon crowd was when we were working our way insidiously into the Vietnam War? Does nobody in this administration remember how that scenario went: first, try it with the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), with American advisers and American equipment and American encouragement, and then if it doesn't do it, throw in air support, and then, if that doesn't work, American combat troops. Call it temporary, of course, something quick and surgical to buy time until our allies can pull themselves together and go it alone. If this administration can't remember how it went before, it ought to consider the possibility that a lot of people do—that we have been conned, once, by experts and that there are a lot of people, as the reaction in the Senate yesterday plainly suggests, who are in no mood to be conned again.

It may be, of course, that there is something to this that we haven't been told in the communique from the Saigon government, announcing the ARVN drive into Cambodia, and also the American collaboration in it, with military advisers, helicopters and air support. The President will have an opportunity to explain tonight in his television address just what there is about this adventure which distinguishes it from the follies of the past. For it is difficult, on the basis of what Saigon has said, and what the Pentagon has confirmed, to find any quarrel with Senator Mansfield's assessment: "Cambodia is a whole new ball game. If we become involved directly or indirectly, it becomes a general Indochina war."

Since we obviously have become involved, not only indirectly but directly, it certainly gives every appearance of being a step toward a "general Indochina war." And the hard questions come immediately to mind. Why, and why now, of all times, when we are supposed to be paring commitments and scaling down involvements and concentrating on Vietnamizing Vietnam? The obvious

argument is that this will remove a great thorn in our Vietnam effort and thereby hasten our exit from the scene—or at least prevent it from being delayed. That is what we were told about the bombing of North Vietnam, and it is no more believable in this instance. For one thing, we would need far better evidence than anybody has offered in advance of this decision that the South Vietnamese can clear out the Cambodian sanctuary; still less is there any evidence that they can keep it cleared out. Even if they could, what is to stop the North Vietnamese, in the meantime, from turning around and giving their full attention to the subjugation of Cambodia? And where does this end, if not in an ever-increasing effort to make good on Mr. Ronald Ziegler's ambiguous implication that we suddenly have an obligation to keep Cambodia neutral and out of Communist control?

Frankly it did not occur to us, when the President first announced his new, "low profile" approach to foreign policy that its first real application would come in the form of active American collaboration in a South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. But we are, perhaps, getting ahead of things; we await the President's explanation tonight of what is new, let alone even remotely promising, about this policy.

[From the Washington Post, May 15, 1970]

#### CAMBODIA AFTER JUNE

Some of the blurred edges of Mr. Nixon's pledge to take "all Americans of all kinds, including advisers . . . out of (Cambodia) by the end of June" are beginning to come into focus. The clearer view is not entirely reassuring. Essentially, what Mr. Rogers and Mr. Laird have said this week in amplification of the President's withdrawal commitment is that, while ground troops will be removed from Cambodia by the set deadline, the United States maintains the option of using its own air and naval arms there and of supporting later forays by military units of South Vietnam.

One can appreciate why the administration would not wish to tell Hanoi and the Vietcong, from the rooftops as it were, that if only they will keep their heads down in Cambodia for six more weeks, they will never be bothered again. Ambiguity has an obvious military utility. Yet at a certain point in the American people's rising ferment, the reasons for keeping the enemy guessing but against the claims of Americans to be informed and reassured about their own government's policy. After everything that has happened in the last few weeks, is there still an argument about where the priority lies?

Perhaps these simple things should be said about the Cambodian intervention. First, it involves combat in another sovereign state, a fact not altered by the use of airplanes or ships or allies rather than ground troops. Second, the criticality of further operations in Cambodia, as opposed to their convenience, remains to be demonstrated, the more so as the current intervention is claimed to be a success. Third, such further operations confirm precisely the fears of those who suspected from the start that intervention in Cambodia could not be swift and "surgical." That is just what "a wider war" means.

Saigon's policy is especially disturbing. The Thieu-Ky leadership is broadcasting loudly that it intends to fight on in Cambodia after June 30; Mr. Ky speaks wistfully of recapturing a town fully 80 miles beyond Phnom Penh. But observers on the scene wonder how long a rekindling of traditional Vietnamese-Cambodian animosities can be avoided, if Saigon strikes go on. Another worry is that South Vietnamese units, if deprived after June 30 of their customary extensive American support, may get into trouble so deep that pressure on the United States to rescue them will overwhelm the

discretion evident now. The administration's commitment to the Thieu-Ky government is large. It is by building up its military prowess that Mr. Nixon hopes to allow troop withdrawals from Vietnam to go forward. Yet surely that commitment does not require the administration to license Saigon to fight a proxy war in a third country.

With some apprehension, we note reports that a good part of the Nixon policy in Cambodia is being based on estimates of what the American public will stand for. Use of airplanes, ships and South Vietnamese, it is suggested, may not make outrage brim over, the way the use of ground troops did. This is, in our view, a very chancy basis for policy-making. It literally asks for policy to be made in the streets. If students and other dismayed by the war come to believe that mass protest is the only deterrent Mr. Nixon will honor, then the evidence of the last three weeks plainly is that the protesters will accept that challenge. Domestic peace as well as international sense argues for limiting the intervention in Cambodia, before June 30 and after.

#### CAMBODIA: HOME TRUTHS AND FIRST PRINCIPLES

"I know it is not the intention of the sponsors to aid the enemy," Senator Griffin said the other day and, in that gentle way politicians have of of sticking a shiv into each other, he went on: "Of course, it is not. But it does aid the enemy when we tie the hands of the Commander in Chief." Well so it does, and so here we go again, with the same pious, specious arguments, reflecting the same (presumed) innocence of the kind of struggle we have been engaged in for five years, the same unwillingness to face the implications of what we have come to call *limited war*, and the consequent incapacity to talk about it in honest terms.

We begin by calling it limited and then when an effort is made to define a limit we call that "aiding the enemy" or worse—we are told that this or that inhibition will endanger American lives. Of course it will; that risk is inherent in a limited war; if economy of life had been our paramount concern, we would have fought this war in a far different, faster, and more efficient way, and at the risk of a far wider conflict—or not fought it at all. It is therefore tempting to write this off to ignorance or the rhetoric of political debate, to leave Senator Griffin at Valley Forge, as it were, with General Washington—except for the fact that the nature of limited war is central to the current Senate effort to exert greater influence over war policy. On the off chance of illuminating the on-going debate, let us return to a few easily forgotten home truths and first principles:

The word limited, as applied to our Vietnam mission, means just that: "confined within limits; characterized by enforceable limitations upon the scope or exercise of powers." It modifies, in this instance, not just the manner in which a war is conducted but the objectives—the realistic outcome and the predictable gains—which can reasonably be expected, as a result of the limitations on the way it has been waged, unless you believe that a reduced investment can produce the same return.

Thus, we have always fought this war with our hands tied. We have not invaded or tried to flatten that country with one swift and terrible bombing blow, although presumably we could have. Neither did we attack Hanoi's chief suppliers, Russia and China; it was not thought to be worth the risk of World War III. So we have always fought the hard way and taken and tolerated more casualties than we would have otherwise, and while this is not a pleasant thought, it is a fact. President Johnson used to say that a bombing halt would tie one hand behind his back—until he saw a purpose in halting the bomb-

ing and, understandably, stopped talking that way. He did not sweep into Laos or across the DMZ or into Cambodia.

Mr. Nixon, of course, has swept Cambodia; but in the process he has produced such a political trauma at home that, for all practical purposes, he has foreclosed his doing it again. He has tied his hands, or one hand, or another hand (you will perceive how grotesque this image can become) and this time the knots look permanent; as McGeorge Bundy observed last week "the appeal to the escalator has been ended by the mass reaction of Americans in (the) last fortnight."

And yet, the administration continues to threaten the sternest measures if the enemy does anything to interfere with "Vietnamization" and our orderly withdrawal, and those in the Senate who would merely ratify the President's public eschewal of further Cambodian incursions are being told by the Republican leadership that they are "aiding the enemy." The President, meanwhile, promises withdrawal, on the one hand, while continuing to project the prospect of a "just peace" as our fixed objective while up in the Senate, his critics draft a timetable for our departure and call it "an amendment to end the war."

What the Senate sponsors of this particular measure really mean, of course, is an end to our participation in the war; they can promise no more. What the President really means . . . who knows?—we do not yet have the habit of plain talk about this war. And because we are not likely to work our way out of it until we do begin to talk about it in real terms, there is a strong argument for passage of the Copper-Church amendment, in a form satisfactory to the White House as well as the Senate. Our most urgent need now is not so much a prohibition imposed upon the President as a start towards a common understanding of all the limits imposed upon all concerned by a strategy of limited war.

[From the Washington Post, May 24, 1970]

#### THE VIETNAMIZATION OF CAMBODIA

The Nixon administration's plan to Vietnamize Cambodia—to support ongoing ground warfare there by South Vietnamese and other Asians after American troops leave next month—is risky and wrongheaded. Far from it being a "mistake" to set a timetable for the South Vietnamese, as Defense Secretary Laird said Friday, it is a mistake for the United States to grant Saigon what sounds too much like an unrestricted hunting license in a foreign country. This is the essence of a wider war, all the more disturbing for coming at a time when the setting of limits should be the key to policy.

Whatever can be said for Saigon's right to make occasional raids against Cambodian water sanctuaries, nothing can be said for continuing presence. Such a presence invites Saigon to get in over its head and then cry for an American rescue. It will surely tempt the Communists to make as much trouble as they can in vacated areas back South Vietnam, with one likely consequence being a slowdown in American troop withdrawals. It encourages Saigon to assert what many Cambodians fear are its traditional ethnic and territorial ambitions or, at least, to draw Washington more deeply into a Cambodian whirlpool. If one accepts the administration's own claims of the great success of its Cambodian venture, in terms of supplies captured and sanctuaries spoiled, then the justification for a continuing Vietnamese presence reduces to nearly zero.

But that the administration supposedly encouraging other Asians, such as Thais and Indonesians, to join military operations in Cambodia is a development with several puzzling aspects. Troubled as we are by the Cambodian intervention, we ordinarily welcome Asian initiatives to come to Saigon. The more the Asian governments

operate with each other the better the chances of the United States' withdrawing and of the region's moving forward on its own. Yet for such an operation to have the best opportunity for success, it must be seen as an Asian one. The United States may help an Asian regional defense effort and entertain hope for it. But as soon as Washington invests its own prestige in that effort and takes on responsibility for its effectiveness, then the whole dreary cycle of American over-reaction and Asian under-performance will have begun again. For the administration to insist that every Asian exercise in collective security represents an unfolding of the "Nixon Doctrine" is gratuitous and probably harmful too.

If the sanctuaries in Cambodia really have been spoiled so spectacularly as administration spokesmen say, then the United States has no further appropriate business there; not in supporting the Lon Nol government, not in sponsoring Saigon's or Bangkok's designs on Cambodia, not in doing anything which makes that unhappy land more of a military and political cockpit than it already is. The United States has no obligations to Cambodia, nor should it take any on. Cambodia is the wrong place for the United States to be investing its own military or diplomatic resources, and this is the wrong time.

The American purpose ought to be to return its and its allies' focus to Vietnam. Presumably this was Mr. Nixon's intention on May 8 when he declared, "I would expect that the South Vietnamese would come out approximately at the same time that we do, because when we come out our logistical support and air support will come out with them." The President was offering himself good advice.

#### THE FLOOD OF MAIL AGAINST THE WAR

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, since President Nixon dispatched American troops into Cambodia in late April, I have received tens of thousands of letters and telegrams against our military involvement in Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular. Some of these communications reflect anger against our mindless military involvements in far-off places. Others reflect sadness at the tarnishing of our Nation's reputation as a result of the war. Others reflect a poignant personal feeling of despair that the Nation will ever right itself. But all are written with a determination that every effort ought to be made to end the war in that spirit which Senator Carl Schurz captured in the 19th Century when he said:

Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right; when wrong, to be put right.

These letters and telegrams to which I refer came from all sections of the United States. I wish to share some with my colleagues, that I have received from Idaho. I withhold the names, because I have not had time to obtain the consent of the writers to place their letters in the RECORD.

A 15-year-old boy, in writing me, expresses an analysis of the Southeast Asia war that adults would do well to emulate. He wrote:

On the (TV) show, you stated many young boys will soon be old enough to fight, he writes. I'm 15, which makes me one of them. I know how it feels to hear so many men were killed today, thinking, soon it could be me. It is not dying I'm afraid of, but knowing I died in vain. There is no real cause to die for. In World War II, it was different, for Japan had bombed our soil.

Then there was Hitler in Germany and the death of so many Jews. But in Viet-Nam? Nothing. No real outstanding cause.

A second correspondent writes:

All of Soda Springs would like to see the war in Cambodia ended. Bring all the boys home.

Still a third urges:

Please put every effort possible into leading our country into complete withdrawal from Viet-Nam and Cambodia so that peace can become a reality. All-out war is not desirable, but neither is slow military withdrawal which leaves many soldiers on active duty with little protection, or the closure of our colleges, interrupted educations, or deaths on campus.

A young man writes:

Being of the younger generation (23) I feel that you do represent the younger generation in our stand in the current crisis in the Indo-China War as it is now always called.

A high-school student at Mountain Home, shares my view when he states:

I have a great fear that the Cambodia situation will end up just like Vietnam. I feel we shouldn't be there, but I know demonstrations will be of no use. So I write to you. . . . All that is coming of the war is many grieving families. . . .

And from another:

Apparently our executive branch has forgotten about government of, by and for the people. To cut off their funds must be the only language the Administration understands. At least the voice of the people has no effect in ending this madness.

The impact of the war on our young has gravely concerned me and still another Idaho correspondent agrees:

It frightens me when I see young Americans so disillusioned about their country. We must remember that in a very few years these young people will be part of the majority, but it is highly unlikely that they will be "silent." If their government ignores them now. . . . I salute those of you who have put your political careers on the line in an attempt to end this fiasco. You are the true American patriots.

Finally, I want to share one more letter written by an Idahoan who remembers that President Charles de Gaulle braved fierce controversy bordering on insurrection in order to withdraw his beloved France from a wrong commitment in Algeria. This correspondent writes:

France withdrew and as someone said, "She didn't fall into the sea."

I ask that the text of the letters from which I have quoted be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: Two years ago I campaigned for you for the U.S. Senate. After watching you tonite on "To End the War", I know every minute of campaigning was worth it. I support your views entirely.

On the show, you stated many young boys will soon be old enough to fight. I'm 15, which makes me one of them. I know how it feels to hear so many men were killed today, thinking, soon it could be me. It is not dying I'm afraid of, but knowing I died in vain. There is no real cause to die for. In World War II, it was different, for Japan had bombed our soil. Then there was Hitler in Germany and the death of so many Jews.

But in Viet-Nam? Nothing. No real outstanding cause. Men don't leave for Viet-Nam with a pat on the back and full support, but division and hatred to send them off. Those same men cannot say they will die so N. Viet-Nam will not invade Southeast Asia, for we don't know what they will or would do. And how about the P.O.W.'s. Instead of saving our men in North Viet-Nam, we are sending more men into Cambodia. Is this the road to peace? Certainly not.

This is more of an emotional letter than a logical one. But our country is emotionally divided, and the war certainly is not a logical one. I am sending a dollar to help you. I thank you, Senator for speaking out. It's about time. In a joint effort of the people and the Congress, we can end this war. We must end it or our country may not be around to celebrate its 200th birthday.

DEAR FRANK: We have no way to adequately express to you and the other great leaders in the Senate for your leadership in trying to end the war in Asia. The television program was impressive and I believe that it will make a tremendous impact on public opinion. We are sending a contribution to Support the Amendment to End the War in Vietnam.

Senator FRANK CHURCH: All of Soda Springs would like to see the war in Cambodia ended. Bring all the boys home. I had three grandsons over there. They should put this important question to a vote from all the people. We are not gaining, only losing.

DEAR SIR: With deep feeling we write to you regarding America's involvement in Viet Nam and Cambodia. As parents of two daughters and a son on two college campuses, we feel we have a great deal at stake and must express ourselves accordingly.

The deaths of these four students at Kent is a direct result of this military action. How much longer can we ignore the advice of military leaders but listen to political leaders in the Indochina confrontation?

Please put every effort possible into leading our country into complete withdrawal from Viet Nam and Cambodia so that peace can become a reality. All out war is not desirable, but neither is slow military withdrawal which leaves many soldiers on active duty with little protection, or the closure of our colleges, interrupted education, or deaths on campus.

It seems that our world must learn to love persons enough to say, "I will not harm you just to get what I want." Our country could become the initiators of this movement by learning to communicate through careful listening and intelligent speaking, by caring for one another enough to eliminate wars, both foreign and domestic. Sound like the Golden Rule? We meant it so.

DEAR SENATOR CHURCH: On one of the local television stations last night, I had the opportunity to see you speak along with 4 other senators. This was an extremely effective and informative way to present your case for this proposed amendment.

You have my support completely in your work, as you have had for all the time you have served Idaho. I feel strongly that we here in the sparsely populated state of Idaho are fortunate to have such a mature and effective voice in Idaho. Being of the younger generation (23) I feel that you do represent the younger generation in our stand in the current crisis in the Indo-China War as it is now always called.

Again, keep up the good work and be assured that the young people of Idaho along with the older folks are behind you!

DEAR SIR: I am a student at Mountain Home High School, and I feel it is better to write to you than to riot or to burn buildings. I am worried about the situation in Vietnam and Cambodia. I have several rela-

tives over there, and I don't want them killed or disabled for life. I don't claim I know what we should do, but I don't feel we should be over there. I am writing to you in hopes that maybe you can do something.

I have a great fear that the Cambodia situation will end up just like Vietnam. I feel we shouldn't be there, but I know demonstrations will be of no use. So I write to you in hopes that you will understand my feeling of leaving or having a military victory. All that is coming of the war now is many grieving families. All I know is we shouldn't be there. Can't something be done?

NEWSPAPER EDITORIALS OPPOSE OUR CAMBODIAN INTERUSION

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, throughout the Nation, many newspapers have endorsed the Cooper-Church amendment designed to terminate our direct military involvement in Cambodia. In so doing, the decision to send American troops into Cambodia is challenged.

I ask unanimous consent to have a few of these editorials printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Evening Sun, May 12, 1970]

#### NO NEW CAMBODIAS

The United States commitment to the present Cambodian operation is accepted, however reluctantly, by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But the committee has now said, in startlingly concrete language, that there should be no new Cambodias. This is the gist of the amendment approved yesterday that would prohibit the following activities for the future: retention of United States forces (not only ground combat forces) in Cambodia, presumably after the projected pull-out date of June 30; the use of American advisers and instructors in that country; American support for mercenaries there; air support of Cambodian forces.

Whether the amendment will survive in the full Senate, or be accepted by the House (which had previously declined to adopt any such restrictions) is far from clear. Indeed, the whole question of operations in Cambodia, as opposed to South Vietnam, has surfaced so quickly it has not received the kind of thorough debate and consideration it deserves. Thus the State Department raises doubts about the constitutionality of such prohibitions and these have not been resolved. The President's right as Commander in Chief to "protect" American forces in South Vietnam—which he claims is one of the major objectives of the present operation—remains murky under terms of the amendment, although its sponsors claim no such restriction is intended. And the use of air power to support, say, South Vietnamese military action would apparently be permitted.

Even so, the intention of the amendment is clear and for the first time the initial, formal step has been taken to exercise congressional power over the purse strings to restrain the executive. This, as much as any demonstrations on the Ellipse or the nation's campuses, should provide pause for the White House and the Pentagon. We do not insist that the amendment in its present form is precisely the right way to go about the matter. The questions and doubts need to be examined further in senate debate later this week than they were by the committee. But the great cry across the country for Congress to reassert its authority has obviously been heard and produced a response, as salutary a development as there has been in the Capitol for a long, long time.

The Nixon Administration, in keeping with

its benign neglect-policy toward Latin America, is trying to defuse the controversy. Plans are being drafted to drastically reduce the size of the military missions in Latin America. That was the recommendation contained in Governor Rockefeller's report. Also, it seems, Pentagon planners have concluded independently that the larger missions should be scaled down. They are unnecessarily expensive and are often identified with undemocratic elements in the host countries.

This is a step in the right direction. The administration might also look to some of the larger embassies throughout Latin America, with the view toward cutting some unessential non-military personnel. Smaller embassy staffs would serve the dual purpose of lowering the United States profile in Latin America and providing fewer potential victims for would be political kidnapers.

[From the Boston Globe, May 13, 1970]

#### HOW TO TURN OFF THE WAR

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has moved to deny funds for unauthorized war operations. The bipartisan Cooper-Church amendment to the foreign military sales bill specifically seeks to prevent U.S. forces from becoming involved in a war for Cambodia and to insure that U.S. forces presently in Cambodia will be out by July 1 and be kept out.

The administration protests that this language imposes limitations on the President's authority as commander-in-chief, especially concerning his responsibility to protect American forces "within" South Vietnam.

This is the same argument presented two weeks ago to justify the invasion of Cambodian territory. Since congressional approval was neither sought nor deemed necessary by the Nixon administration, congressional opponents are left only with their unquestionable power to appropriate funds for the war machine.

Last week some 135 members of the House, including all of the Massachusetts delegation except Speaker John McCormack, supported unsuccessful moves to deny funds without congressional consent for incursions into Cambodia. This week each senator will have to vote publicly for wider war or withdrawal on whatever schedule.

Some suggest this will be an exercise in futility. But at least it means a significant reversal of the long-standing practice of automatically voting military appropriations. Between now and July 1 there will be numerous opportunities to attach identical amendments to all pertinent military appropriation bills. These votes will establish the record on which all congressmen and 35 senators must seek reelection. This is what the new student lobbyists need either to persuade congressmen to their peace views or to garner support for peace candidates.

There is also a chance that the Senate will approve the restrictions. The amendment is being supported by the Senate's two most distinguished Republicans, George D. Aiken of Vermont and John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, as well as Senate Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.).

Sen. Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), speaking for the administration, says the amendment will not get any "more than 30 votes." Sen. Frank Church, an Idaho Democrat and sponsor, counts "more than 40" supporters now and foresees a majority by Thursday's vote time. One hopes that Sen. Edward W. Brooke will support the amendment. Republican votes especially are needed and should represent no embarrassment to the President if we are to believe his statement that "all U.S. troops would be out (of Cambodia) by June 30." That is all the amendment asks.

The administration's ambiguity on the Church-Cooper amendment is typical of the credibility gap, once a hallmark of Johnson days, now apparent in Washington. It was

never more evident than after the session Monday with the nation's governors. The meeting was designed to explore ways to communicate better with students. We are told a presidential "teletthon" is being considered to start a dialogue with youth. There is no need for any such staged production. Actions will speak clearer than words.

A return to withdrawal and disengagement from Vietnam, reform of the draft, approval for the 18-year-old vote, and greater efforts to reduce military spending—rather than floating trial balloons about the need for more taxes—are all better ways to woo the young.

The suggestion of MIT professors to contribute a day's salary toward a \$15 million peace candidates fund also has great merit. Their announcement said "we must ensure that the coming elections will create a Congress that will be committed to peace, the withdrawal of American military presence from Indochina and the prevention of other Vietnams." That is a worthwhile program, not only for university professors, but also for the students and all wage earners who want to turn off the war.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 15, 1970]

#### CONGRESSIONAL DUTY IN WAR IS FINALLY BEING ASSERTED

Had something like the Church-Cooper amendment now before the Senate been enacted half a dozen years ago, we wouldn't be stuck where we are today in Indochina.

The resolution would cut off funds for future American military activities in Cambodia, unless they were initiated with congressional approval. It would not affect the current operation there, but would hold the President to his deadline for pulling U.S. forces out of that country.

One reason we became so hopelessly entrenched in Vietnam is because from 1961, when the buildup of American advisers began, until last year, no one took any specific, concrete steps to stem the widening of the war.

What if two, three or four years ago, Congress had said to the President, "Look, we're not going to pay for any more than 50,000 or 100,000 troops in Vietnam?" No one can say for sure, of course, but the strong possibility is that "Vietnamization" would have begun much faster.

Instead, the executive was allowed to choose, decision by decision, to expand the conflict until the war we shouldn't have fought with 50,000 men has become the war we shouldn't have fought with 500,000.

The President has already announced he has no intention of staying in Cambodia. Why should he object to this congressional reinforcement of his own position? He did not oppose similar resolutions a few weeks ago forbidding use of U.S. combat troops in Laos or Thailand.

The amendment does not prevent Congress from changing its mind, should the political or military situation of Southeast Asia require it. The swiftness with which the Tonkin resolution was passed shows how quickly Congress hands sweeping powers to the president in an emergency—and how easily a president can convince it that an emergency exists.

The State Department—argues that the amendment restricts the President's "fundamental powers" as commander-in-chief—an argument that the executive branch is fond of making. The President has chosen to regard every opposition to his policies as a usurpation of his powers, as though opposition is automatically unconstitutional, illegal and somehow even un-American. That only encourages the kind of "patriotism" that beate up peaceful demonstrators provokes more violent dissent and applauds the shooting of students.

The President, after all, is not the only one with constitutional duties and prerogatives.

tives. Congress has the constitutional duty to declare war, to control expenditures and in a fundamental way to act as a check upon the executive. We are currently fighting an undeclared war at horrible expense in which two presidents have had unusual freedom of action. Church-Cooper is just an attempt to reverse a balance that for too many years has been weighted all in the other direction.

For many months, the only serious anti-war arena has been in the streets. Frustrated in their attempts to alter the course of the war and frequently goaded by the well-advertised indifference of the administration, those who oppose the war turned to marches, rallies, pickets, even—and we condemn it—violence. Church-Cooper is a big step toward moving the action back to the political arena, toward making American institutions seem viable and responsive again. We hope it will work.

[From the New York Post]

#### REVOLT ON CAPITOL HILL

A great many bills have been sent up to Congress by the Nixon Administration, but it must be especially anxious now about prompt attention to the bills for the Indochina war. There may be some delay; an increasing number of legislators seem reluctant to pay with a blank check.

In fact, it appears that at least 41 Senators support the legislation just reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which would amount to a stop-payment order on funds for any U.S. military activity in Cambodia after June 30, and the House Democratic caucus will meet in an unusual session tomorrow—at the request of 54 members—to vote on a resolution introduced by Rep. Ryan (D-N.Y.) opposing the Cambodia invasion.

The Administration is apparently apprehensive about these developments. A State Dept. protest about "statutory" curbs on the powers of the Commander-in-Chief was hastily followed up yesterday by Secretary of Defense Laird with announcements of troop pullbacks from Cambodia and promises that "major" operations will cease by June 15.

It is doubtful that responsible critics will be satisfied by such countermeasures—or by official cheerleading about alleged triumphs in Cambodia even as unrest mounts in Saigon.

The Senate legislation, actually an amendment to the foreign military sales bill, and the Ryan resolution are both expressions and assertions of Congressional responsibility and leadership. There will be debate later on the proposed repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and on the even more stringent measure sponsored by Sens. Hatfield (R-Ore.) and McGovern (D-S.D.), intended to force withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and Laos by the end of the year. In other words, neither the Pentagon nor the President can be calmly assured of unlimited funding for wider war in Indochina by demanding that Congress routinely pass the buck.

[From the New York Times, May 14, 1970]

#### CAMBODIAN WITHDRAWAL

The debate that has opened on the Cooper-Church amendment now gives the Senate a chance to vote a proposal that would bind President Nixon to his promise of withdrawing American troops from Cambodia. It would also make sure that he did not send them back without Congressional consent.

These reasonable objectives deserve reasoned discussion, not the "stab in the back" and "jubilation in Moscow" rhetoric employed in an attempt to discredit the amendment yesterday by some Administration supporters.

Administration arguments that the measure would hamper the President in his con-

stitutional responsibility to take action to protect American troops merely confuse the issue. Nothing in the proposal would keep the President from carrying out the present Cambodian operation, all the more so since repeated statements by Mr. Nixon and Defense Secretary Laird assert that the operation is ahead of schedule and proceeding successfully. Mr. Laird, in fact, has publicly dismissed as unnecessary military pleas for more time to search for Communist arms in the sanctuary bases.

What the Cooper-Church amendment would do is cut off funds to retain American troops in Cambodia after the current operation is completed on June 30. It would also prohibit American advisers or air support for Cambodian forces.

However, the sponsors of the proposal have not attempted to bar limited arms aid for Cambodia nor American air interdiction of Communist supply lines through Cambodia to South Vietnam. Neither is there any attempt to rule out American air support to South Vietnamese forces should they return to Cambodia at a future date, although President Nixon has said that air support for the current South Vietnamese operation would halt by the end of next month.

The importance of the Cooper-Church amendment is twofold. It gives the Senate an opportunity to put on record the strong opposition within that body to a prolongation of military operations in Cambodia. And it would announce the Senate's determination to reassert Congressional prerogatives in foreign policy and defense, areas marked in recent decades by Presidential dominance—and tragic errors.

The real constitutional issue differs from the one the Administration is trying to make. The Constitution vests control over the nation's warring power in both the President and the Congress. No one can doubt the need for Presidential decision-making when split-second questions of nuclear war or peace may be involved. But there never has been such urgency in the Presidential decisions on Vietnam and Cambodia, now under challenge.

By adopting the Cooper-Church amendment and thus reasserting its right to be consulted before the country is taken into war again, Congress will strengthen not weaken the American position in the world. What Vietnam has shown is that it is a war undertaken without popular consent that undermines American credibility abroad, not the opposite.

[From the New York Times, May 17, 1970]

#### CAMBODIAN BALANCE SHEET

Desperately eager to head off a long-overdue reassertion of Congressional restraints over the President's warring powers, the Nixon Administration strove last week to put the best possible face on what it insists will be only a limited extension of the Vietnam war into Cambodia. It remains too early to tell how much or how little military success will attend the two-week-old Cambodian escalation, but it is already plain that it is a political disaster.

Administration sources cite a count of more than 7,000 reported enemy dead and an impressive list of weapons and other booty captured as evidence that the thrust into border sanctuaries has proved its worth. But even Defense Secretary Laird appears skeptical of the body count and nobody doubts that the seized supplies will be replaced in time.

Meanwhile, the main body of enemy forces has not been touched. The Communists continue to extend their grip over northern Cambodia and southern Laos, beyond the self-imposed limits of American penetration. Still a phantom is the central Communist headquarters that President Nixon has said was the principal target of the allied attack.

On the global political front Secretary of State Rogers has conceded that foreign reaction has been largely negative. Instead of inducing the other side to negotiate, President Nixon's get-tough policy appears to have stiffened Hanoi's resolve and strengthened North Vietnam's ties with its Communist allies. It has exacerbated Soviet-American relations at a critical time in the SALT talks and in Middle East negotiations; it even appears to have cooled the quarrel between Moscow and Peking.

But the heaviest price for President Nixon's Cambodian misadventure has been paid at home where bitter division and bloodshed have torn American society. Less than a month ago, Mr. Nixon was boasting that the Communists had made "their most fatal calculation" when they "thought they could win politically in the United States." Now it is the President who has misjudged the depth of American aversion to the war. This opposition has exploded not only on the campuses but within his own Cabinet, in the usually mute State Department bureaucracy and among such solid citizens as 1,000 "establishment" lawyers who plan to travel from New York to Washington this week to urge "immediate withdrawal from Indochina."

Henry Kissinger, the White House foreign policy adviser, yesterday said that the President's July 1 timetable of withdrawal would be fulfilled and that the South Vietnamese would pull out their combat forces about the same time. His statement is made speculative because they have gone far beyond the border sanctuaries and become deeply involved in Cambodia's internal affairs. In any case, it is difficult to believe that the Saigon forces, incapable thus far of mastering their own country, can save the inept rulers of a neighboring nation whose people are ancient enemies of the Vietnamese.

Equally unsettling is the reiteration by an American spokesman in Paris last week of the President's earlier warning that, if the Communists remain intransigent in negotiations and aggressive on the battlefield, "we will react accordingly."

Congress can help restore confidence at home and abroad on the direction of American foreign policy by beginning to reassert its own constitutional powers through adoption of the Cooper-Church amendment. Its goal of cutting off funds for future military involvement in Cambodia would not imperil the troops or undermine Presidential authority to carry out all of Mr. Nixon's stated objectives in the current drive there. Rather it would enable Congress to share with the Chief Executive, as it should, responsibility for ending a war that already has cost the United States far more than it could ever be worth.

[From the New York Times, May 19, 1970]

#### NO MORE CAMBODIAS

The firmness with which Senators of both parties are resisting efforts to kill or cripple the Cooper-Church amendment on Cambodia is encouraging evidence of a new determination in Congress to restore the constitutional balance in reaching vital decisions on war and peace.

The proposal to bar funding of American troops in Cambodia after June 30 does not infringe on the President's constitutional power to command the armed forces in the nation's defense. It does reassert the long-eroded constitutional prerogatives of Congress to participate in foreign policy and defense decisions, which President Nixon ignored when he unilaterally ordered American troops into Cambodia.

An aroused public opinion, to which Congress is at last responding, already has prompted the President to make an open commitment to terminate his Cambodian adventure by June 30. The Cooper-Church amendment would enable Congress to share

responsibility for this important decision, as it should under the American constitutional system, and would give it the reassuring force of law.

The measure does not interfere with the military operations now under way. Nor does it bar any important actions in the future that the President himself has not already foreclosed. It does not prohibit limited arms aid to the Cambodian forces nor air interdiction of Communist supply lines through Cambodia to South Vietnam. Nor—despite some Congressional misgivings on this point—does it rule out future American air and logistical support to South Vietnamese units in Cambodia, although Mr. Nixon has pledged himself to halt the current support operations by June 30.

There is no need, despite Administration urging, for the amendment to re-state the President's power to take action to protect American forces in the field should they be in imminent danger of attack. Congress cannot restrict this power. What Congress seeks to prevent is the use of this power as a pretext for military operations of wider scope undertaken without consultation with the nation's elected legislators.

Essentially, the Cooper-Church proposal is a warning shot across the bows that says: "No More Cambodias!" It does not create a constitutional crisis, but implies that the President could precipitate one—if he again widens the war or reverses American disengagement from Vietnam without Congressional agreement. The Administration argument that the amendment would impair the President's credibility in dealing with the Communists is unpersuasive. The way to assure Presidential credibility is to gain Congressional support by treating Congress as a partner in decisions on peace and war. Acceptance of the Cooper-Church amendment would be a useful step in that direction. But whether the Administration accepts it or not, the Senate can best serve the national interest now by pressing ahead with its enactment.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, May 13, 1970]

#### BLOCKING FUNDS FOR CAMBODIA

The Administration cannot very well make a substantive objection to the Senate resolution designed to limit the United States invasion of Cambodia, since President Nixon has promised that "all Americans of all kinds" will be out of the country by the end of June. So it may be presumed the White House pressure that brought about defeat of a similar proposal in the House last week will not come into play.

Irrespective of Administration wishes and pledges, the bipartisan measure that would cut off funds for retaining American forces in Cambodia beyond the end of next month ought to be enacted. It cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a 9-to-4 vote on Monday and deserves overwhelming Senate approval; later this month or in early June, when the matter comes up for a vote, the Senate should also approve the broader antiwar resolution requiring military withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

The need for congressional restraints is underscored by considerable evidence that Mr. Nixon acted impulsively in sending American troops in Cambodia, and contrary to the advice of high-level civilian advisers. There was no immediate or compelling military reason to invade Cambodia and the expedition has proved pretty much of a fiasco despite the intensive effort of Pentagon propagandists to claim significant results.

The United States can be counted fortunate, thus far, in that there has been no major retaliation by the enemy. Mr. Nixon pictured the invasion as a means of cleaning out North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sanctuaries and protecting U.S. troops in Viet-

nam. But supposing the gamble had been followed by a disastrous Communist response elsewhere (something that still may occur)?

There are at least two sides in a fight, a situation Mr. Nixon seems sometimes to overlook. One side does not know how the other side will react, and herein lies a particular danger in the Indochina involvement. The problem of the sanctuaries is an old one, and who is to say that if sanctuaries are denied one place they will not appear in another?

The possibility has already been raised among Senators that the North Vietnamese may retaliate by attacking United States military installations in Thailand, an American sanctuary for the big U.S. bombers that issue forth to raid targets in Laos and Vietnam. There has never been a serious attack on the American bases in Thailand. Could an enlargement of the war into Thailand be the next possible step?

What might be called the theory of the falling sanctuaries points inexorably toward an enlarged war unless an irrevocable contraction begins. The ultimate sanctuary is China; there have been military men in the capital for years who have believed in the desirability of attacking China. Containing Peking is presumably the goal of the entire Southeast Asian operation. Only yesterday retired Lt. Gen. James Gavin, a notable opponent of Vietnam escalation, said he feared the risk of war with China was increased by the Cambodian invasion.

Unless the escalation is stopped the catastrophe of a war with 800,000,000 Chinese is possible, and indeed, may be inevitable. So Congress is obliged, in the light of the Cambodian enlargement, to take nothing for granted, to put up restraints on the Executive even while hoping they will not be necessary. We presume Mr. Nixon intends to honor his pledge to get out of Cambodia by the end of June, but a congressional funds cut-off would be a strong signal to the hawks pushing for a larger war.

[From the San Francisco Chronicle, May 13, 1970]

#### A VOTE AGAINST MORE CAMBODIAS

The vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to cut off funds for any future U.S. military action in Cambodia is probably unprecedented in wartime.

The words "in wartime" are the key words here, because it is the fact that the Vietnam war is constitutionally undeclared which underlies the Foreign Relations Committee's quarrel with the State and Defense Departments and the White House.

In a declared war, a vote by Congress in support of legislation to cut off all operational funds in a war theater would be unthinkable—even were it a newly entered and dubiously accepted theater like Cambodia. So that explains why no one has been able to recall a precedent for what happened Monday in Senator J. William Fulbright's committee.

Specifically, this rebuke to the Cambodian venture came up as an amendment to a bill authorizing the sales of foreign military goods. It was rushed through the committee on one day's discussion (just as the now reviled 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution was). Its bipartisan sponsors, Senators John Sherman Cooper and Frank Church said the force of their amendment would not keep the President from carrying out his present operation in Cambodia—which he has said he will definitely end by July—but could keep him from a future Cambodian operation without the express approval of Congress.

Apparently the issue may come to debate in the Senate as early as tomorrow, and this debate, like the vote of the committee, will undoubtedly emphasize the mood of dismay, doubt and disillusionment among many Senators and Congressmen in the Capitol.

Observers in Washington who write a

newsletter for businessmen and who never express themselves in hyperbole say that rarely have government officials and members of Congress appeared so angered and confused over a presidential decision as over this one.

We don't think that that decision is going to be reversed by this vote or that it will unduly alarm or hamstring the President, because Congress can't conceivably intend to deny funds to operations already under way. But Congress has expressed its opposition by resolution to the President's sending combat forces into Laos and Thailand, and to deny him funds for a second Cambodia would be just a stronger assertion of the same view.

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 16, 1970]

#### THE AMENDMENT ON CAMBODIA

The Administration is moving in strength to block Senate proposals aimed at limiting the American involvement in Cambodia, but its arguments thus far are not persuasive and there is no indication a great many Senators are impressed. The target of Administration lobbying is the so-called Church-Cooper amendment that would bar funds for retaining troops in Cambodia after July 1; it would allow no money after that for American advisers or U.S. air support.

A weakness in the Administration position is that President Nixon promised unequivocally over television on May 8 that "all Americans, of all kinds, including advisers, will be out of Cambodia by the end of June." The amendment at issue does no more than put a congressional seal on Mr. Nixon's pledge.

Senator Griffin of Michigan, the assistant Republican leader in the Senate, says passage of the measure "would suggest the President doesn't mean what he says and that the Senate doesn't believe him." The record shows that Mr. Nixon has made confusing and contradictory statements on the matter, so the Senate has a reason for putting its own convictions on record in the form of specific legislation.

And credibility aside, there is another aspect of the situation. Since Mr. Nixon was obviously under pressure from the military brass to invade Cambodia, the Church-Cooper resolution should actually be helpful to him in fulfilling his withdrawal pledge, since the hawks would be given to understand they could get no more money. It might be said that the resolution is aimed more at the military men who want to enlarge the war than at Mr. Nixon himself.

There are indications the debate may center around the President's powers to protect American troops whether Congress restricts funds or not, an emotional issue that seems to us more or less irrelevant in the context. No one would advocate steps that would jeopardize the safety of American soldiers. But it would seem that the quicker and further the troops were withdrawn the less risk there would be.

Mr. Nixon said of the thrust into Cambodia that it was "indispensable" to the success of the Vietnamization program and necessary to protect American lives, though as he himself made clear the "threat" had existed in Cambodia for the last five years. Certainly the threat from Cambodia was less than the hazards to which United States troops may be exposed if things do not now go well.

It is quite possible that the American could come up against a powerful force of aggrieved Cambodians, North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, Viet Cong and Laotians. The Thieu-Ky regime in Saigon says it plans to keep South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia after the promised American withdrawal, and if experience is a guide that government will try to keep the Americans in Cambodia as they have been kept in Vietnam.