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SUBJ: Political Activities, 274th Main Force Regiment, Military Region 7. (U).

CDEC LOG NO.

07-2154-70

(C-Jul 71) (6 pages, typewritten; B-3) Directive, last page(s) missing, undated, originated by the Political Section of the 4th Regiment ((possibly aka 274th Main Force Regiment, Military Region 7)), provides guidance for political tasks during Campaign X ((possibly 1970 Summer Campaign)).

(12 Jun 70)  
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Biên Hòa Prov  
III GMR  
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18th RVNAF  
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Document begins with an assessment of the situation, stating that the US imperialists had been defeated in the military, political, and diplomatic fields of the VN conflict during 1969. Heavy casualties on the SVN battlefields and domestic political troubles confronted the US. The anti-VN war movement throughout the world, which had isolated the US from many countries, including those of the free world, and the fiery political attacks by the delegations of the Democratic Republic of VN and the ((VC)) Provisional Revolutionary Government ((at the Paris peace talks)), had greatly undermined US prestige. The defeated position of the US had reduced the faith of a number of US satellites, and deepened the split in the US-Puppet ((RVN)) clique. However, stubborn by nature, the US imperialist had not given up its aggressive scheme. It had nurtured the Vietnamization program to prolong the war and maintain its occupation of SVN.

Confronted with the enemy ((US)) conspiracy, this campaign ((Campaign X)) was designed to disrupt the Vietnamization plan, push the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) to a quick defeat, and create opportunity for the attainment of a ((VC/NVA)) decisive victory.

However, if the enemy failures were advantageous to the friendly ((VC/NVA)) side, then various weaknesses were to be expected in the conduct of the related campaign.

The rainy season, which would start during Campaign X, and material ((food and clothing)) shortages would affect health, and consequently reduce combat strength and efficiency.

Although adequate food had been obtained ((for activities during prevailing shortcomings of cadre and members, including a tendency to balk at hardship and sacrifice, the wait-and-see attitude, fear of a protracted war, and an overwhelming desire for rest, would also have an effect.

Serious shortages of ammunition, drugs, and food difficulties in logistical supply, caused by enemy activities on both ground and water, might adversely affect combat operations.

Document also outlines instructions for political and ideological training activities designed to improve fighting spirit and consolidate unit organization.