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15. SUMMARY: (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a report, dated 17 June 1970, which was prepared by an unspecified agency ((possibly of Son Tinh District Party Committee, VC Quang Ngai Province, VC Region 5)). The document recapitulates friendly ((VC)) and enemy ((FVMAF/RVNAF)) activities in Son Tinh District from the beginning of 1969 to June 1970.

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RECAPITULATIVE REPORT ON MAIN TASKS AND
TASK 180 ((SIC)) CARRIED OUT BY SON TINH

((possibly Sơn Tinh District, VC Quảng Ngãi Province,
VC Region 5)) (from the beginning of 1969 to Jun 70)

PART I. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENEMY ((FVMAF/RVNAF)) AND FRIENDLY ((VC/NVA)) SITUATIONS,
AND THE ENEMY SCHEME OF LAUNCHING ATTACKS TO RELOCATE THE PEOPLE IN
RESETTLEMENT CENTERS.

PART II. IMPLEMENTATION OF MAIN PARTY TASKS, THE TASK OF CONSOLIDATING AREAS UNDER
OUR CONTROL, THE COUNTERPACIFICATION TASK, AND THE TASKS OF KILLING TYRANTS,
BREAKING THE OPPRESSIVE ENEMY CONTROL, WINNING OVER THE PEOPLE, AND
CONSOLIDATING WEAK AREAS.

PART III. ASSESSMENT OF STRONG POINTS AND SHORTCOMINGS, AND THEIR CAUSES.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATIONS, AND THE ENEMY SCHEME OF
LAUNCHING ATTACKS TO RELOCATE THE PEOPLE IN RESETTLEMENT CENTERS.

1. Characteristics of the friendly and enemy situations:

Since Sơn Tinh District was liberated, it has developed into a large liberated
area extending from the mountains to the coast. It is a populated area of strategic
importance which may serve as a stepping stone ((VC controlled area used to gain
access to an uncontrolled area)) to attack the ((Quảng Ngãi)) Province capital. The
western part of Sơn Tinh borders our mountain bases. It is also an area of many
mountains and hills such as Núi Đất Mountain (where US troops are presently stationed),
Sơn Trung Hill, Núi Tròn Hill... ((sic)). It is a favorable place for the enemy to
set up observation towers and posts to block our corridors and protect his rear bases.

The enemy blocking position located on Núi Tròn ((Hill)) in the western area
((of Sơn Tinh District)) is also a Chiêu Hồi ((Open-Arms)) center. This area has
1,200 inhabitants living in Biên Niên Hamlet, Tinh Sơn ((Village)).

There is a good road system in the area connecting the province capital with
Sơn Hà and Trà Bông. Đường Một ((Route 1)) passes through the heart of Sơn Tinh
District and connects the province capital with Quảng Nam. The Trà River winds its
way through Tinh Giang, Tinh Đông, Tinh Ninh, Tinh Sơn, and Tinh Hà Villages.
Since it was liberated, Western Sơn Tinh District has contributed many material
resources to the Resistance. In many villages such as Tinh Sơn, Tinh Ninh, Tinh Bình,
Tinh Hiệp, Tinh Bắc, etc... ((sic)) there have been fairly strong movements going on
to increase ((farm)) production to support ((the Revolution)). Western Sơn Tinh
District is also a good place for us to station troops and establish a corridor
system or a stepping stone area to conduct attacks on the province capital, district
seats, and hideouts and safe rear bases of the enemy.

The people ((of Sơn Tinh)) have a long tradition of heroic revolutionary struggle which they always strive to uphold and foster in spite of the hard trials they have to suffer.

((Page 2 of O.T.))

During the past few years, the army and the people of Sơn Tinh District have contributed to the achievement of brilliant military exploits such as those attained in Ba Gia, Núi Trôn, Quảng Thành, etc.((sic)) Because Sơn Tinh District occupies an important ((strategic)) position, the enemy has intensified attacks on this district, especially since the end of 1968.

2. Enemy situation:

1. Strength as of the end of 1969:

US troops:

Four companies of the 198th Brigade.

One artillery company consisting of 12 to 15 x 105mm to 155mm artillery pieces, and three pacification platoons of approximately 150 men.

Puppet regular troops:

Four D's ((battalions)) of E6/F2 ((possibly 6th Regiment, 2nd Division)): The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th.

Regional Force units: Nine ((should read eight)) companies: The 105th, 107th, 190th, 196th, 422nd, 716th, 933rd, and 380th.

Rural pacification forces: 20 D's ((possibly groups: The 19th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 37th, 45th, 75th, 80th, 81st, 84th, and 85th; the designations of the remaining seven groups are unknown.

Popular Force units: 40 B's ((platoons)).

Sappers: Two platoons plus one engineer platoon.

Police field forces: 20 platoons.

People's Self-Defense Force units: 1,000 men, two-thirds are armed.

River patrol force: One platoon.

3. Twenty-three present posts:

((Names of posts))

Núi Đất

Hồn Trôn

Phu Nhuận

((Names of posts))

Núi Trôn

Gõ Thi

Quản Ly

((Names of posts))

Chó Mồi

Kim Sa

My Lối

P.N. Th^uong ((possibly Phu Nhu^an Thu^ong)), (Tinh Phong)

P.N. Ha ((possibly Phu Nhu^an Ha), (Tinh Phong)

Ho^a Ban, (Tinh Thⁱen).

5. Seven resettlement centers:

Tinh Ky	Kim Sa	Truong An
G ^o Thi	G ^o Da	Phu Hoa
	Phu Non	

((Page 3 of O.T.))

Increase and reduction in enemy troop strength ((in S^on Tinh District))
(from the end of 1969 to Jun 70):

US troop strength ((on)) "High Point" 97 was reduced by two C^os ((possibly companies)) of D1/20 ((possibly 1st battalion, 20th Infantry)).

The strength of the Puppet regular forces was reduced by four D^os ((possibly battalions)). Now there are no ((more GVN)) regular forces troops on the S^on Tinh District battlefield.

The strength of the ((GVN)) Regional Forces was reduced by one C ((the 103rd)).

At the beginning of 1970 the strength of the ((GVN)) Popular Force was increased by six B^os ((possibly platoons)). Now it has been decreased by six B^os which were upgraded and integrated into Regional Force units.

The People's Self-Defense Force strength was increased by 450 personnel.

Pacification groups were reduced by five D^os ((possibly groups)) which / were assigned to other areas. Enemy posts increased by five: Thⁱen A, N^ui Troc, Nho Lam, T^ap M^y, and G^o D^a Posts.

((Names of posts))

Núi Sứa
Ky Xuyên
D.C.T. Khuc
Núi Ngan
Ban Cò

((Names of posts))

Mỹ Khê
Xóm Nít
Đầu Voi
Cầu Bàu Sắt
Châu Sa

((Names of posts))

Núi Cầm
An Vinh
Chi Khu
Đôi ((unit)) 45
(T. An)

4. Twenty-four ((should read 22)) strategic hamlets:

Khanh Van, (Tinh Tho) ((possibly Village))	
Kim Sa, (Tinh Tho)	''
Ngoc Thach, (Tinh Tan)	''
An Phu, (Tinh Tan)	''
Kim Loc, (Tinh Chau)	''
An Dinh, (Tinh Chau)	''
Chau Sa, (Tinh Chau)	''
An Dao, (Tinh Long)	''
An Loc, (Tinh Long)	''
Gia Hoa, (Tinh Long)	''
Tang Long, (Tinh Long)	''
Phu Hoa, (Tinh An)	''
Da Ngan, (Tinh An)	''
Phu Ninh, (Tinh An)	''
Tra Son, (Tinh An)	''
Phu Giang, (Tinh An)	''
Phu Nhon, (Tinh An)	''
Tho Long, (Tinh Phong)	''
Phu Nhuận, (Tinh Phong)	''

P.N. Th^ong ((possibly Phu Nhu^an Thu^ong)), (Tinh Phong)

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Ho^a Ban, (Tinh Thien).

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	Phu Nhon	

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Strategic hamlets increased by five: Tru[~]ng Xu[~]an, Tho[~] Lo[~]c, My La[~]p, Tan My[~], and Long Ba[~]n Hamlets. Resettlement centers increased by two: The Ca[~]m So[~]n and Kim Long Resettlement Centers.

As for enemy troop strength in stronghold ((strategic)) hamlets and resettlement centers and enemy troops deployed in So[~]n Tinh District, they are mentioned in a statistical list enclosed herein.

2. The enemy scheme of conducting attacks to relocate the people in resettlement centers.

Since the 1968 Tet General Offensive and Uprising, during which we inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, the latter has been forced to take the defensive. But the heavier the losses he suffered, the more stubborn he became and the more frequently he introduced cunning schemes to destroy the ((revolutionary)) movement.

To begin with, on 16 Mar 68, two US C^os ((companies)) and one Puppet regular force company conducted a large-scale sweep operations in the Tinh Khe ((Area)) and massacred over 500 civilians. At the beginning of 1969 (13 Jan 69), the enemy concentrated a large force with many modern war facilities to launch a sweep operation in Ba La[~]ng An involving 8,000 US and Puppet troops and 100 tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft of all kinds. The enemy destroyed and burned everything and forced the people to move to the Va[~]n Thanh Resettlement Center in implementation of his scheme of pacifying main objective areas in an accelerated manner.

In early Feb 69, the enemy took away hundreds of patriotic civilians living in resettlement centers and drowned them in the sea. Through this cruel act, he hoped to weaken the will to struggle of the people of So[~]n Tinh District and facilitate relocating them in resettlement centers. However, the ((VC/NVA)) army and the people in So[~]n Tinh succeeded in destroying the Va[~]n Thanh Resettlement Center. This marked the initial step toward the defeat of the enemy's accelerated pacification program.

The plan of pacifying main objective areas failed. Therefore, since Jun 69, the enemy has shifted to the on-the-spot pacification plan ((possibly meaning a plan whereby GVN would attempt to pacify one locality at a time)). He concentrated all his efforts to pacify more quickly, introducing more cunning tricks. For example, he utilized small forces such as the Tra[~]u Di[~]en ((Mad Buffalo; possibly 2nd RVNAF Mar Bn)) and Cho[~] ((Dog)) Cum ((sic)) Battalions which regularly operated along the Tra River to conduct continuous and sustained sweep operations and attacks.

He also sent US field force troops to search villages in mountainous areas. They burned and destroyed everything, and massacred everyone in places where our traces were found. As many as 12 people were killed at a time in Khánh Mỹ ((Hamlet)), (High Trã Village) on ... ((blank ; sic)). They also shot a number of old men and women in Xuân Mỹ ((Hamlet)), (Tinh Hiệp Village) to terrorize the local people. Consequently, when they heard the arrival of US troops, they packed up and fled to Núi Tròn ((Area)) at once, not to return to their homes until after the sweep operation. Enemy soldiers often burned houses of the people to render them homeless. These acts were repeated for two or three consecutive months in the western area of Sơn Tinh ((District)).

Vũ Xuân Bình, Assistant Province Chief, stated that if the Quang Mỹ Dam was destroyed, it would also mean an end to the eastern area of Sơn Tinh District. So, only a few days later, the enemy dropped tens of tons of bombs on the Quang Mỹ Dam. He also used HU-1A's ((helicopters)) to strafe the area day and night to prevent us from repairing the dam. The small dikes which hold back water also collapsed causing great difficulties to the ((farm)) production of the people.

In early July 69, the enemy increased attacks against specific targets in the western area of Sơn Tinh ((District)) in execution of his plan to gradually destroy this area.

Enemy infantry battalions alternated conducting sweep operations. Every five days, a sweep operation was launched against ((Tinh)) Sơn and ((Tinh)) Minh Villages. Sometimes a sweep operation lasted a whole week.

The undesirable elements who remained inactive, took advantage of these operations to resume activities such as spreading ((baseless)) information to threaten the people and reporting on our situation.

Taking advantage of the tense situation and the confusion of the people in some areas, the enemy stepped up his espionage and Chieu Hoi ((Open-Arms)) activities. He arrested people, oppressed them, then assigned them to work for him. He also recruited people who had access to two areas ((VC and GVN controlled areas do work for him as informants)). In some places, he assigned security and intelligence agents to infiltrate our areas and collect information on our situation and our policy, and to discover our agencies, storage facilities, and communication and transportation corridors in order to provide intelligence support for his sweep operations and attacks against our liberated areas.

In addition, he forced those who have relatives and friends ((working for the Revolution)) to appeal to their relatives to rally, or he bribed them to defect ((to the GVN side)). The worst method was to force a father to appeal to his son to return, or wife to call back her husband, etc ... ((sic)).

He sent aircraft to hover over the area all day appealing through loudspeakers to our cadre and guerrillas to give up, and to urge the people to move out to Núi Tròn. After that, the area was bombed. Typically, one small hamlet in Tinh Ninh ((Village)) with a ((surface)) area of only 100 by 200 meters, was bombed for eight days, three to five times per day. The same thing occurred in other hamlets of Tinh Sơn and Tinh Minh Villages etc.....((sic)) Twin-fuselage aircraft

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((sic; possibly C-119)) attacked all places with green vegetation. B-57 aircraft sometimes conducted two to three raids a night. Some gardens with a land surface no larger than seven sao ((one sao equals 0.09 acre)) were attacked with twenty 500 kilogram bombs.

He also used artillery pieces in Binh Lien, Nui ((mountain)) Dat, and Tra Bong Posts and ships at sea to indiscriminately and violently fire at hamlets he intended to destroy. Every day, the local people had to eat dinner early so they could take shelter in their trenches by 1700 hours.

((Page 5 of O.T.))

This situation made ((Party)) activities and meetings impossible. Although the enemy used cruel schemes and tricks to conduct unprecedented fierce attacks against us, he still failed in his relocation and strategic hamlet programs.

Subsequently, he used tanks and bulldozers in coordination with infantrymen to attack and level the houses and vegetation of Tinh Khe, Tinh Son, and Tinh Minh Villages to clear the area. He strived to win over the people by sending US and Puppet troops to conduct repeated sweep operations to "comb" and fiercely attack the Tinh Binh, Tinh Son, Tinh Minh, and Tinh Bac Villages. His purpose was to create a tense situation and confuse the people so they would move to Nui Tron. Some hamlets, such as Thanh My (of Tinh Son Village) and Minh Thanh (of Tinh Minh Village), etc ... ((sic)) were completely abandoned.

Furthermore, he continued to frighten the people by spreading false propaganda, planting espionage agents in our liberated areas to collect information on us, and recruiting informants to provide him with intelligence support to attack us further and cause us new difficulties.

After relocating about 7,000 to 8,000 people in Nui Tron area, he stationed one Regional Force company at the Nui ((mountain)) Tron position. Furthermore, one reconnaissance platoon and one Popular Force platoon, along with henchmen and tyrants from the various villages ((in enemy controlled areas)), arrived to establish ((strategic)) hamlets. CIA agents were also assigned here to recruit agents to facilitate long-range attacks against our liberated areas to support his ((rural)) development activities.

On the outside, one "Republican" ((RVN)) battalion-size unit conducted continuous search operations to terrorize and relocate the people in resettlement areas. This ((resettlement)) program was considered to be completed as of 30 Nov 69.

While in our liberated areas, the enemy made our people's lives unstable and caused difficulties for us through continuous attacks. In the province capital and its fringe areas and generally in areas under his temporary control, the enemy made efforts to consolidate the existing strategic hamlets, and re-establish village and hamlet administrative machinery by appointing cruel henchmen, tyrants, and elements hostile to the Revolution to administrative positions to oppress the people. He also stepped up conscription and troop-upgrading programs and organized the People's Self-Defense Force by flagrantly forcing aged farmers and teenagers ((to join this force)) and to accept weapons ((to perform guard duties)).

Moreover, he stepped up ambushes and laid mines, especially claymore mines, around his hamlets and along our movement corridors.

The military force buildup was conducted in conjunction with the reactivation of political parties and reactionary religions. A typical case was that of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party. Formerly, it operated secretly, but now it conducts activities overtly in most hamlets and relocation areas. Even in our liberated areas, its members have begun establishing contact with previously dormant elements to urge them to resume their activities.

(The Buddhist struggle was conducted under the guise of freedom of belief, democracy, peace, etc ... ((sic)); but, in reality their goal was to support a "third force" which was developing).

Catholic people in the Phú Hòa and Phú Nhuận areas were deceived by the enemy into striving to increase their numbers in all areas and refugee centers.

((Page 6 of O.T.))

The enemy strove to recruit agents among Catholics to employ them as key personnel in his government to conduct long-range attacks against us.

In general, various ((reactionary)) factions and religious sects were supported by tyrants working in the Puppet government and army. They have striven to win over the people and motivate them to attack our revolutionary organizations in an attempt to help the US carry out its aggressive scheme in the South ((SVN)).

In addition, the enemy established covert reactionary organizations, such as the Farmers' Association, to win over the people. These organizations were financed on a monthly basis by the enemy. They declared that they would carry out the land reform policy, develop the economy and animal husbandry, and so on ((sic)), for the people. The enemy planted spies and security agents in these organizations to detect and destroy our revolutionary installations or drive our revolutionary forces away from the people. He increased ambushes and mine attacks against us. He also issued ((ID)) cards to the people and planted long-range reconnaissance agents among the people to classify, control, and oppress them.

COMMENTS ON THE ENEMY SITUATION AND PLANS OF ATTACK.

Sơn Tinh ((District)) is a relatively important area of operation because it provides an easy approach to the province capital through its eastern and western areas. In addition, it is also a place where a great amount of manpower and material resources are available for the Resistance. Therefore, the enemy concentrated a relatively large military force, including both US and Puppet units, armed with modern war equipment such as aircraft, mechanized vehicles, and artillery pieces in this area to carry out his three great plans: Clear and hold, pacification, and de-Americanization, by conducting fierce long-range attacks and sweep operations. For example, the enemy launched a large-scale sweep operation against Ba Lang Yan ((Hamlet)), a small area in Tinh Khê ((Village)), on 31 Jan 69 to carry out pacification and de-Americanization plans.

In addition to large-scale sweep operations, the enemy conducted hundreds of other long-range sweep operations against small areas in an attempt to attack us and relocate the people in his resettlement centers and carry out pacification activities. The enemy set ambushes, conducted raids and leap-frog attacks, and used *Mỹ Lính* ((leatherneck forces, USMC)) to counter our guerrilla attacks.

In addition to military attacks, the enemy applied many cunning and deceptive plans. For example, he used mechanized vehicles, bombs, and artillery fire to destroy trees, houses, and our tunnels in two or three villages in the area. In the economic field, he used armored personnel carriers to destroy crops, houses, farm equipment, and cattle, causing difficulties to our farm production and the living conditions of the people. He stepped up his psywar and *Chiêu Hồi* activities by spreading leaflets, conducting propaganda activities with megaphones, and ordering relatives and friends of our personnel to write letters, appealing to them to surrender. He also forced parents and wives of our personnel to persuade their sons and husbands to side with him. Furthermore, he increased espionage activities and spread groundless rumors ((to confuse the people)) and detect our forces to aid his sweep operations and relocation of the people in resettlement centers.

With the above schemes, the enemy succeeded in relocating a number of people in some areas ((in resettlement centers)), building a number of ((strategic)) hamlets and resettlement centers, confusing the people, and causing us some difficulties. However, he still could not

((Page 7 of O.T.))

change the situation ((in his favor)). On the contrary, he has been driven further into a passive position, thus making him move *confusedly*, displaying many weak points.

Though the ((Puppet)) force is large, it is heterogeneous, consisting of many types of people due to enemy indiscriminate conscription of youths, even those from liberated areas.

US troops are weary of fighting, while the fighting spirit of Puppet troops is low because they fear the loss of US support due to US troop withdrawals which will drive them further into isolation and cause more deaths.

The aim of the enemy pacification plan is a important one. However, the enemy could not successfully carry out this plan because he was strongly opposed by the people and faced with many difficulties in managing and solving material problems for the people relocated in resettlement centers.

Though the agents in charge of carrying out the plan were encouraged and forced onward by higher ranking personnel, due to a lack of confidence ((in higher echelons)) they only performed their tasks for formality.

Concerning the de-Americanization of the war, the Puppet troops were strengthened to replace the US troops. However, they were not strong enough to accept the role of the US troops because they were confused and had depended heavily upon US troop support.

weak. The Puppet government was also strengthened, but it was seriously disorganized. Puppet personnel were very confused. They had to find safe places to sleep and were often killed by us.

The enemy strived to drive our revolutionary forces away from the people and out of areas surrounding cities and towns in an attempt to gradually encroach upon our liberated areas, carry out his pacification plan, and insure his security. In fact, the enemy could not insure security for any of his newly-expanded areas. On the contrary, the enemy was always put into a defensive position and could be defeated at any time. In addition, his pacification plan was strongly opposed by our army and people. Busy with countering our attacks, the enemy failed to pacify some areas of emphasis or to control the people. He became weaker and slower in carrying out his pacification plan.

2. Friendly situation:

Since the beginning of 1969, the enemy has concentrated efforts to implement many cunning plans to attack our movement with the aim of carrying out his three great plans, especially the pacification plan which is the backbone of the scheme to Vietnamize the war.

He resorted to any action, no matter how brutal if it might be advantageous to him. For example, he conducted sweep operations and indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery fire causing casualties ((to our people)) as in a massacre in Tỉnh Khê ((Village)) which resulted in 500 persons killed. Twelve persons were also massacred in Tỉnh Trà ((possibly Village)). He used bulldozers to level populous and wealthy villages, turning them into deserted and dreary areas. Enemy infantrymen also destroyed and burned everything during sweep operations in other villages.

The most brutal act was perpetrated when the enemy strove to impoverish the people by killing cattle, destroying dams and dikes, seizing control of farm products, and leveling villages.

The enemy also stepped up psywar and Chiêu Hồi activities and appealed to our personnel to surrender. He oppressed, terrorized, threatened, bribed, and demoralized the people in an attempt to relocate them into resettlement centers and carry out his pacification plan.

When initially confronted by fierce enemy attacks, a number of people moved into the enemy controlled areas for safety. Those who remained in their homes were confused and fled in a disorderly manner when the enemy conducted sweeps in their areas. Therefore, they lost their legal ((GVN)) status.

Activities of organizations such as our Farmers' and Women's Associations were slow and inadequate. Farm production by the people decreased. Cadre's and soldiers' resistance against the enemy was limited. Also, we encountered many difficulties in motivating civilian laborers ((to do farm work)). Therefore, their contributions in farm taxes was reduced seriously. (For instance, in 1968 we collected 500 metric tons ((of unhusked rice)) but only 200 metric tons in 1969.)

The cultural and educational movement ((in 1968)) was developed, with 3,000 students attending second grade courses. But this movement ended in 1969.

Our guerrilla warfare was weak, therefore, our guerrillas' combat skills were not improved. In some areas, our armed organizations were located. We did not succeed in attacking the enemy, winning over the people, strengthening our forces, or accurately assessing the enemy situation. Some villages did not provide enough support for our guerrillas.

Undesirable people resumed activities against us. "Shuttle" agents took advantage of the fact that they had relations in both areas ((enemy controlled and VC liberated areas)) to spread rumors among the people in our areas to demoralize them. They provided the enemy with information on our situation, especially leading him to our messing and billeting quarters, storage facilities, and corridors. For this reason, the enemy frequently conducted heliborne raids and attacks against us. In addition, in some areas, gambling and drinking were prevalent ((among our cadre and soldiers)).

The management task in local areas was poorly performed. A number of our cadre and soldiers were confused and demoralized. Therefore, they displayed an irresponsible attitude toward missions. They left their weapons to return to their villages or surrendered to the enemy. The fear of sacrifice and hardships, a shirking attitude, and a lack of confidence in ((Party)) policy prevailed among them.

In villages along the Trà River, when the situation became increasingly critical, ((our cadre became confused)); they neither fully understood enemy intentions, nor did they properly assess friendly and enemy situations. As a result, when the enemy conducted his first sweep operation in the Tinh Sơn Area, our Party Committee members falsely believed that this operation was intended to detect our A12 ((sic; possibly a VC unit)), failing to realize that his true purpose was to drive the people out of this area to relocate them in the Núi Tròn Area in accordance with his pacification program. Our cadre even went so far as to argue that the forced movement of the people ((in Tinh Sơn)) to the Núi Tròn Area would be insignificant, as the people in Núi Tròn were also our ((VC)) people. Consequently, they did not pay much attention to carrying out the resolution of higher echelons concerning winning over and holding the people. They did not care to conduct propaganda to inform the people of this deceitful enemy plan and motivate them to refuse to move to his controlled areas. Worse still, while some comrades made strong efforts to motivate the people to adhere to their homes, other comrades said "How can you protect and provide safety for them if they stay where they are and the enemy conducts attacks by fire on their village?" So, the people were allowed to freely move ((into enemy-controlled areas)). A number of village Party Committee cadre were not courageous. They were confused. When night came, they moved to an area

people who managed to remain in their homes but prevented our guerrillas from fighting the enemy by saying that a lack of hostilities would allow them to maintain their legal ((GVN)) status. When the guerrillas came, these people fled because they were afraid of being jeopardized when the fighting occurred. The people who used to give aid to our wounded also left the area after a see-saw struggle ((confrontation)) with the enemy.

Although enemy attacks caused some casualties and produced difficulties to our resistance task, we did obtain some achievements due to direct leadership by the Province Committee and successful implementation of all specific plans drafted by District Party Committee for each locality. At the end of 1969 and especially after attending reorientation training courses on Resolutions 6 and 9 conducted by the Region and Province Party Committee, our ((guerrilla)) movement and our tasks of establishing liberated areas and countering the pacification program made new progress.

In conclusion, we still succeeded in maintaining our struggle movement against the enemy and developing some other tasks.

As for the western area of ((Sơn Tinh District)), we still continued to consolidate our liberated areas there, strongly intensifying our missions and activities such as strengthening the people's faith ((in VC victory)) and maintaining their legal ((GVN)) status. We were staunch in applying military, political, and military proselyting tactics; opposed enemy relocation of the people at Núi Tròn; led approximately 7,000 to 8,000 people to return to our liberated areas; urged the people to increase farm production and grow rice on all cultivated areas; maintained relations in both areas ((VC liberated and GVN controlled areas)) and provided security for the transportation of goods; and improved living conditions for the people. In addition, the motivation of the people to contribute manpower and material resources to the Revolution was effective. The mission of serving the Resistance was successfully carried out. For instance, the supply of food provisions, the recruitment of youths, and the urging of civilian laborers to evacuate wounded were all properly executed.

Our guerrilla warfare movement was significantly developed. We succeeded in killing US and Puppet troops, destroying armored vehicles, shooting down enemy aircraft, wiping out US Leatherneck ((USMC)) troops, preventing enemy collection of rice and relocation of the people, and protecting the property and lives of the people.

People's organizations began to conduct regular meetings to correct erroneous thoughts for their members so that they were able to better serve the Resistance.

Social evils in some areas were eliminated. Security for people living in rural areas was also maintained. In addition, we stepped up security activities in our liberated areas.

Other tasks, such as the cultural, indoctrination, information, propaganda, political struggle, and military proselyting tasks, were also further developed and gained good results.

((Page 10 of 0.1.))

In short, the people's situation was stabilized; all required tasks of the Resistance were fulfilled; and the people's determination to fight was heightened. Especially in areas under fierce enemy attacks, even the people who were relocated were confident in the ((final)) victory of the Revolution and our movements continued to be strengthened.

When initially confronted by fierce enemy attacks, a number of people moved into the enemy controlled areas for safety. Those who remained in their homes were confused and fled in a disorderly manner when the enemy conducted sweeps in their areas. Therefore, they lost their legal ((GVN)) status.

Activities of organizations such as our Farmers' and Women's Associations were slow and inadequate. Farm production by the people decreased. Cadre's and soldiers' resistance against the enemy was limited. Also, we encountered many difficulties in motivating civilian laborers ((to do farm work)). Therefore, their contributions in farm taxes was reduced seriously. (For instance, in 1968 we collected 500 metric tons ((of unhusked rice)) but only 200 metric tons in 1969.)

The cultural and educational movement ((in 1968)) was developed, with 3,000 students attending second grade courses. But this movement ended in 1969.

Our guerrilla warfare was weak, therefore, our guerrillas' combat skills were not improved. In some areas, our armed organizations were weak. We did not succeed in attacking the enemy, winning over the people, strengthening our forces, or accurately assessing the enemy situation. Some villages did not provide enough support for our guerrillas.

Undesirable people resumed activities against us. "Shuttle" agents took advantage of the fact that they had relations in both areas ((enemy controlled and VC liberated areas)) to spread rumors among the people in our areas to demoralize them. They provided the enemy with information on our situation, especially leading him to our messing and billeting quarters, storage facilities, and corridors. For this reason, the enemy frequently conducted heliborne raids and attacks against us. In addition, in some areas, gambling and drinking were prevalent ((among our cadre and soldiers)).

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In short, the people's situation was stabilized; all required tasks of the Resistance were fulfilled; and the people's determination to fight was heightened. Especially in areas under fierce enemy attacks, even the people who were relocated were confident in the ((final)) victory of the Revolution and our movements to be strengthened.

11. IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY MAIN TASKS AND THE TASKS OF DEVELOPING OUR WEAK AREAS, COUNTERING PACIFICATION, ANNIHILATING TYRANTS, BREAKING OPPRESSIVE ENEMY CONTROL, WINNING OVER THE PEOPLE, AND STRENGTHENING OUR WEAK AREAS.

1. Development of forces to counter enemy pacification.

When initially confronted by enemy attacks, we considered these attacks as retaliation for our offensive phase and did not realize that the enemy was attempting to implement a long-range scheme. Village Party Committee echelons were neither fully aware of the Party's principal mission, nor did they consider winning over the people as the decisive task ((in the present conflict)). As a result, they did not properly execute ((Party)) policies.

In the face of such a situation, the ((Quảng Ngãi)) Province Party Current Affairs Committee promptly provided direct leadership for the ((Sơn Tịnh)) District Party Committee, giving all members in that district Party Committee a clear understanding of the Party's major mission of frustrating the enemy pacification plan.

Higher echelons reiterated to us several times ((the Party's principal missions)), but we failed to comprehend their purposes. Therefore, implementation was poor. Village level personnel made inconsistent progress. They were not enthusiastic in performing tasks, and thus obtained poor results. However, after studying Resolution 9 of Z ((sic; possibly COSVN)) and Resolution 6 of ((VC Quảng Ngãi)) Province, our personnel made marked progress.

The ((Sơn Tịnh)) District Party Committee conducted successive political reorientations for district and village Party Committee echelons to review activities, criticize errors in thoughts and activities, and especially eliminate rightist tendencies, a shirking attitude, fear of sacrifice and the fierceness of war, and an improper assessment of enemy and friendly situations.

Appropriate measures were formulated to eliminate the above erroneous thoughts. After conducting political reorientations for personnel in Party organizations, the same sessions were organized for the people. The district Party Committee relied on the Farmers' Association to conduct these political activities. Eighty-nine percent of the inhabitants in the western villages of the district attended these indoctrinations. Attendance at these indoctrinations by the people was highest in Tinh Giang, Minh, Sơn, and Trã Villages; average in Bắc, Hiệp, and Thọ Villages; and lowest in Tinh Đông ((Village)). Particularly after being indoctrinated on Uncle ((HỒ Chí Minh's)) testament, our people progressed, as reflected by an increase in ((farm)) production and in contributions of manpower and material resources.

Along with the establishment of agencies in villages and hamlets and the thought reform program for our personnel, the district Party Committee systematically reconsolidated Party organizations, associations, and branches.

Situation of the Party Chapter before political reorientation: Some comrades refused to operate, and others displayed fear of difficulties and the fierceness of war. In addition, the revolutionary enthusiasm of some aged comrades decreased.

In such a situation, the district Party Committee tried to step up activities by reconsolidating all machineries.

After conducting political reorientation, a review of young and female qualified Party members was made in order to elect them to village Party Committees and Chapter Party Committees. As of now, 150 Party members of 66 village and hamlet level Party Chapters have been elected to their village Party Committees and Chapter Party Committees. The basic social class comprises 66% of the Party members. Of this group, women accounted for 12%; those aged 18 to 25, 21%; those aged 26 to 30, 21%; those aged 31 to 35, 23%; those aged 26 to 40, 11%; and those aged 41 to 45, 13%.

Since having been consolidated, all Chapter Party Committees and village Party Committees have worked more smoothly, and the activities of Party members have shown improvement. For instance, in the face of such a fierce situation, the Tinh Khê Chapter Party Committee was still determined to hold on to the local weapons. Guerrillas have also succeeded in staying close to the enemy. Due to a lack of weapons, they have, with a sense of self-help for self-improvement, gotten near to enemy posts to remove 200 mines ((planted around these posts)) in order to use them to attack him. In addition, the development of the Party has been well performed. The Tinh Bình Chapter Party Committee, which had previously been so idle, has resumed its activities and succeeded in winning over the people. The Tinh Trã Party Chapter only contributed 4,200 kilograms ((of rice to the district)) in 1969 due to its poor agricultural production. But, just from the March 1970 crop, its contribution has reached nine metric tons ((of rice)). Concerning the Tinh Minh Party Chapter, many of its members previously neglected their tasks. They failed to win the sympathy of the people ((resettled in)) the Núi Tron Area and bring them back ((to their villages)). Guerrillas also failed in fighting the enemy. However, after being given political reorientation, they succeeded in bringing some of the people in the Núi Tron Area back ((to their villages)) due to the proper assignment of specific missions to each Party member. The village Party Committees and local authorities have made great progress in their working procedures. Especially, due to political reorientation, the situation where many Party members had previously requested to quit working in the Party Chapter no longer exists.

Up to now, Party activities have been well maintained and ideological struggles in the Party internal organization stepped up.

The development of the Party has also made progress. Throughout 1969 we successfully developed 140 additional Party members. During the first six months of 1970, although we failed to reach the criteria ((for Party development)), we succeeded in developing 120 additional Party members including 87.3% of the basic social class and 26.8% women. Of these, 6% were age 16 to 25, 15% were age 26 to 30, 11% were age 31 to 35, and 9% were age 36 to 40. In addition, among these newly-developed Party members there were 30 guerrillas; that means 39.1% of the total, and 4 security agents, 4%.

Along with the development of the Party, the consolidation of the ((leadership)) machineries of popular organizations and ((specialized)) branches has progressed satisfactorily. Especially, village unit Command Committee members have been replaced with young comrades who are from the basic social class and who have gained outstanding achievements in combat. The security machinery has also been reorganized.

Concerning popular organizations, they previously conducted irregular activities, but, through consolidation, they have made much new progress and conducted **regular** activities.

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Party Chapters have made progress in controlling the people. Right at the beginning, they **began** the reorganization of Farmers' Association cells in compliance with the guidance of the Current Affairs ((Committee)).

(Each Farmers' Association cell must consist of one cell leader and four assistant cell leaders). As of now, six ((Farmers' Association)) cells have been ~~re-~~established. The Farmers' Association Cells in Trá Binh and Tinh Trá Hamlets have conducted relatively successful activities.

Following the experiences of the Tinh Trá Hamlet Farmers' Association cell led by Brother Mai, all villages in the district have been staging phases in establishing ((their Farmers' Association cells)).

((Page 12 of O.T.))

The Women's and Youths' Executive Committees attended the election meeting at district and village levels. The ((Són Tinh)) District Women's Executive Committee consists of 13 members. There are 96 women in charge of the coordination and operations sections in nine villages of the western area ((of Són Tinh District)). These villages consist of 190 cells with 380 female members.

In addition, there are 2,580 members operating in liberated areas, 2,002 female members residing in resettlement areas, and 932 others taking refuge in villages in ((VC)) liberated areas.

Concerning youths, we must provide ideological guidance for their missions in order to strengthen the ((youth)) movement.

In the past, we conducted two indoctrination courses in accordance with the contents and requirements of the Party's principal mission.

The participants of these two courses were 938 Group members including 330 women, 638 associations' members including 237 women, and 1,162 Teenagers' Association members including 527 females.

In the past, we successfully motivated youths to voluntarily serve on the front line. We succeeded in motivating 17 youths, including three female Group members in Tinh Ninh Village, to enlist in our armed forces.

In addition, eight comrades in Tinh Khe, three comrades in Tinh Giang, six comrades in Tinh Binh, and 10 Party members joined village guerrilla units.

The total number of youths who joined village and hamlet guerrilla units was 815 including 260 females.

The Group is also responsible for providing leadership for the education of teenagers. For this reason, the recently initiated teenagers' movement made a great contribution to the revolutionary work.

Members of the village Groups such as those of Sơn, Minh, Hiệp, Bình, Bắc, Thọ, Giang, and Trá ((Villages)) also have detachments. Especially Tỉnh Minh Detachment regularly conducted activities and participated in movements initiated by the Group.

After the indoctrination of the Group, teenagers devoted themselves to implementing their assigned tasks, especially in the emulation phase to celebrate Uncle Hồ's birthday. They purchased 1,235 ang of rice ((one ang is approximately six kilograms)) and transported them from enemy controlled areas to ((our)) liberated areas.

In addition to provisions missions, they eagerly dug trenches along main roads. ((Teenagers')) units created an enthusiastic atmosphere in local areas.

2. Stepping up three-pronged attacks, countering the enemy pacification program, and preventing the people from moving away.

a. Armed activities.

In the process of countering the enemy's pacification plan, first of all, we countered enemy pacification activities in the Ba Lăng An ((Area)) from 1 Jan to Mar 69 by stepping up three-pronged attacks, especially strengthening village and hamlet guerrilla forces and district armed forces.

Guerrillas in Tỉnh Hoà, ((Tỉnh)) Khê and ((Tỉnh)) Kỳ successfully attacked the enemy. In the beginning, in the face of enemy sweep operations and attacks, village guerrillas sometimes had to spread out to preserve their strength like those in Tỉnh Kỳ. However, guerrillas in Tỉnh Khê firmly held on to their areas of responsibility to encircle enemy posts and successfully destroyed enemy agents infiltrating ((our)) organizations. They relied on combat fortifications and used every means to fight the enemy for three successive months.

After the enemy relocated the people into Văn Thành, we recruited and planted 20 to 30 agents in villages to motivate the people to perform liaison missions with agents outside ((enemy controlled areas)). Furthermore, many teenagers died of cholera (20 died within 10 days).

Our agents took advantage of this fact to motivate the people to demand that the enemy settle this problem and allow them to return to their homes. We motivated 1,700 people to return to Tỉnh Khê from the ((Văn Thành)) Resettlement Center.

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Meanwhile, we continued to exercise leadership ((for our agents)) to annihilate the enemy inside the ((Vân Thánh Resettlement Center)) and create favorable conditions for the people's struggles. Especially, we gained the support of the ((RVN)) troops; and as a result, we destroyed the Vân Thánh resettlement center.

The enemy simultaneously conducted attacks on the eastern area and many villages in the western area ((of Sơn Tĩnh District)), especially those located along the Trà River and our positions around the Núi Đất Area to conduct a forced relocation of the people and establish the Núi Tròn resettlement center. The enemy's attacks were the fiercest since early July 1969 (when ((the area)) was leveled ((by bulldozers))). As for the western area ((of Sơn Tĩnh District)), the important thing is that we must frustrate the enemy's pacification plans and relocation of the people to the Núi Tròn ((Resettlement Center)) and attack Mỹ lếch elements ((possibly leatherneck, meaning USMC troops)). Only by doing so can we ensure security for the villages in the western area.

Because of the above reason, the armed and guerrilla forces in the western area were strengthened. These forces played the key role in frustrating the plans of concentrating the people in the Núi Tròn ((Resettlement Center)) and consolidating liberated areas.

✓ District forces are responsible for coordinating with Tỉnh Ninh Sơn, and Bạc ((Villages)) to work out a plan for the attack on Núi Tròn.

First of all, we must conduct political reorientation for guerrillas and make them study Uncle Hồ's testament so as to deepen their hatred for the enemy and motivate them to organize suicide secret guerrilla cells. These cells will, together with political and military proselyting agents, annihilate tyrants. We must employ Party members to play a key role ((in providing indoctrination)). At the same time, we must provide leadership for surrounding villages to counter enemy sweep operations and provide support for ((friendly forces)) in attacking the main objective. The guerrillas of Tỉnh Trà ((Village)) attacked enemy tanks. The guerrillas of Tỉnh Hiệp ((Village)) laid mines in rice baskets in a rice field to kill enemy troops as they took rice in a sweep operation and conducted sniper fire as they withdrew. Thus the enemy could not complete the sweep operation. Previously, the guerrillas of Tỉnh Đông ((Village)) could not defeat the enemy. Now they can effectively counter enemy sweep operations, attack Mỹ lếch elements, and shoot down enemy aircraft.

The ((Sơn Tĩnh)) District Party Committee held a specialized conference on people's guerrilla warfare and conducted training on setting examples and on combat methods adopted by guerrillas in the district. Especially it worked out armed activity plans for other villages to attack US Marines in support of the attack on the main objective. As for our troops in the main objective, they tried to annihilate tyrants, decreased enemy prestige, and dealt heavy blows to the enemy. Our security agents successfully suppressed psywar and Chiêu Hồi personnel. Due to this, we successfully motivated the people in the Núi Tròn ((resettlement center)) to return to their former villages.

In order to successfully win over the people and effectively frustrate the enemy's plan of de-Americanization, the district Party Committee stepped up armed activities and initiated a campaign of killing tyrants which has brought good results. Based on the practical situation of the district and experiences acquired from the activities of various local areas such as the movements for shooting down enemy aircraft in Binh Son and attacking mechanized vehicles at Đức Phổ, village guerrillas have attacked US units on operations in the district.

The ((Sơn Tinh)) District Policy is to transform village guerrilla forces into well-trained forces, manufacture weapons, and strengthen village guerrillas. Each village must have at least 10 guerrillas and at most 28 guerrillas. As many hamlet guerrillas as possible must be recruited. Each small hamlet must have at least 10 guerrillas. We must accomplish the three following missions: Attack enemy tanks at Tỉnh Trà; shoot down aircraft at Tỉnh Đông; and attack US Marines at Tỉnh Ninh. Female ((guerrilla)) platoons must also be activated.

((Page 14 of O.T.))

In general, district units and village and hamlet guerrillas have so far been able to counter US sweep operations. They have fought 400 battles, including 96 countersweep operations, 41 sniper attacks, and 151 other operations, mines, and put a total of 1,857 enemy soldiers out of action. Nineteen vehicles were damaged and 13 others destroyed (including four vehicles either damaged or destroyed by Tỉnh Trà ((Village guerrillas and local force troops)), 10 enemy aircraft were shot down and three others damaged (including three aircraft either damaged or shot down by Tỉnh Đông ((local force troops and village guerrillas))).

Force buildups Despite the fierceness of the war and the casualties we have suffered, village and hamlet guerrillas still increased in both quantity and quality. The majority of Party and Group members have been assigned armed missions. As an example, Tỉnh Ninh ((Village)) previously had 22 village guerrillas, but after a period of performing combat missions, they increased to 40, including one platoon of 15 females. Hamlet guerrilla forces previously had 60 members; now they have increased to 90, including 30 females, etc ... ((sic)).

Sơn Tinh District guerrillas

Presently, we have 318 village guerrillas in 13 villages, including:

68 village unit members, including 62 Party members

52 female personnel

85 Party members

133 Group members

74 secret guerrillas.

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Because of the above reason, the armed and guerrilla forces in the western area were strengthened. These forces played the key role in frustrating the plans of concentrating the people in the Núi Trôn ((Resettlement Center)) and consolidating liberated areas.

/ District forces are responsible for coordinating with Tịnh Ninh, Sơn, and Bắc ((Villages)) to work out a plan for the attack on Núi Trôn.

First of all, we must conduct political reorientation for guerrillas and make them study Uncle Hồ's testament so as to deepen their hatred for the enemy and motivate them to organize suicide secret guerrilla cells. These cells will, together with political and military proselyting agents, annihilate tyrants. We must employ Party members to play a key role ((in providing indoctrination)). At the same time, we must provide leadership for surrounding villages to counter enemy sweep operations and provide support for ((friendly forces)) in attacking the main objective. The guerrillas of Tịnh Trà ((Village)) attacked enemy tanks. The guerrillas of Tịnh Hiệp ((Village)) laid mines in rice baskets in a rice-field to kill enemy troops as they took rice in a sweep operation and conducted sniper fire as they withdrew. Thus the enemy could not complete the sweep operation. Previously, the guerrillas of Tịnh Đông ((Village)) could not defeat the enemy. Now they can effectively counter enemy sweep operations, attack Mỹ lếch elements, and shoot down enemy aircraft.

The ((Sơn Tịnh)) District Party Committee held a specialized conference on people's guerrilla warfare and conducted training on setting examples and on combat methods adopted by guerrillas in the district. Especially it worked out armed activity plans for other villages to attack US Marines in support of the attack on the main objective. As for our troops in the main objective, they tried to annihilate tyrants, decreased enemy prestige, and dealt heavy blows to the enemy. Our security agents successfully suppressed psywar and Chiêu Hồi personnel. Due to this, we successfully motivated the people in the Núi Trôn ((resettlement center)) to return to their former villages.

In order to successfully win over the people and effectively frustrate the enemy's plan of de-Americanization, the district Party Committee stepped up armed activities and initiated a campaign of killing tyrants which has brought good results. Based on the practical situation of the district and experiences acquired from the activities of various local areas such as the movements for shooting down enemy aircraft in Binh Son and attacking mechanized vehicles at Đức Phó, village guerrillas have attacked US units on operations in the district.

The ((Sơn Tinh)) District Policy is to transform village guerrilla forces into well-trained forces, manufacture weapons, and strengthen village guerrillas. Each village must have at least 10 guerrillas and at most 28 guerrillas. As many hamlet guerrillas as possible must be recruited. Each small hamlet must have at least 10 guerrillas. We must accomplish the three following missions: Attack enemy tanks at Tinh Trã; shoot down aircraft at Tinh Đông; and attack US Marines at Tinh Ninh. Female ((guerrilla)) platoons must also be activated.

((Page 14 of O.T.))

In general, district units and village and hamlet guerrillas have so far been able to counter US sweep operations. They have fought 400 battles, including 96 countersweep operations, 41 sniper attacks, and 151 attacks on mines, and put a total of 1,857 enemy soldiers out of action. Nineteen tanks were damaged and 13 others destroyed (including four vehicles either damaged or destroyed by Tinh Trã ((Village guerrillas and local force troops))), 10 enemy aircraft were shot down and three others damaged (including three aircraft either damaged or shot down by Tinh Đông ((local force troops and village guerrillas))).

Force buildup: Despite the fierceness of the war and the casualties we have suffered, village and hamlet guerrillas still increased in both quantity and quality. The majority of Party and Group members have been assigned armed missions. As an example, Tinh Ninh ((Village)) previously had 22 village guerrillas, but after a period of performing combat missions, they increased to 40, including one platoon of 15 females. Hamlet guerrilla forces previously had 60 members; now they have increased to 90, including 30 females, etc ... ((sic)).

Sơn Tinh District guerrillas

Presently, we have 318 village guerrillas in 13 villages, including

68 village unit members, including 62 Party members

52 female personnel

85 Party members

133 Group members

74 secret guerrillas.

We presently have 533 hamlet guerrillas in 13 villages which include: ((Marginal notes)):

	68
Hamlet guerrillas: 137 ((comrades)) (including 71 Party members and 76 Group members).	52
	85
	153
	<u>74</u> ((line out))
Party ((members)) in the first quarter: 53 comrades, presently increased to 95.	358
	((End marginal notes

Group ((members)) in the first quarter: 94 comrades, presently increased to 114.

Female ((members)) in the first quarter: 50 ((comrades)), presently increased to 101.

All the above cited personnel are directly involved in combat activities ((in local areas)). In addition, we have a number of personnel from specialized branches organized into guerrilla forces who can participate in combat activities when necessary.

Presently, the ((troop)) messing problem has been properly settled. There have been no more cases of personnel turning in their weapons to the local authorities and returning home just because of a rice shortage.

In executing the directive of the Current Affairs Committee of the Central Party Committee, all the people in villages have been motivated to join our armed forces and intensify youth activities. This motivation was successful in some villages. For example, in Tinh Ninh Village, 17 youths enlisted ((in our army)), and in Tinh Công Village, 10 others joined a village guerrilla force. Youths and teenagers have participated in the construction of combat fortifications and ((air and artillery)) shelters along routes frequently used by many people, and conducted transportation activities like those in ((Tinh)) Ninh, ((Tinh)) Đông, and ((Tinh)) Trà Villages, etc....((sic))

Guerrilla activities increased the people's confidence ((in the Revolution)) and made them enthusiastic.

b. Political and military proselyting tasks against enemy pacification activities.

Due to overconfidence and the failure to fully understand the enemy's pacification and land encroachment schemes designed to compete with us for the control of the people, in the beginning we neglected ((duties)) and neither made preparations for key personnel nor developed forces to counter pacification activities. For this reason, when the enemy resettled the people, we lost control in some areas, such as Tinh Tra, Hiep Binh and villages in the western area.

Our hamlet and village machineries operated sporadically. Most cadre doubted the enemy's abilities. They were only concerned with the destruction of resettlement areas when the enemy conducted attacks and relocated the people in Ba Lang An, especially cadre in Tinh Khe, the eastern area, Tinh Son, Tinh Minh, Cam Son, and Tinh Tho.

Through the struggle against relocation of the people in Van Thanh, we learned that we must perseveringly motivate the people, create favorable conditions for them, and use realistic examples to indoctrinate them. District Party Committees should provide specific guidelines for each area. We should regain control in areas where we have lost it. With regard to villages not yet resettled, we should develop our forces; control the people; maintain production under any circumstance; counter enemy sweep operations, rape, and plunder; and defend commo-liaison activities in conjunction with efforts to proselyte enemy soldiers. In fringe areas, we should initiate struggles for social welfare and democracy and demand that the enemy construct canals and allow ((the people)) to engage in salt production and return to their former villages. In the district seat, a mission has been outlined, but not yet carried out. In areas where movements are easy, we should develop separate struggles into violent ones.

In this section, we have mentioned only the report on political and military proselyting activities and the destruction of concentration camps in the western area, especially the Nui Tron ((Tron Mountain)) area.

c. Achievements gained in suppressing traitors, exterminating tyrants, and destroying the enemy's oppressive control.

Along with the armed activities of the paramilitary forces in the counterpacification task, the security branch has contributed effectively to the suppression of traitors, the extermination of tyrants, and the destruction of the enemy's oppressive control. The security network from district to village level has been consolidated and set up throughout ((Son Tinh District)). Each branch has been assigned its specific area of operation and an activity plan has been drafted for each area during each period of time.

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situation inside the camps. In this way, we have kept closely abreast of the activities of the enemy so that we can provide timely leadership. For example, as soon as we were informed that the enemy was gathering bamboo, thatch, and other materials to construct posts, we promptly assigned men to burn the stock-piles of those materials in Nui Tron and Tinh Ky.

((Page 17 of O.T.))

After the enemy levelled the lands and relocated the people to the Nui Tron Area, our guerrillas, especially those in open areas, faced great difficulties. The enemy isolated this area and prohibited outsiders from conducting business there. He also forbade trade with our controlled areas and on the road from Tinh Son to the province capital. Enemy troops outside ((Nui Tron Area)) searched and patrolled so often that our guerrilla activities were impeded. To cope with the enemy, we provided effective leadership for inside agents in order to purify our organizations, develop the inside struggle, and motivate enemy troops to allow the people to return to their homes and continue farming or working at their trades. We also urged them not to fire wantonly on routes used by the people to go to markets.

We incited the people to protest an incident in which seven civilians were killed or wounded on their way to market by fire from an enemy aircraft. To obtain successes, we have tested the enemy's reactions by beginning to train the people for struggles on an ever-increasing scale. For instance, first we incited some children to drive cows to their homes and make friends with enemy troops; next we motivated some aged men to pick up dry wood on levelled lands. We then waited for few days to see if the enemy would take any counteraction. He did not and we began to motivate a large number of civilians to return to their homes.

Our major mission was to motivate the resettled civilians to return their former lands and farm. Through the above plan, we were able to easily return more people to their former homes without arousing the enemy's suspicions. The slogan for the struggle was: "Cover levelled lands with green plants." We advised the people to grow short-term crops, and we created support for guerrilla. During the first phase, the people covered the lands with green plants, but the enemy destroyed them with toxic chemicals spread by HU-IA helicopters. We then encouraged the people to grow new plants. When many people returned to their homes, we motivated them to set up huts for resting in the afternoon. These huts were at first burned by fire from HU-IA helicopters, but our guerrillas and young men patiently built new ones which had lamps at night and had ragged clothes hang on lines during the day, like homes where civilians lived. During the first few days, the enemy shelled some of them, but we then dug shelters in these huts for persons with illegal status to live there. When the enemy did not strafe the areas so violently, village ((authorities)) decided to bring a number of ((civilian)) families, and cadre and Party members back to the areas. Some of them did not want to return since they thought they could not live there, but we patiently motivated them. Meanwhile, our armed units continued their activities and created unrest in the area ((Nui Tron)) by cutting barbed wire and bamboo fences and eliminating tyrants. The people, on the pretext of disorder in the area, demanded to return to their homes. Twelve civilian families returned to their homes unopposed in Tinh Minh and Tinh Son. Then, when civilians living outside the relocation area stopped bringing their farming products to the resettlement area because of our motivation, the enemy began to conduct large-scale sweep operations, utilizing twenty-five tanks and one ((infantry)) battalion. Our guerrillas remained to conduct attacks outside the villages in order to protect the people. The situation then became calm, and the people remained in their homes. They kept their rice safe and gave 480 ang of unhusked rice to the Revolution. To intensify the struggle, we assembled the people and analyzed and evaluated our achievements. Before Tet, our armed forces stationed outside successfully attacked US sweep units and enemy troops on search-and-sweep operations.

Due to a thorough understanding of the tasks of suppressing traitors and killing tyrants during the past, 38 wicked tyrants were killed in resettlement zones, strategic hamlets, and important areas of operation. They included one lieutenant, one senior sergeant of the Command Committee of the 4th Armored Regiment, one other senior sergeant, a security corporal of the Nui Trong Post, one rural development cadre, two Popular Force members, one village leader, nine intelligence agents and informants, and 13 chiefs of inter-families and hamlets. The most significant event was an attack conducted on 27 Apr 70 by the armed reconnaissance force. In this action, one male and one female cadre of the district disguised themselves as civilians and killed in broad daylight two tyrants in their houses at Nui Tron Post.

((Page 16 of O.T.))

There were many cases similar to this. Armed security forces of Tinh Ky killed Nguyen Thanh in the resettlement area; those of Tinh Long killed Nguyen To Thuan, an intelligence agent, and Pham Khoi, a hamlet leader who had helped the enemy kill one of our guerrillas, and one agent; those of Tinh Phong killed Nguyen Thi Tai, an undercover informant; and those of Tinh Thien killed Hoai, another undercover informant, ...etc... ((sic)).

Along with activities in forward areas, we have made a roster of ((suspected men)) in liberated areas, classified them into different categories for ideological reform, and precluded activities of enemy spies. We have arrested and given hundreds of enemy personnel reform training at Province and District camps, indoctrinated over 500 others in villages, and put under close surveillance hundreds of personnel in order to sever their relationships between the two areas ((enemy and friendly areas)). In hamlets, we have conducted indoctrination courses on security maintenance. As a result, the people have discovered a number of suspected persons and sent 850 letters to Puppet administrative personnel and soldiers in an effort to reduce the atrocities of these elements and pressure them to ensure their collaboration ((with the Revolution)).

In short, the extermination of traitors and tyrants and the destruction of the enemy's oppressive control have contributed considerably to the counterpacification task, pressured the enemy's oppressive control forces in areas temporarily under his control, and limited the atrocities of tyrants and the activities of spies in our areas.

Organization

The district Party Committee has decided to activate one element in the Nui Tron Area, headed by Current Affairs Committee cadre of the District Party Committee, and composed of military, political, and military proselyting cadre, and representatives of various branches and agencies subordinate to the district.

Minh, Son, and Bac Villages jointly organized a leadership committee to destroy resettlement camps. The committee was led by the village Party Committee Secretary. The cadre of village units, members of security, political, and military proselyting sections and some village Party members followed the people in order to regain control over them and induce them to return to their native areas. For instance, Tinh Son Village deployed one agent among 107 people who were moving to the An Bo Station; in Ban-ca-bo, 67 inhabitants were followed by one agent.

caused difficulties for us in requisitioning ((food)) and in farm production activities. Faced with this situation, the district organized a specialized meeting to study the characteristics of US soldiers. Through the meeting, we realized that US soldiers were cruel, but were also demoralized and frightened and could be easily swayed. For this reason, we used megaphones and hung leaflets written in English and covered with nylon sheets in places frequented by US troops. We also motivated the people to participate in these activities. Keeping abreast of enemy activities, the people saw US troops pick up these leaflets and read them. Afterwards, we wrote a relatively long leaflet and at night hung it on the enemy post gate. Shortly thereafter, we sent an old man to herd buffaloes, a young boy to catch crabs, and a woman to catch fish around the US post. One day, these people were arrested and taken by US soldiers to their post. Under interrogation, they answered that they only came to herd buffaloes and catch fish and crabs. The next day all of them were set free and when they returned to our ((controlled)) area, we immediately spread this story to all local inhabitants. Then we sent out another young boy (who is a guerrilla force member) to catch fish. This boy was also arrested and set free by US soldiers. We also sent out Mr Toa, a 70 year old man, to herd buffaloes and farm in an area (Mý Danh Hamlet) adjacent to the enemy post. When they encountered this old man, soldiers of US tank forces were going to shoot him, but he gave some signal to them, and they did not shoot him but returned directly to their post. Taking advantage of this, we motivated the people to return to their farmlands for production. All the people of Mý Danh Hamlet have now returned to their hamlet and successfully carried out farm production activities.

Recently, we also attended to the improvement of our administration and recruitment activities and conducted short-term training courses to improve the professional skills of specialized cadre. However, generally speaking, various villages still neglected military proselyting activities.

c. Implementation of farm production and the contribution of material resources and manpower to the Resistance.

a) ((Farm)) production: In order to relocate the people, the enemy made every effort to destroy the economy in liberated areas. In addition, Vũ Xuân Bình stated that: "Only by destroying the Quang Mỹ Dam and the irrigation system along the Trà River can we relocate the people in the Sơn Tinh Area." The enemy used thousands of tons of bombs to destroy dams, kill people's buffaloes and cows, and spread chemical poisons. Besides enemy sabotage activities, we had to endure disasters which damaged our crops and plunged us into successive difficulties which sometimes seemed insurmountable. But due to the sound leadership of higher echelons, the people's experiences, and the unified leadership of ((subordinate)) Party Committees, we were able to motivate all people to participate in combat tasks and concentrate efforts on farming; thus, we gained satisfactory results. As soon as the enemy destroyed the Quang Mỹ Dam, we quickly guided the people in constructing dikes to keep back salt water. In addition, we guided the people to cultivate all the lands in the eastern and western areas, build up irrigation systems, dig ponds and wells, and construct dikes to provide water for 776 mau

((Page 20 of O.T.))

((one mau is equivalent to 9/10 of an acre)) of land. We intensified farm production, eliminated all difficulties in farm production tasks, led farmers in collective farming, and improved their standard of living. In a recent period, we established 21 work exchange and rotational work cells, in which 670 cell members and 599 Farmers' Association members participated. The most outstanding

As a result, enemy troops reduced violence and plunder; searching was also limited. Armed forces inside continued to destroy tyrants and undermine enemy prestige with indictments laying bare his crimes. Our secret security agents killed... ((an unspecified number)) of enemy personnel. Enemy troops indiscriminately fired on civilian hamlets, killing seven people and wounding a number of others. Taking advantage of this incident, our inside agents incited the people to demand medical treatment for the wounded. Since it was night, the enemy did not dare take the wounded ((to the hospital)), and it was not until 0800 hours the next morning that they were evacuated by aircraft. Dead bodies were carried to the military gate, and thousands of people from villages who were going to the market came with sticks to demonstrate against the enemy. At that moment, a US and a Puppet soldier came through the crowd. Mr T. said to them, "Your men have told us that security is ensured here. Why are innocent civilians still killed? Where is the security? We will not stay here any more." The people then unanimously repeated that there was no security. They left the dead bodies for the enemy and compelled him to bury them. In fact, the enemy had to pay the people to bury the dead bodies for him. Meanwhile our key agents were proselyting Popular Force members.

We deepened dissension among Regional Force members, and on this occasion, we returned the people to their homes without suffering any losses. The next morning, almost all the people moved their furniture back to their homes from the ((relocation)) villages. A small number remained, but our men worked with them and persuaded them to go back to their former homes. In support of armed activities, our rear elements were trying to stabilize the morale of the people, unite them, and motivate friendly personnel to build houses for persons who just returned from relocation areas, especially those who returned during the rainy season.

US and Puppet forces jointly conducted several sweep operations, but the people have so far maintained their legal status. They enthusiastically participated in the struggle and promoted it to a political one supported by armed activities of the people. We staged the struggle and proselyted enemy troops while enjoying legal status. We succeeded in protests against relocation of the people in Tỉnh Sơn and the ravishing of women in Tỉnh Bắc, and prevented the enemy from taking rice from the people in Tỉnh Thổ. Mrs T struggled against the enemy by herself. She had her leg broken by enemy fire when she refused to live in the relocation area.

As for transportation, we successfully protected our goods from robbery, thus reducing our losses. Two to three hundred tons of food and strategic merchandise ((possibly weapons and ammunition)) to support the Revolution were transported to liberated areas every month. We also prevented the enemy from taking away the buffaloes, cows, pigs, and cocks of the people and burning their houses. Good results were obtained by the counterrelocation program in the Núi Trơn Area and in the political struggle and military proselyting fields. We rallied 12 enemy servicemen to our side, distributed 392 proselyting and 2,700 policy-universalizing letters, conducted 253 loudspeaker campaigns, hung 800 slogans, recruited 17 agents from enemy ranks, spread 18,968 leaflets, and ideologically indoctrinated 518 civilians including those from ((enemy)) soldiers' families. We laid bare the crimes of US troops at Núi Đát where they killed civilians and burned houses.

((Page 19 of O.T.))

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cell was Comrade Mai's cell in Tinh Tra. Members of this cell continuously exchanged their work and intensified farm production. In the 1969-1970 Winter-Spring season, we cultivated 4,800 mau of rice, 829 mau of sweet potatoes, 53 mau of corn in the first crop, 224 mau of manioc, 61 mau of various types of beans, 46 mau of minh tinh ((possibly a type of comestible root)), and 21 mau of peanuts. In comparison with the 1968-1969 crops, the cultivation of rice increased by 96 percent, sweet potatoes increased by 80 percent, manioc increased by 66 percent, corn increased by 16 percent, and beans of various types increased by 22 percent.

The District Party Committee also kept abreast of the activities of various villages, studied their weaknesses, and provided specific guidance for them. As a result, the people of Tinh Giang and Tinh Song who had previously given up their farming activities for commerce returned to their farmlands for production and have gained considerable results. The people of Tinh Tra and Tinh Tho often suffered from hunger and had to eat rice substitutes, but presently, due to IR-8 rice seeds and good crops, they have a surplus of sweet potatoes and manioc and sell them to the Revolution. In addition, we used the slogan: "Green vegetables and fruits grow on levelled lands," to encourage the people in villages levelled by the enemy and motivate them to cultivate all the land. Despite destructive enemy attacks, sweep operations, and efforts to comb villages, such as Dong, Giang and Hiep, that are adjacent to mountainous areas in an attempt to turn them into white areas, the district has successfully motivated the people to remain in these villages to farm, and kept them from being turned into white areas such as in Vinh Tuy and Tan An... ((sic)). For these reasons, we have preserved the legal status of the people in these villages.

Regarding cultivation techniques, we paid attention to the use of IR-8 rice and grew subsidiary crops to increase production. In fringe and white areas as well as areas under enemy control, we employed slogans demanding that the enemy return democracy and social welfare to the people and give them the right to travel between the two areas ((RVN and VC controlled areas)) to produce salt and to catch fish. We constructed dikes even in areas where people were relocated such as Tinh Thien, Tinh Ky, Tinh Hoa, and Tinh Ke, and made preparations to take the people back to their farmlands.

To date, all the people have farmed and cultivated more than half of the land. Salt production has been developed and fishing has also been promoted. This year, we provided guidance for the performance of specific tasks and the fulfillment of criteria regarding land to be cultivated by each laborer. We also guided the people to reclaim and cultivate lands, and determined farm production criteria for each cell and each household. This guidance spurred increased production as compared to 1969. The people in Tinh Giang recultivated 30 mau of land in Na Lang and Tho Luu. In Tinh Tra, Comrade Mai's cell cultivated some idle land with IR-8 rice, and the people in Tinh Song, Binh, Bac, and Hiep also reclaimed large areas of land.

All untilled fields in Tinh Minh are now cultivated with corn and other crops. We are determined to implement the slogan: "Cultivate the land all year so as to obtain crops throughout the four seasons," and to succeed in our agricultural production in order to defeat the US aggressors. Due to the above factors, crop output has improved. Individual output for 1969 was 195 kilograms ((of rice)) and the individual output for the first half of 1970 was 146 kilograms ((of rice)).

b) Food collection and purchase task:

Particular attention was paid to mobilizing manpower and financial resources. It became a principal mission, vital to our success. This year we maintained or nearly attained the same level of production as in 1968, and received direct leadership from the district Party Committee which ensured timely execution of higher echelon resolutions. This year, the Farmers' Association played a key role in acquiring manpower and financial resources. It also filled a main role in political motivation by encouraging farmers to contribute all ((farm products)) to the front line. Therefore, as compared with previous years, contributions by the people increased. The ratio of individual contributions made by 10 western villages from the Mar 70 harvest was almost equal to that of 1969. As of May 70, we had collected 153 tons of rice. Part of this was collected in cash. In some villages where contributions were previously low, they became higher. As examples:

Villages	Contribution in 1969	Contribution from the Mar 70 harvest
Tỉnh Trá	4,200 kilograms	6,680 kilograms
Tỉnh Sơn	22,000 "	27,000 "
Tỉnh Bình	9,500 "	15,000 "
Tỉnh Minh	25,000 "	20,000 "

The highest contribution recorded in Tỉnh Bắc Village was 24.5 kilograms; in Tỉnh Sơn Village, 10 kilograms; Xuân Hoà Hamlet, Tỉnh Hiệp Village, 30 kilograms; and Trá Bình Hamlet, Tỉnh Trá Village, 21 kilograms.

Tỉnh Sơn Village ((made a significant contribution)) due to effective leadership by the village Party Committee and exemplary Party members. The criterion fixed for Party members was 1,221 ang of rice, but they agreed on 1,463 ang of rice after discussion. The criteria for contributions was exceeded by many comrades, such as Comrade Be, Chief of the Economy Section, etc.....((sic)).

The lowest contributions recorded were by Tỉnh Giang and Tỉnh Đông ((Villages)).

The food purchase task also met prescribed requirements. During the first six months of ((1970)), we bought 455 tons of rice. Some days, we bought six to eight tons of rice. Many villages have already surpassed their criteria for the entire year. Tỉnh Sơn Village had a criterion of 110 tons of rice but bought 104 tons in the first five months of the year. Previously, Tỉnh Trá rarely had 10 tons of rice on hand, but by May 1970 it had bought and stored 30 tons. In Tỉnh Bình the transportation and purchase of food were well performed. Particularly in Tỉnh Minh Village we motivated many people to carry out the task, including members of the Youth Group and Women's Associations who were willing to purchase food. Therefore, during the emulation phase from 1 to 19 May 70 to celebrate Uncle's ((HỒ Chí Minh birthday)), the village bought 60 tons of rice, exceeding the annual requirement of 15 tons.

Due to upgraded ideological adjustments of the people, especially members of village associations, other activities have also developed.

cell was Comrade Mai's cell in Tinh Tra. Members of this cell continuously exchanged their work and intensified farm production. In the 1969-1970 Winter-Spring season, we cultivated 4,800 mau of rice, 829 mau of sweet potatoes, 53 mau of corn in the first crop, 224 mau of manioc, 61 mau of various types of beans, 46 mau of minh tinh ((possibly a type of comestible root)), and 21 mau of peanuts. In comparison with the 1968-1969 crops, the cultivation of rice increased by 96 percent, sweet potatoes increased by 80 percent, manioc increased by 66 percent, corn increased by 16 percent, and beans of various types increased by 22 percent.

The District Party Committee also kept abreast of the activities of various villages, studied their weaknesses, and provided specific guidance for them. As a result, the people of Tinh Giang and Tinh Song who had previously given up their farming activities for commerce returned to their farmlands for production and have gained considerable results. The people of Tinh Tra and Tinh Tho often suffered from hunger and had to eat rice substitutes, but presently, due to IR-8 rice seeds and good crops, they have a surplus of sweet potatoes and manioc and sell them to the Revolution. In addition, we used the slogan: "Green vegetables and fruits grow on levelled lands," to encourage the people in villages levelled by the enemy and motivate them to cultivate all the land. Despite destructive enemy attacks, sweep operations, and efforts to comb villages, such as Dong, Giang and Hiep, that are adjacent to mountainous areas in an attempt to turn them into white areas, the district has successfully motivated the people to remain in these villages to farm, and kept them from being turned into white areas such as in Vinh Tuy and Tan An.. ((sic)). For these reasons, we have preserved the legal status of the people in these villages.

Regarding cultivation techniques, we paid attention to the use of IR-8 rice and grew subsidiary crops to increase production. In fringe and white areas as well as areas under enemy control, we employed slogans demanding that the enemy return democracy and social welfare to the people and give them the right to travel between the two areas ((RWN and VC controlled areas)) to produce salt and to catch fish. We constructed dikes even in areas where people were relocated such as Tinh Thien, Tinh Ky, Tinh Hoa, and Tinh Ke, and made preparations to take the people back to their farmlands.

To date, all the people have farmed and cultivated more than half of the land. Salt production has been developed and fishing has also been promoted. This year, we provided guidance for the performance of specific tasks and the fulfillment of criteria regarding land to be cultivated by each laborer. We also guided the people to reclaim and cultivate lands, and determined farm production criteria for each cell and each household. This guidance spurred increased production as compared to 1969. The people in Tinh Giang recultivated 30 mau of land in Na Lang and Tho Luu. In Tinh Tra, Comrade Mai's cell cultivated some idle land with IR-8 rice, and the people in Tinh Son, Binh, Bac, and Hiep also reclaimed large areas of land.

All untilled fields in Tinh Minh are now cultivated with corn and other crops. We are determined to implement the slogan: "Cultivate the land all year so as to obtain crops throughout the four seasons," and to succeed in our agricultural production in order to defeat the US aggressors. Due to the above factors, crop output has improved. Individual output for 1969 was 195 kilograms ((of rice)) and the individual output for the first half of 1970 was 146 kilograms ((of rice)).

b) Food collection and purchase task:

Particular attention was paid to mobilizing manpower and financial resources. It became a principal mission, vital to our success. This year we maintained or nearly attained the same level of production as in 1968, and received direct leadership from the district Party Committee which ensured timely execution of higher echelon resolutions. This year, the Farmers' Association played a key role in acquiring manpower and financial resources. It also filled a main role in political motivation by encouraging farmers to contribute all ((farm products)) to the front line. Therefore, as compared with previous years, contributions by the people increased. The ratio of individual contributions made by 10 western villages from the Mar 70 harvest was almost equal to that of 1969. As of May 70, we had collected 153 tons of rice. Part of this was collected in cash. In some villages where contributions were previously low, they became higher. As examples:

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For example, manpower motivation

((Page 22 of O.T.))

was previously unsuccessful, but has now obtained good results. There were ample men to evacuate the wounded. During the recent activity phase V ((sic)), many villages motivated 30 to 40 civilian laborers to participate in medical evacuation on the front line. The Youth Group also had members prepared to serve on the front line.

Civilian laborers evacuated 301 wounded in three to seven days ((sic)).

After motivating the people in Tỉnh Đông, Tỉnh Giang, Tỉnh Sơn, and Tỉnh Minh to participate in the development of armed forces, we recruited youths to reinforce guerrilla forces and higher level forces.

Particularly in the food motivation phase, many people bought 500 tons of food on their own and concealed, transported, and preserved it.

Indoctrination, propaganda, and psywar entertainment activities were rapidly resumed. A second-level school was set up in the district and attended by 4,000 students during 1968. It came to a standstill at the end of 1969, but has resumed classes. It had nearly 100 classes with 1,560 students. There were 17 classes with 502 students in Tỉnh Sơn; 10 classes in Tỉnh Giang; and five classes in Tỉnh Trà. The number of classes continued to increase.

During the great political motivation phases, we conducted psywar and entertainment activities in hamlets and applied the ((motivation)) principles appropriate to our present requirements and missions. We motivated the people, stabilized their morale, and instilled in them a revolutionary optimism and enthusiasm by singing songs.

2. Enemy schemes in weak and bordering areas, hamlets and district seats.

Since Campaign Z ((sic)) was initiated in early Feb 69, most enemy defense systems in districts, district seats, hamlets, and resettlement areas have been disrupted, with some hamlets and resettlement areas being attacked and destroyed by us. The people rose up and annihilated tyrants. The Puppet government was seriously demoralized and nearly disorganized at low levels. At the beginning of the 1969 Summer-Autumn Campaign, the enemy intensively strengthened defense in many forms to impose oppressive control on the people.

As for his oppressive forces, the enemy made every effort to strengthen and develop reserves, Popular and Regional Forces, and combat Youth Groups. He recruited hundreds of People's Self-Defense Force members and greatly increased rural pacification teams.

The People's Self-Defense Force and paramilitary forces were employed to protect hamlets and US bivouac areas. In addition to forces stationed at military posts, the US assigned squads and platoons, in coordination with Puppet troops, to oppressively control the people in hamlets such as Trũng An and Gô Đá. Sometimes the enemy also used field police and reconnaissance and sapper ((sic)) forces to conduct ambushes and raids.

In hamlets, the enemy set up interlaced fences, planted mines, and increased ambushes along our ((transportation)) corridors. Furthermore, he made every effort to consolidate the Puppet government at hamlet and village levels.

He brought exiled Puppet administrative personnel back to his resettlement centers and newly-pacified areas. In hamlets under his control for a long time, he organized elections to bring tyrants belonging to reactionary factions, especially members of the Nationalist Party, to the government. In addition to the Puppet administrative machinery, he built an intelligence network and planted spies, informants, and covert agents to discover our agents and oppress the people. He established a new party called the "Dân Xã" Party. Many of our men did not clearly understand this party and have joined it. The enemy also strove to summon our cadre and action units in liberated areas to surrender and exploited our contact agents and soldiers (such as Anh of the district seat).

He continuously conducted training courses called "denunciation of the Communists" in order to sort out our people in areas under his control. Meanwhile, the rural pacification personnel tried to entice the people by distributing water pumps and buying well-bred pigs and oxen for them. On the other hand, he planted covert agents to discover our cadre, soldiers, and guerrillas, and search for our trenches and combat fortifications. Concurrently, he arrested the people and tortured and oppressed them.

He increased conscription and developed People's Self-Defense organizations to replace personnel of the paramilitary forces in protecting hamlets. He upgraded militiamen to the Regional Force, formed militia inter-platoons, deployed Regional Force troops at blocking points to replace US troops or RVNAF Regular Force units, and assigned the latter to carry out combat missions and pacification activities.

In summary, since early spring of 1969, especially during Jul 69, the enemy has intensified pacification and combat activities in our areas. He gained some good results, and the majority of our people were moved to resettlement centers. However, we maintained, in general, continuous attacks on these centers and strategic hamlets and have killed many tyrants in hamlets and when returning from exile. The majority of the people continued to believe in the Revolution except for a shirking and passive few.

Since Campaign V180, we have developed underground agents inside enemy controlled areas and accelerated our activities. The people had new enthusiasm; this was favorable to the development of the Revolution.

As for the enemy, although he has carried out some pacification missions, his troops' morale went down. Puppet troops dared not stay in areas where US troops had left. Puppet tyrants and administrative personnel left their offices at night and assigned their subordinates to stay. Most of the personnel of the People's Self-Defense Force deserted, and the remaining ones hid their weapons and fled upon sight. Some of the enemy tyrants attempted to plead their cases before us.

((Page 24 of O.T.))

3. Our activities and consolidation.

In conjunction with the task of countering the enemy pacification program, maintaining control of the people, and strengthening our liberated areas, we made tremendous efforts to kill tyrants, break the enemy's oppressive control, win over the people, continuously attack the enemy, and motivate the people to rise up and seize power.

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1) Improving organization and unceasingly making preparations and attacking the enemy:

Our action unit has increased in number many times since the summer and autumn of 1968, especially before the 1969 Summer Campaign and since the 1969 Autumn Campaign. It was reinforced by four District Party Committee members, while the district organized a forward steering committee composed of one assistant secretary and one Current Affairs Committee member in charge of military affairs and district Party Committee members in charge of security, political affairs, and military proselyting.

Since Jul 69, because the enemy intensified pacification activities and established more resettlement centers, many of our people have left the liberated areas. So the District Party Committee held discussions with the Chapter Party Committee members and village Party Committee members to have village and hamlet guerrillas form action units in charge of attacking enemy posts. Each unit was composed of eight to 12 members under the leadership of the Chapter Party Committee and village Party Committee, such as those of Tinh Thọ, Thiện (Hòa Hân, Long Thành Gõ Đá), Trùng An, Kim Long, and Tinh Hòa Villages...((sic)).

We continuously attacked the enemy, killed tyrants, broke his oppressive control, improved our capabilities in our areas, and conducted three-pronged attacks to bring the people back to their villages.

2) Conducting three-pronged attacks and purifying the people.

Since spring of 1969, we have conducted four large campaigns: the IV ((Summer-Autumn)) Campaigns, the D Campaign, and the V Campaign. Although we had inadequate district and village forces, our action units (Há, An Tây, Kim An, Phong and An Đông units, and those of Tinh Tân, Tinh Nhòn, and Kỳ Province Capitals), in coordination with guerrillas of Hòa, Khê, Thiện, Châu Bình, Sơn, and Minh Villages and various armed security units, succeeded in killing a large number of enemy tyrants and pacification personnel.

In addition to the operational phases initiated by higher echelons, our district organized short-term phases to eliminate tyrants. Our action units took advantage of every opportunity. Secret guerrillas and security agents successfully eliminated a number of tyrants.

In coordination with the province unit, our district unit focused its forces on areas of emphasis. Our forces applied different tactics, such as ambushes, raids, concealing troops for attacks during the day, and joint actions between outside forces and in place agents, etc..... ((sic)).

Our political struggles were closely coordinated with our armed actions in eliminating tyrants and the enemy administrative system. When the enemy's control of the population was broken, we intensified our political struggles, which improved the people's living conditions and increased their enthusiasm, such as in Tinh Kỳ Village.

The military proselyting task has obtained better results. We have indoctrinated enemy soldiers' dependents to use as a backbone in their struggles to demand social welfare and democracy in posts and strategic hamlets. The indoctrination has not been widely conducted, but it has produced considerable results. In some areas, the people, after being indoctrinated, knew how to proselyte enemy troops and take advantage of them to demand rights and counter the enemy's terrorism and robbery. They also knew how to instigate the enemy's personnel from the paramilitary force, especially TNTT ((possibly combat youths)), to abandon their ranks, as in Tinh Long and Tinh Nhon. We have recruited a few agents in some posts. They are not yet operating effectively, but have caused the enemy to decrease his shellings of villages and provided us with information on new enemy schemes, etc...

Generally, the recent annihilation of tyrants and disruption of the enemy's control in hamlets have more or less helped to intensify the political movement and turn the balance of forces in our favor. During the first six months of the year, in addition to killing tyrants, with the people's help, we have suppressed and reformed a number of covert administrative personnel and lackeys. We gradually eliminated suspicious individuals from among them, enabling the people to gain control over their areas by themselves.

3. Strengthen forces, change the balance of forces, then gain control of areas:

Since Campaign Z69, we have seized partial control of some new areas and stepped up our activities in a number of hamlets. During the Summer-Autumn 1969 Campaign, the enemy launched fierce attacks against us, trying to encroach upon additional land. We conducted destructive attacks and pacification activities against rural areas. In several liberated villages our agents were newly-planted. These villages had been occupied by the enemy many times because we were not strong enough to drive them out. To improve the situation we attached much importance to force development, stressing quality because of the limited number of personnel.

Since Dec 69, after being indoctrinated on Resolution 9 of the Region ((Party)) Committee and Resolution 6 of the Province ((Party)) Committee, we have devoted our efforts to strengthening forces, and started implementing them to disrupt the enemy's control and kill tyrants. We have focused attention on developing the Party, Group, popular organizations, covert guerrilla, covert security, and key forces, and on the political and military proselyting struggles. Our aims were to keep close to the people and motivate them to launch three-pronged attacks and rise up and coordinate with outside forces to annihilate tyrants. The enemy's control has been considerably loosened and his officials demoralized. In some areas, they left their offices at 1500 hours to go somewhere else for the night. We have intensified the strengthening of forces by improving our men's qualifications.

Besides the armed forces, we have activated covert guerrilla and security organizations in the inside areas to regularly attack the enemy. The associations of farmers, women and youths in the front line area have been developed. We now have three legal Party Chapters. There are Party members serving as leaders in most of the hamlets. In addition, coordination and operations committees consist of three to six members.

Due to our past attacks and strengthening of forces, we have gained control of many areas. There we have introduced political activities to the people and succeeded in mobilizing manpower and material resources to serve the

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Resistance against the US for national salvation. We have eliminated suspicious individuals in many hamlets, creating favorable conditions for boosting the people's struggles to demand social welfare and democratic rights, to use available land, to fish and make salt, and to travel freely, etc... ((sic)). In addition to this, we have also planted agents in some hamlets to gradually change these areas into critically disrupted ones. The people in several hamlets and post areas, who had been tightly controlled by the enemy, have now dared to act, and our forces have penetrated and remained in some of these areas.

Populations in Different Areas:

Population in our controlled areas:	14,211	persons
Population in contested areas:	32,463	"
Population in areas under loose enemy control:	23,011	"
Population in enemy controlled areas:	15,000	"

COMMENTS ON STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES:

Strengths:

1. We still attacked the enemy. As a result, we have succeeded in firmly holding a number of hamlets and seizing control of some enemy installations and posts and maintaining the initiative in this drastic struggle.
2. Our forces in the inside ((enemy)) areas have been developed. Compared with the time when the enemy started his destruction to implement the pacification program, they are now better in quality and quantity. A concrete example is that they have planted Party agents in a number of hamlets to lead various movements.
3. We made some progress in annihilating tyrants. Enemy ringleaders and administrative personnel who were sent to local areas to undertake the pacification task were killed. Many were killed by our covert guerrillas. It is the progress of our movements which favors the disruption of the enemy's control and the creation of favorable conditions for the people to struggle for social welfare, democracy, and freedom to trade.

Weaknesses:

1. The strengthening of forces, especially of the Party and the covert guerrilla force, was slow and far from meeting the criteria, thus failing to turn the balance of forces in our favor and proceed toward liberating many hamlets.
2. The extermination of tyrants and disruption of enemy control is still substandard. We have not yet killed as many tyrants and ringleaders as required nor wiped out restrictive administrative machineries, so we have not yet effectively supported the people to rise up.
3. Many of our action units successfully infiltrated ((enemy)) areas but failed to remain there. That is why they were easily defeated, and our movements developed slowly.

Our offensives in the front line area were not continual. This is because units operated strenuously only during phases of activity and reduced their activities at other times, and these activity phases were irregular.

4. The motivation of the people was sporadic, so we could not urge them to launch three-pronged attacks.

5. Our movements in district seats were very weak. Our units failed to stay there and also they were small in number. So they have not yet killed tyrants, nor broken the enemy's control and thwarted his defensive plan.

((Page 27 of O.T.))

Reasons

1. The characteristics of the General Offensive and Uprising phase were not thoroughly understood.

Though leadership for the forward area has been provided by the District Party Committee, it failed to focus on the main problems. We lacked effective measures and efficient organization for implementation. Passive and rightist attitudes still prevailed. Personnel were not courageous in holding on to their areas of operation or operating deep in enemy areas. In the annihilation of tyrants, breaking the enemy's oppressive control, and building up forces, they did not have confidence in the people.

2. Cadre and personnel did not fully understand the advancing policy for the forward area. They still relied on foreign weapons, failed to coordinate three-pronged attacks, and took no interest in the build-up of strength to shift the balance of forces.

3. Various action units did not thoroughly understand their political mission. Armed action units still relied heavily on weaponry, neglecting strength buildup and motivation of the people. They had a poor working system. ((Cadre)) did not pay much attention to improving working procedures for all units.

III. OBSERVATIONS ON STRONG AND WEAPON POINTS.

Strong points

We have maintained and widely developed the guerrilla warfare movement in our controlled areas. In countering enemy pacification activities our guerrillas have become the key force for countering the enemy and defending liberated areas. We have employed many attacking methods: We laid mines; destroyed enemy war facilities; attacked tanks and aircraft; used many improvised weapons; innovated sapper tactics into our guerrilla warfare; and developed hamlet guerrilla forces.

We successfully applied three-pronged attacks in countering enemy pacification activities. Despite fierce struggles against the enemy, the people continued to maintain their legal ((GVN)) positions, increase their direct contact struggles against the enemy, remain in their areas of responsibility, develop farm production activities, and transport goods between bordering and mountainous areas to enemy controlled and liberated areas. In addition, we stabilized the lives of the people, maintaining and furthering the political movement and heightening revolutionary pride.

We successfully motivated the people to contribute material resources and manpower to the Revolution.

Reasons for strong points:

The above achievements were due to:

The correct and skillful policy of the Party and the constant leadership of the Current Affairs Committee;

The sound solution of ideological matters within Party Headquarters, and the masses' full understanding of the main mission of the Party;

The people's firm tradition and determination and solidarity among cadre and Party members;

Efficient leadership and organization for implementation.

((Page 28 of O.T.))

Shortcomings

Fewer results were obtained in improving forces than in attacking the enemy. Concern was given to preparing for immediate tasks, while long-range activities were almost ignored. The establishment of Farmers' Associations, the Party's key organizations, was also neglected. Various groups and committees did not operate on a permanent basis, thus loosening our administration and control of the people.

The three-pronged attack tactic was not properly applied. The military proselyting facet was ineffective especially at the beginning.

Personnel did not fully understand guerrilla warfare. Though stepped up, the movement was far from being widespread among the people. The development of guerrillas was substandard. Less emphasis was placed on recruiting female, teenage, and secret guerrillas. The number of replacements recruited for the district force was too small, so its combat activities were limited.

The guerrillas, therefore, failed to play the key role in killing enemy personnel and winning over the people.

Party Headquarters were not strengthened. The development of Party members proceeded slowly. The development of Four-Good-Quality Party Chapters and Party members was below the set standards. As a result, Party members could not play their leading, exemplary roles in Party Chapters. The training and improvement of cadre was very slow; therefore, the requirements of the movement for leadership cadre were not fulfilled.

The recruitment of personnel in different areas, hamlets, and organizations was slow. Therefore, we could not fill the personnel gap due to combat losses.

Guidance on finance-economy tasks was not properly provided. Produce and financial collections were below the set standards. The amount collected was small. Personnel mobilized to be assigned to friendly units on the front line were inadequate.

Causes of shortcomings

We did not understand that the General Offensive and Uprising was just a phase in our protracted war and that we were required to make intensive efforts to achieve victory in a short period of time. As a result, we did not improve our forces while attacking the enemy, to help carry out the Party's immediate and long-range missions.

We did not properly evaluate enemy and friendly forces. We did not keep a firm attitude. Every time we met with difficulties or the enemy stepped up his destructive activities, we hastily concluded that he was strong. We were subjective and failed to realize his cunning schemes and our own shortcomings.

We did not understand the Party's main missions. Consequently, we failed to provide effective leadership and frustrate the enemy's pacification program. Some places (villages in the eastern area) let the people go over to the enemy side.

We did not thoroughly understand the policies for our areas. The execution of these policies was inadequate. Branches and services were not encouraged to join in accomplishing the Party's main missions.

The morale of members of the Party Headquarters has slowly improved. Rightist outlooks, the fear of death, unwillingness to accept tasks, working for form's sake, shirking attitudes, and worrying about the welfare of one's family was relatively predominant among personnel. This has been an obstacle to the development of the movement and the employment of its advantages.

17 Jun 70

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----