

W FILE / SUBJ.
 DATE / SUB-CAT.
 6170

1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM	8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 0060 71
2. SUBJECT: Security Section of Xuan Loc District Party Committee, VC Ba Ria - Long Khanh Province, VC Region-7 (U)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 16 February 1971
3. ISC NUMBER: A701.500 A723.210 G AFTERA	10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 1970	11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1E
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 7 January 1971	12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>B</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>	13. PREPARED BY: EDWARD A. FELIX, 1LT, MI CHIEF, PROD DIV, 89 ELM, CDEC
7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: George S. Lapinskes GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

22.03.03

15. SUMMARY: (U) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents and concerns Report 186/C15 signed by Truong Giang for C15 ((possibly the Security Section of Xuan Loc District Party Committee, VC Ba Ria - Long Khanh Province, VC Region 7)) and three undated reports of unknown origin. Report 186/C15, dated 18 June 1970 outlines the development of reactionary ((pro-GVN)) nationalist parties, activities of Buddhist followers and Roman Catholics, and the situation of 14 ((RVN)) pacification groups in Long Khanh Province during the second quarter of 1970. The report also mentions combat achievements of ((VC)) local forces from 2 April to 26 May 1970, and achievements in the development of security agencies, and self-defense and armed reconnaissance units. The other three reports list 21 ((GVN)) officials in Long Khanh Province and 65 ((GVN)) officials in Bao Dinh, Bao Hoa, Cam Duong, Gia Ray, and Bao Liet areas.

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186/C15 ((possibly the Security Section
of Xuân Lộc District Party Committee, VC
Bà Rịa - Long Khanh Province, VC Region 7))

REPORT ON ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION DURING THE
FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1970

I. ENEMY SITUATION

A. Military:

To put the Vietnamization plan into effect, the enemy continued to increase his accelerated pacification activities. He intensified military activities during the second quarter of 1970 in order to consolidate and protect his military bases, sectors, sub-sectors, isolated posts, and strategic hamlets along lines of communication.

To execute the plan the Puppet regular force units coordinated with Popular and Regional Forces to conduct repeated operations using battalion to platoon-sized units against our forces in three areas, especially in the province capital, the district seat (Long Khanh Province Capital and Tân Phong District Seat), Bảo Bình, Bảo Chánh rural areas and areas along Route 1. These attacks were also conducted against our forces in Suối Cát, Bảo Định, Bảo Hòa. In ((our mountain and forest base areas, they attacked Đất Ruộng Đỏ, Lăng Minh, northeastern Bảo Bình, Suối Nước Dục, and Suối Đá areas.

The enemy increased the number of patrols and planted mines and ((booby-trapped)) grenades in strategic hamlets (at night).

Before Apr 70, the enemy conducted continuous long-range sweep operations deep into forested and mountainous areas. From Apr to May 70, with the support of tracked vehicles, the enemy continued his sweep operations against areas surrounding the province capital and Bảo Bình. The sweep operations conducted deep into base areas during the second quarter were reduced. (Since May 70 the Puppet and US troops have only conducted sweep operations as field training exercises along lines of communication in order to protect personnel who are building roads).

The enemy divided his troops into small elements and used Special Forces and ambush tactics, (attacks with mines) in coordination with air and artillery fire, to conduct repeated attacks against the Suối Nước Dục area. These tactics were commonly used by the enemy in base areas, mountainous areas, and areas surrounding province capitals, and district seats with the support of tracked vehicles. The enemy launched police operations to conduct searches, raids, and ambushes (in Đất Đỏ areas, Bảo Vinh Province Capital area, and areas surrounding the district seat).

B. Political activities

During the second quarter, the enemy tried to consolidate his oppressive administration in infrastructure organization by re-electing people's village councils (19 Mar to 9 Apr 70) and hamlet administrative

committees (7 May 70). He attempted to strengthen the People's Self-Defense Force, and drafted youths to upgrade his troops.

The enemy tried to encourage and protect reactionary factions and religious sects (Đai Việt Party) to gain support.

He increased psychological warfare activities and appealed for ralliers by using all methods, such as:

Using the land reform policy to conduct deceitful propaganda activities; encouraging the people to increase ((farm)) production, develop animal husbandry, lend money; giving medicine and gifts to the people; and opening schools (in rural areas, Bình Phú, Bảo Chánh, Suối Cát, and so on).

He spread propaganda on false victories, especially those in Cambodia.

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c. Economy

The enemy tried to blockade us. He attacked entry and exit points to impede food transportation into our areas. To carry out this plan, the enemy used his forces to conduct attacks such as: Sweep operations and attacks against entry and exit points (in Bao Binh area). He also increased intelligence activities at entry and exit points (Route 1), strategic hamlets, and along communication lines; investigated our activities; used his henchmen in the restrictive (RVN) administrative machinery to control and encircle us. He conducted shellings and planted mines to intercept our activities. (He planted mines beneath manioc trees, along trails and roads leading to strategic hamlets).

d. Counterespionage activities.

1. National Policemen

Plans: He trained 2000 ((RVN)) policemen to conduct extended operations against us. The enemy selected a number of soldiers of F18 ((18th RVN Division)), and Popular and Regional Forces, and trained them in Vung Tau for three months, then sent them out to operate.

He consolidated ((police)) sub-stations and coordinated the Phung Hoang force with other intelligence forces to attack the revolutionary infrastructure.

Activities: Police field forces coordinated with military policemen, and Regional and Popular Forces to conduct searches and police operations, capture people, set ambushes along trails leading to the province capital and district seat (Tân Phong - Long Khanh). They were also more concerned with searching for deserters during the second quarter of 1970.

In addition to their activities in urban areas during the first three months, the ((RVN)) policemen operated in rural areas such as Báo Bình, Báo Hòa, Suối and Suối Cát, and along Route 1.

Schemes: They arrested the people to exploit information on our situation, and forced them to join the enemy organizations. They persuaded automobile drivers, including drivers of lumber trucks, and traders, to create dissension among the people and our cadre.

2. Phung Hoàng intelligence activities

In order to support the accelerated pacification plan, Phung Hoàng intelligence agents and intelligence agents of the sector coordinated with policemen and secret agents to conduct search operations (in the Đất Đỏ area). They categorized the people in ((GVN)) pacified areas. They established espionage networks to destroy the revolutionary movement, eliminate our agents in hamlets, and control the people.

Enemy schemes

The enemy established intelligence networks in villages and hamlets and attempted to train the village and hamlet personnel as intelligence agents. He assigned personnel and increased the number of intelligence agents (policemen) to collect information and set up intelligence networks in villages and hamlets. He also conducted two training courses for about 120 trainees, mostly women from ages 18 to 25, then assigned them to operate in the eastern area ((of the province)). Particularly, the last training course with 22 trainees were assigned to operate in Báo Bình, Tân Phong, Gia Ray, Suối Cát, Báo Vinh along Route 1 (Gia Liều) and in the core area of the province capital.

During the second quarter of 1970 they bribed children to collect information on the friendly ((VC)) situation. (In Báo Vinh, one cell with 15 children was detected, and in Suối Chôn three children operated under the supervision of the ((RVN)) hamlet administrative personnel).

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In short, during the second quarter of 1970, Phung Hoàng intelligence agents operated on a broad front, especially in rural areas and strategic hamlets in order to support the accelerated pacification program and destroy revolutionary organizations at village and hamlet levels. They failed in this plan. The revolutionary movement of the people has developed in the three areas.

3. Activities of the ((RVNAF)) military intelligence, military security, and intelligence ((organizations)) of sector ((of Bà Rịa - Long Khánh Province)):

The enemy military intelligence and military security personnel continuously operated along routes ((Routes 1 and 3 in Gia Ray)). During the second quarter, these personnel were reinforced to operate in Gia Ray Area (Route 3) and in areas of posts located on Route 1 from Ông Đôn

Three-way Intersection to Bình Tuy. They assigned Ba Thông to operate at Base 4 and five other personnel to Gia Ráy Village. Their activities were to prevent revolts and desertions. They disguised themselves as drivers transporting lumber and collected information on our situation.

During the second quarter, the intelligence ((organization)) of the sector trained a number of children and assigned them to Bảo Vinh. A number of Puppet soldiers who were sergeant or higher were also trained. They disguised themselves as deserters and workers. (Two were detected). They constantly operated in the area bordering the province capital (Đất Đỏ area and Bảo Vinh).

4. Other types of intelligence personnel

We did not collect information or discover any plans.

5. Pacification activities

Organization: There were 14 pacification teams in Long Khanh Province and three teams of Trường Sơn Cadre (ethnic minority) in Xuân Lộc District.

Information on their activities is as follows:

Team 1 with approximately 35 personnel in Túc Trùng, was transferred to Bảo Hòa on 9 Jun 70.

Team 6 with approximately 20 personnel in Bao Hoa was transferred (to an unspecified area).

Team 9 in Đinh Quán.

Team 8, with about 22 personnel, operated in the Suoi Cat area, Gia Ray.

Team 13 operated in the Dầu Dây area, An Lộc.

Team 10 operated in Tân Phong and Tân Lập.

Team 3 operated in the Bảo Vinh area.

Team 1 ((Mountainous Development Team)), with approximately 25 personnel, operated in Gia Ráy.

Team 2 ((Mountainous Development Team)), with about 18 personnel, operated in Bảo Chánh.

Designations of other teams are unknown.

Activities: Each team is divided into small groups. Each group consists of 10 to 12 cadre and operates separately in each hamlet. During the day, cadre go to the people's houses to conduct deceitful propaganda and psywar activities. They develop (by force) the People's Self-Defense Force organization to control the people.

In support of these teams, the enemy used local force units to conduct control and search operations in the areas and strategic hamlets outside the area. There were also operations conducted by regular troops in coordination with US forces in bordering areas.

In brief, the enemy intensified his activities in accordance with his wicked plans, but he failed to gain great success. During the second quarter of ((1970)), his plans were disrupted in many areas, including Báo Vinh Hamlet and Suối Chôn where the People's Self-Defense Force was disorganized. The pacification personnel came there during the day and returned to Suối Tre, Long Khanh at night. In Suối Cát and Báo Hảo, the People's Self-Defense Force was not yet organized, and administrative personnel were killed. (Some took refuge).

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9. ((sic)) Open-Arms activities

Along with sweep operations, economic blockades were conducted to cause us difficulties by an attempt to rally our troops to the enemy. The enemy resorted to the following plans:

He forced friendly ((VC)) troops' dependents to appeal to their husbands and sons to rally.

He bribed them.

He encouraged their henchmen to appeal to friendly ((VC)) troops to surrender and gave awards to 120 personnel.

He conducted propaganda by using leaflets and loudspeakers to spread rumors of false victories and information to demoralize our troops.

During the first six months of 1970, the enemy Open-Arms activities confused our troops. Friendly troops had poor morale. Some cadre were unable to endure hardships.

As a result, nine rallied to the enemy, seven in the first quarter and two in the second quarter of 1970. (They were from the province capital and district units).

The reason for that is that our political indoctrination was poor, ideological leadership was ineffective, and the control of soldiers was not strict. There were also enemy attacks. The defection of our cadre in the province capital ((unit)) is a result of the penetration of enemy agents into our ranks.

Reactionary Party ((GVN))

During the second quarter ((of 1970)) the enemy developed reactionary parties, especially the Đại Việt ((Great Vietnam)) Party, headed by Hoàng Việt, Secretary of Long Khanh Province ((Đại Việt)) Party Headquarters. (We were informed that Hoàng Việt is aka 1st Lieutenant Em).

This party took Tân Phong as an experimental site to organize and develop the Party. Within three days it recruited 60 Party numbers in Tân Phong and in a few days during the first three months in the urban areas of the province capital, it organized two Party Chapters (with five Party members in each).

A show of force was organized at Đông Tâm Theater in Long Khanh on 10 May 70.

The way by which the Party developed relies mostly on compulsion (Tân Phong) and the support of Puppet local authorities, and is aimed at the bourgeoisie, the civil servants, and Puppet troops. The slogan of the Đại Việt Party is to struggle for freedom and democracy. If its members were arrested by the Puppet Government, they were freed.

Freedom Fighter's Association: (It was reported to be composed of VN Nationalist Party members). Đôn ((Senator Trần Văn Đôn)) replaced Đỗ Cao Trí ((Lt General)) to lead this association. During the second quarter, according to the order of leaders of this association, there should be 700 members (previously there were only 70 members). According to our agent's report, this number was reached by late May 70. But most of these members did nothing for the association.

We did not collect much information on other parties' activities. We knew only that Roanh, a teacher, replaced Loc to act as Secretary of Long Khanh Province VN Nationalist Party Headquarters. Xã Hội Cấp Tiến ((Radical Socialist)) Party ran for election to the Long Khanh Province People's Council. (Thieu ((President of RVN)) motivated 100 Catholics of this party to force the people, civil servants, and soldiers to participate in the demonstration against three senators of the Puppet Government during Jan 70).

Reactionary activities under the guise of religion.

During the first three months we collected information on activities of reactionary parties operating under the label of religion, such as Thích Quang Trí ((possibly the Venerable Thích Trí Quang)). They organized the so-called Buddhist Democratic Force and assigned cadre to rebuild or establish a new pagoda (Bảo Bình) and take advantage of the people's faith. They conducted deceitful propaganda saying that if the people joined this organization they would be free from military obligation, and if they were captured by the Puppet Government they would be freed. Therefore, a number of people joined this organization. We did not collect information on their activities.

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Those who disguised themselves as Catholic priests, (especially in Tân Xuân Hamlet) took advantage of the belief of their followers, and unemployed and backward people, and trained them to become intelligence agents.

In short, the reactionaries, under the cover of religion, took advantage of the beliefs of the people to bribe them to follow the enemy, join their religion, and provide them with support.

The Puppet Government's activities in the province, districts, and villages.

Organization

Struck by our continuous uprisings and offensives to kill tyrants and break the oppressive enemy control, the ((RVN)) local administrative machineries were disorganized and confused. The remaining personnel, due to fear of death, are working lackadaisically. Others took refuge in other areas or surrendered to us and confessed their crimes before the people. In this situation, however, the enemy still remains stubborn and has to make every effort to stabilize the Puppet Government.

For instance, during the first three months of ((1970)), he sent a number of village and hamlet administrative personnel to participate in a supplementary training course. He also recalled those who had taken refuge in other areas from their former jobs and trained them to become intelligence agents. (Most were members of the check and control section, Phung Hoang intelligence agency).

During the second quarter ((of 1970)), he tried to consolidate the hamlet and village administrative machinery by organizing deceitful elections of the people's councils and village administrative machinery in all districts, on the following days: 19 Mar 70 in Xuân Lộc Village; 26 Mar 70 in Hiếu Kinh Village; and 9 Mar 70 in Gia Ray Village.

During May 70, he conducted another election for hamlet administrative sections.

Because the people protested these elections, the enemy failed to achieve his plan. Therefore, he had to designate candidates (in Xuan Loc Village).

He also had to choose pacification personnel (in Suoi Cat) and chiefs of Suoi Chon and Bao Vinh B Posts to work as hamlet chiefs. In other places, due to our continuous attacks during the second quarter ((of 1970)), the enemy could not consolidate his administrative machinery, village administrative personnel were confused. For instance, Tân Thủy Hamlet administrative personnel were removed and there were no replacements. At present, there are no administrative personnel at Bao Vinh and Suoi Chon.

At Hamlet A, there are still local ((hamlet)) administrative personnel who take refuge in other areas.

After a policeman and the chief of Gia Rây Village were wounded the remaining administrative personnel feared us and confessed that they have worked for the sake of their purchase of rice (Can). Ngô Lê, who was wounded by us, said that after he recovered he would stop working etc ... ((sic)).

After the elections conducted during Mar and May 70, village and hamlet administrative machinery was reorganized with newly elected personnel whose names are as follows:

1. Xuân Lộc Village

Village administrative personnel: Nguyễn Tân Quang, Village Chief, replaced Nguyễn Trác.

4. ((sic)) Nguyễn Hoàng, Deputy Village Chief. (He was formerly a registrar).

3. Bùi Xuân Canh takes charge of the economic ((section)). We know only the names of those personnel who were designated by the enemy, because the election of this village administrative machinery was cancelled because of our activities.

Hamlet administrative personnel: Names of the newly elected personnel are unknown.

1. Tân Phú Hamlet: Đinh Văn Chuan, Hamlet Chief; and Bùi Đắc Duy ((aka)) Cường, hamlet security agent; Phạm Duy Quốc, Assistant Hamlet Chief.

2. Phú Thanh Hamlet: Minh, Hamlet Chief.

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3. Phú Mỹ Hamlet: Đào Lai, Hamlet Chief ((replaced Mười Dâu)); Hùng, Deputy Hamlet Chief; Đạt, Assistant Security Section Chief; Nguyễn Hồng, clerk.

4. Bảo Vinh A Hamlet: Nguyễn Văn Năm, Hamlet Chief; Hà Văn Dưa, security agent replacing Ich.

5. Bảo Vinh B Hamlet: Đinh, Hamlet Chief ((took refuge)); Thuồng, aka 35, hamlet security agent ((took refuge)).

6. Suối Chôn Hamlet: Nguyễn Văn Vinh, Hamlet Chief ((took refuge)); Kinh, Assistant Hamlet Chief ((took refuge)).

7. Hiếu Kinh Village (Bảo Định): The election of the village council was held during Apr 70.

Village Council: Chinh, Chairman; Huỳnh, Vice-Chairman; Mui, member; Thê, member.

Village local (RVN) administrative personnel: Nguyễn Văn Nhiệm, Village Chief; Tài, policeman; and Trịnh Văn Ý, Assistant Village Chief.

Hoa

Thị Vàng

Thị Nhiệm

} Village clerks

Tiên
Luân
Ty

} Policemen who just returned from a training course

Hamlet local ((RVN)) administrative personnel:

Bảo Định Hamlet: Phạm Văn Sung, Hamlet Chief; Nguyễn Thành Trung, Deputy Hamlet Chief; Sửu, Hamlet Security Section ((Chief)); Nguyễn Văn Chính, Assistant Hamlet Security Section Chief.

Bảo Thi Hamlet: Nguyễn Văn Tân, Hamlet Chief; Nguyễn Văn Chiên, Assistant Hamlet Chief.

Bảo Toàn Hamlet: Nguyễn Văn Phú, Hamlet Chief; Phạm Văn Tri, Assistant Hamlet Chief.

Bảo Hòa Hamlet: Nguyễn Văn Vinh

Bảo Liệt Hamlet: The name of the hamlet chief is unknown.

Bảo Bình 1 Hamlet: Lê Văn Út, Hamlet Chief ((took refuge)).

Bảo Bình 2 Hamlet: Ba Bo ((possibly Hamlet Chief)).

Bảo Bình 3 Hamlet: Chung A Sáu ((possibly Hamlet Chief)).

3. Gia Ray Hamlet local ((RVN)) administrative personnel: The Hamlet Council is newly elected.

Ngô Văn Lê, Chairman (who was wounded by friendly forces, is now in the hospital).

Nguyễn Quân, Vice-Chairman, (Popular Force Platoon Leader).

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Nguyễn Văn Nguyễn, clerk.

Trần Văn Thắng, Assistant of the Village Council.

Village local (RVN) administrative personnel: Nguyễn Văn Căn, Village Chief; Thanh Sướng, village policeman, who was wounded by our troops.

Nguyễn Văn Phan, village registrar's office member; Phan Văn Hối, Chief of village Information Section; Nguyễn Văn Năm, village clerk.

Hamlet local (RVN) administrative personnel:

1. Trung Lương ((Hamlet)): Nguyễn Văn Kẹo, Hamlet Chief ((killed by our troops)); Cao Văn Sơn, Assistant Hamlet Chief.

2. Trung Nghia ((Hamlet)): Cao Văn Nhỏ, Hamlet Chief (wounded by our troops); Nguyễn Văn Cầm, Assistant Hamlet Chief.

3. Trung Tin ((Hamlet)): Nguyễn Văn Thanh, Hamlet Chief (formerly a public security agent in Long Khanh); Nguyễn Văn Nhuận, hamlet security agent.

4. Bảo Chánh ((Hamlet)): Mai Văn Tô, Hamlet Chief; Nguyễn Văn Thạch, security agent; Lê Văn Thường, security agent.

5. Suối Cát Hamlet: Thảo, Hamlet Chief (now an Assistant Pacification Group Leader). He replaced Hiến.

6. Bình Phú Hamlet: Chiêu A Mãng, Hamlet Chief; Chiêu A Nhi, Assistant Hamlet Chief; Chiêu A Ang, security agent.

Three local (RVN) administrative personnel in Gia Rây Village were wounded during our attacks, and one named Hien abandoned his post in Suối Cát.

4. Tân Phong Village.

1. Tân Phong Hamlet: Nguyễn Đình Dầu (aka Su?), Hamlet Chief; Chiêm, Assistant Hamlet Chief; Tài, hamlet security agent.

2. Xóm Mới Hamlet: Thoai, Hamlet Chief; Quyên, Assistant Hamlet Chief; Hung, hamlet security agent.

3. Phú Bình Hamlet: Xuân, Hamlet Chief; Phú, Assistant Hamlet Chief.

4. Tân Thủy Hamlet: Sàng Vòng Sàng, Hamlet Chief; Lâm Kinh, security agent.

Luồng Quý Tàu, Assistant Hamlet Chief. (He was formerly a pacification cadre).

These members abandoned their posts and there was not anyone to replace them.

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The Puppet Government makes every effort to force the people to participate in the People's Self-Defense Force organization and equip them with weapons. But in many areas, such as Tân Thủy, Suối Cát and Bảo Vinh Hamlets, the People's Self-Defense Force was destroyed. In Bào Hòa Hamlet and Hamlets 1 and 2 of Bào Bình Village, the people refused to stand guard duty. Activities of the People's Self-Defense Force in the remaining areas (the province capital and Tân Phong ((Hamlet)) were not noteworthy. Recently the enemy forced the People's Self-Defense Force members to attend a one-month military training course, and equipped them with weapons. He established an inter-hamlet command committee and organized a finance section to steal the people's property to feed themselves.

At Phú Thanh and Phú Mỹ Hamlets the enemy chose 100 of the 700 People's Self-Defense Force members and 20 others in Tân Phong

for training. In Gia Ray, Bao Chanh, Binh Phu, Tan Phu, and Tan Phong and Bao Binh 3 Hamlets, People's Self-Defense Forces still remain, but their activities are limited, because they fear death, (especially after our attack against Gia Ray on the night of 26 May 70). The remaining enemy key force is the Popular Force. As of Jun 70, the People's Self-Defense Forces in Bao Vinh, Suoi Cat and Bao Hoa Hamlets were destroyed. Their reorganization has not yet been completed.

The enemy was defeated in the entire region ((possibly SVN)). In our district, the enemy's ((GVN)) restrictive administrative machinery was destroyed by us in many areas. Henchmen were demoralized. However, they are stubborn and still continue to implement their wicked plans.

In addition to the employment of the military forces to conduct sweep operations, the enemy attempted to intensify espionage activities. He emphasized the development of intelligence networks, in which the strategic hamlets were key areas (especially in rural areas and areas adjacent to communication lines). The enemy tried to consolidate his restrictive administration machinery to control the reactionary factions and use reactionaries who disguised themselves as monks or priests in order to motivate the people to oppose us. Policemen and members of Phung Hoang intelligence agencies conducted notable activities in rural areas and areas adjacent to communication lines.

In the past, the enemy schemes were dangerous and caused us many difficulties. He failed to implement his plans and was defeated. His accelerated pacification plan was frustrated especially during the second quarter. He could neither pacify the hamlets (within the district) nor reorganize the restrictive administrative machinery. Due to his unjust nature, dissension in enemy ranks became more critical. His henchmen were demoralized and feared death. The hatred of the people has deepened, although he has done his best to reorganize his administrative organizations.

II. FRIENDLY ACTIVITIES.

d ((sic)). Investigation and study:

a. Study of enemy plans:

Train 2,000 policemen to conduct immediate and long-range attacks against us ((VC)) (2nd quarter).

Train intelligence agents of the Phung Hoang agency and of the sector to operate in many areas (only the number of intelligence agents for the first quarter is known).

b. Study of enemy organizations:

The police station assigned six policemen to the Phung Hoang intelligence agency.

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The enemy established the People's Self-Defense Force command committee in two hamlets in the core city area of the Long Khanh Province Capital, and, at the same time, he conducted a military training course for 100 People's Self-Defense Force members in the core city area and for 20 others in Tân Phong. (They were equipped with rifles).

c. Investigation of suspected individuals.

During the second quarter ((of 1970)), ((local security agencies)) have completed 12 dossiers on tyrants ((GVN officials)) (including two in ((Long Khanh)) Province Capital, three in Suối Cát ((Hamlet)), five in Gia Ray ((Village)) and two in Bảo Định Hamlet). During the first quarter, they have completed three of 15 dossiers. All these dossiers were submitted to Party Chapter Committee for consideration. Crimes of tyrants in ((Long Khanh)) City were pointed out clearly.

The number of enemy personnel listed for the first quarter ((of 1970)) was 26, and 120 for the second quarter. Notably, during Jun ((70)), 65 others were listed. The total of 146 personnel listed was divided as follows:

Intelligence agent of the police	8
Intelligence agent of Phường Hoàng organization	5
Civic Action cadre	4
Pacification cadre	9 (including one secret informant)
Hamlet and village local (RVN) administrative personnel	13
Intelligence agents of military security	5
Intelligence agents of ((GVN)) Special Forces	1
Intelligence agents of F18 ((18th RVN Division))	1
Reactionary factions	2
Mountainous development cadre	5

(Chiêu Hồi) ((Open-Arms)) personnel 1

Suspects 20 (classified)

2. Suppression of counter-revolutionaries

a. Mission of killing tyrants: Throughout the district, 91 tyrants were killed or wounded during the second quarter. Altogether, 140 tyrants were killed or wounded during the first and second quarter of 1970.

Killed: 46 ((during the second quarter))

Policemen	3 (including one first lieutenant)
Intelligence agents of the Phuong Hoang organization.	1
Intelligence agents of F18	2
Pacification cadre	3
CIDG soldiers	1
Puppet troops and Popular Force members	7
Various intelligence and public security agents and policemen	29 (including two intelligence captains of the 33rd DTA)

Wounded: 45

Village local (RVN) administrative personnel	2
Hamlet local (RVN) administrative personnel	1
Pacification cadre	2 (including a team chief)
Policemen	3
Popular Force members	2
People's Self-Defense Force members	3
Intelligence agents of various categories and Puppet officers.	32

Forces which participated in killing tyrants.

Village and province capital security forces coordinated with guerrilla and special action units in seven battles.

Suối Cát Village: Two battles. On the night of 2 Apr 70, our forces killed a Phuong Hoang intelligence agent.

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On 2 May 70, we killed two pacification cadre and wounded two others (including a team chief) in an ambush.

Bảo Chánh Village: On 28 Apr 70, we killed two intelligence agents of the 18th RVNAF Inf Division.

Province capital: Armed reconnaissance agents, in coordination with the Special Action Unit, conducted two attacks in the province capital (on 6 and 10 Apr 70), killing four cruel Popular Force soldiers, wounding three People's Self-Defense Force members, and destroying the local (RVN) administrative head office in Xuân Lộc Village (twice) and two others.

Tân Phong ((Village)): In a sudden attack on 22 Apr 70, we killed one CIDG intelligence agent.

Gia Ray ((Village)): On 26 May 70, we penetrated the local village (RVN) administrative office, killed three enemy personnel, and two cruel Popular Force soldiers, and seized many documents and papers.

Activities of Secret Armed Reconnaissance and Self-Defense Units

On the night of 5 May 70, the secret armed reconnaissance units killed seven enemy personnel and wounded 18 others (including three first lieutenants).

On the night of 4 May 70, three secret self-defense soldiers in Bình Lộc ((Village)) infiltrated the core city area of the province capital and attacked the Thanh Tâm Ice Cream Bar, killing 25 persons (including two captains of 33rd DTA) and wounding 15 others. (Most of them were security agents, policemen and pacification cadre and were not classified).

The district sapper reconnaissance unit attacked the police service and killed three and wounded three (on the night of 20 May 70).

The guerrillas of Bảo Vinh ((Village)) killed a chief of a Popular Force post in an ambush.

b. Warning and indoctrination: 231 enemy personnel were indoctrinated and warned; 142 during the second quarter of 1970 and 89 during the first three months.

Enemy personnel warned and indoctrinated during the second quarter were classified as follows:

Local ((RVN)) administrative personnel and spies: 9

People's Self-Defense Force members: 79

Suspected persons: 16 (three were identified).

Families whose members joined the People's Self-Defense Force, served as local ((RVN)) administrative personnel and spies: 38.

Method of attacking the enemy: We have used covert armed reconnaissance forces and military proselyting agents in the local area. We have coordinated with overt forces of district and the province capital and villages to gain the following objectives: Chiếu Hối, ((Open-Arms)), and police services, hamlets and village local RVN administrative offices to kill tyrants and break the enemy oppressive control of the population.

We have conducted the three-front attack to kill the enemy. As a result, during the second quarter of 1970, we killed the chief of G2 of the 33rd DTA in the province capital. We also motivated the people to conduct political struggles to demand their democratic rights and social welfare. On the other hand, we demoralized and menaced a number of local ((RVN)) administrative personnel. They did not dare to work for the enemy (in Suối Cát). We warned and persuaded local ((RVN)) administrative personnel, spies, and People's Self-Defense Force members and lowered the morale of enemy. We demoralized the others by conducting a people's court to judge and warn them in public (as the case of Phong) or sent letters warning them.

Results and influence:

People who were warned and indoctrinated realized their mistakes. They did not work for the enemy (in Suối Cát). Particularly, People's Self-Defense members protested by not holding weapons and standing guard (Suối Cát, Báo Vinh, Tân Thủy, and Báo Hòa ((Villages))).

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The rest were so confused and demoralized that the enemy could not strengthen their forces. (Thuy, a local ((RVN)) administrative personnel in Suối Cát abandoned his office, and the assistant chief of the pacification group was assigned to replace him.) Local ((RVN)) administrative personnel in Gia Ray declared they would quit their jobs because they were afraid. We have broken all oppressive forms such as hanging flags, pictures and banderols, and forcing the people to work as laborers (during the second quarter of 1970). We gained partial control of the people in number of places such as Suối Cát, Tân Thủy, Báo Vinh, Báo Bình 1, 2 and Gia Ray.

C. Breaking the oppressive enemy control of the population.

According to the initial reports during the second quarter of 1970, we destroyed 23,300 meters of barbed wire (in Báo Vinh B Hamlet we destroyed 20,000 meters), picked up 4,000 columns ((sic)) of fence, thus destroying 25 ((possibly rows of fence)) out of 29.

We destroyed the administrative office in Xuân Lộc Village. (We have twice conducted attacks in the city and in the province capital). We destroyed an information house in Bao Vinh and two administrative offices in an inter-hamlet of Phú Thanh and Phú Mỹ.

We destroyed two-thirds of the barbed wire fences at Bao Binh and Bao Chanh Hamlets, and a part of the fences in Bao Hoa and Suoi Cat.

We destroyed 50 electric wire poles.

We destroyed 113 enemy banderols, 19 ((RVN)) flags, and three columns ((sic)) of flags.

We seized a number of administrative pacification documents (in Gia Ray and Tân Phong), and burned many documents in the Xuân Lộc Village administrative office.

We have also disseminated many circulars which order the disorganization of reactionary organizations and enemy restrictive administrative machinery. We have spread many slogans and Front flags.

2. Security maintenance task.

During the second quarter ((of 1970)), we conducted propaganda on security maintenance for 1,067 persons.

Contents of propaganda: We have conducted propaganda on our victories, enemy failures, and his cruel espionage scheme. We have motivated the people to sharpen their vigilance against the enemy to protect our revolutionary organizations, cadre, and soldiers.

In addition, we have guided various branches on how to conduct propaganda on the security maintenance task. Twenty-seven persons participated in this task (10 in Bao Vinh Village, 17 in Bao Binh, including members of the Farmers, Youth, and Women's Associations.

Result:

Six non-Party members have discovered four targeted individuals and promised to guide us to kill them. (Four non-Party members in the province capital discovered two targeted individuals, and in Gia Ray two non-Party members discovered two others).

3. Internal security task.

During the second quarter ((of 1970)), we have done the following:

Discovered bad ideological thought of workers in Bao Vinh Village and reported them to the province capital Coordination and Operations Committee and the district Party Current Affairs Committee for proper actions.

Detected cadre who lacked vigilance (in Gia Ray) and promptly made reports to the district Party Current Affairs Committee.

Suggested ideas on the investigation of the grenades planted in Bao Vinh Village to the village and district security sections.

Village security sections regularly indoctrinated their members to increase their vigilance against enemy psychological warfare and "Open-Arms" policy. (According to the report, the security section in Bao Binh Village usually inserts the indoctrination into evening meetings).

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District security sections must ~~check~~ the personal history statements of cadre, soldiers, and workers in various branches subordinate to the district and provide training documents on security maintenance for agencies.

During the second quarter, two com-mo-liasion agents of the province capital and district units surrendered to the enemy. In addition, two people living in Bao Binh, which is under our control, moved to the enemy controlled area. Based on information provided by these people, the enemy launched attacks against us ((VC)) and caused difficulties to ((friendly forces)) in local areas. Tong, an ethnic minority member living in the province capital, was planted into our ranks by the enemy and stole one battery, ~~three loaded~~ magazines, and guided the enemy to attack and shell the penetration base in the province capital.

5. ((sic)) Development and strengthening of forces in various branches

During the second quarter of 1970, branches recruited 17 additional personnel, six secret agents, seven secret association members, two secret reconnaissance agents and two secret armed reconnaissance agents.

Development of forces in villages:

Province capital: There were no recruits.

Old agents such as secret armed reconnaissance and security agents were strengthened ((sic)).

In Bao Vinh ((Village)) there were one assistant chief of the village secret security section who was assigned by the Group, three secret security agents, and one secret association member who was subordinate to the association and under the professional guidance of security cadre.

In Suoi Cat, there were two secret agents, three secret association members, and two key secret armed reconnaissance agents.

In Gia Ray, there were two secret armed reconnaissance agents.

In Bao Binh ((Village)) there was only one hamlet secret association member, because two of the three members were discovered and captured by the enemy. The available strength was five ((sic)).

In Bao Binh ((Village)), district cadre recruited one secret agent and three secret association members. There were no additional members in Binh Phu, Bao Chanh, and Tan Phong Villages.

Strengthening of forces:

Suối Cát Village Security Section was provided guidance on working procedures (three cadre were assigned there for guidance).

Gia Rây Village Security Section was strengthened. (A session was conducted in the village security section with the deputy security section chief present to review tasks and working procedures, and outline the coming plan.)

Every village established contact with one spy. (The number of former spies was unknown). A statistical report on the reduction and increase of ((spies)) must be made to show whether there was an increase or reduction in the strength of overt forces. There are 18 comrades. Among them, there were three assigned to areas of responsibility: Miss Bãy Vãn to Gia Rây Village; Comrade Ba Truông to Báo Vinh Village, and Comrade Chung to Báo Định Village. They were reinforced by Comrade Xuân. Three were province capital armed reconnaissance agents. Comrade Tho was cell leader.

In short, our cadre paid particular attention to strengthening secret forces during the second quarter, especially the secret armed reconnaissance agents and spies. The strength recruited in Suối Cát, Báo Định, and Gia Rây Villages was higher than in other areas.

In general, the result of this task did not meet the combat requirements. For example, in Bình Phú, Báo Chánh, and Tân Phong Villages, no agents were recruited during the second quarter.

6. Submission of reports.

Activity reports were regularly made and submitted from district to province, and the Current Affairs Committee, but village ((security sections)) did not regularly send reports except to the province capital. For instance, in some areas, only one report was made for the entire second quarter ((of the year)), and none were prepared in Tân Phong, Bình Phú and Báo Chánh Provinces.

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The reports submitted did not reflect all of our tasks, especially the strengthening and development of secret forces.

General comments

During the second quarter, after reviewing the conference held to review activities of branches during the first three months of the year, the enemy caused us difficulties. But, with the determination of the whole army and people to fight, efforts were directed at attacking the enemy and smashing his pacification plan. We have fulfilled a part of the requirement for the political task in local areas. But after the sapper campaign of the three-month plan ((Apr, May, and Jun 70)), we failed to meet the established goals. We were still weak and still had shortcomings.

We did not specifically investigate and study the situation or did not promptly detect enemy schemes or pay attention to frustrating the enemy pacification plan.

We killed many enemy personnel. We reached only 20% of the requirement for killing enemy tyrants from province to village and hamlet levels. (We killed 18 enemy tyrants, but wounded only two in Gia Ray. The local ((RVN)) administrative personnel in Tân Thủy and Hiên in Suối Cát fled).

We recruited only 17 agents among 87 ((sic)). So we attained only 20% of the requirement. Especially, we failed to recruit agents.

For these reasons, we failed to smash the enemy pacification plan, to strengthen weak hamlets and gain control.

We also failed to initiate a security maintenance movement and provide safety for internal organizations. We did not broaden the movement among the people, the units and organizations. Security sections of agencies did not operate continuously.

Reasons

Some villages met difficulties, such as poor living conditions and shortage of cadre.

We did not understand the importance of the sapper tactics in which efforts are concentrated to smash the enemy pacification plan in our villages and hamlets.

Our cadre did not concentrate their efforts on carrying out specific missions.

We still met difficulties and were confused in carrying out measures.

We still lacked political and security cadre to provide guidance for weak villages on specialized tasks and help lower level comrades solve difficult problems.

These factors had a great influence on the success of the three-month plan of our branch during the second quarter of 1970. They also restricted achievements of the branch by smashing the enemy pacification plan in our district, especially the main missions of the branch, such as suppression of tyrants and establishment of spy, reconnaissance, secret armed, hamlet security, and security agents.

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We failed to control the situation and have not fulfilled the staff role for the Party Committee echelon.

18 Jun 70

For C15

/S/ Trương Giang

REPORT ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF VILLAGES AND PROVINCE CAPITAL DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1970

Position	First Quarter of 1970	Second Quarter of 1970	Increased	Decreased	Present	Reasons
((Security)) section chief	4	4		1	3	Comrade Ba Diên was assigned to T7 (District Party Committee).
Assistant ((security)) section chief	4	5	1		5	One assistant section chief of Bao Vinh Village.
Cadre	5	5			5	
Overt armed reconnaissance	3	3			3	City
Covert armed reconnaissance agent	9	13	4	1	12	One covert armed reconnaissance agent moved to Bao Binh Village.
Hamlet security agent	6	6			6	
Secret security agent	22	29	7	1	28	
DB ((possibly spy))	1	1			1	
Secret association member	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>10</u>	
	59	76	17	3	73	

LIST OF 65 ENEMY PERSONNEL DURING JUN 70

Full Name	Position	Address	Remarks
<p>l ((possibly rural development)) cadre in charge of the highland area.</p> <p>gũ</p> <p>light hamlet ((RVN)) administrative personnel</p>	<p>Chief of the Civic Action Section</p>	<p>Bảo Định</p>	<p>List of these cadre was sent to ((security)) section by Gia Ray Village Unit.</p>
<p>am Lô Ren</p>	<p>Undercover informant for police</p>	<p>Bảo Hoà</p>	<p>See the reports which mentioned the ((RVN)) administrative personnel of Bảo Định Hamlet.</p> <p>He exercised oppressive control over the population in Bảo Hoà Hamlet.</p>
<p>iên</p>	<p>Policeman</p>	<p>Cầm Dưỡng</p>	<p>His activities were reported to the province ((security)) section.</p>
<p>ê Mông</p>	<p>Undercover informant of F18 ((possibly 18th Division)).</p>	<p>Gia Ray</p>	<p>Informant of (E52 ((possibly 52nd RVN Regiment)). The people were afraid of him).</p>
<p>ài Suối</p>	<p>Undercover informant of sector</p>	<p>Bảo Liệt</p>	<p>He provided information for the enemy to attack our troops.</p>
<p>ni Thủy</p>		<p>Bảo Hoà</p>	<p>She was suspected of being an intelligence agent.</p>

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LIST OF PUPPET GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL
PROVINCE LEVEL

Hồ Đắc Diêm: Province Chief

Võ Văn Khuông: Assistant Province Chief

Administrative personnel:

1. Trương Văn Hòa: Chief of the Information Service.
 2. Đào Văn Du: Chief of Service in charge of Highlander Affairs.
 3. Huỳnh Văn Danh: Chief of Rural Development Service.
 4. Nguyễn Đức Nhân: Chief of Youth Service.
 5. Nguyễn Thế Truyền: Chief of ((Rural Development)) Section.
 6. Phạm Văn Nam: Chief of General Administrative Service.
 7. Lê Kim Trọng: Chief of Administrative Service.
 8. Kế: Chief of Land Service.
 9. Đặng Cảnh Tường: Chief of Agricultural Development Bank.
 10. Huỳnh Ba: Chief of Public Work Service.
 11. Đoàn Việt Bằng: Chief of Taxation Service.
 12. Lê Đình Trúc: Chief of Agricultural Service.
 13. Vũ Thang Trang: Chief of Animal Husbandry Service.
 14. Võ Văn Bé: Chief of Public Health Service.
 15. Trần Văn Kiệt: Chief of Elementary Education Service.
 16. Lê Hoàng Năm: Chief of Social Welfare Service.
 17. Đỗ Khắc Cẩm: Chief of Service in Charge of Communist Refugee Affairs.
 18. Nguyễn Văn Trung: Chief of Far Eastern Affairs Office.
- Nguyễn Văn Tú: Financial Controller.
- Nguyễn Văn Xuân: Agricultural Committee Member.

19. Phạm Trung Chánh: Chief of National Police Service.

Puppet organizations at district level:

District Chief: ((Blank))

Assistant District Chief: "

Chief of Office: "

There are twelve sub-services ((sic)): Police, Youth, Court of Conciliation, Agricultural Information, Open-Arms Treasury,

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Taxation, Investigation, Interrogation, and Public Health sub-services.

According to the semi-annual report, there were some changes in local ((RVN)) administrative personnel in some hamlets as follows:

In Trung Lương Hamlet, Gia Ray Village: Bay Sơn replaced Keo.

In Tân Phú Hamlet: Cuong replaced Đinh Văn Chuẩn, aka Bay Ông, who resigned his position.

In Phú Thanh Hamlet (location of province capital): Tan replaced Minh.

-----END OF TRANSLATION-----