

W FILE SUBJ.
DATE SUB-CAT.
6/70

1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM	8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 1384 70
2. SUBJECT: Activity Report, Security Section, VC Binh Dinh Province Party Committee, VC Region 5. (U)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 3 March 1971
3. ISC NUMBER: A723.210 G APTERA A723.500	10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 22 June 1970	11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1A1, 6G
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS, 9 September 1970	12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>1</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>	13. PREPARED BY: EDWARD A. FELIX, 1LT, MI CHIEF, PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC
7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>George S. Lapinskes</i> GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns an extract translation of a report, dated 22 June 1970, originated by VX.5 ((possibly the Security Section, VC Binh Dinh Province Party Committee, VC Region 5)). The report reviews the activities of the Security Section of Hoai Nhon ((District Party Committee, VC Binh Dinh Province)) from 15 December 1969 to 15 June 1970. The report is divided into three parts: (1) The general situation in every field; (2) past activities ((of the Security Section of Hoai Nhon District)); and (3) an assessment of ((VC/NVA)) strengths and weaknesses.

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((Marginal note:)) ((This report is to be put on)) file for the first six months of 1970 ((End of marginal note)).

REPORT ON MISSIONS OF THE SECURITY BRANCH
OF HOÀI NHƠN ((DISTRICT, BÌNH ĐỊNH PROVINCE)) DURING THE FIRST
SIX MONTHS OF 1970 ((FROM 15 DEC 69 TO 15 JUN 70))

The report has three main parts:

I. General situation on all fronts.

II. Missions.

III. Comments on and assessment of strengths and weaknesses.

I. GENERAL SITUATION ON ALL FRONTS:

1. Enemy ((RVNAF/FWMAF)) military activities:

Enemy forces employed during the past six months included:

US forces: During the past six months ((of 1970)), the US forces, which manned blocking positions throughout P ((possibly Hoài Nhơn District)) were often changed. During the first quarter of 1970, the US forces, which manned some blocking positions in Hoài Mỹ and Hoài Châu ((Villages, Hoài Nhơn District, Bình Định Province)), had withdrawn. During Apr 70, they established two additional blocking positions. One was at Thiên Chánh Bridge, manned by one US platoon; and the other was on Lộ Điện Route (Hoài Mỹ ((Village))) manned by another platoon to protect their construction of two strategic routes, one leading from Tam Quan to the seashore and the other from Bông Sơn ((Village, Hoài Nhơn District, Bình Định Province)) to Hoài Mỹ to link ((with another route)) running to the seashore. During May 70, they withdrew US forces from two blocking positions: One in Xoài Huê High Point (Hoài Châu) and the other in Liên An ((Hamlet of)) (Hoài Châu). They also withdrew a number of US troops from Hoài Châu and Hoài Sơn and sent them to Hoài Hảo and Hoài Thanh, southern and northern Tam Quan, and Hoài Hương Villages to replace Puppet ((RVN)) main forces which were assigned to reinforce other areas.

In summary, during the past six months ((of 1970)), permanent US forces in P were two infantry battalions and two artillery and engineer battalions. But, the forces which manned blocking positions were frequently changed.

Puppet forces (main forces): Their permanent strength was four battalions of the 40th Regiment, two secret platoons of more than 100 men, one Puppet CIDG platoon of more than 50 men, two police field force platoons of more than 100 men, two Puppet Special Forces platoons, and 22 pacification groups. During Apr ((70)), they sometimes assigned from one to two battalions of the 40th Regiment to reinforce other areas. Before the beginning of the second phase ((of activities of VC Campaign)) K8, the entire 40th Regiment had withdrawn. Currently, Puppet main forces are not present in P. (At times there were units of the 40th Regiment coming to P to consolidate their forces and then move away.)

Local forces: ((In Hoài Nhon District)) they were composed of 16 Regional Force platoons, 57 Popular Force platoons, thousands of combat youths, and People's Self-Defense Force members. During early May 70, after the withdrawal of Puppet main forces to reinforce other areas, the forces cited were assigned to replace them at blocking positions to implement the de-Americanization program. The cited forces, in coordination with US forces, conducted sweep operations, burning the people's houses and arresting them.

War facilities:

Fifty-four artillery pieces (105mm and 205mm howitzers and 106mm and 107mm mortars).

((Forty)) aircraft of various types.

200 military vehicles of all types.

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Enemy schemes and tricks:

During the first six months of ((1970)), the enemy intensified sweep operations. He continually employed all types of forces available in P to conduct sweep operations in liberated areas.

To carry out his de-Americanization plan, the enemy attempted to consolidate Puppet authorities at all echelons. He brought his administrative personnel in exile ((sic)) into areas where his blocking positions are located to oppress and arrest local inhabitants. He also strove to consolidate Puppet forces, develop self-defense forces, and increase police operations to conscript people between 17 and 38 years old in Tam Quan District Seat, as he did on 13 Mar ((70)). He imposed an economic blockade on us by prohibiting the people from purchasing rice to carry into our controlled areas. To control the people, the enemy made them change their identification cards.

In addition to his continuous sweep operations in liberated areas, he intensified psywar and Chieu Hoi activities.

After the night of (31 Mar/1 Apr ((70))) when we started ((a phase of)) activities, he launched sweep operations in some areas, but was repeatedly attacked by our people and troops. Thus, the Puppet troops and government were confused and critically demoralized. This was proved by the fact that Puppet troops refused to provide reinforcements when ordered, while Puppet authorities hid ((in well-defended positions)) in Bong Son and Tam Quan District Seats.

To cope with us, the enemy used the following schemes:

Assigned spies, intelligence agents, and reconnaissance agents to collect information on the situation and planted espionage agents in our liberated areas to collect information for the conduct of sweep operations, raids, and ambushes against us.

Increased ambushes and air raids and deployed infantry forces to block corridors used by our forces.

Intensified psywar and Chiêu Hồi activities.

Employed armored vehicles and forces at blocking positions to conduct search operations to detect our forces.

Enemy tactics: During the past six months, the coordination of US forces, Puppet forces, pacification groups, tyrannical officials in exile, espionage agents, intelligence agents, and informants with information concerning our cadre's and guerrillas' locations provided by ralliers and **captives facilitated** the conduct of intensive sweep operations in liberated areas. Such operations sometimes lasted for 10 successive days, in Hoài Châu and Hoài Hảo ((Villages)) etc ((sic)).

He used gasoline to burn orchards and trees in villages located at the foot of a mountain in Hoài Hưởng, Hoài Tân, Hoài Hảo, Hoài Thanh, southern Tam Quan, and Hoài Đức ((Villages)), etc ((sic)). He conducted surprise raids by helicopter between 1300 and 1600 hours ((sic)) in Hoài Hảo, Southern Tam Quan, and Hoài Thanh, etc ((sic)) to detect our forces.

He increased raids and ambushes against our corridors, making it difficult to operate, as in Hoài Thanh, Hoài Hưởng, Hoài Sơn, and Hoài Châu ((Villages)), etc ((sic)).

The Puppet Government intensified strict control of the people. When our attacks were conducted against him, the enemy held local inhabitants in defensive points of his blocking positions day and night or urged them to sleep **there** ((at night)) to prevent our attacks. (Even for those living in Tam Quan District Seat.)

In some areas such as Tân Thanh ((Hamlet)) ((Hoài Hảo ((Village))), and Hamlet 5, Công Thành (Northern Tam Quan),

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he planned to force local inhabitants to clear these areas and move their houses close to each other to facilitate his control. (This enemy plan could not be carried out.)

Recently, when the 40th Regiment was assigned to reinforce new positions, US forces were assigned to man blocking positions in Hoài Thanh, Hoài Hưởng, Hoài Hảo, and northern Tam Quan Villages. He used armored vehicles to conduct continuous sweep operations, designed to search and repel our forces from populated areas and our stepping-stone areas ((VC-controlled areas used to gain access to uncontrolled or disputed areas)). On 9 May ((70)), he assigned one M-113 and M-118 armored platoon together with US and RVNAF forces to sweep and set fire to a number of **the peoples houses in northern and southern Tam Quan Village**. During this operation he arrested three civilians in a liberated area and destroyed crops.

After the night when we began our second phase ((of Campaign)) K8, the enemy increased air and artillery activities west of a route ((unspecified)) and in areas surrounding the foot of a mountain ((unspecified)).

He recently intensified raids at night between 0200 and 0400 hours and in the afternoon between 1500 and 1700 hours. This was because his intelligence reports **told** him that during these periods our cadre and guerrillas frequently made movements. He also increased attacks in mountainous areas of Hoai Hao and Hoai Chau ((Villages)).

The majority of enemy forces in blocking positions (especially Puppet forces) were in a defensive position to protect their blocking positions. He increased police operations in areas under his control to conscript youths, tighten his control, and arrest local inhabitants.

In summary, during the past six-months, the enemy launched extensive sweep operations from blocking positions to search for revolutionary forces. During the first days of our phase of activities, enemy forces reacted slowly or remained on the defensive in their blocking positions. Puppet authorities, being confused and demoralized, hid in district seats.

2. Enemy psywar activities:

In conjunction with his military activities, the enemy increased his psywar and Chiêu Hồi activities to relocate local inhabitants and separate them from revolutionary forces. He held meetings with local inhabitants at blocking positions to distort the truth, praise the Thiệu-Ky-Khiem regime, and tell them that the Republic of Vietnam is a "strong nation."

During his long-term sweep operations, the enemy dropped leaflets and appealed for rallying to demoralize revolutionary cadre and soldiers. He used ralliers and ((VC)) defectors to spread propaganda over loudspeakers from aircraft to minimize the people's confidence in us and sow dissension in our ranks.

During sweep operations conducted in areas adjacent to his blocking positions, the enemy arrested revolutionary cadre's family members to persuade or force them to call their husbands and sons to rally to his side. He bought off those families who had a good relation with the Revolution to work for him under inter-family and hamlet chiefs. He also urged the people to work for him etc ... ((sic)), thus giving them bad records ((in the Revolution)) to separate them from revolutionary forces.

On 14 Mar ((70)), the enemy concentrated revolutionary cadre's families and relatives living in areas under his temporary control and assigned his henchmen to force revolutionary cadre's families living in areas under mixed control to attend a seven-day indoctrination course (from 14 to 21 Mar 70). Those who attended this course were from six villages: Northern Hoai Nhon, Southern and Northern Tam Quan, Hoai Thanh, Hoai Son, Hoai Chau, and Hoai Hao. The indoctrination concerned appeals to their husbands and sons to rally to the enemy side.

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The enemy distorted and blindfolded the truth about Cambodia.

While carrying out the accelerated pacification plan, he applied demagogic policies by erecting hydrants, building schools and churches, setting up fortifications, etc ... ((sic)) to charm backward people.

In brief, during the first six months of 1970, in coordination with repeated and fierce military attacks, economic disturbance, arson, and arrest and beating of people, the enemy intensified psywar activities and made every effort to undermine our morale and deepen dissension in revolutionary organizations. Due to the great influence produced by enemy activities, our cadre and soldiers, especially those who live in ((RVN)) controlled areas with illegal status, fear the enemy. Demoralized, they ((overestimate)) the enemy. The backward people's morale was also greatly affected by enemy activities. During the last half of the year, being influenced by enemy psywar activities, a small number of cadre and soldiers defected and surrendered to the enemy. They provided information for the enemy and helped him find caches or conduct sweep operations and attacks against our areas, causing us small personnel losses.

Evidence:

Hoài Thanh:

Ngọc Sơn Hamlet: Nine personnel (one hamlet unit member, one security cadre, one member of personnel section, one local force member, four hamlet guerrillas, and one illegal male agent) defected to the enemy. They helped the enemy attack and destroy the messing and billeting quarters of our guerrilla cadre.

Mỹ An Hamlet: Hộ Thị Thông and Tạ Thị Tấn previously participated in the Revolution and their families had a deep resentment for the enemy and suffered hardships caused by his personnel. Despite this, after being bribed by the enemy, they now work for him. They helped the enemy find the messing and billeting quarters of our guerrilla cadre and provided him with the movement and operation procedures used by our guerrilla cadre.

In the same hamlet, four personnel (one member of hamlet propaganda culture and indoctrination section, one hamlet guerrilla, and two illegal male agents) defected to the enemy. Bông, who was also a member of Mỹ An Hamlet, surrendered to the enemy. From an enemy aircraft he appealed to the people by loudspeaker.

Hoài Châu:

When captured by the enemy, Đào, Chief of Gia An Hamlet, provided information for the enemy and helped his troops uncover a cache, seizing one automatic rifle, one carbine, one K-44 rifle, one box of documents concerning the village unit, and one village medical kit. He also helped them capture one female member of the village unit, two guerrillas, and some revolutionary families.

Cánh, a member of Hội An Hamlet Finance-Economy Section, surrendered to the enemy. He helped the enemy uncover a cache, kill one village propaganda and training cadre and one hamlet guerrilla cadre, and capture all the propaganda and training documents. He also provided information for the enemy. As a result, enemy troops intensively conducted shelling and sweep operations against us in the following days. Furthermore, the enemy deployed troops to intercept the corridors detected, creating difficulties for our cadre and soldier's activities.

South Tam Quan:

When captured by the enemy, Khích, a member of Tăng Long Hamlet Guerrilla Unit, surrendered to the enemy. He provided information for the enemy and helped enemy troops uncover our caches, seizing two B-40's, one B-41, five B-40 grenades, and one radio set.

Hoài Hương:

Dối, a guerrilla cadre, living with illegal status in ((RVN)) controlled areas, surrendered and provided information when captured by the enemy. He also helped enemy troops uncover our caches and kill five of our cadre.

Hoai Hông:

Three personnel who lived illegally in ((RVN)) controlled areas defected to the enemy and provided information for him. Therefore, the enemy attacked and destroyed our cadre and guerrillas' living quarters with aircraft expending gas and rockets.

Hoai Hào:

He was formerly a messenger for the village unit. When captured and bribed by the enemy, he **yielded** and provided information. He helped enemy personnel uncover our fortifications and kill one guerrilla. He also helped enemy troops conduct a sweep operation in which they killed three cadre and captured five comrades, including one member of a village Party Committee and one member of P ((sic)) finance and trading section.

Hoai Đức:

Phieu, who was a secretary of Hoai Đức Village Youth Group, was captured by the enemy in late 1968. In May 70, the enemy released him to ((VC)) liberated areas for operation. Taking advantage of the favorable opportunity, he stole a carbine from his comrades and turned it over to the enemy. Later, he informed the enemy of our cadre and troops' messing and living quarters. As a result, the enemy conducted continuous air and artillery attacks against the positions (but inflicted no losses on us).

Nguyễn Gioi, a Youth Group member in South Tam Quan, living illegally in an ((RVN)) controlled area, was captured by the enemy during 1968. In 1970, the enemy released him to operate in ((VC)) liberated areas. However, we promptly arrested him for indoctrination. As a result, he signed a certificate and promised not to work for the enemy.

A number of youth living illegally in an ((RVN)) controlled area were influenced by enemy psywar themes. They defected to the enemy.

These are merely a sample of personnel have been influenced enemy psywar themes. Their surrender to the enemy has harmed the Revolution and created dissension in our organization and suspicion among the people. Some other persons in the district have committed the same mistake.

3. Activities of different targets:

a. Activities of enemy spies and reconnaissance agents:

To support his accelerated pacification and strong attacks against ((VC)) liberated areas, destroy our low-level installations, and develop his military and political activities deep in our ((VC)) areas, the enemy inserted many spies into liberated areas during the past six months to keep abreast of the friendly situation and support his attacks.

Organizational method: Espionage networks were widely established among the people. Particularly, the enemy employed local people without distinction of sex or age. Espionage networks and informants were numerous. They provided the enemy with information concerning our activities to serve his attacks.

The enemy also used those who have relatives in both ((RVN)) controlled and ((VC)) liberated areas, non-aligned individuals, and those definitely against the Revolution. Disguised as traders and pack bicycle riders, enemy agents frequented our areas to operate and keep abreast of the friendly situation.

Furthermore, the enemy made contact with some foreign ((possibly Chinese)) youths and assigned them to operate under forms such as: Riding pack bicycles, selling refreshments, visiting relatives, etc... ((sic)). They were deployed in ((VC)) liberated areas, especially in areas under mixed ((RVN and VC)) control to collect and provide information for the enemy.

The enemy also recruited those henchmen of the Nhu-Diệm regime who, after being condemned by the Revolution and the people, had

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moved away. The enemy planted them in liberated areas to counter and suppress the Revolution. He also assigned a number of prisoners to return to liberated areas for operation.

The enemy motivated most soldiers' dependents, especially ((RVN)) Regional and Popular Forces troops' wives, to collect information concerning the friendly situation. This was because they easily frequented our ((VC)) areas.

With more cunning schemes, the enemy enticed, oppressed, or bribed those who were previously good agents for us to serve as informants for him. Some families that did not have a revolutionary awareness were bribed to provide the enemy information concerning our cadre and guerrillas' messing and billeting quarters.

During repeated and fierce sweep operations against ((VC)) liberated areas, the enemy captured and tortured the people to extract information about our cadre and guerrillas' messing and billeting quarters.

According to information recently supplied by our agents, the enemy is intensifying espionage activities. For example, his helicopters have inserted personnel on mountain flanks. A number of defectors have been trained and instructed to disguise themselves as our cadre and soldiers to penetrate ((VC)) deep into liberated areas to gain information on the friendly situation. The enemy could thus facilitate deep attacks into our areas.

Disguised as civilians, enemy reconnaissance agents also moved to ((VC)) liberated areas close to our key positions to keep abreast of the friendly situation.

In general, in districts of liberated areas and areas under mixed ((RVN and VC)) control, enemy spies publicly or secretly operated and provided information for the enemy to launch attacks and create difficulties for us.

Activities of enemy spies whose sources are unspecified.

Our cadre and guerrillas came to My An Hamlet, Hoai Thanh Village, during the evening to collect taxes. Immediately the next morning, the enemy came to interrogate and threaten the local inhabitants. (This case was suspected to have been an act of underground agents.)

Two raids conducted against Tam Quan Nam of Cuu Loi Hamlet, Dong Nghi ((Village)) were suspected to have been acts of enemy informants.

Many raids causing losses to our cadre and guerrillas in Hoai Chau Village were also suspected to have been acts of informants.

Nguyen Thi Lang and Nguyen Thi Bot, two prostitutes, were suspected of being agents deployed by the enemy. They were arrested by us and released after indoctrination.

These are only some specific cases in which specified and unspecified enemy agents played main roles. Being either inhabitants of local areas, from somewhere else, or agents planted by the enemy, they collected information on the friendly situation and furnished it to the enemy to limit the revolutionary movement. In addition to these cases, there are also many others involving enemy agents who are very effective in gaining intelligence information for the enemy.

b. Activities of ((RVN)) Special Forces:

During Jan 70, the enemy continuously landed Special Forces troops on the fringes of mountainous areas in Hoai Thanh, Hoai Hao, Hoai Chau, Hoai Son, Hoai Tan, Hoai Duc....((sic)) to detect our corridors, storage facilities, and activities to facilitate artillery or airborne attacks.

From Feb to Apr, Special Forces troop insertions decreased because the enemy had increased special reconnaissance forces activities on mountain edges and intensified sweep operations in mountainous areas. US troops also established positions on high points of Be Mountain (Hoai Non), Koi Hue Hill (Hoai Chau), and the eastern flank of Da Bac ((Mountain)), (Hoai Hao), etc ...((sic)). From these points, the enemy could easily observe our activities.

During late Apr 70, the enemy landed Special Forces troops in Hoai Huong, Hoai Tan, Hoai Hao, Hoai Son, and Bong Son, creating many difficulties for us.

Before starting the second activity phase, enemy Unit K.8 landed one Special Forces platoon in the mountainous areas of Hoai Tan and Bong Son and another in the mountainous areas of Hoai My and Hoai Duc. These troops hindered our movements and activities.

On 15 Mar ((70)), US Special Forces troops laid an ambush on the road down Tách Bo Hill near Hoài-Dúc Village, capturing one of our guerrillas.

On 17 Mar ((70)), US Special Forces troops conducted attacks against our camp, killing one illegal non-member.

On 3 Jun ((70)), 25 Special Forces troops landed to conduct a search operation from Hồ Giang to Cát Slope at the mountain edge of Hoài Chau Village.

On 13 Jun ((70)), the enemy landed one ship of Special Forces troops at Kiêu Ngua of Hoài Hào Village.

This is merely an enumeration of some of the Special Forces troop activities which limited our movements and operations.

c. Activities of Puppet ((RVN)) administrative personnel:

In accordance with the accelerated pacification plan, the enemy tried to establish a system of Puppet administration from village, hamlet, Xóm ((sub-hamlet)), to inter-family echelon during early 1970. In some parts of ((RVN)) controlled areas, such as Bông Sơn, Hoài Tân, Hoài-Dúc, Mỹ Lộc, Tam Quan Village, and a number of villages such as Định Trì, Định Công, Hoài Mỹ, Phú An, Kim Giao, Hoài Hương, Chuông Hoà, and Hoài Châu where enemy control is relatively secure, the organization of the hamlet, Xóm, and inter-family Puppet administration was successfully established. But, in all other villages and hamlets in the district, only the village or hamlet Puppet ruling machinery was organized. The majority of the personnel of this organization took refuge in other places. A number of exiled Puppet administrative personnel were selected by the enemy to carry out the accelerated pacification plan and sent to hold various district key positions to counter the revolutionary movement. In many places where either all or some of the Puppet administrative personnel were killed, the enemy had other persons to immediately replace them.

The number of Puppet administrative personnel in the district is now 887 ((sic)), composed of:

District cadre: 68

(Forty of them are administrative personnel and 28 are members of the district security office.)

Personnel in six police stations: 36

Village administrative personnel: 102

Hamlet --" : 334

Xóm --" : 84

Inter-family --" : 253

These persons held oppressive control over the people. They intercepted people going to market to arrest them or to demand money from them. For example, in Hoài Hào the people were forced to pay from 200\$ to 300\$ SVN. In Hoài Thanh, the relatives of revolutionary families were each obliged to pay from 3,000\$ to 5,000\$ SVN. As a result, one mother had to sell her child for 5,000\$ SVN to pay the tyrants. In Hoài Mỹ, the inhabitants were authorized to keep only enough rice for their use and deliver the rest to the local authorities. This measure was to prevent the people from supplying rice to the Revolution.

In many areas, they forced revolutionary families to reside in a common place at night. During the day, we launched fierce attacks. They confined these families in their defensive ((posts)) and in district seats day and night to discourage our attacks.

The administrative personnel in exile and the tyrants also established contact with those free to move between the two ((VC and RVN)) areas or are discontented with the Revolution, and regimented them to gather information.

The following night we opened fire to begin ((Campaign)) K8, they were confused and fearful, hiding deep inside district seats such as Tam Quan and Bông Sơn. They were even more demoralized when we started the second phase of K8. During the day, some village and hamlet administrative personnel returned to military posts to operate and to search revolutionary families, arresting and beating them.

A number of administrative personnel in exile and tyrants recently followed US tracked vehicles to local areas to conduct sweep operations. They burned and destroyed the people's houses and property.

While the gunfire was roaring on all battlefields, many reconnaissance and covert guerrilla units killed tyrants in district seats during the daytime. This terrified the tyrants who remained. They went mad, arresting and torturing a number of teenagers and people who went to market. In My An, they shot and killed two teenagers and committed more evils against the people.

In summary, the administrative personnel in exile and tyrants were quite cunning. They accompanied US and Puppet troops to local areas to arrest and beat the people and burn their houses to implement the accelerated pacification program. However, now they conceal themselves in district seats to prolong their lives a little, as is the case of the pacification program of the US and its lackeys.

d. Activities of reactionary mob disguised as religious dignitaries:

The religions in P ((possibly district)) are Buddhism, Caodaism, Protestantism, Catholicism, etc... ((sic)). Generally speaking, the number of meetings of most religions reduced. Only a few dignitaries serving in the Puppet Government are wicked ((sic)).

Caodaism:

Caodaists seldom held meetings and advised members not to take a hand in blood, i.e. do not support either side. Caodaist dignitaries spread a rumor during Mar 70 that peace will be restored this year due to the omen of the disappearance of the Doc Binh ((Large Vase)) Star from the sky. (That is the comet we have seen rising in the east every dawn.)

They have recently made three suits of clothes for each believer to wear during the demonstrations to greet the Japanese Delegation coming to Tay Ninh. (The date this delegation is coming is unknown.) They are conducting oral propoganda using the proverb "When the oyster and heron fight,

win, but men in white suits ((Caodaists)) will succeed." They spread news of peace to undermine the people's will to fight the aggressors, inspiring a passive attitude in them; and pacifying those whose degree of conscience is low.

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Buddhism: In general, the number of Buddhist meetings was reduced. Before 8 Apr ((70)), a Buddhist congress was held at Rung Quit ((Forest)) (Northern Tam Quan) with the assistance of approximately 30 government officials of Tam Quan District and the villages in Tam Quan District. At the end of the congress, the Buddhist province association secretary asked the following questions:

- 1) Who drove the French aggressors away and brought victory to the country?
- 2) Who overthrew the Ngô Đình Diệm regime?
- 3) Who are now fighting the ((US)) aggressors while you ((the Puppet Government)) remain at your seats?

When no one among the followers (including government officials) replied, the secretary answered:

- 1) The people's Revolution and the Buddhists drove the French imperialists away and brought victory.
- 2) The Revolution and Buddhists overthrew the Ngô Đình Diệm regime.

The third question was not answered. Then the congress was closed.

The 15 Apr ((70)) Buddhist ((Illumination)) Ceremony was relatively well-organized. The district and village government officials were invited to this ceremony but did not come. On this occasion, the province Buddhist association secretary read and carefully explained a Buddhist declaration of points dealing with home affairs and seven points on foreign affairs (enclosed here).

There was no clear indication that this religion was against us, except for a number of persons who used this religion as a screen to serve the Puppet Government and oppose the people and the Revolution.

We killed a Puppet SGT on 2 May ((70)). He was tall and had a shaven head. Disguised as a Buddhist priest, he had penetrated hamlets, pretending to preach religion. Under this screen, he spied on our activities. He stated that bullets could not harm him, because he had magic power and that he became a Buddhist monk when he was a child. Our guerrillas killed him and seized a Colt ((.45 caliber pistol)), grenades, and a compass.

Activities of other religions were unknown.

The activities of all religions were aimed at hypnotizing backward persons and weakening their will to fight.

4. Activities of reactionary factions:

In P ((possibly district)) there are various parties: "Can Lao Nhan Vi" ((Labor Human Dignity)), "Quoc Dan Dang," "Dai Viet," etc... ((sic)). These parties generally operate secretly and belong to the Puppet administrative machinery from village to province levels. They develop their members and strongly counter the revolutionary movement.

According to the 1969 report pertaining to the total number of members of all parties, this number ((sic)) was in exile in 1965 when we initiated the liberation ((movement)). Now a number of them belong to the Puppet administrative machinery at village, district, and province levels. (A list of them is enclosed here.) The other number is in exile and hold important positions in the Puppet administrative machinery. (A list of this number is enclosed here.)

During the first six months of 1970, other parties appeared in the district such as the "Progressive Society" and the "Democratic Socialist" Parties.

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The Progressive Socialist Party is merely a transformation of the Labor Human Dignity Party. The Democratic Socialist Party is reorganized from many other parties. (Activity plans of this party are unspecified.)

4. Social, security, and political situations.

During the first six months of 1970, according to the situations of various villages, security organizations held several meetings to indoctrinate the people on countering enemy espionage activities to maintain security and order in liberated areas. During this period, crimes decreased considerably in comparison with 1969. Even though some crimes were noted in hamlets, they were not serious.

To intensify the "killing-enemy" movement, guerrillas laid many fragmentary grenades, cluster bombs, and mines made from dud artillery shells. These weapons sometimes killed or wounded the people, as happened in Tam Quan Nam, Hoai Xuan, Hoai Chau etc... ((sic)). This lasted a long time, because this district was a complex one. Furthermore, illegal cadre and youths often escaped to other villages from places where the enemy was conducting sweep operations. Being unfamiliar with the areas, they often stepped on our mines and grenades. It was also noticed that some ((VC)) people in southern Tam Quan used grenades to kill fish, but due to carelessness were killed by their own grenades.

Another social problem was that ((the people)) played the ((GVN National)) lottery. This was widespread throughout the areas and underlined control in some liberated areas.

5. Friendly situation:

Cadre and soldiers:

Generally, cadre and soldiers throughout P ((possibly district)) displayed a firm revolutionary viewpoint, recognized enemy schemes, and appreciated our great victories. They therefore, performed assigned tasks and combat activities.

During operation phases, friendly forces conducted violent attacks against important enemy strongholds throughout the area, embarrassing the enemy even though he tried to counterattack and use sweep operations to neutralize our pressure. Secret guerrillas and armed reconnaissance agents of various villages and districts dared kill enemy tyrants in the district seats during the daytime. Such activities confused the enemy and increased the people's revolutionary pride.

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Most cadre and soldiers thoroughly understood their roles and missions during the present phase and had the spirit to attack the enemy continuously to frustrate his accelerated pacification plan.

Since the beginning of 1970, the enemy has increased police operations, conscriptions, and destruction of our installations to implement the de-Americanization plan. He conducted large-scale, long-term sweep operations, planted reconnaissance and intelligence collection agents and spies in our areas to collect information and guide violent attacks, and destroyed our economy, agricultural products, and the people's houses. A number of friendly soldiers and cadre either doubted our victories or lacked confidence in the people. They displayed complacent and waning attitudes. Some of them betrayed the Revolution and the people and surrendered to the enemy. A number of low-level cadre were negligent or lacked a determination to oppress the enemy. As a result, some casualties were inflicted on our organizations. Some other cadre were afraid that their activities would influence their families' security, so their political attitudes sometimes wavered.

The task of protecting agencies and the Party also showed weakness. Many cadre and soldiers, through ~~careless movements to different places~~, have exposed themselves to observation by enemy espionage agents, thus allowing enemy forces to launch attacks against friendly agencies, inflicting casualties upon them.

The people's situation:

The people became enthusiastic about the victory of the Revolution. In particular, after our operation phases, the people in many areas, such as Tam Quan Bắc, Hoài Thanh, Hoài Châu, Hoài Mỹ... etc.... ((sic)), stood up to the enemy, demanding freedom of movement to earn their living, liberty, democracy, compensation for trees and property, and medical care. They were successful in this struggle. The people also contributed manpower and materiel to the Revolution by working as laborers and paying taxes. They also ensured security maintenance, detected enemy local administrative members and espionage agents, and protected friendly cadre and soldiers. When our forces killed enemy tyrants in district seats, the people were enthusiastic and placed more confidence in the victories of the Revolution.

However, in the face of enemy long-term destruction of liberated areas, a number of people became confused and dared not carry out their tasks. Since US forces replaced Puppet main force units at several posts and conducted sweep operations, a number of the people have been bribed. Finally, the latter worked as informants, spies indicators, and secret affairs service members... ((sic)).

II. ACHIEVEMENTS:

During the first six months of 1970, being proud of the results of the general offensive and uprising gained by the people and the army throughout SVN, the district security branch overcame hardships to gain achievements and contributed to frustrating the enemy accelerated pacification plan. The branch carried out its assigned tasks in every situation and gained the following achievements:

1. Motivation of the people:

While implementing important policies of the Party, such as motivating the people to participate in political activities, collecting and purchasing food, countering the accelerated pacification program... etc... ((sic)), the security branch often held meetings to indoctrinate the people, cadre, and soldiers on security maintenance and increasing their vigilance.

~~-----END OF TRANSLATION-----~~