

W FILE / SUBJ.
DATE / SUB-CAT.
6/70

1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM	6. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 1389 70
2. SUBJECT: Que Son District Party Committee, VC Quang Nam Province, VC Region 5. (U)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 22 January 1971
3. ISC NUMBER: A157.613/135 A159.710 A739.400 A747.000	10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 22 June to 5 August 1970	11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1G, 1K2, 1S, 6B7, 6C, 7A6.
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: 22 August 1970	12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>R</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>	13. PREPARED BY: <i>Michael H. Crutcher</i> MICHAEL H. CRUTCHER, CPT, MI CH, PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC
7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>George S. Lapinskes</i> GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a notebook maintained by an unidentified member of Que Son District Party Committee, ((VC Quang Nam Province, VC Region 5)). The notebook, with entries dated from 22 June to 5 August 1970, contains notes on political reorientation and village activities. An entry recorded before 27 July 1970 reveals that there were six underground agents in Nha Tam Resettlement Center and that three of the six were serving in a ((RVN)) People's Self-Defense element. The notebook also contains a list of personnel of villages in Que Son District.

Campaign 180

p53

Leave Blank!

11-1173-70

(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 22 August 1970 in South Vietnam (BT000570; RVN MR 1) by 2/51st Inf, Quang Da SZ, RVN MR 1. The document was received at CDEC on 31 October 1970, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 39,878, dated 4 November 1970, under CDEC Document Log Number 11-1173-70. Translation was requested by XXIV Corps, Quang Nam Province, Team 15.

08.09

((Page 1 of O.T.))

THE SITUATION IN 1970

((Page 2 of O.T.))

1. Sơn Thượng ((Village)):

Hamlet 6 has 392 inhabitants, four informants, two active agents, and one prospective Party member.

Hamlet 5 has 478 ((inhabitants)).

2. Sơn Thành ((Village)):

P. Đức ((Hamlet)) has 210 households, 957 people, and six agents (including four informants and two active agents).

K. Đức ((Hamlet)) has 162 households, 462 people, four informants, and one Group member.

X. Thượng ((Hamlet)) has 132 households, 504 people, and two agents (including one active agent).

C. Đông ((Hamlet)) has 145 households, 793 people, and no agents.

3. Sơn Lộc ((Village)):

Hamlet 1 has 261 households, 1,000 people, six informants, and two active agents.

Hamlet 2 has 54 households, 263 people, and two informants.

Hamlet 3 has 92 households, 518 people, two informants, and one active agent.

4. Sơn Thắng ((Village)):

Groups 9 and 10 have 78 households, 287 people, six informants, and three active agents (six Party members).

5. Sơn Thành ((Village)):

Thuần An has 163 households, 378 people, and three agents (including one active agent).

Cang Tây ((Hamlet)) has 296 households, 1,385 people, and no agents.

Mỹ Đông ((Hamlet)) has 176 households, 345 people, and no agents.

Nhã Tâm Resettlement Center has six underground agents and one prospective Party member. Three of the agents are serving in a ((RVN)) People's Self-Defense Force element.

Gõ Vang P. Hưởng Resettlement Center has 97 households, 370 people, and four agents.

Rũng Nho² has 210 households, 821 people, and four agents.

Phú Hiệp has 102 households, 501 people, five agents, and one Group member.

Phu Thanh has 212 households, 850 people, and four agents.

An Xuân has 23 households, 95 people, and six agents (two Party members).

Hamlet 7 P. Tho has three active agents.

Hamlet 5 has five active agents, five informants, and three Party members.

Dân Trí School Temporary Resettlement Camp has 238 households, 1,195 people, and no agents.

High School Temporary Resettlement Camp has 103 people and 455 households.

Gõ Ông Bup ((Resettlement Camp)) has 93 households with 450 people.

Lạc San ((Resettlement Camp)) has 327 households and 1,575 people.

Sơn Khương ((Village)):

K. Trung ((Hamlet)) has 380 households, 680 people and six agents (two active agents and four informants).

K. Quê¹ ((Hamlet)) has 42 households, 420 people and 12 agents (including four Party members).

K. Bình ((Hamlet)) has 480 households, 2,000 people, and three informants.

K. Hạ ((Hamlet)) has 216 households, and 580 people.

K. Thượng ((Hamlet)) has 390 households, 2,120 people, and six informants.

K. Sơn ((Hamlet)) has 382 households and 1,325 people.

Sơn Ninh ((Village)):

K. Bình Giữa ((Hamlet)) has 210 households, 700 people, and three agents (including one active agent).

Ninh Bình ((Hamlet)) has 139 households, 896 people, and one informant.

Xuân Hoà ((Hamlet)) has 369 households, 1,200 people, and two informants.

Đông An ((Hamlet)) has 25 households, 290 people, and two informants.

29 Jul 70

Report on the development of the situation in Phu Phong.

There were 3,800 inhabitants, 38 Party members including nine secret Party members, 28 Group members (including six secret Group members), and four Party Chapters (including one legal ((RVN)) Party Chapter).

((RVNAF)) Đôn Mối Military Post had two Regional Forces platoons, and two platoons of TNTT ((possibly Combat Youth Force)). ((Enemy troops)) at Bả Mách Military Post conducted attacks on friendly corridors.

Hướng An had two Popular Force platoons, two ((RVN)) People's Self-Defense Force platoons, and Regional Forces.

Mộc Bài had one Regional Force platoon, one Popular Force platoon, and one pacification squad.

Công Ba had one US CAP, two Popular Force squads, and one Regional Force platoon.

Bả Rá had one Regional Force platoon, two Popular Force platoons, one People's Self-Defense Force platoon. One US CAP, was stationed in Hamlet 8.

On 15 Jan 69, one battle group, two Special Forces battalions, one battalion of the 51st Regiment, and troops mustered from combat ships conducted long-range operations and initiated psywar and pacification campaigns lasting six months to intimidate the people. As of Jun 69, 25 members of the Party Chapter were killed; the population was relocated; 17 cattle and over 1,000 ang ((one ang equals approximately 6 kilograms)) of rice were seized. From 20 Jan to May 69, we failed to sabotage communication lines. However, we continuously conducted night attacks on enemy encroachment elements and troop concentration points. We laid mines in the fields of Hamlet 1 where enemy vehicles often travel. On the first day, one vehicle was destroyed and one damaged. On the following day, one vehicle was destroyed and another damaged. The enemy was forced to use the road to escape through B. Phục. His vehicles struck mines, and one engineer squad was destroyed while clearing roads. As a result, his convoy no longer used these roads.

From 20 Jan to Feb 69, the enemy decreased activities. His Special Forces withdrew. On 18 Mar 69, during a meeting with his friendly force in Quê Sơn, Dang decided to attack Hamlet 1A to pacify the eastern area of Thăng Bình because, according to his reconnaissance, Hamlet 1A had an agent network of Thăng Bình. He relocated 400 people of Hamlet 1A to Ba Khố, and stole and devastated crops. In view of the situation, the village Party Committee decided to conceal our troops in Hamlet 1A. We killed one enemy platoon in the first clash, and then sent Party members to the hamlet to take key roles in the struggle. Under our fire from outside, the people yielded and demanded to return to their former areas. With the help of the village Party Committee, they reconstructed their houses and tunnels in their former areas. However, the enemy did not allow us to use this as a stepping-stone area ((VC term for VC controlled area used to gain access to an uncontrolled area)) to attack him. He re-attacked this area and killed five old women and some children, although confronted with strong opposition from the people. Our cadre decided to relocate the population to ((Hamlet)) 1B.

At that time, rice was ripening and was cultivated by the enemy. Our men could not engage in farming because they were under enemy attacks. Those who had legal status were killed when they returned to their houses. Cadre could not enter this area. The village Party Committee assigned cadre and Party members to support guerrillas in attacking the enemy. One hundred men who rallied into two groups were sent to B. Phuc at night to bring rice for hamlets.

In Jun 69, the enemy moved to other areas, and seized all the remaining property of the people. The village Party Committee, guerrillas, and V10 unit deployed troops in B Phuc, destroyed one platoon, captured a second lieutenant, Than a military post leader, and killed two tyrants ((GVN officials)). Due to our activities, the people in this area lost their legal status. Our troops also set minefields. The enemy dared not come to this area because each time he did he sustained five to 10 KIA. Our troops later removed the mines and brought the people and legal families to their former villages to work as agricultural laborers. From Mar to Jun 69, the enemy returned to this area only once. Since then, the population has regained legal status.

((Page 4 of O.T.))

Prior to the performance of pacification tasks at Hamlets 5 and 7 of Phu Phong ((Village)), the enemy concentrated two ranger battalions, and one battalion of the 51st Regiment at Hang Nhân and Lộc Gòn. He employed his ranger forces to attack us, destroyed our fortifications, and inflicted heavy losses upon us. His armor units conducted operations, and tightened the encirclement of many areas. A number of our Group members surrendered to him.

One ranger company and approximately one Regional Force battalion moved to Hamlet 4, relocated the people to other areas, and defoliated Hamlet 5 during a seven-day period. Every bamboo and thorn bush was cleared. Besides this, the enemy decorated his agencies with flags, and hung slogans to welcome the province chief. He also arranged for a film to be shown.

In the beginning, our forces were (overconfident), and did not make advance preparations. The enemy concentrated his espionage agents at Hamlet 5 in an attempt to use it as a stepping stone area to exert pressure on all villages. However, we discovered his intentions through specific information provided by our agents. The higher echelon assigned V10 ((unit)) to ((the village)). The village Party Committee sent four secret guerrillas to ((Hamlet 5)) and three agents to Area Cong 3 of Hamlet 7 for operations, and gathered all assault guerrillas to announce awards for suicide elements. On the evening of 23 May 69, we had a departure ceremony for three guerrillas and one action unit with the mission of exterminating tyrants. Their mission was dangerous.

"I do not know whether I will survive," one of them said.

The friendly agent network dared not conceal them. They had to stay in areas near tyrants' houses. Later, they killed Vang and Lung and withdrew safely when the enemy exchanged fire with them.

Twelve men of Unit 25, Quang Đa, and 12 guerrillas laid an ambush from an administrative office to Chanh Ta. On the following morning the enemy pacification personnel and one psywar group were caught in that ambush and

sustained 20 KIA, including six pacification men and one tyrant. Since then, pacification personnel have been frightened by our activities. We continuously laid ambushes, conducted small attacks, stayed in this area at night, and hid during the day. In the face of our operations, the enemy was frightened, and intended to use artillery to discover our forces. We urged the people to denounce secret spies and administrative personnel, destroy house number plates, and burn enemy ((RVN)) flags. We captured a secret cell of six men, **three inter-family chiefs**, three administrative personnel including two members of Quốc Dân Đảng party; administered thought reform to two men; and imposed punishment upon two others before the people.

From Apr to Dec 69, the enemy cleared the eastern area of Thăng Bình and strove to conduct vigorous attacks on Phu Phong, especially **economic attacks**, to cause us difficulties in performing our missions in villages. His combat boats and ranger forces doubled efforts to pacify this area and relocate the people.

From Jan to Jun 70:

15 Jan to 20 Jan 70: Two ranger battalions and one combat group attacked Quang Tín and Quang Nam Provinces. The enemy also defoliated front hamlets, spread propaganda concerning the pacification program, and burned all rear hamlets. This decreased the confidence of the people ((in the Revolution)) and demoralized our cadre and Party members. In the eastern area of Thăng Bình, some cadre did not uphold the spirit and (behavior) of a revolutionary soldier. Others expressed their discontent and were derelict in their duties. From Dec 69 to Feb 70, we hit the enemy hard, killing over 2,800 enemy in Thăng Bình and Phu Phong. In engagements in Hamlets 2 and 3, (89, 25, 70) ((possibly Units 89, 25 and 70)) destroyed 10 armored vehicles and killed over 300 enemy. In a coordinated operation, guerrillas killed 87 enemy including two officers, one doctor, some members of the ((village)) council, and three tyrants. In the face of these activities, the enemy was frightened. However, he still attempted to attack our forces, and had three more M-118's ((**APC**)) **destroyed** by guerrillas. Later, the enemy did not dare move to Gia Hamlet. He forced the inhabitants to leave. But the latter pretended to be afraid of us and returned.

((Page 5 of O.T.))

Finally, he compelled one old man and one disabled man (father and son) to go ahead. When the son advanced, the father wept for fear his son would be killed. The enemy deployed his troops at Hamlet 2. All inhabitants moved to Hamlet 4. Only one warning **guerrilla cell** remained. Our force directed a series of fire at the enemy. The enemy fired thousands of mortar shells until 1700 hours, and then withdrew to B. Hoã.

In Feb 70, he attacked and stole rice and property. During Mar 70, he used seven armored vehicles to carry 700 ang of rice to distribute to the people in the B. Hoã Resettlement Center. We motivated 500 to 700 people to demand that the enemy give back that quantity of rice within two days. The people were determined to stay there. The enemy battalion commander was compelled to comply with their demand and ordered 10 vehicles to carry over 1,000 ang of rice to the people. Thus, they gained 200 ang of rice ((sic)).

On 20 Apr, the enemy conducted sweep operations in B. Giang and B. Hoã. The inhabitants moved to the eastern area. Most of them followed the enemy.

We studied a lesson, and trained our cadre to conduct political struggles. We also urged the people to move their property from their houses and shelters to river banks ((where they could conceal their property)).

On 17 Apr, the enemy levelled the terrain. ((The higher echelon)) assigned cadre to recruit agents and to inspect organizations, and urged them to take appropriate action against the enemy.

On the first day, the enemy cleared six or seven gardens, and met with resistance from people who at first did not dare oppose strongly. Later, under the guidance of four Party members and two Group members, six people hit Americans. Some others hid rice and kept fortifications from being destroyed.

On that night, four village Party Committees arrived at three secret liaison stations to meet Party Chapter cadre and assess the situation. One squad of ((Unit)) 72 and elements of the province also gave their opinions. At 0300 hours, they decided to gather 200 men of Party Chapters and hamlet, village, and guerrilla forces to assign missions. Each Party Chapter would leave behind two men to maintain contact with our agent network in fringe areas. Four cadre of the village Party Committee and two guerrilla cells would also remain there. Three units, each of about 70 men, including Party Chapter cadre and hamlet and village guerrillas, with village Party Committee and Chapter Party Committee cadre acting as chiefs and assistant chiefs, would be activated. Each cell of 12 men would be sent to P ((Phu)) Hường for operations. Two underground key cadre would receive two of the remaining men. Two village Party Committee members and six guerrillas would seek refuge on solid ground ((sic)).

The enemy sent six more vehicles for reinforcement, and cleared the area where four cadre were hidden. These cadre moved to the river bank, and then returned to seek refuge. Two of them ran out to fire at the enemy in order to cross the river to the disputed area near Hường An. There, they had to hide in the bushes together with two youths when they encountered the enemy.

After contacting a friendly force in ((Phu)) Hường, they decided to return that night. Four village Party Committee members and six guerrillas stayed behind to dig fortifications in the cleared area until 0300 or 0400 hours. Four village Party Committee members waded in the lotus pond to gather (duckweed) to camouflage sampans. From 17 to 24 Jul, while the enemy continued to level the terrain, we gathered our men ((in one place)) at night and assigned them to collect information on the enemy situation. Guerrillas were determined to establish one fortification per night where the enemy had levelled old ones. In four nights they constructed four fortifications.

((Page 6 of O.T.))

On the third day, the enemy force in Phu Phong moved to Hamlet 3 and the force in P. Hường moved to a pagoda. They exploited the families of our cadre and guerrillas, conducted (deceptive) propaganda, publicized false victories, and relocated the people to other areas. The people resisted, but they had no choice. The people in Hamlets 1 and 2 moved first. The enemy, using loudspeakers, conducted propaganda activities and sang songs. He collected two tents and 180,000\$ SWN from Hamlet 5.

and brought them to the area ((unspecified)). Using this money, he built 12 houses for 2,000 people there. Then he spreaded propaganda and entertained them with movies. In the face of this situation, some cadre were demoralized and feared they would be detected and killed by the enemy. Only eight youths maintained their determination to join the guerrilla force. One comrade fled to Dong Lang at the end of Apr, fearing that he might be transferred ((to another post)) by the district and province headquarters. Brother Hao arrived on 28 Apr. A meeting was held in Hamlet 4 on the night of 1 Apr by the village Party Committee. In that meeting we decided that tyrants must be killed promptly. We arrested two tyrants. Two others escaped. As a result of a meeting conducted by legal cadre, six Group members were sent to the relocation area to motivate the people to fight. On the night of 31 Apr, our cadre went to Hamlet 5 and discovered the presence of one enemy C ((possibly company)). They returned immediately and reported this to their superiors. Comrades Cu and Diem were then ordered to activate two three-man cells. Comrades Diem and Ham were ordered to activate two other cells in Hamlet 6. These cells assembled at Dong Dong. Their mission was to spread propaganda, using (loudspeakers) to appeal to enemy troops to abandon their ranks and lead the people to wage political struggles. As a result of their activities, 600 people returned to their former homes on the night of 1 Apr.

After being attacked, enemy personnel were demoralized and moved to M. Bai, but the remaining covert ((GVN)) personnel continued to control the people closely. Mai, an inter-family chief, still exercised tight control over the entire population of the three hamlets. On 2 Apr, we made a fund drive and collected 2,000\$ SVN to buy meat for feasts. Ten comrades drank a toast pledging to lead the people home. On the night of 3 Apr, other comrades also made the same vow. When they met the people, the people burst into tears.

On 3 Apr, everybody grouped for an attack. Village and hamlet guerrillas, with Party and Group members, altogether more than 30 men, moved forward and were followed by over 100 cadre. Each cadre was responsible for guiding five people (or one family) home. When they approached the ((hamlet)), three of them crawled to the road to reconnoiter the situation. The people reported that two enemy C's had moved to M. Bai. They infiltrated the hamlet at 1000 hours. There were no enemy there. They fired and entered an enemy agency. Mai escaped. We were ordered by our agents to arrest Mai. We brought 800 people back to their homes. Each comrade brought 10 people to Hamlet 4 and temporarily assigned five people to each family there. Three days later, they used cadre and guerrillas to clear roads, build houses and dig trenches, then began to lead the people home. One US company launched sweep operations between May and Jul 70. Puppet ((RVNAF)) troops dared not fight, fearing we would take advantage of the open terrain to conduct sniping fire against them. However, once one Puppet D ((possibly unit)) with a 60mm mortar, an 81mm mortar, and two ((possibly radios)), commanded by one CPT and two 2 LT's, conducted a sweep operation on our forces. Six of our comrades fought and the enemy suffered 13 KIA. He believed that he had encountered our main force, so he reacted fiercely. One ((enemy)) C was sent to the battlefields as reinforcements. They engaged us throughout the day, but did not move to Hamlet 1. Neither could they move to Hamlets 2 and 3.

During 180 ((possibly Campaign 180)), we conducted two coordinated attacks at Hamlet 3, and one at Huong An, killing 97 enemy and putting out of action 120. During six months, we killed 200 enemy soldiers and shot down one H34 ((possibly CH-34)) and one HUB helicopter.

Phu Diên:

((Labor Youth)) Group Chapter members: 25.

Cadre: 58, including 12 women and two recruits.

Village guerrillas: 28, including two women, four Party members, and 18 Group members.

Hamlet ((guerrillas)): 45, including 13 female and four secret guerrillas.

Action unit: Three members: One Party and two Group members.

Armed security force: Four members.

Legal agents: 15, including penetration agents.

Population in five liberated hamlets: 2,710.

During Mar and Apr we fought four battles, killing 25 members of enemy pacification Groups 43 and 48. The enemy withdrew, stopped his pacification activities, and made preparations for the second phase starting on 15 Jan 70. He reinforced the force stationed at Núi Đát ((Mountain)) with two ranger D's ((possibly battalions)), one ROK D, and 20 vehicles. He conducted attacks deep into the area ((Phu Diên)), destroying 25,000 gia ((one gia equals 36 kilograms)) of rice. The enemy shuttled about the area attacking us. Party Chapter held a meeting and proposed to attack him both on the front line and in the rear area. One A ((possibly squad)) with one Chapter Party Committee would attack on the front line and another element would attack in the rear. At first, the Chapter Party Committee was apprehensive of the presence of US forces. Later, realizing that the US strength was of little account, it assembled cadre, guerrillas, and forward elements into a bloc to win the support of the people. The enemy cleared Hamlet 1, but we dared not attack him. Between 15 Jan and early Feb 70, he cleared a number of hamlets and established family status records. We risked an attack against his pacification team, killing five Americans and two Puppet troops. Taking advantage of the victory over this team, we assigned men to areas to recruit agents and assigned available agents to observe the situation. The enemy cleared Vong Quarter ((possibly in Hamlet 1)) and relocated 300 people into Thưởng Vĩnh and Xuân Mỹ. Two legal Party members and one Group member were sent to these areas. They burned one house and led the people back to Hamlet 1. Among the people were 20 evil ((sic, possibly RVN sympathizers)) families. In the hamlet, we indoctrinated the people and made a fund drive. The people did not beat the gong ((a form of warning)) until we had withdrawn completely. Thereafter we summoned the people and motivated them to protest against the enemy by refusing to beat gongs or hang flags ((to warn him of our presence)). Failing in the second phase, the enemy drew back and left 25 men in Hamlet 1.

On 5 Apr 70 two ranger D's with 20 vehicles staged an attack on the rear. The tyrants who escorted them burned houses and deprived the people of their property. They then relocated 400 people at Bà Ren. Our element in the rear planted agents in liberated areas, exercised control over organizations, put forward arguments to help ((the people)) answer the enemy easily when being relocated, then motivated them to attack the US sweep force. At first, the element dared not attack, but when one enemy C ((possibly company)) consisting

of 130 members reached Đồi Chũa Hill, the element decided to launch the first offensive on the enemy. Our two three-man cells destroyed four ((one word illegible)), killed 20 enemy soldiers, and wounded four. This success stimulated our comrades, but they still feared enemy reaction. However, the enemy made no reaction at all. He only changed his strategy by dispersing his troops widely at night. Our force divided into three cells and ambushed him, killing five and wounding three. We were then able to cope with the enemy, but dared not conduct attacks during the day. The enemy sent 12 men to Hoà Mỹ. Three of our comrades attacked them, killing five and wounding three. Again, the enemy made no (counterattack).

He deployed his troops thinly at night and occupied a hill for a good vantage point. We could not lay explosive charges, fearing the explosion might injure friendly forces. We therefore carried bombs from X. Trã, laid them near enemy positions, and detonated them electrically. On 26 Jun our mine at Lô Ong But Hamlet exploded, killing 30 enemy soldiers. Another mine, was carried from X. Trã at 1700 hours on 24 Jun. The enemy troops concentrated at the spot where we had laid the mine. The enemy was everywhere, so we had to disguise ourselves to approach the place where we had laid the mine and detonated it. Thirty-one enemy were killed by the explosion, including one tyrant.

((Page 8 of O.T.))

Formerly, only six members of our guerrilla force were combat ready, but now all 28 members are capable.

Female guerrillas also requested to fight and cried when their requests were not approved. We attacked the enemy at dawn instead of at night, because he often increased security at night. Two comrades killed 15 enemy soldiers with six grenades.

One enemy C was stationed at Nong Sung (it was stationed close to the mountain for defensive purposes). Comrade Lon, village chief, furtively approached it, removed two mines, and threw grenades at enemy soldiers, killing three. After each battle, we motivated our comrades. They were always zealous and competed with each other. Once, when the enemy reached Gõ Du, they secretly attacked him, killing three and wounding two, although they did not have permission to do so.

In the face of an enemy force consisting of two ranger D's and 18 vehicles, we dispersed our force. Only Comrades Long and Tấn were left ((in the rear enemy position)). Seeing four enemy soldiers at their ((the enemy)) base, they attacked them, killing five ((sic)), capturing two rifles and one radio, and destroying one heavy machine gun.

The enemy relocated 900 people into Bà Rén. During June, he relocated 300 people. We were unable to attack Bà Rén, so we established contact with agents inside the area and ordered them to urge the people to fight. At midnight, the people cried out, asking for rice and water. They urinated and defecated on roads. This situation lasted four days; and the enemy, finding no means to solve it, agreed to give the people their freedom. All 300 people returned to the former area, except four who were imprisoned in Hối An.

In the second phase, 300 people were forced to go to Thượng Vinh. In the Voñg Quarter ((in Hamlet 1)), there were four spies, two covert inter-family chiefs, and one assistant hamlet chief. We arrested these individuals and Lê Giang, an Open-Arms cadre, and reformed them ideologically.

Our action unit infiltrated Hoanh's rice mill and arrested him. He confessed that he had performed Open-Arms activities. He had 75,500\$ SVN. We held a meeting to judge him. The enemy control there loosened consequently. We still control Hamlet 1, and the people still make contributions to us.

The people have reclaimed buffaloes and cows from the enemy three times. He returned five buffaloes to them. An old woman in Hamlet 4, whose son died during his military service, bought one cow with the death gratuity. The enemy stole her cow and killed it for food. She took off her trousers, and threw them on the meat. She also struck enemy soldiers with her trousers. Despite all this, they continued to eat the meat. She grabbed the meat and finally succeeded in recovering half of it. She sued them and was compensated for half ((the price of)) a cow. When the enemy arrived in Bã Reñ, he divided and suppressed the families of our cadre and guerrillas. But the people opposed him and asked him to oppress only those who committed crimes instead of punishing their relatives. He made concessions and released these families.

In the military proselyting field, we wrote letters to enemy soldiers, particularly those who were demoralized. As a result, three soldiers have deserted. They killed two tyrants and returned home with three rifles.

During the last half of 1969 and the first half of 1970, we incapacitated 695 enemy soldiers. From 25 Feb to 3 May, we killed 25 US and Puppet soldiers. In comparison with the achievements of 1969, which was 203 US soldiers KIA, the achievement in the first half of 1970, 445 enemy KIA, is much more commendable. This is due to the increase of military and related activities. The total quantity of rice collected during the six first months was 52,396 kilograms. The purchasing was undertaken by a legal purchasing cell. It could buy in the presence of US or Puppet soldiers. In accordance with the policy, each family was to provide five ang of rice. The total quantity of rice bought during six months was 40,091 kilograms. The total quantity of agricultural products was seven tons, and 400 kilograms of salted fish.

One woman named Tiên was selected "Four Responsibilities" woman. She is always busy refining sugar, operating the sugar press, and building ploughs.

Agricultural production activities:

Cadre have been assigned to aid in the production. The result is 562 acres of rice fields, 217,000 manioc plants, 26,000 banana plants, and 44 ang of beans. We have three three-man work exchange cells. The output of the three cells was below production norms. (Mr. Phú in Hamlet 3 ((possibly a meeting was held by Mr. Phu in Hamlet 3))). These three cells received disapprobation.

((Page 9 of O.T.))

Sơn Thượng:

Population in liberated areas: 2,230.

Cầu Chở Đun: 35 Puppet soldiers, 12 Americans, and one B ((platoon)) with more than 30 members and eight Americans.

There were 24 cadre (eight female), 30 Group members, two B ((possibly secret)) Party members, and three B ((possibly secret)) Group cells.

Enemy schemes:

In early 1969, the enemy launched attacks against our economy and planted agents deep in our areas. He spread propaganda by (loudspeakers) to exert pressure upon our people. On 15 Feb, his troops at Quế Sơn, with seven vehicles, launched sweep operation at Hamlet 4. They spread propaganda, conducted pacification activities, oppressed the families of our cadre and guerrillas, and relocated the people to An Xuân and Chở Nón. They constructed houses in these areas, and forced the people to go there, bringing with them materials taken from their old houses, which they were forced to raze. The enemy burned 21 houses and destroyed a number of sheets of tin.

In the second phase, the enemy did not relocate the people, but levelled and cleared areas. He increased his savage pillage during the first 15 days of Apr, then cleared one kilometer of Route 105, and Giáo Tân Area during two days (where the relocation center is situated). The Chapter Party Committee held a meeting to plan (countermeasures), because our cadre had been undermined. The plan is to conduct three-pronged attacks, including the people to struggle and oppose the enemy levelling houses, graves, and crops. One farmer, seeing such action, told enemy personnel very courteously that his son works for RVN. He continued, stating that RVN should not do this because the people will not be able to earn a living and will starve. The two enemy drivers listened to him and agreed. The third vehicle was driven by an American. He levelled the group indiscriminately. The other two drivers stopped him and explained the situation to him. Finally, they allowed the farmers to pick up all manioc and potato plants, and then continued to level the ground. We saved three tons of agricultural products in this way.

After five days of levelling the ground, the enemy assigned Pacification Group 19 to Cầu Chợ Đụn. This group coordinated with another pacification group there and troops stationed on Route 105 to pacify and level areas. The route was cleared completely. The enemy underestimated us. He moved about freely on the road. The committee sought a means to fire at the enemy on the route and kill tyrants. It decided during Jun 69 to entrust this mission to action units. Three guerrillas in Hamlet 4 and three action units, disguised as Puppet soldiers and armed with AR-15 ((M-16)) rifles, boldly moved on the route despite the presence of US troops at Giáo Tân. One of them smoked, one moved about, and the third was the security. When they met Americans, they asked for cigarettes and then moved to the former agency. There they met one armed Puppet soldier, but he took no notice of them. They met three other Puppets and two tyrants. Our guerrillas stopped a car loaded with rice and papers to ask about the situation. They forced the driver to raise his hands. One guerrilla hit three Puppet military men (one of them is Đặng Quyên, Sergeant, E51), while others destroyed three Honda scooters, rice, and papers (200 reams). After this, enemy troops became cautious. They dared not move about freely, and always moved in groups of 15 or more. Our movement became easier.

((Page 10 of O.T.))

Phu Tho: 3,917 inhabitants

((Possibly the Phu Tho Area from)) Núi Ông Lũng, Hamlet 4, to Núi Đông, Hamlet 8, Road 105, and Đường Sắt ((Railroad)).

An Xuân: ((Possibly occupied by)) one US platoon, one Regional Force platoon, and one Popular Force platoon.

Hon Mo² ((possibly occupied by)) one US company.

Xuân Phước: ((Possibly occupied by)) one ((US)) CAP element, one Popular Force platoon, and one Regional Force platoon.

The enemy attacked from four directions ((at Phu Tho)) and occupied various hamlets.

F ((the enemy)) established the An Xuân Relocation Center by the end of 1968 and intensified his attacks at the beginning of 1969. Sometimes, he used three combined US and Puppet battalions or three armored vehicle battalions to conduct sweep operations lasting 10 to 15 days. His tactics were to attack specific targets where revolutionary forces, Party members, and cadre's families were concentrated. He also used helicopters and HULA aircraft to land troops on the bivouac areas of cadre, and planted agents in our organizations to sabotage us. At a guerrilla ((serving as an enemy spy)), killed the village chief. In addition, he arrested a cadre's wife, oppressed cadre, and assigned his agents to mingle among traders to collect information for future raids and ambushes. When we eliminated tyrants, the enemy became even crueler. He killed Comrade Ly, Comrade Tranh's father, and Comrade Tung's mother in Hamlet 6. In an attempt to demoralize our cadre and soldiers, he also killed 16 persons and all members of some families.

He used 30 armored vehicles and two battalions to conduct sweep operations in one village, killing 21 persons. He attacked Phu Tho and Hamlet 5 and relocated the people living there. Cadre and guerrillas were defeated by the enemy and could not react against him. These facts obliged the Chapter Party Committee to hold a meeting studying the role of cadre. At the meeting, the Chapter Party Committee set forth two tasks: Improve cadre and soldiers' ideology and strengthen our organization.

In response to our motivation to make cadre and soldiers understand enemy schemes, foster their hatred of the enemy, build their revolutionary tradition, encourage them to perform the seven assigned tasks, and increase their determination, eight Party members volunteered to join the suicide and QDC ((sic)) Groups. After assigning the counterpacification groups to hamlets, the cadre and guerrillas who remained in the area had to take charge of rear activities. Each comrade was determined to do his part in the activation of suicide groups which would take charge of the rear and front. ((To encourage cadre and soldiers)) some organizations and associations contributed a sum of 4,000\$ ((possibly \$ SVN)) to organize a troop departure ceremony. At the ceremony, all people, Group members, guerrillas, and suicide group members pledged they would totally frustrate the enemy pacification plans. Afterwards, we concluded that to attack the enemy in An Xuân, we must send a guerrilla force to the front line and assign one suicide cell to Road 105 to eliminate enemy tyrants. (Enemy tyrants stationed at Road 105 were very cautious. Therefore, it was difficult to attack them.)

We realized that in the near future the US would turn over administrative responsibility to the Puppet forces. By that time, we would be capable of attacking the enemy. The enemy now conducts large sweep operations and concentrates his units to establish a foothold. He has two objectives: Concentrate and relocate the people. These activities can be divided into three phases.

To pacify Hamlet 5 and occupy An Xuan, the enemy used HULA aircraft to fire at Hamlet 5 nine times, destroying 50 houses constructed by our cadre. Afterwards, he used megaphones for Open-Arms and psywar activities. Faced with this situation, our village held a meeting to pacify the people and encourage cadre and soldiers to remain in the area. The people said that they would not leave the area as long as the revolutionary forces existed. However, the situation there became more critical. The enemy assigned US and Regional Force units to relocate the people of Hamlet 5 and force them to participate in their meetings ((possibly meaning demonstrations against VC activities)). In the meantime, we incited the people to flee. Therefore, the enemy was only able to relocate about 30 persons, all children and women. The enemy assigned agents to contact the people and keep abreast of their activities. He also categorized villages, attacked strong villages first, and arrested cadre's dependants. Despite all enemy efforts, the people kept all our activities secret and did not reveal any information. The enemy forced the people to participate in meetings; and while they were absent from their homes, he stole their property. Despite the people's objections, the enemy also organized ((false)) elections to establish his administrative machinery with the participation of selected people. We were determined to eliminate cruel tyrants and liberate the people from the oppressive enemy control, even though we would have to struggle fiercely.

At the beginning of 1969, the village had 19 Party members and three Chapter Party Committee members, including four female members.

Result of the election: Eight were judged of medium quality.

Two were issued awards.

24 Group members

26 guerrillas

3 Party members

9 Group members

22 hamlet guerrillas

62 village cadre including six females

3 Party members with legal status.

((Page 11 of O.T.))

The enemy organized a second meeting and attempted to relocate the people, but our Party members struggled against him and said:

"Why did you ((the enemy)) tell us to attend the meeting and then steal our property while we are absent from our homes?" Taking advantage of the opportunity, the people identified those who had robbed them, shouted, and refused to attend the meeting. The enemy forced the people to relocate, but the people struggled against him and said: "Why did you only relocate our sub-village?" The enemy attacked cadre's dependent, destroyed our trenches and withdrew.

Our cadre made every effort to eliminate secret enemy administrative personnel and assigned security agents and guerrillas to kill from three to five Puppet soldiers every night. Our security agents made an investigation, arrested, and took proper action against a number of comrades ((who were enemy spies)). We recruited key personnel and heightened the enthusiasm of the people. The enemy used armored vehicles to conduct sweep operations in four southern hamlets, killing 21 persons and demoralizing the people. He assigned the people living in other areas to come to our area and destroy people's houses. Our people refused to construct new houses in the relocation center. The enemy, therefore, forced people living in other areas to construct 60 houses for our people. Our cadre explained to the people that all enemy activities were aimed at intimidating us. Therefore, we must be determined to remain in our area of operations. We activated a secret unit in An Xuan, appointed one or two key agents in each sub-village to lead the people's struggle, and made every effort to destroy the enemy relocation center. We fully understood the enemy situation and formulated plans to counter his raids. On the night of 20 Feb 69, we concentrated all civilian and military forces to attack the enemy relocation center which was occupied by one Popular Forces platoon, and An Xuan which was occupied by one Regional Forces platoon and one US platoon. We assigned 12 comrades (including two Chapter Party Committee members, two Party members and six Group members) to attack the relocation center and oppress An Xuan. The three leading elements were assigned to attack the relocation center and one element was assigned to attack An Xuan. In this attack, we killed or wounded 17 enemy including 12 Popular Forces soldiers and two ((village)) council members, burned one house, and encouraged the people to participate in struggles and set 39 other houses on fire. (We **did not burn all these houses**) ((because, we actually only wanted to intimidate the enemy)). Taking advantage of the situation, the people said: "If you ((the enemy)) cannot provide security for us, we will return to our farm lands." The enemy had to make concessions and allowed the people to return to their farm lands. The people repaired their houses and increased agricultural ((production)). During this period we recruited four Party members, three Group members, 13 agents, and activated one secret guerrilla cell.

Afterwards, the enemy used tin to construct houses ((for a new relocation center)). We ((VC)) tried to burn these tin roofed houses but did not succeed. Therefore, we formulated a plan to destroy these tin sheets as soon as they were sent to the local area. In this attack, we defeated one Popular Forces platoon and destroyed more than one hundred tin sheets. ((After our withdrawal)) the people said: "Do not waste your ((the enemy's)) time constructing these houses, because the liberation forces will come and destroy everything."

Thereafter, the enemy moved back to their position, and the people returned to their farm lands. The people of An Xuan continued paying taxes to us and supplying rice for guerrillas (from Jan to May 69). The enemy failed to relocate the people.

Elimination of tyrants: We planned to eliminate Dinh, an enemy tyrant who had the same task as Nguyễn Minh Châu ((sic)) and often traveled on Route 105. Being afraid of us ((VC)), he always departed at 0700 after the departure of US security guards.

Disguised as an ((RVN)) sergeant and armed with a Colt pistol, Tho went with two other comrades armed with AR-15's ((M-16 rifles)) to Bá Ong Vè, where they expected US security guards to pass. When these guards were 50 meters away, ((Dinh)) began to follow them. After crossing the ((one word illegible)), they came upon Dinh, who was armed with an AR-15 and riding a "Honda" motorcycle. They killed Dinh and took his weapon, four bolts of cloth, and rode the motorcycle to Hamlet 2.

Attack on Hamlet 7: The people's movement in this hamlet has been developed. Enemy activities conducted there were designed to deceive the local inhabitants. Our force consisted of three Group ((members)), one secret guerrilla cell, one female legal secret security agent, and a liberation section. Whenever the enemy held any meeting, we opposed it. We denounced his crimes and successfully opposed lootings. From Jun to Jul 69, the enemy failed in his endeavor to organize an election for his local administrative machinery, because no local inhabitants would participate in it. Those who were forced by the enemy to take administrative positions accepted them with our approval. We admitted the inter-family chief into an anti-defoliation cell. The hamlet chief resigned, after deciding that it was not good for him to assume this position. So only the inter-family chief remained in his position. Afterwards, the enemy placed an exiled hamlet chief in this position. By this time, our cadre had decided to make the inter-family chief ((and the hamlet chief)) abandon their positions by assigning them missions. ((The hamlet chief)) refused to accept our mission after being motivated by the inter-family chief. We threatened to kill both of them. The enemy forced relatives of our cadre to assume these positions so that they would not be killed by us. Our comrades talked to them. After discovering the enemy's plan for defoliating Hamlet 7, we ordered our guerrillas to conduct fires from inside and outside of the hamlet. The enemy feared that the inhabitants would oppose the defoliation of the hamlet. One of the two comrades hiding under sugar cane stalks was discovered and killed by the enemy. The enemy told the inhabitants that they ((VC)) had come to the hamlet, hidden under sugar-cane stalks and had been supported by the inhabitants, so he had to clear all sugar cane. After our cadre explained ((to the local inhabitants)) that people in Phú Thọ live on sugar cane, they told the enemy that it was not right to clear all sugar cane because of some Communist hiding under them and that they would rather die than let him clear all the sugar cane.

Finally, the enemy could do nothing more than make the inhabitants strip all leaves from the sugar cane. The inhabitants succeeded in protecting 50 mau ((one mau is equivalent to approximately 9/10ths of an acre)) of sugar cane.

In an attack against An Xuân, X ((Xuân)) Phước, our troops completely destroyed one Puppet platoon, killing 12 enemy troops. We caused difficulties for the enemy in Hamlet 7, but our activities there were not successful. Due to our ineffective methods, he arrested all our agents operating there. The inhabitants of Hamlet 5, have come back to their hamlet only during the daytime and have left at night.

Assassination of hamlet chiefs:

One female Party member and two female Group members were assigned to assassinate three ((hamlet chiefs)) named Thuc, Phao and Trong, by laying a time bomb under a mat on which they slept. However, the bomb failed to explode after 15 minutes as expected. Our agents brought the fuze back and reported their failure. Having been discovered by the enemy, they could not carry out their missions.

((Attack against)) pacification cadre in Hamlet 8:

We had made some preparations in this hamlet before the enemy sent two pacification groups there. He conducted raids and ambushes and held meetings. We simultaneously launched continuous attacks against Hamlets 7 and 8. In the attack against Quan Mai in Hamlet 7, we killed nine US and Puppet troops. Later, most of our guerrillas in ((Hamlet 7)) withdrew. A small number of them remained. We employed hamlet guerrillas and a village element to counter the enemy raid against Hamlet 4. During the following month, at 0200 hours every morning, we laid ambushes from a hill. We killed 12 enemy troops and wounded three to five others in one ambush.

((Page 13 of O.T.))

We killed seven of 15 pacification cadre and (disorganized) ((one pacification group)) in one month. The enemy sent one Special Forces company to Hamlet 8. Regional and US forces conducted an attack on the front line. While the enemy launched continuous raids and laid ambushes, we attacked him with explosive charges and also laid ambushes. Some Special Forces members said that they would not retreat, and that they were determined to destroy the guerrillas in Phu Tho. We decided to conduct a surprise attack to upset the enemy plan. At 0200 hours, we laid an ambush ((at an unspecified area)) and as ((Special Forces)) members fell into the ambush we attacked them from three fronts, killing eight of them. Since then the survivors have said that the guerrillas of Phu Tho are brave fighters. The enemy is now demoralized and more cautious in movement. We killed a total of 17 Special Forces members from Tay Ho. Our activities caused dissension between US and Puppet ranks. Puppet troops said: "If we moved by ourselves without US soldiers, the Communist would attack us." Contradictions were prevalent between Puppet troops and pacification cadre. Pacification cadre conducted propaganda to deceive the people while Puppet troops robbed them. Local inhabitants told pacification cadre that they would not listen to their propaganda, because they were often robbed by Puppet troops. Due to the dissensions between pacification cadre and Puppet troops, the former reported what they were told to the area headquarters. Afterwards, they withdrew from Hamlet 8.

In Jan 70, three US and Puppet battalions were assigned to all villages ((of Que Son District)) where they relocated 440 local inhabitants. They relocated 320 inhabitants of Hamlets 3 and 8. We conducted sniper fire against them. The inhabitants of Hamlet 8 carried rice and farm tools with them when they were relocated in Hamlet 7. They were urged to build three sheds. There was one Puppet platoon in Hamlet 7. The inhabitants in Hamlet 4 were relocated in the district ((Que Son District)). We assigned a legal political struggle ((section)) chief there to motivate the

11-1173-70
relocated inhabitants to stay in the open, thus asking children cry. In addition, living in a poor area made them hate the enemy. As a result, he provided each of them with half a can ((one can is equivalent to approximately 250 grams)) of rice every two days. This quantity of rice was insufficient for them, so they protested again. This time, the district chief promised them he would settle the problem. They were authorized to cook in the houses of the inhabitants ((of the district)), but these people opposed that. After our motivation, 100 people returned to their former hamlets within two days. The remaining relocated inhabitants also asked permission to live in houses in An Xuân ((Village)). But the people of An Xuân opposed that. Finally, the enemy had to let them return to their former hamlets to obtain rice. We motivated them not to bring any rice with them, but resume the same form of struggle. Afterward, the remaining relocated inhabitants initiated struggles against the enemy. Many of them came back to their former hamlets despite enemy opposition. (All of them returned to their former hamlets within five days.)

Our force in Hamlet 8 was weak and was located close to the enemy's area. This made it difficult to motivate the people to return there. For this reason, our cadre decided to disorganize ((the enemy local administrative agency)), capture enemy administrative officials and spies, and attack the resettlement center. Secret guerrillas of Hamlet 7 and village ((secret guerrillas)) conducted an attack ((against the resettlement center)) while cadre made preparations to bring the relocated inhabitants back to their former hamlets. Over 100 inhabitants returned that night, and the rest returned the following day. We destroyed three sheds and motivated over 300 inhabitants to return to their former hamlets. Only seven families were persuaded by the enemy to stay in ((the resettlement center)). In this attack, we killed two enemy ((personnel)). The survivors fled to Hùng An.

The guerrilla force in Hamlet 4 has the responsibility of killing enemy troops in Gò Đá.

Guerrilla forces of Hamlets 1 and 2, together with local forces of Hamlets 6 and 7, were responsible for countering enemy attacks against rear areas. Our hamlet guerrillas once killed eight enemy troops in an attack conducted by Hoa ((possibly RVN force)) against Hamlets 1 and 2. In other battles, they killed one enemy troop and sometimes two, thus frustrating the enemy's attempt to attack our rear areas. Guerrillas of Hamlet 2 also succeeded in destroying an enemy force in their ambush.

((Page 14 of O.T.))

Two comrades of a hamlet guerrilla cell captured one ((enemy soldier)), wounded one, and captured one weapon in an ambush (May 70). ((Guerrillas)) of Hamlet 4 succeeded in maintaining Gò Đá and repelled an enemy force ((attempting to attack it)). Since then enemy soldiers have not dared to come to the area. In a coordinated attack, our village guerrillas killed six enemy soldiers including Sergeant Ba, and captured one M-79 ((grenade launcher)) and one Colt pistol ((unspecified)).

((Our guerrillas)) had never engaged US sweep forces. ((Combat)) cells in rear areas and engineer forces motivated hamlet guerrilla forces to attack US sweep forces. Party members and the unit leader of Hamlet 2 were assigned to conduct the first attack against ((a US sweep force)) with grenades to acquire experience. They killed four members ((of a US sweep force)). After that, a meeting was held for all hamlet units to disseminate the results of the attack. We once set an ambush against the enemy during the day, but met with a ((strong)) reaction. After that, we attacked him only in thinly populated areas so that we could use large explosive charges. ((The guerrilla force of)) Hamlet 8 killed 10 enemy soldiers in one engagement. Once, a US force moving from a hill to a rice field was attacked. They are now afraid to enter Hamlet 8. Our ((guerrillas)) killed four enemy soldiers with grenades and six others by destroying an airplane. The guerrillas of Hamlet 8 had good combat efficiency. During a six month period, village guerrilla forces conducted four attacks against the enemy at night, using explosive charges and mortars.

((Guerrilla forces of)) hamlet ((one word illegible)) killed 34 enemy soldiers, wounded 23 others including 16 Americans, and put out of action 58 including 39 Americans. In six months, 20 ((guerrillas)) were recruited by eight hamlets, and eight hamlet unit command committees were consolidated. Only ((guerrillas)) of five hamlets had good combat efficiency. The well trained unit had nine members ((sic)).

Political struggles: We motivated 113 persons to go to the market. We conducted military proselyting by means of loudspeakers five times. We succeeded in the struggle to demand ((the release of)) 26 wounded persons ((held by the enemy)).

We motivated six persons, including two women, to enlist in our army, 123 persons to serve as civilian laborers, and eight persons as Dcg ((possibly sappers)).

Our security agents killed five enemy ((officials)), held thought reform sessions for five, and indoctrinated 90 others.

They completed the collection of rice for 1969 in 1970 ((sic)). Rice: 2,275 ang ((one ang equals six kilograms)).

4,121 ang 552,654\$ ((SVN))

227 ang 55 tons and 103 kilograms

T ((sic)) 1002 = 16,854 kilograms of rice; purchased 522 ang of rice from the enemy and saved 2,250 cans ((of rice)).

Production: 378 ang of rice was harvested from the crop planted in the third month of the lunar year ((in 1970)).

4.7 meters ((two words illegible)).

We had 353 mau of sweet potatoes, 62 cans of bean seeds, 11 mau of peanuts, 2 mau of spinach, and 910,070 manioc plants.

We conducted nine training courses for 175 trainees; provided medical treatment for 61 persons in villages; and evacuated one person to ((a hospital)) at higher echelon.

A village ((of Quê Sơn District)) medical store has a quantity of medicine valued at 130,000\$ ((possibly SVN plasters)). Hamlets had their own medicines. The ((people's)) organizations had been strengthened. Organizations from village level to groups and cells of (Hamlets 1, 2 and 4) were consolidated. It is noteworthy that 60 women were recruited in six months.

Recruitment of cadre: In 1969 there were 19 comrades, ((including)) four female comrades and eight teenagers.

Recently, we recruited 15 comrades including 4 female and 14 teenagers, 7 guerrillas and 2 security agents ((sic)).

Presently, there are 34 comrades including 6 Group members, 6 students, and one captured ((by the enemy)).

There were 20 ((sic)): Five females, six Poor ((Farmers)), six Middle ((Farmers)), six guerrillas, three action team ((members)) and two security ((agents)).

In 1969, there were 26 Group members. Thirty Group members were recently recruited. This gives a total of 56 ((Group members)), including 18 women, 12 ((Group members)) who were promoted to Party members, 12 students and four who were captured by the enemy.

Presently, there are 29 Group members, and one female member.

((Page 15 of O.T.))

Son Long is 12 kilometers long and four kilometers wide and has a population of 1,435 people.

((Enemy forces)) withdrew from Hòn Chông in Jul 69, but they regularly conducted attacks on the surrounding areas of Hòn Chông to relocate local inhabitants. The enemy's plan was to attack and clear An Long, Thuận Long, which was located near our corridor. Therefore, this area was subjected to continuous enemy attacks. His attacks were designed to relocate local inhabitants. He even killed an entire family and forced children to move to Châu Sơn. Once, in an attack by his battalion-sized unit against the area, he looted all the people's property, completely destroyed crops, and relocated a number of local inhabitants. Puppet forces conducted only a few sweep operations, while US forces were aggressive ((in launching operations)). Once, an injured woman was handcuffed and led from An Long to Route 105 (two other women were handcuffed on other occasions) by the enemy. The people were relocated five times, but returned to their former village each time. The enemy killed 27 buffaloes, seized rice, and raped women during a sweep operation. Local inhabitants initiated a struggle against his acts, but it was not successful and they had to move. The enemy even conducted search operations for as far as thousands of kilometers ((sic)) Forty-four ((armored)) vehicles were used in his operations in villages. US forces occupied a hill while Puppet forces launched a three day attack against a village, stealing the property of local inhabitants. It was difficult to build dikes on swampy rice fields ((to keep back water)),

but enemy ((armored)) vehicles ran over them causing water to drain off, thus confusing local inhabitants. Our guerrillas did not fight him. Local inhabitants did not want us to fight either. Despite that, our cadre decided to attack the enemy to prevent local inhabitants from moving away and to protect our land. After we had fired three shots, local inhabitants insisted we stop. They reasoned that the enemy would come to the area where gun shots were heard to kill everyone there. But, our cadre knew that they would lose control of local inhabitants, unless they attacked. According to lessons learned in S ((Són)) Thăng and ((Són)) Thanh, we knew that the loss of Són Long, would leave us no stepping stone ((VC-controlled area used to gain access to an uncontrolled area)) in the area. Therefore, our cadre participated in a seven day reorientation course. After this course, they killed 24 enemy soldiers in seven days. Next, a training course for Group Chapters was held. Each of those who attended this course volunteered to kill three to five enemy soldiers. Youths not belonging to guerrilla forces could fight the enemy effectively. The number of guerrillas concentrated for combat activities was large, but local inhabitants contributed no rice. This prevented Youth Group members from joining guerrilla forces, but they volunteered to help guerrillas in any fighting against US forces. Local inhabitants had insisted that we not fight the enemy, but later requested us to do so. This was because the enemy would devastate the surrounding sites of an area where they could not launch an attack. In areas where attacks conducted by guerrillas were successful, US forces were afraid that we might gain the confidence of local inhabitants. Local inhabitants were afraid that a surprise sweep operation might be launched by US forces when our guerrillas were not deployed there.

An anti-US sweep force movement was initiated, but the number of guerrillas was small. In Sep 69, one company of a US sweep force conducted a sweep operation against Châu Són. They approached the area from three directions, but were attacked by our hamlet guerrillas. The enemy suffered seven wounded and one killed. During another sweep operation conducted by an enemy battalion-size unit, enemy forces were deployed at Gò Tróc, Triệu Dường, and Dường La and 44 enemy troops were deployed at Đá Khâm. While a group of enemy troops from Són Thăng entered ((a village)) which was commanded by two village guerrillas and two hamlet guerrillas. The two hamlet guerrillas were frightened, but were motivated by an assistant village chief. They killed one enemy soldier, wounded two others, and then fled to another area. Later the Americans came to the area. They asked local inhabitants where the Communists were. The villagers led them in the wrong direction, but the American soldiers did not pursue. Not being alerted of the approach of another US force from the back, we had to stay in trenches to fight them. The fighting began at 1500 hours and ended at 1830 hours. Our continuous fire made it impossible for the enemy to penetrate further into the area, though his troops were brought there by helicopters and supported by airstrikes and artillery fire. (Our force was four guerrillas and two hamlet security agents.) The enemy sustained 31 casualties including 24 dead, and lost 8 weapons, 9 cameras and 13 duffle bags in this battle.

((Marginal note)) Hồng, assistant village unit leader, took command ((in this battle)). ((End of marginal note)).

The people contributed more than 1,000\$ SVN to the dinner party. Twenty guerrillas were recruited for Châu Sơn Hamlet. Ten comrades of Thuận Long (previously there were none) coordinated with village guerrillas in an attack against US troops, but were counterattacked by these troops. In the evening, a meeting was held by the village unit and Party members to draft a plan to prevent attacks on hamlet guerrillas by the enemy. (Village ((guerrillas)) were equipped with mortars.) Explosive charges were to be prepared (because none were left at the Province Unit). In the morning we killed three enemy soldiers by sniper fire. The enemy assigned 23 soldiers to the foot of "Hòn Chiêng" to counterattack us, but these men fell into our mine field and six of them were killed. (There were, ten ((sic)) enemy soldiers left.)

The village ((guerrilla)) movement did not have any self-procured weapons. Party and Group members and cadre were enthusiastic and resolute. We recruited 20 village guerrillas, 15 guerrillas for An Long, 20 hamlet guerrillas for Châu Sơn, and 20 others for T. Long.

The enemy conducted a six-front sweep operation, deployed seven blocking positions, and stayed three days. We were oppressed by enemy air and artillery fire, and had to stay in trenches. We planned to split ((the unit)) into cells for a counterattack. We checked the amount of rice we had and found that we were short of rice for breakfast (at midnight ((sic))). We planned to conduct a large battle. We found that a female comrade had received 20 cans of rice for us. We sent one man to get them. This quantity of rice was distributed to six cells; each cell received three cans. They cooked all the rice and brought it with them to the battlefield.

A three-man cell conducted a search operation throughout the village but did not attack the enemy. The enemy was overconfident. At 0800 hours, he searched the village and made contact with us. We opened fire from six directions, killing nine and wounding three enemy soldiers. He fled and then withdrew to S Thạch in the afternoon.

((Marginal notes)) The people of Chau Son gave us two ang ((a measuring unit for grain equivalent to approximately six kilograms)) and 1,000 ((\$SVN)) and one cadre ((there also)) gave 1,000 ((\$SVN)). ((End of marginal notes)).

In Jan 70, the enemy launched a three-front sweep operation. His troops were deployed in a column formation in the village. They penetrated the front and the rear of the village. Air and artillery strikes paved the way for infantry troops. Our comrades counterattacked and raided them. At 1500 hours we met the enemy. Comrades Trưởng Sĩ and Sanh attacked him from the rear. Comrade Sĩ killed four enemy soldiers seizing one pistol and one AR 15 ((M16)) rifle. The enemy withdrew to S. Thăng.

The Chapter Party Committee conducted an indoctrination session for guerrillas and youths, and then registered Group Chapter members and village unit members.

Antiaircraft activities: The people prevented us from shooting at aircraft. We had to motivate them and our guerrillas to use machine guns to shoot at enemy HUIA helicopters which were flying low to drop grenades. In Jun 70, the enemy used a blocking position at "Hòn Chiêng" and conducted artillery strikes on the village, keeping the people in their houses. The Chapter Party Committee led the people to perform the production task legally ((sic)). Châu Sơn Hamlet members killed two enemy soldiers with

recoilless rifles. Two guerrilla cells were assigned to Hôn Chieng. The enemy was overconfident. He landed his aircraft and unloaded food. We shot down one H34 ((helicopter)) on the spot. In the afternoon we shot at a US fleet ((sic)) and damaged it when it came to remove the plane. At night, eight HULA helicopters attacked us constantly, but we shot down one of them. (That day we shot down one plane and damaged another.)

((Page 17 of O.T.))

The people requested the enemy to cease his artillery fire so that they could farm. The enemy redeployed his troops and the people continued to legally carry out their production task. Presently, the enemy is intensifying his oppression. Since 8 Jun ((70)) he redeployed his troops three times.

The sweep operation in Mar 70 was conducted by a large enemy force. We had to secure a hill. The enemy penetrated the area but we were unaware of it. He attacked the area and herded 700 people to Lạc Sơn and Quê Sơn. The Party Chapter anticipated the situation in time and moved far from the village. Two Chapter Party Committee ((members)) and a number of units consisting of young members were assigned to contact the people but they were unable to even after having stayed in the area for three nights. Because they were strictly controlled by the enemy, the people dared not meet us. ((The enemy)) spread a rumour that he had destroyed our area. Our youngest guerrilla named Chinh penetrated the resettlement center and reported on the situation of our area and friendly members.

((He related that)) Sister Tuấn was selected as Chief of the Camp ((sic)). (She lives in a place located two to three kilometers from a ((rice)) field.) Comrade Chinh penetrated the center again in the evening and was almost discovered by a tyrant if the people did not hide him in time with an umbrella. That night, Sister Tuấn led 65 people out of the center. The people placed more confidence in our guerrillas who fought the enemy, shot at aircraft, and succeeded in penetrating enemy controlled areas.

1969 29 ((sic))

Twenty Party ((members)), five Chapter Party Committee ((members)), two female ((members)), and three cells.

1969: Eleven Party ((members)) were recruited including one female member.

1970: Eight Party members were recruited, including two members for a guerrilla unit.

Production task:

We had difficulties in farm production activities. If we farmed near the edge of a mountain, wild animals would damage our crops, if we farmed in open areas we were afraid of enemy bombing. In 1969 when our farmers farmed near the mountain their crops were ravaged by boars. In Jul 69 they suffered from famine and were pessimistic. The Party Chapter held a meeting to plan for providing leadership for the production task.

Guerrilla units were assigned to maintain contact with the enemy at the front whereas at the rear of An Long three hunting teams were organized to protect the crops.

When the enemy levelled the ground, the people were discouraged again. In Jan 70 a meeting was held to initiate a production movement. The organizations had to motivate their members to do the farming and Party members

and cadre had to set the example. The enemy ((from helicopters)) shot at us when they discovered us. In Mar 70, six people were killed and two others wounded while working. The people were very frightened. The T. Long Party cell suggested that rice had to be cut bit by bit to avoid arousing the enemy's attention. In Apr 70, cell 4 of Th Long had to sow beans at night. Sister Tuan of the Chapter Party Committee sowed four ang of bean seeds at noon to avoid arousing the enemy's attention.

((Page 18 of O.T.))

Following Sister Tuan's good example, the inhabitants enthusiastically increased their agricultural production. Each family grew from four to five beds of beans. Proper leadership was provided to motivate the people to work the fields at night. Mr Quan grew seven ang of potato seedlings and a large amount of vegetables. Since two farmers grew only 10 ang of rice seedlings and harvested only 10 ang of unhusked rice, we thought that we would fail to collect the 1970 preliminary agricultural tax quota. Only in Chau Son were the crops good.

A meeting was immediately held by the Chapter Party Committee to discuss and settle difficult problems concerning the collection of taxes. Guerrillas enthusiastically urged the inhabitants to grow potatoes. As a result, we gradually collected taxes and sufficiently supplied our personnel. In spite of great enthusiasm by the inhabitants, the ((revolutionary)) movement developed slowly in 1969. And in 1970, though relocated by the enemy, the people's organizations continued to develop effectively. They soon had good living conditions instead of the famine they had previously suffered. A cooperative was established to buy local products and provide the villagers with necessary goods. At first the inhabitants did not believe in our organization and bought goods only when we help them by paying the cost ourselves. However, due to the increasing development of the ((revolutionary)) movement, a meeting was held in (May 70) to motivate members of the cooperative to study their basic regulations and elect an administrative section. People were urged to invest their money in the cooperative. They were afraid of losing their money if cadre were killed, robbed, or attacked by the enemy.

Each cooperative member had to buy share costing nearly 30,000 SWK.

In 1967 and 1968, all rotational work cells here were completely disorganized.

In 1970, some families consisted only of crippled aged people or children. One cadre was appointed by the Party Chapter to take charge of the Farmers' Association. Party members and members of various organizations closely coordinated with one another to increase agricultural production. Three to four households shared one buffalo. Peasants who had buffaloes of their own could cultivate enough rice to transplant three ang of rice seedlings. Those who had no buffaloes could only cultivate two ang. Rotational work exchange cells were established in Thuan Long and An Long. The peasants supported each others and buffaloes were no longer rented. Some families had six or seven members with only two who could work on the farm. They also successfully cultivated and transplanted from 11 to 12 ang of rice seedlings. The enemy conducted a number of fierce artillery strikes after his sweep operation. The peasants were therefore forced to transplant at night instead of during the day.

On 8 June ((possibly 1970)), the enemy landed troops at Hon Chong. Most of them were equipped with recoilless rifles. During the afternoon, they

conducted artillery strikes throughout the area, killing two civilians and wounding one other. At that time, ricefields had just been plowed and it was very difficult for the inhabitants to transplant rice seedlings. They had to return to their village in the morning. Sometimes it took them eight days to plant one ang of rice seedlings. They later came back to their village and continued their legal agricultural production ((sic)).

In 1969 and 1970, we successfully killed 122 enemy troops, wounded 389, and incapacitated 599 others including five tyrants, one policeman, and five ((RVNAF)) officers. We also captured 55 packs, 129 grenades, 12 weapons, and three colt pistols; shot down five aircraft; and damaged eight others.

We conducted 40 attacks against Nguyen Huynh and adopted troop concealment tactics to attack it eight more times, killing one tyrant, capturing two others, and **destroying seven** pacification teams.

Guerrilla activities in 1969 and 1970:

Guerrillas successfully cleared 218 meters of ricefields and 220 meters of other land. Each of the villagers cultivated one sao and 15 meters.

They collected 50 metric tons ((possibly of unhusked rice)) in 1969 and 16 tons in 1970.

They also purchased 425 ang of rice.

((Page 19 of O.T.))

Phu Thanh ((possibly Village)), Bat Mountain and Hill 45:

Hamlet 1 is located between X Tan ((possibly Xuan Tan Village, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province)) and the National Highway; Hamlets 2 and 3 are located at Ba Ru; Hamlet 4 is located at Ben Quang (the left side of the village); Hamlet 5 is a disputed area and Hamlet 6 a cleared area (565 ((possibly the number of its inhabitants))); Hamlets 7 and 8 are located within the village and Hamlet 9 is adjacent to the railroad and Phu Dien ((possibly Phu Dien Village, Duy Xuyen District, Que Son Province)). Three of these hamlet are already liberated.

In 1969, there were 740 inhabitants, but now only 320 remain ((this is possibly the number of inhabitants in the three liberated hamlets)).

The population of ((Phu Thanh)) Village is approximately 3,800.

One company of 703 Regional Forces ((possibly Battalion 703)) was located at Bat Mountain. Ba Ru is about 500 meters from Hamlet 7. Bat Mountain is about 300 meters from Hamlet 8.

On 7 Jan 69, the enemy deployed one Regional Forces company of the 703 to pacify the area. Our village understood his schemes. Therefore, countermeasures had carefully been made. From the Party Chapter to village and hamlet cadre and guerrillas, everyone was aware of the situation. At 0730 hours two cells with six comrades were assigned to lay an ambush. As soon as the enemy troops entered our area, they confronted our fierce attack and had to withdraw to their military post (about 700 meters away) after 25 minutes of fighting. We killed 13 enemy troops, and wounded two others; seized two AR15 ((M16)) rifles and one M79 grenade launcher; and destroyed one PRC10 radio. The enemy later used HU1A helicopters to attack us. On 8 Jan, he sent one company to attack Hamlet 5. Five of his troops

... as a reinforcement, and attacked Hamlets 5 and 6. We concentrated our forces to counter his attack and killed three enemy soldiers and wounded one.

Through the valuable experience gained during those three days, we developed our achievements and initiated a movement aimed at motivating our personnel to attack the enemy. After realizing that we had enough strength to defeat the enemy, three cells were carefully camouflaged to conduct an ambush with mines planted 30 meters from Bả Rủ Post. One leader of a People's Self-Defense Force platoon was killed by a mine (at Mrs Khoa's alley) and 10 of his troops were also killed. Two others were then killed while fighting our infantry troops. Afterward, we conducted repeated attacks against 703 ((Regional Force Battalion)). Within only one month, we launched five successive attacks on this force and frustrated the enemy's pacification plan. During that month only one of our comrades was wounded.

In May 1969, one US battalion attacked Hamlet 7. The first day, they were driven back to Bả Rủ ((Post)) and five enemy soldiers were killed. During seven consecutive days, the enemy confronted our fierce attacks and had to use bombs ((unspecified)) to enter the hamlet on the seventh day.

In November 1969, one ROK company attacked Hamlets 7 and 8. Our troops coordinated with one cell ((force)) to counter the attack. We repelled them, killing five enemy troops. The enemy used bombs to destroy Hamlet 7 and 8 and relocated the inhabitants at Hamlet 5 and 6 and Bả Rủ. Ten days later, the enemy withdrew his troops, leaving the hamlets uninhabitable. The Puppets then deployed a blocking position at Đát Mountain. We motivated cadre and inhabitants and planted agents to operate in enemy areas. In early 1970, 450 people were returned to their former homes to continue their farming.

Our cadre strongly used experience gained in anti-pacification phases and detected a number of enemy secret spies serving as inter-family chiefs in Hamlets 5 and 6. We also successfully employed some local (GVN) administrative personnel who provided information on the local situation and indoctrinated some other bad elements. Two tyrants were captured and killed, Khanh, coming from Ao Vuong, was appointed hamlet chief by the enemy and oppressed the inhabitants.

((Page 20 of O.T.))

We followed Khanh's activities for five days before assigning two cells to ambush him. These cells killed him. The people rejoiced. By order of the Party Chapter, cadre convened meetings to motivate the people in Hamlets 5 and 6 and threaten evil individuals ((meaning those who had contact with the enemy)) and non-aligned individuals.

The population of Hamlets 5 and 6 is now 565. There are three agents who have promptly reported the situation there to us. The people have been motivated to economize rice for contribution to the guerrilla force. The inter-family chief (a second lieutenant working at an enemy post) who accepted the position of assistant hamlet chief was arrested and killed. Thus enemy control was disrupted, and the people began to lead an easier life.

Three US C's attacked the village ((unspecified)) from three directions at 1730 hours on 10 Apr 70. The cadre, guerrillas, and people were all taken by surprise. Guerrilla cells were assigned to block their advance. The Party Chapter guided a number of cadre to Phú Điền. Only six valiant comrades

were left. The people all evacuated the area. We prepared dinner and cooked rice for lunch for the following day. Enemy attacks were sporadic, so cadre gradually returned. For 25 days the enemy attacks were negligible. There were six US troops who often searched and killed tyrants ((sic)) at night, but did nothing during the day. We conducted sniping fire on them and they immediately moved to Cay Ket, Hamlet 5. This made us overconfident. When they encircled and raided us, we failed to react and suffered two KIA (Vu, and Sinh). This was a shock to the cadre. Some cried. They all left for Phú Diên. Only seven comrades stayed. The Chapter Party Committee urged them to stay. Taking advantage of our failure, the enemy increased his search operations. The people were frightened and advised us to flee. Cadre forced BT ((possibly platoon leaders)) to find the most secure place for messing and billeting. They were further demoralized because their former lodgings had been discovered ((by enemy aircraft)) when a comrade had fled. Comrade Quach, after attending the meeting and asking superiors for instructions, urged them to remain at their positions. Party members were urged to be exemplary in this matter. They constructed five fortifications during one night. Key Party members dug holes in the outer perimeter of the hamlet. Most cadre gained their composure but some still demanded to be transferred to district. Cadre were determined to fight the enemy and change the situation. They killed eight enemy soldiers with a mine made from a 105mm artillery shell, and laid many explosive charges. Enemy movement was then restrained. The situation gradually turned to our favor. Cadre returned. The Party Chapter held a meeting and ordered a movement into Hamlets 5 and 6 to stabilize ((control of)) the people. The enemy refused to sell rice to the people in Hamlet 3. They opposed the enemy, and compelled him to sell them rice and allow them to return to their former homes. At first, he rejected their demands. But later they were successful. They have now built an irrigation system and cultivated the whole field.

On 9 May 70, the Puppets conducted a sweep operation. We laid mines and prepared to initiate a massive attack against them. They hit a mine made from a 155mm shell and eight were killed by the explosion. On 11 May, both the US and Puppets withdrew.

We planned to guide the people home. Cadre advocated constructing houses and trenches for the people. Military as well as civilian personnel built houses and repaired trenches. They paid great attention to the dependents of WIA and KIA.

((Page 21 of O.T.))

To date, 320 people have returned to their native areas. Cadre built houses for the people first, and for themselves later.

Sôn Thang: Formerly consisted of the following four hamlets: T. Dong, T. Tây, S. Trà and Trà Đình.

In addition to the two Popular Forces platoons which frequently launched attacks, there were one pacification team and one People's Self-Defense Force platoon. Sometimes one Popular Forces platoon, one Regional Forces squad, and one US squad were reinforced to patrol at Thang Trà.

Thang Đông is the village which had the most landowners and tyrants.

Thang Trà is the village where the people had the best tradition of revolutionary struggle.

In late 1968 its population was 1,892 people. At present there were only 233 people. Of them, 166 people are under our control. The enemy's attacks in Thang Trà were more intensive than in other areas.

evacuate to other areas. In Feb 70, the enemy massacred the people in Area 4 near Trā Đinh.

On 25 Jan 70 he conducted a raid, killing one hamlet cadre and five teenagers.

On 6 Feb ((70)), US troops searched Area 5, killing an old man.

On 18 Feb ((70)), an explosion caused the deaths of or injury 13 enemy troops. On the night of 19 Feb ((70)) the enemy entered the houses of five families in Thang Trā, killing five women and 11 children.

Altogether, 125 people were killed in 1969 and 72 were killed during 1970.

(During 1970) 78 enemy spies were assigned to appeal to our cadre ((to defect)). The enemy made every effort to terrorize the dependents of our cadre and guerrillas. From Mar to May 69, the Party Chapter had 31 members, including four legal members. There were also 13 guerrillas and 46 military, civilian, and administrative cadre. Because one cadre did not thoroughly understand ((the Party's)) guidelines, or the enemy's schemes, they were demoralized. Some of them by failing to hold their ground were a bad influence on the people. We had 13 guerrillas, but the Party failed to control them. Therefore, they conducted ineffective activities and were driven from ((RVN controlled areas)). While withdrawing, they fell into an ambush and suffered personnel losses (because they did not rely on the people). ((Administrative)) machinery existed, but was at a standstill. The cadre and the people failed to keep in contact with each other. Enemy attacks caused a famine. Enemy spies distributed rice to the people and moved freely in two areas ((possibly VC liberated and RVN controlled areas)). As a result, when cadre arrived here, the people attempted to capture them and turn them over to the enemy. We then had six guerrillas and three armed security agents. A number of guerrillas fled from enemy attack. Cadre and guerrillas had no confidence in each other. There were four legal cadre left. In 1969, eight cadre were killed. In 1970, two cadre were killed and two others were captured. Within two years, 10 Group members and seven cadre were killed. Nineteen cadre remained (including four legal cadre). There were six Group members, 11 military, civilian, and administration cadre, 10 guerrillas including eight Party members, two secret guerrilla cells, 14 key agents, five key political struggle cells with 15 members and three military proselyting cells. There were also 92 Farmers' Association members, 48 Women's Association members, and two association sub-chapters.

(Each association sub-chapter had three members.)

During late 1968, cadre improved their skills.

Two former cadre were assigned to Trā Đinh where they had to follow ((reactionaries)) who had resumed their activities. Five guerrillas and three armed security agents conducted nine indoctrination courses for 78 individuals within one and a half months. We sent six to the thought reform center ((sic)).

Two others were sentenced to death. Later, the enemy assigned missions to our cadre's wives instead of undesirable individuals. We forced these cadre to participate in indoctrination and motivation sessions. Every cadre took an oath. The security ((section)) assigned them missions and released them.

((Marginal notes)) Two installations of Popular Forces. Population of Trā Đinh was 166 people. ((End of marginal notes.))

((Page 22 of O.T.))

Cadre continued to conduct (six) meetings among the people, informed them of the enemy psywar and Chiêu Hồi ((Open-Arms)) schemes, suppressed anti-revolutionary individuals, and guided the people's struggle. Our cadre also recruited agents and contacted our former agents for use as key cadre in guiding the people's struggle.

After each struggle our cadre promptly disseminated its results. When 16 of our personnel were killed by the enemy, penetration agents conducted a struggle with the participation of 36 groups of people and three key cadre. They led US troops to the place where the massacre took place. The people joined the struggle in greater numbers, forcing the US to call more troops from Doi Doi to bury these dead persons. Eight people came to Doi Doi to conduct a struggle, demanding compensation for the victims. Twelve other demonstrators came for the same purpose. Finally the US agreed to pay 96,000\$ RVN compensation for the 16 victims. Three key cadre requested the enemy to transfer the corpses to Da Nang. Our people also insisted upon this. Three families came to receive compensation. While the people were demoralized by the critical situation, the enemy intimidated them and forced them to go to Trã Đĩnh ((sic)). Our cadre held a commemorative ceremony for these victims. Our forces motivated the people of Trã Đĩnh and surrounding areas to participate in the ceremony to denounce the enemy crimes. Two delegates of the village who expressed their opinions were determined to turn this distress into revolutionary acts. A commemorative ceremony was once again held by the whole village. All but two cadre attended. During the ceremony every delegate burned incense and resolved to strengthen the movement. After that, the people continued to struggle. Under the guidance ((of our cadre)), they refused to spend the nights in Trã Đĩnh Hamlet as usual to Quế Sơn, (because they were afraid of the cruelty of US troops.

The people burned the houses three times. Two other burnings were conducted by our personnel. Frames of houses were twice built ((by the people)). The first time, we interrupted the construction at its beginning. The second time, after 21 frames were already built, our key agents struggled against the construction of houses and forced the dependents of cadre to struggle. Unable to destroy all of the houses by ourselves, we motivated the people to destroy them. We incited the people to oppose the construction of houses, suppressed anti-revolutionary individuals, and disseminated leaflets and posters urging the people to destroy houses. We planned to attack one enemy platoon at Cầu Liêu. Personnel were sent to ((Sơn)) Long to borrow heavy machine guns. On the way back to the unit, we encountered two enemy companies, killing three enemy soldiers and wounding six others. The enemy troops fled in confusion. The next morning the enemy appeared again and tried to gather the people together. We positioned our guns at Núi Đát ((Hill)) and fired on the enemy forces. They fled and called for reinforcements. One Regional Forces Company and three Popular Forces platoons moved toward our positions. We assigned one agent to make acquaintance with a Popular Forces member and intimidate the enemy troops by telling him that there were many well armed Communist troops in this area. The enemy withdrew his troops from this area permanently when he heard this.

Once, when the enemy had assembled the people for a meeting we incited them to disperse. As a consequence, the enemy arrested the people one by one and tortured them. We fired several salvos. When our agents spread the rumor that the VC had laid ambushes, the enemy and the people fled. The meeting was unsuccessful.

At present, 32 cadre remain. All specialized agencies conducted meetings, motivating the people to make contributions and increase farm production.

In 1969 we killed 43 enemy soldiers. In 1970 we killed 56, including 23 US soldiers, wounded 17 US soldiers and six Puppet soldiers, shot down one aircraft and destroyed 206 meters of ((barbed wire)) fences. We also captured five People's Self-Defense Force personnel and later released them.

((Page 23 of O.T.))

We sent the people 32 personal letters, 46 military proselyting letters, 54 testaments and funeral orations, and 47 written orders. We conducted eight protests against gathering the people ((for meetings)), eight protests against building houses, four against defoliation, two against land encroachment, and presented 16 petitions demanding rights of free movement and permissions to bury our six slain comrades.

In addition, we intimidated the enemy six times and motivated 16 families to return to our ((VC)) liberated areas from Q.Son ((possibly Quê Son)) to farm for us.

Activities in 180 ((possibly Campaign))

(In 1969) 18% of our guerrilla forces were women.

The requirement for well-trained guerrilla force are:

Thirty (50%) must be Party members.

Fifty (70%) must be Group, members.

All must be qualified for combat duty.

Each village was required to have one well trained guerrilla cell, one engineer cell, and one village guerrilla platoon with 20 to 25 members. Each hamlet was required to have one to two ((guerrilla)) squads.

Before 180 ((possibly Campaign))

On 27 Mar ((70)), two battalions conducted a sweep operation in an area east of Quê Son and Phú Phong to steal rice.

East of the district: In Sơn Khoang and Sơn Trung the movement was strong within one month.

West of the district: Three US sweep force companies launched continuous attacks instead of large-scale sweep operations.

N. Sơn ((possibly Nghĩa Sơn)): There were no mobile forces operating in this area except the paramilitary force units. The enemy applied Special Forces tactics in intercepting ((transportation)) corridors, and used air and artillery strikes.

Requirements for ((Campaign)) 180:

Our forces must annihilate two-thirds of all paramilitary forces (seven or eight platoons). Guerrilla forces must annihilate five to seven platoons. Altogether we must eliminate 12 to 15 platoons, seriously disorganize seven more platoons, kill 150 tyrants, and destroy 10 aircraft and 40 military vehicles. In addition we must incapacitate 2,500 enemy troops and gain the support of 10,000 people in enemy ((RVN)) controlled areas and 10,000 people in disputed areas. Before 180 ((possibly Campaign)), we destroyed five pacification platoons and activated two platoons in P. Tho ((possibly Phu Tho Area)).

(Within six months) we annihilated 10 platoons, damaged six platoons, killed 70 tyrants, and downed nine aircraft.

Comparison of combat achievements:

1969: Both main and guerrilla forces incapacitated 3,876 enemy soldiers.

1970: We killed 2,955 enemy soldiers (as of 10 Jun 70).

Of these our guerrillas killed 1,260 regular troops and 523 Regional Forces members.

We incapacitated 1,723 enemy soldiers, including 94 US soldiers and 26 tyrants.

Comparison with 1969:

Ratio of casualties ((caused by main force)):

1/25.5

Ratio of casualties caused by guerrilla force:

Non-combat: 1/32

Combat: 1/81

During the first six months of 1970, the main force used 4,070 rounds of ammunition.

Guerrilla forces used 18,700 rounds.

As an average, guerrilla and main forces spent eight rounds to kill one enemy soldier.

The first six months of 1969:

During 90 days of 180 ((Campaign)), each guerrilla killed one to nine enemy soldiers. The prescribed quota was one enemy soldier per day or 90 enemy soldiers in three months.

During the first six months, each comrade killed two to five enemy soldiers.

ACHIEVEMENTS: DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1970:

f villages	Number of battles	Kill in action		Wounded in action		Captured	Tyrants
		Total	Americans	Total	American		
((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))	((5))	((6))	((7))	((8))
Phong	25	185	31	15	6	((Blank))	1
Thanh	25	74	33	25	11	((Blank))	3
Điện	61	296	222	149	69	((Blank))	((Blank))
Hưng	22	84	58	33	16	((Blank))	1
Hiệp	4	10	((Blank))	6	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
Pho	24	108	32	55	25	2	((Blank))
Phước	19	122	49	24	14	((Blank))	2
Phan	7	5	2	8	2	2	((Blank))
Trung	20	68	29	30	19	((Blank))	((Blank))
Thanh	16	39	34	26	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
Liên	9	33	13	11	6	((Blank))	((Blank))

Incapaciated		Weapons	Aircraft	Vehicles	Forces completely annihilated
Total	American				
((9))	((10))	((11))	((12))	((13))	((14))
200	37	3	1	10	((Blank))
99	44	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
445	291	8	1 HU1A ((helicopter))	((Blank))	((Blank))
117	74	((Blank))	((Blank))	1	((Blank))
16	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	1	((Blank))
165	57	3	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
146	55	1	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
15	4	2	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
98	48	((Blank))	1 HU1A ((helicopter))	((Blank))	((Blank))
65	60	3	((Blank))	((Blank))	1 squad
44	19	1	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))

((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))	((5))	((6))	((7))	((8))
Sơn Thanh	9	17	5	6	2	((Blank))	((Blank))
Sơn Thắng	8	15	3	20	5	5	((Blank))
Sơn Lộc	1	1	((Blank))	2	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
Sơn Long	23	121	116	82	69	((Blank))	((Blank))
Sơn Thạch	14	38	38	26	26	((Blank))	((Blank))
Sơn Viên	4	8	8	1	1	((Blank))	((Blank))
Sơn Phước	10	37	8	27	8	((Blank))	((Blank))
Guerrillas	301	1,215	681	483	305	9	7
Local Forces	81	955	((Blank))	217	((Blank))	((Blank))	71
	389	2,170	((Blank))	700	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))

	((10))	((11))	((12))	((13))	((14))
	7	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
	12	((Blank))	1 H31 ((helicopter))	((Blank))	((Blank))
	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
	185	10	4	((Blank))	((Blank))
	64	2	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))
	9	1	1 HUIA ((helicopter))	((Blank))	((Blank))
	15	((Blank))	2	((Blank))	((Blank))
	<u>981</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>((Blank))</u>
	250	22	((Blank))	21	One platoon One squad
					13 platoons + 2 squads and one US Units
	1,231	56	((Blank))	33	14 platoons

So far, the guerrilla force has attained 3.6% ((of its projected strength goal. Of those already recruited, 24% are female members, and 39.6% are Group members.

Of the above 18 villages, the following five village did not attack the enemy: Phu Huong, ((Sơn)) Minh ((sic)), Sơn Phú Hiệp and Sơn Viên.

Line units were outstanding units: (Phu Điện, Phu Phong, Phu Huong, Phu Tho, Sơn Thượng, Sơn Trung, Sơn Long, Sơn Thanh Phú Quốc).

Name of village	Number of liberated inhabitants	5N Dung ((sic))	Number of inhabitants under temporary enemy control	Number of inhabitants under enemy oppressive control	Number of cadre	Guerrillas	Group members	((Blank))
((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))	((5))	((6))	((7))	((8))	
Phu Thanh	320	500	150	3,000	8	9	9	((Blank))
Phu Phong	3,600	350	((Blank))	500	38	103	28	1,200 inhabitants of Phu Hung, Phu Hiep, and Phu Thanh have been sent to T6 and T8.
Phu Huong	1,507	800	((Blank))	1,200	22	74	25	
Phu Dien	2,710	800	((Blank))	((Blank))	22	70	25	
Phu Hiep	767	((Blank))	501	((Blank))	5	27	6	
Phu Tho	3,417	((Blank))	566	((Blank))	20	72	29	
Son Thuong	2,224	478	((Blank))	700	24	49	30	
Son Thanh	810	((Blank))	1,782	1,300	13	20	10	
Son Trung	2,100	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	19	72	25	
Son Khanh	800	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	11	23	15	
Son Lanh	118	((Blank))	((Blank))	2,800	6	15	5	

((1))	((2))	((3))	((4))	((5))	((6))	((7))	((8))	
Sơn Thành	31	((Blank))	((Blank))	6,000	3	3	((Blank))	
Sơn Lộc	19	((Blank))	((Blank))	4,200	9	4	1	
Sơn Thắng	399	287	((Blank))	1,000	19	16	6	
Sơn Long	2,435	92	((Blank))	((Blank))	20	84	26	((Blank))
Sơn Thạch	820	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	12	45	10	
Sơn Viên	1,200	((Blank))	((Blank))	6,000	16	114	34	
Sơn Khuông	20	420	2,100	4,100	4	4	4	
Sơn Ninh	13	((Blank))	((Blank))	3,100	4	4	2	
Sơn Phước	1,004	((Blank))	((Blank))	((Blank))	26	40	28	
	24,314	3,727	4,819	27,800	271	838	318	
	27,041		32,619					
		59,000 ((sic))						

2,400 ((possibly inhabitants)) were sent to Đà Nẵng and Cam Ranh, 3,000 were sent to Khg K ((sic)) 1,000 inhabitants of Sơn Khuông were sent to Đức Dục.

((Blank))

Comrade Thang's review of the political reorientation conducted in Quê Sơn.1. Assessment of enemy failures and friendly victories.

After his strategic failure the enemy shifted to an unconventional war. After 1965 the war had changed entirely.

The enemy built strategic hamlets, introduced new propaganda campaigns as the "denouncement of Communist crimes" and the "annihilation of Communists," and established an effective Puppet administration system at all echelons. At that time our armed forces were still weak, but we enjoyed the active support of the people and had gained great achievements in our simultaneous uprisings.

After its failure in the unconventional war, the US sent American troops to SVN. During the first dry season the reinforcements consisted of five divisions and two brigades totalling 260,000. (The 1st US Division moved to Đà Nẵng; the 3rd US Division moved to Chu Lai; the "Anh Cā Đō" ((Big Red)) Division came to SVN; the 9th US Division to the Mekong River area, and the 101st Division to An Khê). The five divisions are five well-trained US units. However they failed in their search and destroy operations and pacification programs.

In Mar 65, the 1st and 3rd US Marine Divisions entered SVN with 40,000 troops each. (The official strength of a division is only 16,000 men, but with its rear service personnel it has altogether 40,000 men). The US Marines are an army branch activated (in 1775) before the foundation of the USA ((sic)). On 27 May 65, two US Marine companies were completely destroyed by X70 unit upon their arrival at Chu Lai. One friendly company also destroyed one US company at Thanh Mountain and captured 14 weapons. In the Gô Hà Battle, one additional US company was eliminated. On 19 Aug 65, in the Van Tuông Battle, we killed 100 US troops. Activated in 1917, the "Big Red" Division participated in three wars: War I (in France and Europe) for 46 days; World War II, during.... ((blank)); and in the Vietnam war. It suffered failures during 1300 days of combat. The 9th US Division penetrated the Mekong Delta while the 1st US Air Cavalry, a creation of McNamara, originated from a ((US)) cavalry unit. This division has 16,000 air cavalry troops and is now equipped with 360 aircraft. It moved to An Khê and then to ((Quảng)) Tri and ((Thuá)) Thien, and was seriously defeated there.

Making a comparison between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, we find that in the Korean War the US brought in only two divisions composed of 70,000 troops.

((Marginal note)) The 25th US Division occupied ((two words illegible)) in six days. ((End of marginal note)). At the beginning of the Vietnam war, when the US troops arrived in Vietnam, one division landed at the mouths of two rivers while another landed at our rear. The enemy succeeded in encircling us and changing the situation. Afterwards an additional 200,000 US troops were sent in and drove us back to the 17th parallel. The fight lasted for four years before negotiations. Both sides agreed to a ceasefire and establishment of the frontier at the 17th parallel. In the first monsoon season, though

In 1967, the US troop strength in Vietnam increased to 550,000, composed of nine divisions and five brigades (excluding two Marine Divisions). The 25th US Division and the 4th Division moved to the Western Highlands area. The 101st Airborne Division and Americal Division are fire fighting divisions ((sic)). Two brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division and two brigades of the 99th US Division were sent to SVN. All of them were well-trained units. Only the 4th Division and the Americal Division were newly activated units. (196th 198th-11th) ((possibly Brigades)).

Number of US troops incapacitated by us:

1965 - Killed or wounded	167,550
1966 - Total strength	270,000
Killed or wounded	180,000
1967 - Total strength	365,000
Killed or wounded	17,000 ((sic))
1968 - Total strength	630,000
Killed or wounded	230,000
1969 - Total strength	660,000
Killed or wounded	255,000

Number of US aircraft shot down by friendly forces:

1965	1,337
1969	133 ((sic))
1968	6,000

((Page 27 of O.T.))

Number of enemy vehicles destroyed by us:

1964	720
1965	1,960
1966	3,200
1967	8,500
1968	13,000
1969	13,000

Because the enemy sustained considerable casualties, he was forced to de-escalate the war. In late 1967, his strategy shifted to the defensive.

((In the VN war)) the enemy employed a massive number of troops. The ratio of different forces of the US expeditionary troops was as follows:

Total strength: 560,000

Infantry troops: 60%

Marine forces: 50%

Strategic Air Force: 19.5%

Tactical Air Force: 31%

Naval troops: 36%

Aircraft carriers: 66%

However, since the unconventional war began in mid-1965 until mid-1969, 400,000 enemy troops were incapacitated, among whom 45,000 were killed.

In the Korean War, during five years of combat ((sic)), the enemy casualties were only 360,000, of whom five percent were officers.

In World War I, 270,000 enemy ((US)) troops were incapacitated.

In World War II, the number of enemy losses was 260,000.

In the VN war, during four years, the enemy lost (according to our reports) 700,000 men, of whom 15 percent were officers. The training of an American officer is very intense. He must attend two training courses lasting from seven to 10 years. He must also belong to the capitalist class.

Using our general uprising policy, the Mau Than spring ((sic)) marked a turning point in revolutionary history. Consequently, we can conclude in any war, the side that is forced to take the defensive is on the verge of losing the war. Enemy failures:

The enemy stopped his destructive warfare against NVN of his own initiative.

The four-sided Paris Conference recognized the NFLSVN.

Seeing our victories on all battlefields, the US was obliged to withdraw its troops unilaterally. 10,000 troops have been withdrawn at three different times, and the withdrawal of 150,000 troops will be completed by May 71. Because of its repeated failures, the US had to withdraw troops while fighting. Actually, they had withdrawn two divisions and three brigades ((sic)) (the 1st and 9th Divisions, the 1st Division ((sic)) and two brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division) but only a part of one division was withdrawn.

Enemy difficulties:

The enemy has encountered great economic difficulties and inflation is rampant. In World War II, the USSR spent 187 billion ((rubles)) and lost 17 million men, the US death toll was only 280,000 men. At the end of World War II, the US made a profit of 40 billion dollars from the sale of weapons. The gross national product of the US was 900 billion dollars per year, while that of the USSR was only 500 billion per year. Since then the US dollar has increased ((sic)) in value. At that time, 14 billion US dollars circulated were guaranteed by 28 billion ((of gold)), but now 36 billion US dollars are only guaranteed by 13.5 billion dollars of gold. For this reason, the US currency has been devaluated ((sic)) and it cannot control the international monetary system.

The devaluation of the US dollar has affected the lives of citizens. ((The US Government)) had to increase the tax level to 19%.