

This devaluation was caused by the production of war materiel **instead** of consumer goods. ((Under the circumstances, the USA)) had to import engines, gasoline, cloth and food. Of the six branches of heavy industry only leather shoes ((sic)) and nuclear weapon manufacturing branches are still operating. West German, Japanese, and French goods are overflowing the USA.

According to the production documents, the ((economic and industrial)) improvement of Japan reached 87 percent whereas that of the USA remained at 53 percent.

The expenditure for the Vietnam war was too enormous.

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The USA acknowledged having spent 200 billion dollars, which is a sufficient sum to rebuild all of its cities.

Inflation exerted great influence upon the lives of the people.

3. Therefore, US foreign policy met with difficulties, and its world strategy was ruined. The US has 200 million people, 2,800,000 troops, and 300 bases abroad. It has 19 divisions, but brought half of its divisions (including one armored division) to SVN, deployed two divisions in Korea, five divisions in Europe and two others in the US. Therefore, its world strategy was ruined. The US possess broad capabilities for waging the three following kinds of war: Unconventional, limited, and nuclear. Limited war could be waged on a large scale and in 44 countries. (It belonged to the third kind ((of war)) ((sic))). Since 1955, five countries were used as experimental sites ((of limited war)). Among them, only two experimental sites were successful (in the Dominican Republic victory was obtained by using one division, and Israel occupied one-third of Egypt.)

((Marginal notes)) VN, Cuba and Korea were unsuccessful. ((End of marginal note)).

The US would not be able to cope with its failures if it escalated the VN war. It took part in Czechoslovakian war ((sic)) in which the USSR brought in 24,000 troops in one night.

4. For these reasons, the struggle movement became greater in the US. Four struggles were conducted by students, housewives, American Negroes, and upper class intellectuals. (There are 25 million American Negroes but 15% of them are in the army.)

Despite its severe, overall, and continuous failures, the US still stubbornly planned to carry out the Vietnamization program to prolong the war. ((Marginal notes: The US suffered failures due to four disadvantageous factors: Targets, time, position, and tactics. However it continued to be stubborn and launch fierce attacks. Its aim was to escalate the war and carry out its neo-colonialist policy.))

## Part 2:

### Friendly successes:

First, we achieved ever greater military victories. From the beginning of 1969 to 1970 in our province, we attacked the (196th, 198th and 111th);

The Americal Division, 12 battalions, and two battalions of 7th Marine Regiment. The accelerated pacification was widely carried out throughout the territory. Cop Bién ((possibly nickname of RVN Marine Unit)) launched ((sweep operations)) Vu Minh 1 and 2 and Lien Ket 9.

We succeeded in countering the enemy's accelerated pacification, incapacitated 14,500 enemy troops in the province and 4,500 enemy troops in Quê Sơn. Our ((VC)) liberated area was firmly maintained.

In the economic field, the people's contribution was satisfactory. Political struggle and military proselyting activities obtained good results.

B Giang ((sic)): Within two months we killed 700 enemy soldiers and destroyed 47 vehicles. We annihilated almost an entire Puppet company (and destroyed 12 ploughing machines).

1. We achieved strategic successes by frustrating the enemy's "search and destroy" tactics, pacification program, and "clear and hold" operations, and by disrupting the enemy's perimeter defense.

We shifted to a new strategy by initiating the General Offensive and Uprising.

2. Our victories are significant. Our population is only 31 million people and our territory is small. However, they succeeded in defeating the Americans and thus have shown the people of the world that the US is not as frightful as they thought.

3. **International significance:** Our national successes gave us more experience, which contributed to the liberation movement throughout the world and triggered the world movement. The US imperialists were opposed wherever they went. The people of the world praised our heroism and admired Chairman HỒ.

It will not be long before we gain the final victory. The US has failed, but is trying to save its prestige. We will win the war. But what would make the victory advantageous (is to win the war at the right time). It will take our utmost effort, especially on the part of our cadre.

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#### Reasons for our success

##### Weaknesses:

We failed to gain control of the people.

Guerrilla activities were weak. There was an increase in personnel of only 3.6%. The prescribed goal was six percent.

We had no secret guerrillas. Political struggles helped to break ((the enemy's)) oppressive control. Military proselyting activities did not disintegrate enemy forces.

We failed to strengthen ((VC)) liberated areas, improve the Party, upgrade the people's standard of living, and develop revolutionary capabilities. The strength of liberated areas depends upon the cadre and the people for its development.

Some villages did not settle the population problem.

((Marginal note:))

We met economic difficulties. Cadre were pessimistic. They were not aggressive in attacking the enemy. They feared difficulties and hardship. Furthermore, they did not have a firm determination. ((End of marginal note.))

Mission:

The enemy attempted to carry out "search and destroy" tactics, the pacification program, "clear and hold" operations, and the de-Americanization plan.

The Puppet army was strong and their strength high. Nixon advocated the doctrine of using war to promote war.

Our rear areas were hurt economically.

((Marginal note:)) Pacification was accelerated. The enemy established perimeter defenses and blocked key positions to protect cities. ((End of marginal note.))

He followed the very cunning scheme of psywar activities by launching fierce attacks and practicing demagoguery at the same time. However, we were overconfident in coping with the enemy.

The enemy's future alternatives in the province:

Redeploy troops while maintaining four divisions of about 260,000 troops. He may redeploy the 3rd Marine Division and the Americal to the north and the 11th Brigade to TKy-TBinh ((sic)).

Build perimeter defense by moving to 38 positions in the east and 42 others in the west.

Resettle the people and carry out pacification programs by persuading the people to move to ((RVN)) controlled areas.

Launch fierce attacks and sweep operations, use tanks and aircraft, disturb our economy, and create difficulties for the people.

The intensity of enemy attacks would then be greater than it has been in East T Binh, for example.

((Marginal note:)) When the 38th ((RVNAF Division)) or 196th ((Brigade, 23rd US Division)) moves to our areas under cover of helicopters and tanks, we should gain the initiative by attacking these newly arrived forces. ((End of marginal note.))

The US is de-escalating the war. Three factions ((sic)) have advocated the following:

End the war immediately.

Withdraw combat troops and leave support forces behind.

Carry out sporadic troop withdrawals and prolong the war.

Nixon was supported by the community (of millionaires) in the northeastern United States. He belongs to the community of men (who own oil, iron, and steel ((sic)) mines).

However, all three factions were unsuccessful, because the Indochina War broke out.

Cambodia consisted of 101 sub-sectors. We liberated 50 sub-sectors and 10 battalions, encircled nine battalions, and disintegrated four battalions.

The French own 56% of the interests in SVN. The ((VN)) war has not been profitable to the US, but **has cost** it a great deal of money. However, ((it had to take part in the war)) because it feared that if VN were overrun, the whole of Asia would be invaded by the Communists.

Three characteristics of the General Offensive and Uprising:

Our principal missions aimed at the following five objectives:

Oppose the Vietnamization program.

Motivate the people ((to struggle against the enemy)) and gain control of the population.

Strengthen border areas.

Develop our capabilities in all fields (military and political forces, and the Party).

Provide guidance for economic activities.

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Six major tasks:

1. Military:

Guerrilla warfare has played an important role ((in the present war)). Two-thirds of the total number of enemy casualties were caused by guerrilla forces. Each guerrilla killed on the average two enemy soldiers every six months. In the future, he should try to kill at least one enemy soldier every month. Friendly casualties dropped two percent.

Guidelines for self-critique during the political reorientation:

1. The ideals, attitude, and will to fight of a person are judged on his evaluation of friendly and enemy forces and his strengths and weaknesses, and whether or not he follows the example of Chairman Ho, who dedicated his life to the Revolution and had absolute confidence in our victory.

The thorough understanding of ((Party)) policies concerning popular warfare, protracted war and self-sufficiency, and the guidances in Resolution 10 and principles of three-pronged attack will demonstrate his firm commitment and fighting spirit.

Full understanding of primary missions and our potential is included in a personal critique.

2. Rightist and passive attitudes can be found in ((a cadre's)) performance. Does he attack the enemy continuously; does he have a proper attitude about life and death; and has he a firm will to fight, to hold on to the area of operations, and to counter enemy pacification activities and destroy enemy troops? ((The presence of a)) shirking attitude or a lazy attitude, and one's attitude toward the internal struggle and strengthening of unity are included in a personal critique.

3. Whether a person suffers from individualism will be reflected through his work, which may be for the Party or for personal glory and interest.

Attitudes toward personal interest, corruption and waste, and one's responsibility toward the Party and the development and future of the Party are included ((in the personal critique)).

Also mentioned in the self-critique is whether or not ((the person in question)) follows Uncle ((Ho's)) examples, ethics, ~~has~~ and a thrifty, humble, and simple attitude, and whether he fully understands Uncle ((Ho's)) testament and is worthily performing his work.

Individuals are requested to make comments by themselves and give true critiques of themselves.

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Cell 1: 7 ((men))

Cell 2: 6

Cell 3: 6

Cell 4: 7

Cell 5: 4

#### 1. Attitude and combat spirit

Three comrades of Cell 1 displayed fear of death 3/6 ((possibly on 3 June)).

((Some of our men)) were daunted by difficulties, and overestimated the enemy. But through political reorientation, ((they)) clearly recognized the enemy failures. However, ((they)) still failed to realize the achievements attained by d25 ((possibly 25th Battalion)).

They feared a prolonged war, lacked confidence, and doubted their strength to endure.

They did not clearly understand the principle of three-pronged attack.

District agencies did not understand their major missions.

They were afraid that they could not implement the policy of self-help, especially that concerning manpower and supplies.

((Some of our men)) quit fighting.

((Marginal note)) Viewpoint should be consolidated ((sic)).  
((End of marginal note.))

2. ((Our men)) adopted rightist and passive attitudes and feared hardships, lacked a sense of responsibility, and quit some missions.

Internal struggle in cells 4 and 5 was weak.

((Some of our men)) were reluctant to work ((three words illegible)).

3. Diem and Cai were inclined to individualism. They did not participate in internal struggles and coveted high positions.

Fear of death:

3/7 ((possibly three members of cell 7))

3/6

4/6

7/7

4/5

Individualism: 3/6

Fifty percent of the members of the branches feared death.

Villages ((possibly faced difficulties)) in self-sufficiency.

Primary missions were understood more clearly.

Leadership was improved.

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Inquired about food requisition and purchasing of Sơn Thượng, fighting activities of Bả Văn ((sic)), production of Phú Phong, and ((the number of)) military proselyting agents and security agents.

26 Jun.

Dinh conducted a raid during the day and killed five enemy troops. Hang attacked reinforcements.

Four guerrillas killed 10 enemy troops, wounded another, and captured three weapons in an ambush.

At 1110 hours, Comrade Day, a village guerrilla, assistant arrow leader Thu, and three other comrades conducted a raid on the area between the parking area of four enemy tanks and a large enemy ship, causing an accidental clash between enemy troops. Altogether, 17 enemy troops were killed. In this raid, they killed 58 enemy troops; wiped out the command committee of an enemy company; destroyed one ((unstated)) machine, one 60mm mortar, and a number of other weapons; and captured four mines, three AR-15 ((M-16)) weapons, one individual mortar, and one pair of tinoculars for night use. The enemy landed troops and fought our forces along the dike until the next day.

Order number	Villages	Liberated population		Five contents ((sic))		Loosely controlled area		Areas under enemy control		Party Chapter				Group Chapter		
		Hamlets	Population	Hamlets	Population	Hamlets	Population	Hamlets	Population	Party Chapter Committee	Total	Female members	B ((sic))	Total	Female members	B ((sic))
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
1	Phu Phong	9	3,800		200				1,500	5	38	4	9	28	8	6
2	Phu Thanh	3	320	2	545	1	150	3	2,600	2	8	2	1	8	2	
3	Phu Dien	5	2,700	1	800				300	3	18	2	1	20	3	3
4	Phu Huong	5	2,116	1	827			1	1,100	7	22	4	1	30		
5	Phu Tho	8	2,257	2	813				900	3	22	5	2	29	11	
6	Phu Hiep	3	770					1	2,000	2	7	1	1	6	1	3
7	Son Thuong	4	2,230	1	500			1	600	7	34	8	2	30	9	5
8	Son Trung	5	1,264						900	5	20	5		36		
9	Son Khanh	3	380						1,000	2	9	1		17	9	
10	Son Lanh	3	128						2,500	3	7	1		3	1	2

Village guerrillas						Hamlet guerrillas					Military, civilian and government cadre	Agents in friendly controlled area		Agents in enemy controlled area	
Command ((guerrilla cadre))	Total	Female agents	Party	Group	B	Command ((guerrilla cadre))	Total	Female ((guerrilla))	Party	Group		TH ((sic))	HD ((sic))	20 ((sic))	
(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)
5	30	3	12	8	6	14	30			3		16		9	
1	3	1	1	1		3					72	4		3	
4	24	1	4	10	6	10	40	13		4	38	20		4	
5	21	4	3	16	7	5	25			14		6		1	
4	25	6	2	11		14	45		3	9	56				
3	7		4	2	7						22	6		4	
6	10	2	4	10	9	9	22	1	2	5		7		18	1
4	15	2	7	8		11	47		2		52				
4	12	1	3	1		5	16	5	2	6	17	6	1		
1	3														

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
11	Sơn Thanh	1	31					3	5,000	1	3	1		1	1	
12	Sơn Thắng	2	233		453				1,200	1	19	7	1	5	7	1
13	Sơn Long	3	1,455		90				500	3	20	5		36	13	
14	Sơn Thạch	3	857						1,800	3	10	3		37	9	
15	Sơn Viên	7	1,040						5,400	3	14	1		24	5	
16	Sơn Ninh	2	21					3	2,100	1	3			2		
17	Sơn Khuông	1	20	1	420	1	2,100	3	4,200	1	5	1	3	1		1
18	Sơn Lộc		19						4,200							
19	Sơn Thanh		810				1,782		1,300							
20	Sơn Phước		1,200						2,000							
			21,571		4,648		4,032		41,100							

Population in liberated areas: 21,571

Population in controlled areas: 4,648

26,219

Loosely controlled areas: 4,032

Enemy controlled areas : 41,100

45,132

Total: 71,351

CDEC Doc Log No. 11-11770

	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)
11	1	3	1									9				
12	5	10	1	2	1		4					11	14	3	2	
13	3	19	3	2	5		8	42	11	2	2	63	34			
14	5	16	3	1	4		9	20	3	1	2	40	9			
15	4	24	2	3	6		15	45	2	0	7	28	8			
16	2	3		1	1							14	5	3		
17		3	1	3											12	2
18																
19																
20				(228)					(329)							

3 Aug 70. Review of the political reorientation by Comrade Thang.

Requirement of the political reorientation was satisfactorily fulfilled.

((We)) understood the major tasks.

Leadership was promoted.

At the beginning, we corrected erroneous thoughts, then continued to control the ideology ((of our men)).

Four strengths: Attitude and will ((to fight))

Everyone has trained himself to have confidence in victory and determination to defeat the US.

We always made an effort to accomplish our missions. The results obtained were unmatched.

We bravely surmounted apparently insurmountable difficulties to carry out combat missions and promote the movement.

Due to a thorough understanding of the concept of life and the right attitude toward life and death, we had the necessary strength to fight.

For these reasons, the movement was maintained and developed in some areas.

Weaknesses:

1. Assessment of friendly and enemy situations:

We usually estimated the enemy correctly.

We had a tendency to overestimate the enemy when encountering fierce attacks and did not understand his basic weaknesses.

Some comrades were overconfident and inaccurately assessed the situation. Therefore, when the enemy attacked, they displayed pessimism and lacked confidence.

We did not believe in the people's capability. (Chairman Ho taught us to rely on the people.) This limited the development of the people's strength.

We also did not trust our own capability and that of the Party Chapter. Therefore, we failed to strengthen our determination and often depended on higher echelons.

Reason: Unstable working class viewpoint and lack of revolutionary determination.

Our men displayed a firm will to attack the enemy. (Comrade Thanh of P Trach and the guerrillas of Châu Sơn Hamlet killed 31 enemy and captured eight rifles.)

We properly assessed the enemy and friendly situations and adopted the correct way of thinking.

Understanding of the policy: We implemented the people's war, but we failed to understand the policy of protracted war. The principle of the revolutionary struggle is to make efforts to gain victory step by step.

We must master the three-pronged attack, a resourceful guideline which requires the contribution of each civilian, soldier, and cadre, and a general leadership quality for the revolutionary struggle. Anywhere that this policy is successfully implemented, we can gain the support of the people and promote the ((revolutionary)) movement.

((Our men)) still relied on higher echelon and did not display a spirit of self-sufficiency. They did not make efforts to provide their own supplies, but relied on supply for (one bullet and four kilograms of rice) ((sic)).

The major missions were generally not understood; therefore, they were poorly executed. Various district agencies did not support the village Party Committees, and displayed lack of enthusiasm in their tasks and a lack of determination to fight the enemy.

((Marginal note:)) Ideological problems. ((End of marginal note))

2. Rightist and negative outlook:

Lack of aggressiveness in attacks on the enemy.

Fear of death: Party members and district cadre failed to stay close to villages and were afraid of being sent on missions. The village special action units attacked the enemy in forward areas. The people's motivation left much to be desired, and the recruitment of agents was ineffectively performed. Agents were not employed to attack the enemy. ((Our men)) displayed fear of duty in remote areas.

((Our men)) were afraid of death, but they still had an ideal.

Attitude towards duty: ((Our men)) were not determined to overcome difficulties and the fierceness of the war, and were afraid of a prolonged war. For these reasons, they lacked self-assurance and balked at difficulties. Critiques within internal organization were not frankly carried out, resulting in a lack of unity.

Reason: Some people elected to the Party as representatives of the working class did not belong to this class and did not display an absolute revolutionary spirit. We should improve their revolutionary ethics.

3. Individualism: Subjectivism, conceit, and jealousy for high position were prevalent among our men. They were often concerned with their family rather than their revolutionary work. The cause for this weakness was that most of our men belonged to the old class ((sic)).

Our cadre were conceited. They considered themselves the main reason for the success of the movement, and the Party's achievements. They displayed overconfidence in leadership, and thought that they were aggressive.

Common reasons:

1. The struggle has reached the phase in which our Revolution should be completed. The enemy Vietnamization plan is entering a violent stage, creating many difficulties for us, and adversely affecting our morale. We should correct erroneous thoughts to counter enemy psychological warfare.

The war has reached its climax.

2. As our fight moves toward victory, we encounter more difficulties that we have not made efforts to overcome.

3. Training was not based on Marxism-Leninism. It would be beneficial to us if we review the present situation. The chief reason for poor development is our poor training.

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Role of a secretary: Master the ideological task in internal organization and be the keystone of the coming reorientation course in order to help the Party Chapter successfully perform its key role in the movement. The political reorientation of agents is a matter of great importance.

Participate in ((Party Chapter)) activities and frankly make critiques for the Party Chapter. By so doing, the Party Chapter can be improved.

Three requirements of political reorientation for the Party Chapter.

Promote the leadership role of the Party Chapter.

Improve the ideology of Party members and encourage them to be exemplary in missions.

Party Chapter must play a key role in leadership and development of the movement in villages.

Lessons learned from political reorientation conducted in villages.

Good leadership is required to settle messing matters.

Attention must be paid to ideological development to eliminate rightist and passive attitudes, such as the fear of protracted war and the tendency to worry over family affairs.

The key role of the Party Chapter is to guide struggles and discussions.

Practical experience gained from hamlet cells are used as instructional material for the three-pronged attack and the building of liberated areas.

Major missions must be implemented.

Select three ((outstanding)) personnel representing three aspects of operation, and an outstanding production member.

((Learn)) lessons acquired from food requisition and purchasing in Sơn Thượng. (Hamlets 1 and 2 attained 100% of their goals.)

Improve attitudes toward study and promote freedom of thought.

Review activities of Party members to select Four-Good-Quality members.

The secretary must organize training for Party members to increase the number of hard-core Party members and to strengthen the Party.

Rate achievements and select outstanding individuals and exemplary acts.

Some points to be clearly understood.

The enemy sustained heavy defeats while we achieved great victories.

The enemy was forced to de-escalate the war, while our revolutionary struggle gained success.

Specific schemes used by the enemy against our village.

Our common mission and major tasks consisted of:

Countering enemy pacification and winning the support of the people,

Breaking the enemy's oppressive control.

Building up our area.

Our major missions aimed at five objectives, including the disruption of the enemy

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((missions)) in fringe areas, strengthening our forces and ((development of)) the economy.

Experiences in providing effective guidance for ((political)) reorientation of Party Chapters:

1. To ensure success for the political reorientation of ((Party Chapters)), we must make them realize the role of a Party Chapter. This is the basic factor in strengthening the Party. According to Chairman Ho's teaching: "Only when a solid foundation is built, can the house stand firm." The motivation for strengthening of Party Chapters is to strengthen the Party Headquarters. Only when many Party Chapters are strengthened will the Party Headquarters become strong.

2. The strengthening of Party Chapters during the General Offensive and Uprising is essential to a decisive victory. Therefore, the policy ((for strengthening of Party Chapters)) must be sound, and it must be executed properly. Victories can be achieved sooner or later, it depends on how well Party Chapters perform their roles.

3. Cadre are a nucleus, a fortress, a school, and a link between Party Chapters and the people.

I. EXPERIENCES:

1. To provide effective guidance in the ((political)) reorientation, we must fully understand the following objectives and requirements: Thoroughly understand Resolution 10 of the Region ((VC Region 5)) Party Committee; accurately assess the friendly and enemy situations; recognize ((the enemy's)) schemes and tricks; comprehend prime missions and the five objectives of major tasks ((which are to destroy the enemy, win over the people, build up forces, ((carry out)) the task of fringe areas, and develop the economy))

(based on the resolution of the District ((Que Son)) Party Committee).

2. We must eliminate such ideological weaknesses as rightism and individualism. We must combat these weaknesses in Party Chapters, correctly evaluate strengths and weaknesses, and classify Party members of Party Chapters (Four=Good=Quality, fair, or poor Party members) in order to take appropriate action concerning them. These weaknesses must be corrected during the ((political)) reorientation.

3. We must improve the capability of leadership and the vanguard spirit of ((Party members)), and make them fulfill the seven responsibilities of a Party member.

All other tasks are important, but the ideological task is the most important one.

## II. CONTENTS OF THE ((POLITICAL)) REORIENTATION:

1. How was the enemy defeated and how did we win in the past (1960)? Since 1969, the enemy has suffered repeated failures. This has driven him toward complete failure in all fields

We have achieved ever greater victories. How have we achieved victory after victory ?

Military successes led us to success in all fields.

The meaning of our victories: ((Our victories)) are of strategic importance and ((have had)) international repercussions.

Causes for our victories: The Party's leadership.

The gallantry of our people and cadre

International support and socialism in NVN.

2. Prospects for the near future: The enemy will suffer increasingly severe failure. We will enjoy favorable conditions. With our strong efforts, we will certainly win. We are determined to create favorable conditions to achieve a complete victory.

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3. Enemy schemes and tricks: ((Our)) difficulties and advantages:

Following are the five enemy plans:

Vietnamize the war. The accelerated pacification program is the backbone of the Vietnamization plan.

Set up a defense system to protect base areas, communication lines, and cities. He will set up key positions, but will not conduct strong attacks (previously, he conducted search and destroy operations and carried out his plan of aggression by launching repeated and massive attacks against us). He is compelled to disperse his forces to man key positions. Previously ((his operations)) were conducted by division or brigade-size units and the ((smallest operations)) were conducted by

battalion-size units. Platoon or squad-size units are now employed, instead.

Use tanks, US sweep forces, and air power to undermine our economy and attack our rear areas to paralyse our resistance forces and cause difficulties for local inhabitants.

Carry out cunning Open-Arms and psywar plans. This has been proved in our reports.

The above facts lead us to conclude that despite his failures, the enemy remains stubborn and cunning.

Advantages and disadvantages of the resolution ((of Que Son District Party Committee)).

4. What is the common task of the Party Headquarters in the near future? ((This common task is)) to carry on the Revolution patiently and carry out the ((following)) immediate and prime missions:

Counter pacification activities and relocation schemes to win the people to our side.

Eliminate enemy local administrative officials.

Strengthen our forces.

5. Cadre must strive to implement the following five major tasks:

Destroy a large portion of US and Puppet forces, tyrants, and enemy local administrative officials, and motivate ((local inhabitants to)) eliminate tyrants.

Motivate the people to rise up and win them over to our side.

Intensify ((political)) movements in district seats and province capitals.

Make efforts to strengthen cadre and develop guerrilla warfare, political and military movements and ((people's)) organizations.

Requisition and purchase commodities and engage in agricultural production.

6. Specific mission prescribed in the resolution of ((Que Son)) District Party Committee: Develop guerrilla warfare; win the support of the people; ((conduct)) military proselyting and political struggles; ((develop)) the economy and strengthen our forces and the Party; and perform ideological tasks.

### III. GUIDELINES AND METHODS:

We must prove our arguments by our deeds.

Guideline for ideological motivation of Party members: We must strengthen the ideology of Party members. In conjunction with politically awakening the working class, we must invigorate their sense of patriotism ((and remind them)) that nothing is more valuable than freedom.

Promote hatred ((of the enemy)).

Motivating someone to be aware of something is promoting his spirit,

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Through indoctrination and discussion, we must improve the cadre's proletarian viewpoint and promote their resentment of the enemy.

Method of ideological motivation: We must try to develop Party members' strong points and virtues.

IV. INDOCTRINATION: Members should divide into cells for discussion to gain practical experience.

In coordination with the performance of the ideological task, some problems will be discussed.

After indoctrination is conducted, we will elect those who are most aggressive to the Party Committee and expel Party members who do not have a revolutionary spirit.

During political reorientation, Party and Group Chapters must select qualified individuals to develop the Party and strengthen Party Chapters.

While the motivation of political reorientation is performed, village units and guerrilla force should also be strengthened. Group Chapters should be reorganized and the popular associations should be consolidated.

Specific assignment and report on the operational phase: Party Chapters should make activity plans emphasizing principal missions. Later, the Chapter Party Committee will give the Party Chapter guidelines for missions such as: Political struggles, purchase and collection ((of food)), and annihilation of tyrants. It is necessary to anticipate the situation.

Discussion of the plan for political struggle by the people: In order to prepare for future activities, 90 to 95% of those indoctrinated should make ideological progress. Particular attention should be paid to the selection of "Outstanding Emulator," "Determined-to-Win Hero," and "Three-Pronged-Attack Soldier" winners in the village.

Discussion on the activity plan of the village: Efforts must be made to fulfill the following requirements:

Eight villages are to be rated "excellent."

Seven villages are promoted from "fair" to "good" ratings.

Five villages are promoted from "poor" to "fair" standing.

No village is to be rated "poor." However, emphasis is placed on population growth. A village losing population cannot be rated as "fair."

Village ((Party Committee)) prescribes the criteria for work among the people at hamlet level.

11-11/52/0  
Requirements for gaining experiences in the villages:

1. Properly assess the activities of cadre and their ideological development classify Party members and their activities prior to political reorientation, and note any who have a pessimistic attitude. Evaluate the development of the ((revolutionary)) movement, especially the performance of the principal tasks such as: Three-pronged attack, ((agricultural)) production, and purchase and collection of provisions.

We should help Party Chapters to solve specific problem.

2. Submit reports and help Chapter Party Committee to utilize them.

3. During political reorientation, cadre should learn lessons concerning ideological motivation, realistic deliberation, and emulation.

4. Activity plan for village:

In P Diên ((possibly Phu Diên)) we must strengthen our control of Route 1 and build strong fortifications.

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Liberated areas must be strong enough to frustrate the enemy pacification and relocation plans.

Phu Tho must strengthen its forces and develop the forces in liberated areas. Its cadre have placed no confidence in the people.

((The force in)) Hamlets 5 and 6 must thoroughly understand the ((above mentioned)) five objectives.

Parallel with the development of the Party is the solution of cases of poor Party members.

Cells, teams, groups, and installations must be consolidated to gain desired results from political motivation activities among the people

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CONTENTS OF THE SIX MAIN TASKS

1. Military:

Choose objectives for attack.

Attack the US sweep force and vehicles.

Break the enemy control and win the support of the people.

We must have many well trained guerrillas. Hamlet guerrilla forces must be increased to six percent of the population. The troop messing problem must be solved.

Cadre must exercise direct leadership over all activities.

Provide proper training on fighting methods and learn lessons promptly.

2. Oppose the enemy's pacification and relocation plans, disrupt his control, and win the support of the people.

Correct the ideology of ((cadre and soldiers)) to ensure that they thoroughly understand the five missions ((to be accomplished)) and the four "principles of staying close." The Party must rely on the people. The measure ((to counter the pacification plan)) should be a three-pronged attack against the enemy. Consolidate action units, improve leadership to win the people to our side, and make better activity plans.

3. Strengthening liberated areas:

Conduct ideological motivation.

Develop cadre, guerrilla forces, and groups.

Increase production to improve the standard of living ( especially in S. Long ).

Mobilize manpower and material resources (especially in P. Tan).

Counter Open-Arms activities.

Make efforts to improve specialized skills.

4. Political and military proselyting struggles:

Organize forces and train legal ((GVN legal status)) cadre.

Lead the people to struggle.

Try to maintain legal status.

Try to demoralize enemy troops through the military proselyting activities of the people.

Establish an organized agent force.

Urge enemy troops to kill tyrants and start a military revolt.

5. Economy:

Increase production and use all available land.

Activate work-exchange cells and Farmers' Associations.

Purchase food and ask ((the people)) for contributions.

6. Improving ((cadre's and soldiers')) ideology and strengthening the Party.

Recruitment of Party members.

Consolidation of our organizations.

Ideological tasks.

Cadre ranks.

Sơn Thượng: Only seven families in Hamlet 1 have not paid taxes to us. All members ((possibly in this hamlet)) paid taxes by May 70.

Nguyen Ai Van was outstanding in collecting ((money)) and killing cruel tyrants.

Nguyen L<sup>u</sup>c was outstanding in all activities, especially in collecting ((financial)) contributions.

Nguyen Thi M<sup>u</sup>u, an inhabitant of Hamlet 3, made a generous ((financial)) contribution.

Đinh Thin, an inhabitant of Hamlet 1, exceeded the requirements for contributions.

Đinh Thi Đ. , an inhabitant of Hamlet 1, exceeded the requirements for contributions.

Đinh B<sup>o</sup>i and Nguyen Kham set good examples in motivating the people to make ((financial)) contributions and in making contributions themselves.

5 Aug ((70))

Resolution of Q. Sơn ((Quê Sơn)) District Party Committee:

1. Situation:

By the end of 1969, the enemy had conducted a sweep operation and relocated the people in the eastern area and moved from ((two words illegible)) to Núi Đất. He pacified the area stretching from Hương An to Ba Ren.

The US sweep forces who launched attacks on Sơn Trung were reinforced by US CAP elements. The bivouacking platoons used sweeping tactics to attack Phú Thọ and Sơn Thượng. They relocated the people living there and created immense difficulties for us.

The enemy attacked Sơn L<sup>u</sup>nh, Anh ((S<sup>o</sup>n)) Th<sup>u</sup>ng, and relocated the people of Sơn L<sup>u</sup>nh, ((S<sup>o</sup>n)) Th<sup>u</sup>ng and Sơn L<sup>o</sup>c.

He landed his Special Forces at Hon Tau three times, and then at Sơn Minh Mountain, Sơn Phước.

The enemy used US CAP elements and Puppet forces to launch continuous sweep operations in the fringe and rear areas and used his pacification tactics. He intensified his psywar, Open-Arms, and spy activities in ((two words illegible)). Two ((revolutionary)) cadre and four guerrillas deserted.

The enemy destroyed our economy and created difficulties for us.

Friendly situation:

During the first phase, we attacked Hưởng An and Xuân Phước.

During the second phase, we attacked the district town and Công Ba.

We attacked Ông Hing Slope, Công Ba and Bà Ren during the third phase.

Local forces: The 180th ((Unit)) completely annihilated 10 enemy platoons and overran one enemy position.

Guerrilla forces changed their modus operandi and fiercely attacked enemy sweep forces in four villages in the eastern areas, Sơn Long, Sơn Khanh, Sơn Thạch, and Sơn Trung. Our activities were not very effective in Phú Thọ. The guerrillas of Sơn Long Village encircled Hòn Chông for four days, and downed four aircraft.

Teenagers also participated in combat activities.

The total number of enemy troops who were put out of action was 2954.

One fifth of these were eliminated by guerrillas.

Economization of ammunition:

The armed forces managed to save 25% of their ammunition and guerrilla forces saved nine percent of their ammunition.

We saved 12% of our total ammunition. We suffered three percent casualties and used 10% of our ammunition.

We successfully met the quota for eliminating enemy personnel and fulfilled 67% of the quota for destruction of enemy vehicles.

The requirement for downing enemy aircraft is 10 aircraft per unit. We shot down 12 aircraft.

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In some areas, we have used half of our time to train troops. For example, during the ((last)) three months, we spent 45 days to improve the combat capability ((of 75 persons)).

In Sơn Thượng, we conducted a raid and eliminated one Puppet platoon. One of our comrades was wounded.

Our guerrilla forces strength increased by 12% during the year. However, we suffered some losses. Therefore, we now have more than 900 guerrillas of whom 97% are Party members.

2. Destruction of enemy control and winning the support of the people

9,000 inhabitants were relocated by the enemy.  
1,500 people remained in Sơn Long, ((Sơn)) Phước, ((Sơn)) Khánh. ((Sơn)) Lanh.

1,200 people were under our control.

((Blank)) number of people were under temporary enemy control.

7,500 people were sent back to their homes.

3. Political struggles, enemy ((FWMAF)) and military ((RVNAF)) proselyting activities.

Struggles by people living in Sơn Thang:

Struggles to counter enemy relocation of the people. Intensification of ((farm)) production activities, ((trading)), and military proselyting activities.

Our attacks on the enemy were sporadic. During some months, our village eliminated 200 of the enemy, but during the others, we killed only eight enemy soldiers.

Some units killed 20 enemy troops but other killed only three enemy ((per month)). We have about 100 hamlets, but not all of them were capable of attacking the enemy.

The number of guerrillas in the entire district comprised 3.6% ((of the total population)). Nine percent of the guerrillas were Party members. (According to the requirements, 30 to 50% of the guerrillas must be Party members.)

Twenty percent of the guerrillas were Group members. (According to the requirements, from 70 to 100% of the guerrillas must be Group members.) The number of secret guerrillas was not adequate. Therefore, they could not successfully develop our movement.

Political struggles: Cadre with legal status were unqualified and could not employ the struggle methods skillfully.

The military ((RVNAF)) proselyting element had a very poor capability and could not destroy the enemy. There are now 62B ((sic)) and one company of TNTT ((possibly combat youth)) (in Sơn Thành).

The enemy used youths conscripted in the local area to occupy key positions in Phú Hiệp.

According to the requirements, we have to win the support of 25,000 people, but we actually convinced only 7,000 people.

Military Activities:

Employment of guidelines.

People's warfare movement.

Strength increase.

Improvement of troop capabilities.

Intensification of technical and tactical training.

Ideological and political tasks.

((Farm)) production of rear services.

((Marginal notes:))

Areas under the control of liberation forces comprised six percent of the total area.

Areas under enemy control comprised 1.5%.

During ((the last)) six months, each guerrilla killed an average of three enemy soldiers.

The rate of casualties in eastern areas was 1/25 ((possibly 25 enemy KIA to one friendly KIA)).

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Two or three tanks and aircraft should be destroyed.

Guerrillas and cadre must kill half the number of ((village)) council personnel and hamlet and inter-family chiefs.

Assessment of enemy schemes:

The enemy conducted pacification activities, occupied key positions in eastern areas, and relocated people living in western areas.

He conscripted youths, upgraded his troops, ((two words illegible)) and oppressed youths.

He destroyed our economy.

He carried out psywar and Open-Arms activities, and created a false appearance of prosperity in his economy.

The Vietnamese Nationalist Party openly eliminated those who betrayed the Party, conscripted youths, sent members on missions, and created difficulties for us.

We planted mines ((in areas frequented by the enemy)), killing four US soldiers and wounding six others.

Our ((VC)) soldiers in Sơn Thanh used grenades to attack Nong Truong, killing 10 enemy and wounding 11 others.

Two teenagers ((Group members)) were wounded by grenades in this attack.

One guerrilla in Sơn Thanh deserted ((possibly his name is)) (Le Cat).

27 Jul ((70))

In Sơn Khanh, we downed one HU1A aircraft, killing 11 enemy soldiers.

Teenagers of Sơn Lanh (enemy controlled area):

Killed six enemy troops and wounded four others.

Our guerrillas killed five enemy soldiers.

In Sơn Thang, we killed five enemy soldiers.

In Sơn Thang, we killed eight enemy troops on 16 Jul ((70)).

The enemy landed two US battalions and eight artillery pieces at Sơn Phước. First, he landed his troops at Se ((sic)), then at Đa Ngang and Nhu Sơn. Five minutes later, he landed troops at Dui Chuong. During the first days he remained inactive. Afterwards, he attacked ((liberation forces)) in Phú Gia, Dui Chuong, Bình Yên, and Khánh Bình. He moved in platoons or in groups of eight, 10 or 12 persons, and deployed his troops on all hills in the village.

At the end of the month (26 Jul ((70)) he moved four artillery pieces and concentrated his troops in Hang Cop (Sé) and Đường Keó Gó ((trail of lumber trucks)). He attacked Ty Lê, Đa Ngang, Nhu Sơn and the ((VC)) hospital in Quảng Đa. (He was guided by the people.) Afterwards he withdrew and the people of Phú Gia returned home. But shortly thereafter, the enemy increased his activities and dispersed his troops. He now has four artillery pieces in Hang Cop and two artillery pieces and two mortars in Dui Chuong.

During the first days ((sic)), the US troops collected ((maize)), but afterwards they assigned this task to the people living in the eastern area.

((Marginal notes:))

On the fourth day, the enemy relocated the people. One US soldier was assigned to watch three relocated people. The relocated people were given food and drinking water and were taken to the relocation center by ship the next day. ((End of marginal notes.))

The enemy relocated all people with legal status from Da Ngang and Nhu Sơn to Núi Quê and N. Sơn. The people who did not have legal status fled to the mountain. Brother Hoang, the leader of the hamlet unit, came to Phú Gia and could not return to the unit on time. Village guerrilla units were driven out ((by the enemy)).

At night, the people ((who were hiding on the mountain)) returned to ((their land)) to collect maize. Ten days later the enemy thinly dispersed his troops and deployed eight to 12 soldiers at each position. Therefore, the people without legal status could not return to their land and suffered from hunger. Two hamlet guerrillas who operated near the enemy position were wounded.

Phu Gia had 50 inhabitants, including cadre, militia, and guerrillas. Twenty of them moved to Sơn Viên and 30 remained in the area. Hamlet cadre also fled to enemy controlled areas.

The population of the area ((unspecified)) was 1200. Only 200 people without legal status remained in the area.

The enemy enlarged the Dui Chương Post and established strong fortifications.

H<sup>o</sup> landed his troops at Ba Huynh Xa and Cây G<sup>o</sup> V<sup>u</sup>ông and then moved to Sơn Phước.

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Twenty to 30 teenagers among the 200 persons without legal status who remained in the area were able to work for us.

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----