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person is prohibited by law.		(Classification and Control Markings)	
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3. ISC NUMBER: A747.000	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Alvin W. Lotz</i>	MICHAEL H. CRUTCHER, CPT, MI CHIEF, PRS DIV, US ELM, CDEC	
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5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 16 August 1970	7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT		

22.03.03

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a report prepared by Cuu ((possibly Phan Van Cuu, Assistant Political Officer of Phong 7, aka Security Section, VC My Tho Province Party Committee, VC Region 2)). The report, numbered 131/AN and dated 29 June 1970, contains information on military, political, and professional activities of armed elements and guerrilla units in the province. Also listed are the names and positions of members of the Steering Committee of Phong 7 and its five subordinate elements.

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My Tho Security Section

No. 131/AN

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED  
SECURITY ((SECTION))

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I. MILITARY ATTACKS:

Implementing the combat missions assigned by higher echelons, the ((province)) armed security force coordinated with district and village armed security forces and guerrillas to conduct 11 attacks against strategic hamlets, killing or capturing 12 individuals. Specifically, these attacks have been conducted in the following areas:

Binh Phu ((Area)): Our security force conducted three attacks in this area, killed two cruel "Chiêu Hồi" ((Open-Arms)) personnel, arrested, indoctrinated and warned another, and captured one large loudspeaker.

Hoa Hung and Huu Hoa Strategic Hamlets: Our security force conducted three attacks in these hamlets, arrested, indoctrinated, warned ((and released)) eight People's Self-Defense Force members including six Chiêu Hồi personnel, one Popular Force soldier, and one Regional Force soldier, and seized one trai da lang ((possibly meaning grenade)).

K.12 ((possibly Area 12)): Our security force conducted two attacks in this area, killing one cruel reconnaissance cell leader.

Ba Ton ((Area)): Our security force conducted one attack in this area but failed to kill the four PSDF members, including Hi, a ((PSDF)) inter-team chief, as planned.

Hoa Khanh ((Area)): Our security force conducted two attacks in this area, but failed to kill the enemy personnel in their homes as planned because they were absent.

II. POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ((POSSIBLY INTELLIGENCE)) ACTIVITIES:

In coordination with military attacks, stress was placed on political and ((proselyting)) attacks which were conducted in the following areas:

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At Hoa Hung and Huu Hoa Strategic Hamlets: Our security force confiscated 30 family status records; flew two flags; hung two slogans; recruited three agents to collect enemy information; and reeducated, warned, and released six "Chiêu Hồi" personnel, one Popular Force soldier, and one Regional Force soldier.

At Binh Phu ((Area)): Our security force held a meeting to indoctrinate 20 persons having relations with the enemy; arrested for indoctrination, then released one "Chiêu Hồi" personnel; and sent two warning letters to families of local ((RVN)) administrative personnel.

At Hoa Khanh ((Area)): Our security force held two meetings to indoctrinate 70 people. Most of them have had relationships with the enemy. Our security force also motivated the masses to support the Revolution, and they contributed 11,000\$((SVN)) ((118\$ SVN = \$1.00 US)). Four ((warning)) letters were also sent to local ((SVN)) administrative personnel and spies.

### III. SECURITY FOR CADRE:

Our security force safely escorted Comrade Sau Binh to the area north of Route 4, and a number of other cadre of the Section from the area north of Route 4 to the area south of Route 4 despite the difficult situation at the time.

Twice they safely escorted transient personnel coming from Chau Thanh District.

We repaired fences, planted mines, and displayed a high vigilance in the protection of our base area.

We also guided ((VC My Tho)) Province unit cadre in finding a place to establish their base area. We strengthened security so they could successfully establish a base area.

### IV. STRENGTHING OF FORCES:

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By implementing the resolution adopted by the section and basing our decisions on the present situation and capability of our cadre and soldiers, we reorganized and reassigned our personnel as follows:

The Command Committee of "Phong ((lit: office or section)) 7" consisted of:

Tran Van Y, official Party member, Commander; Cao Đức Thắng, Assistant Commander; Nguyen Van Dung, Assistant Commander; and Pham Van Cuc, Assistant Political Officer.

Present assignment of responsibilities:

Tran Van Y, in charge of the armed reconnaissance unit operating in the area south of Route 4.

Cao Đức Thắng, in charge of the two armed reconnaissance detachments operating in Hoa Khanh ((Area)) and K12 ((possibly Area 12)).

Nguyen Van Dung, on TDY at Long Trung ((Area)) and Cai Lay District Seat.

Pham Van Cuc, in charge of the permanent duty office of "Phong 7" and the armed security detachment. He must collect all reports and submit them to Party Committee echelons.

Tran Nghi, in charge of the armed security detachment which guards the detention camp.

Our Security forces are divided into five detachments as follows:

Detachment 1 consists of the following comrades:

Pham Cong Cuc, Party member, acting Platoon Leader;

Nguyen Van Thanh, Group member, acting Assistant Squad Leader;

Tran Van Tuoi, acting Assistant Squad Leader; Nguyen Van Ben, soldier; Nguyen Van Dien, soldier; and Tran Van Hung, soldier.

Detachment 2 is composed of the following comrades:

Vo Van Choi, Party member, acting Assistant Platoon Leader; Huynh Van Ben, Squad Leader; Le Van Deo, Group member, soldier; Le Van Hoang, soldier; Nguyen Van Moc, soldier; Huynh Van Hoang, soldier; Nguyen Van Tien, soldier; Nguyen Van Nhac, soldier; Nguyen Van Deo, soldier; and Chin Tiem, medic.

This detachment is in charge of guarding the detention camp.

The remaining three detachments are armed reconnaissance detachments.

Detachment 3 is composed of the following comrades:

Nguyen Van Than, probationary Party member, acting Squad Leader; Vo Van Chau, Assistant Squad Leader; Vo Van Phat, Assistant Squad Leader; Le Van Quan, Group member, soldier; Nguyen Van Bang, soldier; Nguyen Van Nhin, soldier; and Nguyen Van Thao, soldier.

This detachment is assigned to operate along Route 4.

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Detachment 4 is composed of the following comrades:

Vo Trong Thung, probationary Party member, acting Assistant Platoon Leader; Ha Van Ngo, official Party member, Assistant Platoon Leader; Ngo Van Long, probationary Party member, soldier; Mai Xuan Hung, Group member, soldier; and Nguyen Van Dong, soldier.

This detachment operates in K12 ((possibly Area 12)).

Detachment 5 is composed of the following comrades: Nguyen Van Ti, Group member, acting Squad Leader; Nguyen Van Nien, Assistant Squad Leader; Nguyen Van Hoanh, soldier; and Pham Van Van, soldier.

This detachment operates in HK ((possibly Hoa Khanh Area)).

Nguyen Thanh Chien, probationary Party member, is in charge of the correspondence of "Phong 7".

Nguyen Van Ngoc was already discharged from military service.

Le Van Tai, Party member, is serving with the detention camp detachment until his discharge from military service.

Truong Van Hung, Group member, has been wounded again.

Pham Van Be Tam, Party member, has also been wounded again.

Nguyen Van Truc, probationary Party member, has also been wounded. These three comrades are still undergoing treatment.

Indoctrination task:

We indoctrinated our personnel on the Party's policy for the sick and the wounded, ((discussions)) on the May 70 report and the preliminary report on the mission of the branch ((possibly security branch)), and studied a number of directives and resolutions adopted by the Section. Twenty-two comrades participated.

Concerning the promotion of cadre, we recommended that the Command Committee of the Section promote Comrades Cuc and Nghi to Platoon Leaders; Comrade Thuong to Assistant Platoon Leader; Comrades Chien, Tuan, and Hung, to Squad Leaders; and Comrades Thang, Phat, Tui, Nghia, and Bang to Assistant Squad Leaders.

Hung and Tui were recommended for admission to the Party.

In addition, we built three houses with messing and lodging facilities. We also built an additional ((underground)) trench to provide emergency shelter for three people.

Concerning farm production, we did not have information on the results obtained by the various detachments, except that the detachment of Comrade Cuc cultivated one "Cong" ((one cong = 1/10 of an acre)) of rice.

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Comments:

Although we could not destroy the targets ((tyrants)) as assigned by higher echelons, we could kill their henchmen. This has strongly affected the morale of the enemy especially in the Binh Phu ((Area)), Huu Hoa, and Hoa Hung Strategic Hamlets, and K 12 ((possibly Area 12)). As for our ((security)) personnel, combat spirit is very high; they always display aggressiveness, determination, and courage in the execution of their missions.

In the technical ((possibly meaning intelligence)) field, our branch is not very well qualified and we are unable to secure accurate information about the enemy. Additionally, efforts to recruit underground agents ((to act as informants)) did not progress as expected. Consequently, our ((security)) personnel were killed when they entered the targets' houses to kill the occupants. This happened in Binh Phu, Ba Ton, and Hoa Khanh ((Areas)).

The above ((presentation)) is a subjective viewpoint. Objectively, the enemy still has many cunning and cruel plans and may create many difficulties.

Communication and liaison between the various "Canh's" ((sic)) and "Phong 7" was not regularly performed, especially in the area north of Route 4. As a result, no experience could be gained from these areas, and this denied our leadership the opportunity to provide prompt guidance and assistance.

29 Jun 70

/S/ Cửu

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