

CEO

W  
~~REF~~ / ~~OPS~~  
file / subj.  
date / sub-cat.  
7-70 / ~~REF~~

DIRECTIVE ON PAVN/PLAF CAMPAIGN X  
July 1970

Number 73CT/TV

((SUBJECT:)) INITIATION OF CAMPAIGN X

In order to save his rural pacification plan which failed miserably and to remedy his weaknesses displayed during our K 700 ((possibly the 1970 Spring-Summer Campaign)), the enemy is stubborn and is foolhardily striving to carry out his campaign of "Rural Pacification and Development for a Complete Victory" throughout SVN, which Quang-Da is one of the provinces he selected as a pilot area. He is going to use cunning and brutal tricks to take control of our whole fringe area. This is a new trick of the enemy. However, this time he is weak in all aspects. He is very confused and affected by basic weaknesses as pointed out by our directive concerning the countering of the enemy's "Pacification for a Complete Victory" Campaign.

To take the initiative and frustrate the enemy's above scheme, C50 ((possibly Current Affairs Committee, Quang-Da Party Committee, Region 5)) orders all forces to concentrate their greatest efforts during Campaign X in order to hit hard and frustrate the enemy's "Pacification for a Complete Victory" Campaign. They must create favorable conditions for a sustained offensive with a goal of completely defeating all of the enemy's cunning schemes. They must conduct large-scale elimination of enemy village administrative personnel and tyrants. They must break the enemy's control of the population and destroy an important part of his pacification personnel, staff, and support troops so as to discourage him and frustrate his "Pacification For a Complete Victory" Campaign in its initial stage.

The preparation ((for Campaign X)) should be completed before 4553 ((coded)) day, 49 ((coded)) month, 1970.

An operational order of Front 4 will specify the time, plan, and targets of attack for our armed forces.

While implementing ((Campaign X)), our leaders must bear in mind the following points:

1. Concerning military actions:

The three forces ((main forces, local forces, and guerrillas)) should try their best to improve their combat skills, heavily attack the enemy's sensitive spots, destroy a large part of his potential, and neutralize his ((pacification)) campaign.

Their four main objectives are:

Killing a large part of the enemy's village administrative personnel, tyrants, US ((pacification advisors)), police forces, pacification teams, and Popular and Regional Forces which implement the pacification plan;

attacking the ROK troops that support the pacification plan;

destroying a large element of the enemy's 47-

((engineer)) forces which are leveling the terrain and controlling the communication routes in an attempt to split our battlefields;

crushing the enemy's key agencies, especially his military sub-sectors, which are the direct command posts of the pacification campaign.

Our forces should center their attacks on the enemy units which protect the concentration points of the relocated people and strategic hamlets.

We should make the best use of our three forces to direct the attacks of our secret guerrillas on the enemy's ringleaders, administrative personnel, and intelligence agents; and develop to the limit the ability of our units that have been localized ((meaning units of the VC regular forces that were assigned to a specific area, usually a district, and placed under the command of the local forces headquarters)) so as to make them fulfill their role of the local striking force. We should promote our urban guerrilla warfare and urge our secret self-defense troops and special action units in cities and towns to steadily carry on their own operations while coordinating with Campaign X in support of our rural forces. We should concentrate all efforts to achieve the highest results during our climaxing phase. At the same time, we should be ready to confront the enemy's counterattacks and maintain the momentum of our routine activities.

2. Our political struggles and troop proselyting should be closely coordinated with our military activities to form an effective three - pronged offensive. Our attacks should be combined with the people's uprisings. Our elimination of the enemy's administration, tyrants, and control system should be coordinated with the development of our revolutionary organizations and the purging of undesirable people. Our attacks on the enemy's defense troops in charge of protecting concentration points of relocated people and those in strategic hamlets should be coordinated with the people's struggle demanding return to their former villages.

In weak areas ((RVN controlled areas)), concentration points, and strategic hamlets, we should frustrate the enemy's attempt to enroll all of the population into his civilian organizations. We should disorganize his people's Self-Defense Forces; break his control; incite the people to rise up; destroy the concentration points and strategic hamlets; kill the administrative personnel and tyrants; and intimidate, suppress, and disband the enemy's civilian organizations. We should take control of the weak areas; stage people's uprisings in concentration points and strategic hamlets; disrupt the latter; and urge the inhabitants to return to their homeland.

Our military actions, political struggles, and troop proselyting activities must instigate a constant unrest in the enemy's rear area in order to drive his leading agencies into continual confusion. We should keep them constantly busy parrying our attacks so that they cannot carry out their pacification campaign. We should disrupt a number of enemy irregular force units. We should disintegrate the Puppet village governments by killing the enemy administrative personnel or intimidating and forcing them to quit their jobs. We should deepen the enemy's internal friction; demoralize and isolate his ringleaders; create dissension among the US advisors, the police force, and Popular Forces, and between the pacification personnel and their leaders.

3. We should carefully prepare ((for Campaign X)) and complete all preparations within the allocated time.

We should improve the morale of our three types of troops; urgently consolidate their organization; replace their equipment; prepare the battlefields; and map the plan of attack for each area, target, and objective in accordance with the order issued by Front 4.

((Page 3 of O.T.))

We should carefully re-evaluate the political attitudes of each person living in the enemy's concentration points, strategic hamlets, and weak areas. We should motivate them urgently; consolidate their leadership systems; and assign them specific missions. We should instill a high fighting spirit for our three forces which consist of the secret guerrillas, the political struggle forces, and the troop proselyting personnel. We should make them determined to defeat the enemy's "Pacification for a Complete Victory" Campaign. We should revise the plans of action of each area, especially the combat plans, the targets, and objectives of our secret guerrillas, security personnel, and troop proselyting agents, and also our plans for motivating the people to rise up eliminating the tyrants, breaking the enemy's control, and returning the relocated people to their homeland.

Each area should prepare an advance plan for a simultaneous uprising so that when an opportunity occurs, they can carry it out and obtain the highest success.

4. During Campaign X, we should keep track of the operations of our forces; encourage and improve progressive personnel; develop our ranks; consolidate our organizations and our leading agencies; and recruit Party members, Youth Group members, secret guerrillas, self-defense members, secret agents, and strike force personnel (as prescribed by our recruitment plan). We should consolidate and intensify the activities of our civilian organizations; properly handle their members, as well as the people ((meaning non-members)); increase security measures; screen the population; and expel undesirable people. We should study a plan for pulling out a number of youths ((from the enemy controlled areas)) and replacing them with our armed forces. We should quickly take advantage of our initial successes and intensify three - pronged attacks in every area.

5. We should pay particular attention to providing guidance for implementing the regulations concerning messing, billeting, movement, and activity for each area. We must increase security maintenance. We must create and protect the legal status of our people living in the fringe areas and liberated areas.

Upon receipt of this directive, various local Party Committees, military agencies, sections, branches, and civilian organizations from A ((sic)) to C echelon, must study it to thoroughly understand its context; enhance their determination to fight; and urgently implement it through specific programs, plans, and measures. They are ordered to submit their plans of action to C50 before 4553 ((coded)) of 49 ((coded)) month, 1970.

15 Jul 70

For C50

/s/ Phudc

49