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From A15 [possibly the Standing Committee, Sub-Region 5, COSVN]

To TI [possibly Tan Uyen District Party Committee, VC Region 5, COSVN]

We have received the recapitulative report on the campaign, the report on the study of the resolution of Sub-Region, the common activity plan of TI, and the plans of four villages.

We warmly praise the prompt implementation of the resolution issued by the Sub-Region Congress of Representatives. The meeting was attended by members of the Executive Committee of our Party organization with the participation of [representatives] of various branches and villages. With that sense of urgency, the meeting scored an initial success.

We would now like to present some opinions to you:

I. COMMON SITUATION:

Three questions were raised during the Conference: "What is the political solution? What is the principal victory? What must we do to attain it? We have gained great victories during the past three months, but there are no signs of a quick victory etc..." We do not understand these questions.

You are requested to ask the comrades what they meant when they asked these questions, so that we may properly answer them. However, we feel a need to reaffirm the following:

1. The Americans are expanding the war to Cambodia in a defeated and passive position and in a situation where they are forced to deescalate the war.

By doing so, they aim at buying time to strengthen the puppet government and army, carry out the Vietnamization plan, and save the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak government which is facing the danger of collapse. They expanded the war while they are forced to withdraw troops [from SVN], while they are not able to increase troops, while the war theater has become larger and their troops are spread thinner. They are not expanding the war in a position of war escalation.

2. Though expanding the war, the U.S. obviously could not save the situation. The Vietnamization plan has been continuously frustrated and the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique is near collapse. The U.S. imperialists have been sinking deeper into a military, political, and economic stalemate. Though they are able to commit satellite troops such as the Saigon and Thai troops to Cambodia, this has not been as easy as they had wished. The puppet troops, unable to replace U.S. troops in SVN, are now being sent to die in Cambodia. They are extended over two fronts and they are suffering heavier casualties while they are unable to develop their numerical strength: their morale was increasingly undermined; their national feelings have developed; the pacification plan was adversely affected, (pacification cadre were widely dispersed) and presented many gaps.

Meanwhile the Revolution in SVN, Cambodia, and Laos has taken a new turn. The front of Indo-Chinese people who are united in the struggle has developed day after day. We have been confronted with difficulties in some areas, but our recent victories clearly proved our advantages have increased and that the Revolution has new capabilities.

3. The two probabilities embodied in Resolution 9 remain unchanged, and the first probability has been greatly strengthened. Thus, the main mission in SVN is to defeat the pacification and Vietnamization plans in order to lead the Revolution to a decisive victory. In Cambodia, the principal mission is to overthrow the Lon Nol-Matak government in order to liberate the country. There is no better way than that. Whether it will take a long or short time [to fulfill these missions] depends upon the subjective efforts of each individual and local area.

II. PART OF THE STUDY OF THE RESOLUTION DEALING WITH THE SITUATION IN THE DISTRICT

Your report on the three-month plan did not include a detailed review and a comparison of the implementation of the six-month and three-month plans. You did not compare different fields, tasks, and requirements of the two periods, or implementation measures. To control the antipacification activities, we must know which villages have carried out the prescribed plan, what part they did not perform well, and what they did not achieve, such as motivation of the people, military proselyting, political and financial activities, etc... Other questions to be examined by the villages are whether or not we should plan to disorga-

nize the People's Self-Defense Forces and hamlet administration, kill spies, activate covert Party Chapters, covert Group Chapters and civilian organizations, maintain control of the two hamlets, and gain control of half of the hamlets in the southern part of the village. After three months, we must review achievements and examine the obstacles which adversely affected our progress. Only the analysis of victories, progress, and deficiencies to find the reasons for failures is helpful to the conference. This enables it to draw conclusions.

Concerning the reasons for shortcomings, we have some opinions:

1. We agree with you that because our comrades failed, while assessing the situation, to see the enemy's weaknesses and the importance of the campaign, they lacked determination, enthusiasm, and boldness in carrying out their tasks; they were dragging their feet. However, you should carefully study every report, every echelon, every branch.

2. Concerning the methods of operating and building forces, generally speaking, we have not brought into full play the various forms and methods of operation which are appropriate for each area and each category of force. Our forces stayed outside of enemy areas. They occasionally infiltrated the areas to carry out missions or prompted the people to leave the areas.

Mingling with the people or using secret forces is rare. New methods for each task, such as antipacification activities, attacking the People's Self-Defense Forces, killing or giving direct or indirect warnings to tyrants, or using fifth columnists to arrest them and confiscate their guns have not yet been adopted. Old and less effective methods are still used.

3. Activity plans were not specific. They did not specify the details for each task for each village each month. The organization for implementing these plans was poor. The plans have been worked out without discussion and without provisions for solving difficulties. District committee members assigned to the villages did not make serious efforts to help the villages progress and solve their problems. Neither did they teach village Party members and cadre the procedures and methods of resolving difficulties.

After working out a plan, they did not take necessary steps to carry out each portion of work nor did they fix a working schedule. They also failed to review activities which should be conducted daily or every five days. Also, at the end of each month, they failed to review the results of the plan or make a critical analysis of its implementation.

4. In leadership, they failed to grasp the principal missions in areas of emphasis. This is shown by their rare mention of principal missions in areas of emphasis and primary villages in their activity plan, review statements, and weekly and monthly reports. These missions are always mentioned along with other missions in other villages.

III. THREE-MONTH PLAN:

Concerning the competence of each echelon, the sub-region is the echelon in charge of working out resolutions. Districts and villages must thoroughly perform missions, requirements, and methods prescribed by the sub-region. Districts are responsible for engineering specific measures to help villages perform these prescribed missions, then urge and control their activities.

Districts do not issue their own-resolutions. Their activity plans must include an objective analysis of enemy and friendly strengths, weaknesses, advantages, and difficulties. The purpose is to develop basic advantages and seek measures to overcome difficulties. They must not gloss over these details.

The district committee's report on indoctrination did not mention the study of the sub-region's resolution. The report did not point out what points of the resolution are good and what points should be supplemented. Instead the district committee worked out a resolution of its own (though based on the common resolution). This is not a proper procedure. Activity plans for every area have been carefully prepared by the sub-region. They need only to be discussed and supplemented.

A number of difficulties were raised in the study of the activity plan, but no measures were sought to clear them up. For instance, you wrote, "when U.S. troops were still on the battlefield, they launched many sweep operations in the outer areas and exercised a loose control inside the hamlets. When

the Puppet troops replaced them, they concentrated their activities in the hamlets and loosened control in the outside areas; that is why we encountered difficulties attacking them in the hamlets. This resulted in our failure to step up the movement. " You did not discuss why there was such a phenomenon and how to cope with it.

You have spent too much time discussing and preparing the common resolution for the district, whereas, little time was devoted to devising plans for each village or finding a means to solve problems for each village and hamlet. Following are some problems which have been thought up at the conference but have not yet been resolved:

What should we do to cling to our areas of operation?

What methods of operation should be used to enable us to stay in these areas?

How can we make the best use of our capabilities in countering enemy pacification activities?

How can we motivate the people to rise up with enthusiasm and join our forces?

How can we clear up material difficulties?

How can we establish Four-Good-Quality Party Chapters and eliminate passive rightism?

In brief, upon receipt of the sub-region's resolution, districts and villages must study it to fully realize their missions, understand the requirements, measures prescribed, and then strive to carry out the points they agree upon and make recommendations for supplementing other points which are to them deficient. The district should not draft resolutions of its own, but organize and direct villages to effectively implement [the sub-region's] resolution.

Above are some opinions we want to present to you. If further discussions are desired, please write to us.

25 July 70

For A15

/s/ Nguyen Van Truc