

8/70

MESSAGE

Subject matter: Exploitation of the drastic deterioration of the Communist position in the face of our rapidly expanding program of Pacification and Development.

Recently, after heavy military losses, and in the face of the rapidly expanding program of Pacification and Development in the Republic of Vietnam, the Communist leaders in the South ordered the men under their command to spread out and avoid contact with our own armed forces or those of our allies. At the same time, they are to go back to guerilla warfare, to increase sabotage and terrorist activities aimed at the substructure cadres, as well as at our armed civilian forces.

According to a document captured from the enemy, entitled "Resolution 14", the Communist organization called "Central office of South Vietnam (COSVN)" acknowledged the following:

- Communist recession in the face of the progress of the Pacification and Development program in the Republic. The Communist forces no longer have the capability to hamper the efforts of the Government to enlarge the secure areas. Consequently, the Communist command cadres have been cut off from the activities of the village military command, forcing the guerillas to be separated from the people.

- The Communist command cadres are now disconcerted and worried by the ever decreasing level of Communist guerilla activities in almost all countryside areas. Thus, the guerillas are forced to operate in small, separate units which are easily repelled and which usually suffer dramatic losses.

- The Communist hopes of a victorious offensive in the Fall of 1969 in South Vietnam were crushed, because they did not have the capability to coordinate the military and political offensives.

In order to free themselves from the present desperate situation, the Communist "Resolution 14" advances a number of their new duties:

- "Initiate a vast movement, leading the people to an armed struggle, coordinated with the political struggle and enemy troop propaganda; fortifications are to be continuously built up in all three zones. At the same time, great efforts should be made to strengthen the armed forces, to increase the activities of guerilla and regional forces in the Provinces and Districts aimed at annihilating and weakening enemy forces (Republic of Vietnam) on a large scale and a continuous basis."

- "... Defeat enemy pacification and invasion plans (Republic of Vietnam), disintegrate his rear (Republic of Vietnam), strengthen our commanding position in full control of military organizations and of the political struggle, in order to achieve a decisive victory, at the same time securing ultimate victory in case of a long drawn-out conflict."

- "Increase guerilla activities in towns and cities and in populated areas of the countryside, especially the areas surrounding the towns, military bases, the communication axes, and populated areas with a great number of people of the same religion and minorities."

- "... Establish branches of the Party and other political organizations, train guerillas in secret, who will live among the people..."

- "... Amend the lack of vigilance, the unreadiness to fight and the carelessness in security matters."

"... Make plans to increase guerilla warfare appropriate to the situation in each zone. The duty of the guerilla and self-defense group is to attack the Hamlet and Village officials, policemen, Pacification and Development cadres, members of the Civil Defense, popular forces..."

- "... Make use of sub-groups and of organizations armed with superior weapons to carry out daring attacks in areas deep in the enemy heartland (Republic of Vietnam)"

Through the main points unveiled from "Resolution 14", we learn that unlike their usual wont, the Communists have acknowledged their heavy losses in several fields, as, for instance, the confrontation with the definite advances of the Pacification and Development program in the Republic of Vietnam, and they also have recognized their mistakes in carrying out the policy

of engulfing the South supported by the Hanoi Communists. However, the Central Office of South Vietnam has not forgotten to advance propaganda lines, to use their customary tricks to delude their cadres through alluring promises of large scale offensives and of ultimate victory.

All of this proves that the Communists are trapped into a situation so desperate that it is extremely difficult to save. At the same time, this has shown that the Communist command cadres of the South no longer believe in the capability and the military potential of their own forces, as they are faced with the prospect of an ever elusive victory moving further and further from their grasp.

However, in order to calm their subordinate cadres, and in their conspiracy to push them to a slow death for the invasion policy of the Hanoi usurpers, the Communist henchmen in the South will try hard to maintain a state of war at a level high enough to prove their presence and high enough for propaganda purposes, to agitation while biding their time.

Here is clear proof that the Communists have not resigned themselves to abandoning their cruel invasion design; so, even if military activities have temporarily subsided because the Communists are exhausted, the political struggle between them and ourselves will flare up violently, with terrorist and sabotage acts... causing trouble in our rear, committed by embedded Communist cadres and Communist henchmen.

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In order to exploit the situation and to crush the agitation and sabotage designs of the Communist hoodlums in time in the days ahead, the Ministry requests that the agencies carry out the order to strictly apply psychological warfare measures attacking enemy propaganda along the following lines:

1/ Lay bare the obvious defeat of the Communists in the face of their present desperate situation, as well as the victorious position of our side, for the people and especially for the enemy cadres to see, revealing that the Communists are bogged down in their design to engulf the South, thus hastening

the rapid deterioration of enemy ranks, depriving them of every capability to carry out any activity against us:

- After the Heavy losses they suffered during the Mau Than Tet offensive, the Communist potential has definitely been diminished. Especially, since the beginning of 1970, the Communists have not been able to wage any large offensives, to realize any campaign of note-- the high points of Winter-Spring, then Spring-Summer and even the Fall 1970 phase have been crushed by us in the egg. The divisions of North Vietnamese regulars have suffered so much damage that they no longer have their previous capability to attack; even more, they have had to spread out, to hide away for fear of being uncovered by our armed forces, to avoid contact with our troops.

- From the large scale military activities with participation of large units, large divisions of regulars on the battlefields, but without the decisive victory they anxiously awaited -- the Communists are now back to weak, unrelated forces, applying spreading out tactics, using snipers... with surprise, sneaky attacks, fearing to show themselves because they would be annihilated, how can the Communists hold off our powerful armed forces? In a situation so desperate, the Communists will certainly be crushed by the might of our Armed forces and the might of the countryside of the Republic of Vietnam.

- Along with military victories inflicting heavy losses to the Communists, the Republic of Vietnam has also been successful in the task of pushing the Communists off their bases of operations; it has foiled their plan to use the countryside to surround the towns and cities and the plan to use the war to feed war.

In losing the countryside, the Communists have lost the strategic compass of guerilla warfare; consequently, although they are trying to restart the guerilla movement, they will not be able to get out of the desperate situation they are in now, because they have no land, no population and thus no place to cling to and will be easily annihilated by our armed forces.

In the meantime, our armed forces and those of our allies have destroyed almost all of the Communist safe bases in Cambodia -- having lost those safe and secret bases, they have naturally lost the supply corridors for restarting war on as

large a scale as they have planned. Consequently, sooner or later, the Communists will suffer a dramatic defeat.

- What is worthy of note is that, though the material losses suffered by the Communists are important, they are not as important as the bogged-down situation they find themselves in and the spiritual break-down of the North Vietnamese cadres.

According to the declarations of the enemy cadre returnees and the documents captured from the Communists, the majority of enemy cadres have lost heart, no longer believe in the Party, are afraid of being sent to the battlefields... and are seeking every means to return through the Open Arms program.

2/ Denounce and condemn the continuous invasion activities and the design for drawing out the war of the Communists with the Policy of increasing guerilla warfare, agitating our rear through terrorist activities, sabotage and massacres of innocent civilians. Aim at heightening the vigilance of the population and encourage them to spoil any bribery tricks and agitation activities of the Communists.

- Emphasis must be laid on unveiling and explaining to the population the criminal tricks of the Communist rebels. They have been and are applying them in fomenting the movement for an immediate cease-fire, demanding peace, neutrality... to create pressures on the legal, constitutional government of the Republic of Vietnam, aiming at the realization of a non-coalition government, and toward the usurpation of political power for the Communists.

- Create a movement among the population to determinedly resist the coalition designs as well as the false peace policy of the Communists, increase and create a high anti-communist spirit among different classes of the population, create powerful support for our government's demand for the realization of a just peace.

3/ Praise the results and highly publicize the victories achieved by the Republic of Vietnam in the Pacification and Development program, in order to bolster morale and heighten the fighting spirit of our Armed Forces and People; we will thus crush all propaganda and sabotage activities of the Communists, creating favorable conditions for a victorious struggle against the Communists in all fields.

Saigon, August 8, 1970

Assistant to Minister of Information

s/s CHUNG DUC MAI

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