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person is prohibited by law.		(Classification and Control Markings)	
1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM	8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 0323 71	9. DATE OF REPORT: 2 April 1971	10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
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4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 20 August 1970	12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)	13. PREPARED BY: EDWARD A. FELIX, 1LT, MI CHIEF, PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC	
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 8 March 1971	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC		
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>B</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>			
7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT			

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15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a directive prepared by NT ((possibly Nam Truong, aka COSVN)) and reproduced by an unspecified agency of Bien Hoa Province Party Committee, VC Region 7)). The directive, dated 20 August 1970 and addressed to subordinate agencies ((of Bien Hoa Province Party Committee)), pertains to the disruption of the enemy's ((GVN)) accelerated pacification program and development of friendly ((VC)) village and hamlet forces.

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From: NT ((possibly COSVN)) Current Affairs Committee.

To: Cadre at all levels and subordinate agencies.

1. According to reports, the enemy plans to conduct a "special pacification program" from 1 Jul to 30 Oct ((70)) in an attempt to:

Eliminate our infrastructures within enemy controlled areas.

step up the PHÙNG HOÀNG Campaign directed by the province chiefs to spot and destroy our organizations and forces. Efficiently control the people within his pacified areas, reorganize his administrative agencies from village and district to higher levels in Dec, develop his infrastructures in Nov, and prepare for the presidential elections in 1971. The goal of this program is to annihilate friendly infrastructures or isolate them from the people.

In the recent past, we obtained successes, especially during our operational phase. The enemy admitted that areas under his control were 'only half safe. Since his troops were sent to Cambodia, his pacification activities have been performed poorly. However, we did not fulfill the requirements of the situation. The in-place forces and movements showed weaknesses.

2. In order to cope with this enemy scheme, we should fully understand all the resolutions and directives issued by COSVN, especially Directive 21/CT-70. We should make specific plans and take appropriate measures in local areas. We should also pay attention to the following points:

a. The main objective of the enemy's accelerated pacification program is to eliminate our infrastructure and, at the same time, develop a series of enemy infrastructures, especially oppressive administrative personnel, pacification cadre, and overt and covert spies. Therefore, in counterpacification activities, we should thoroughly understand the basic requirements, and be determined to eliminate tyrants ((GVN officials)) and ringleaders in his oppressive administrative machineries, spies, and Chieu Hoi personnel. We must also protect, strengthen, and develop friendly village and hamlet forces in every field, particularly the secret guerrilla force among the local inhabitants.

b. In the future, in order to implement this special pacification program, the enemy will use extremely cunning and cruel schemes aimed at the friendly infrastructure. For this reason, we should make positive efforts to increase political indoctrination courses for cadre, Party members, underground agents, and other village and hamlet forces, including overt and covert forces. We should increase their vigilance and indoctrinate and provide guidance concerning the application of methods of improvement in local areas.

At the same time, they should develop a high determination to stay close to the people, hold on to our areas, increase all activities, conduct continuous attacks against the enemy, and develop friendly forces and the people's movements. We should eliminate their subjectivism, lack of vigilance, and shrinking attitude.

c. These missions are not only missions of the security agency, but also the missions of various agencies and groups, including the armed forces directed by Party Committee echelons. Party Committee members and Party Chapters should work out a plan for fighting the enemy and forging a unity of mind and action in all fields of activities in the local forces, various agencies, groups, and armed forces in compliance with the directives, especially Directive 21/CT-70. In order to disrupt the accelerated pacification program, subordinate agencies should try to use the inside and outside forces ((meaning the forces operating inside and outside GVN controlled areas)), utilize three-pronged attack tactics ((military, political, and military proselyting activities)), coordinate the three forces to assassinate ((GVN)) spies, Chieu Hoi personnel, tyrants, oppressive administrative personnel, and pacification cadre. They should also coordinate with the people to launch attacks against the Popular Force outposts. If we properly perform these missions, we will be able to eliminate the enemy infrastructures and strengthen and develop our agents and village and hamlet forces. This is also a factor in changing the balance of forces in our favor.

All subordinate agencies should closely observe the enemy special pacification program to detect his new schemes.

How were our successes obtained in counterpacification activities?

It is requested that suggestions be made by subordinate agencies and that reports on the results of the implementation of Directive 21/CT-70 in their own local areas ((be forwarded to COSVN Current Affairs Committee)).

COSVN Current Affairs Committee certified true copy of original on 20 Aug 70.

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