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SUBJ: Deactivation of Sub-Regions 2 and 3, COSVN, and Missions of VC/NVA Troops of Long An Sub-Region, COSVN, During the 1970 Rainy Season. (U)

09-2022-70

22.03.04

(C-Feb 71) (10 pages, handwritten; B-3) Directive, classified ((VC)) SECRET, dated 31 Aug 70, originally signed by Nguyễn Chánh for an unspecified ((VC)) sub-region headquarters ((possibly Long An Sub-Region Headquarters, COSVN)), reproduced by an unidentified individual, provides guidance on the political tasks of the elements ((possibly of Long An Sub-Region)) during the rainy season of 1970. The document reads in part as follows:

11 Sep 70  
 Xth 30099,  
 Hân Nghia  
 Prov  
 RVN MR 3  
 494th RF Co,  
 Hân Nghia  
 Sector, RVN  
 MR 3  
 Batch No.  
 Unknown  
 Received CDEC  
 18 Sep 70  
 Category: A

"The rainy season of 1970 is of strategic importance ((possibly because it will enable the VC/NVA troops to intensify their attacks to control the course of the military situation in Indochina)) and is characterized by new requirements for political tasks of friendly ((VC/NVA)) armed elements due to the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) escalation of the war in Cambodia and Laos.

From the date of the coup d'etat by the Lon Nol Clique in Cambodia to date ((31 Aug 70)), significant military victories have been scored by the friendly side in Cambodia, Laos, and SVN. Due to the fact that the enemy continues to experience bitter defeats, he will undoubtedly resort to other plots to turn the tide of the war in his favor. He will push his accelerated-pacification program in SVN, and will intensify his military operations in Cambodia to save the Lon Nol Clique from its desperate situation. During the months to come, the enemy will focus efforts on the preparation for his 1971 dry season offensive to destroy the revolutionary movement in Indochina.

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"The development of the situation in SVN will depend on the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, and vice-versa. The revolutionary movements in SVN, Cambodia, and Laos are one. The enemy military failures throughout Indochina will compel the Americans and the Puppet ((RVN)) Government to increase their military attacks in Cambodia and along the border areas to preclude future friendly offensives and to implement their Vietnamisation of the SVN war.

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"Friendly personnel are confused by the complicated development of the situation in Indochina and are demoralized, because they have failed to realize the enemy's disadvantages ((in his escalation of the war)). They see only the difficulties caused by the enemy cross-border operations and have become unaggressive, undisciplined, and discouraged.

"Presently, ((possibly Long An Sub-Region)) is confronted with considerable difficulties, one of which is the merger of Sub-Regions 2 and 3 ((COSVN)) into one sub-region ((possibly Long An Sub-Region)) in response to the requirements dictated by the development of the situation in SVN. The merger of Sub-Regions 2 and 3 was hastily done, and thus was not accurately implemented. The reorganization of troops ((which have been disorganized by FVMAF/RVNAF cross-border operations)) is not yet accomplished, especially the reorganization of the three battalions ((possibly 16th, 269th, and 6th Battalions of former Sub-Regions 2 and 3 which have been reorganized into one battalion designated as the 1696th Battalion)), due to the lack of company and battalion cadre. Except for K2 and K3 ((possibly Companies)) which have been deployed, ((the other elements of the 1696th Battalion are ~~inoperative~~)). Friendly troops are unfamiliar with the local terrain and are confronted with considerable difficulties in logistical support. Concurrently, their health is affected by inclement weather during the rainy season and poor food.

"The immediate political tasks of all friendly armed elements are to make friendly personnel fully realize the enemy defeats in SVN, Cambodia, and Laos to improve their morale. They are to know that although the enemy is stubborn he will be defeated. They are to have full confidence in the Party leadership and are to be kept abreast of their missions during the rainy season ((of 1970)), which are to take advantage of the current enemy failures throughout Indochina to launch more violent attacks to disrupt the enemy pacification program in SVN, defeat the enemy military operations in Cambodia which are intended to consolidate the position of Lon Nol, and create favorable conditions for the friendly offensive during the dry season of 1971.

"Efforts are to be made to promote the revolutionary spirit of friendly personnel. Repeated political indoctrination sessions are to be conducted to heighten their determination to fight and to win and to correct their deficiencies, particularly their tendencies to relaxation and fear of protracted war.

"Two political indoctrination courses are to be conducted. The first political indoctrination course will be conducted from the end of Aug 70 to the end of Jun 71 to promote the army's traditions. The second political indoctrination course will be conducted in Sep 70 to spiritually prepare friendly personnel for the accomplishment of their future missions. Attention is to be paid to the popularization of friendly victories in SVN, Cambodia, and Laos.

"Friendly troops operating in Cambodia are to be indoctrinated on the international proletariat.

"Emulation campaigns are to be initiated to score greater victories to celebrate the coming holidays, i.e the August Revolution on 19 Aug, Independence Day on 2 Sep, and the Anniversary of the Death of Uncle Hồ Chi Minh on 3 Sep.

"The combat criteria for friendly armed elements in the local sub-region is to kill 3,500 enemy troops between 15 Jul and 15 Oct 70.

"Civilian proselyting activities are to be increased, especially in Cambodia. The instructions outlined in Directive 155-M, originated by the Military Affairs Party Committee of SVNLA, are to be observed."