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**STUDY OF DIRECTIVE 20
TASKS IN THE 1970 RAINY SEASON**

CONTENTS:

1. Characteristics of the situation in the rainy season.
2. Comparative war situation of the enemy and our side.
3. Our missions and requirements in this year's rainy season.

1. [Blank in original]

2. Abolish the neutral regime in Cambodia and set up a pro-American regime.

Turn Cambodia into a colony.

Suppress the Cambodian people's revolutionary movement.

Destroy our head and news-center agencies.

It was the U.S. ambition to get through within six to eight months, as a solution to their plot of de-Americanizing the Vietnam war,

3. Our forces have widened their areas of operation in Cambodia.

[Enemy forces there included] two brigades and 67 battalions of the Cambodian forces, eight Saigon battalions, and five U.S. battalions.

Cambodia has taken a great leap forward.

In Laos, friendly forces completely occupied the Plain of Jars and liberated the two provinces adjacent to Cambodia, middle, upper and lower Laos [sic].

In South Viet-Nam, friendly forces put 230,000 enemy out of action, including 70,000 Americans, and inflicted heavy casualties upon 70 enemy battalions, equivalent to 450 companies, and 40 pacification groups and units. In addition, friendly forces also downed 4,200 airplanes, destroyed 10,000 military vehicles, 200 warships, and 1,500 artillery pieces, captured 8,000 weapons of various types, and caused 7,000 enemy soldiers to desert their ranks.

II. COMPARATIVE WAR SITUATION OF THE ENEMY AND OUR SIDE:

1. The enemy is continuing to withdraw his troops while accelerating the special pacification program.

2. Because he has been attacked repeatedly by our forces on all battle fields, the enemy has had to disperse his widely.

3. The enemy is now faced with four contradictions.

He has come to a deadlock. He is now engaged in the Cambodian and Lao battlefields, yet he cannot increase the number of his troops, but instead has to withdraw them. Faced with our repeated offensives, the enemy's incapable of getting out of his deadlock.

The Puppet forces were incapable of saving the situation in South, yet they have to be sent to help Cambodia.

Internal contradictions grew even more acute.

[Contradictions] between the masses and the Thieu-Ky clique have developed in scope.

Puppet servicemen and civil servants. [sic].

Economic aid to Cambodia is cut and aid to the South is reduced after the troop withdrawal.

4. The entire U.S. and Puppet forces have been deployed thinly on the battlefields. Enemy soldiers have been seriously demoralized and become unhappy with the war. As U.S. troops are withdrawn, Puppet soldiers get confused and seek ways to protect their own lives.

5. Enemy schemes in the days to come.

Cause disturbances (partially in Cambodia and Laos) and continue the pacification program.

Enemy [situation]:

Intermediate areas:

Assembly area for troop withdrawal.

Area adjacent to troop stations.

Area where the enemy developed control and launched sweep operations.

Our strong points:

[The enemy] does not believe in the effectiveness of his pacification activities.

His internal organization is weak.

His Popular and Regional Forces are weak.

We are able to penetrate enemy controlled areas.

Our weak points:

The people are being relocated, and we can only operate around them.

Our forces inside enemy area are still inadequate.

[Illegible passage - appears to be about problems of "base organizations."]

In some areas, we failed to control the population. In others, the revolutionary movement declined. In some areas, we ran short of material supplies.

Requirements and missions:

Considering the characteristics of the battlefield, we should make every effort to motivate the people to rise up and conduct three-pronged attacks.

Our armed forces must fulfill their role of a driving force.

Friendly situation:

1. We are holding the initiative throughout the three zones [meaning Viet-Nam, Laos , and Cambodia] of Indochina.
2. The Cambodian Revolution is developing to its fullest extent and was successful in the recent campaign.
3. The situation has turned in our favor.

The rainy season of this year is very significant and is quite different from that of last year.

III. OUR MISSIONS IN THE RAINY SEASON:

Develop our advantages and new capabilities on the main battlefield and throughout Indochina.

Intensify our attacks during the rainy season to gain great victories.

Closely coordinate [our forces] on all battlefields of SVN, Cambodia, and Laos.

Urgently develop our forces in all aspects.

Develop a high determination among units at all levels and various associations.

Try to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy's mobile troops, Regional and Popular Forces, and pacification teams in local areas.

Closely coordinate three-pronged attacks, agitate the masses to rise up, [illegible passage follows].

All echelons should clearly realize our successes and the enemy's failures and thoroughly understand our strategic plans for the rainy season.

Specific tasks and plans of each unit:

Parallel with destroying the enemy's combat potential, protect our corridors.

Total quantity of rice

Money

312 liters of rice:

14,040\$ [SVN] [118\$ SVN = \$1.00US]

Medical allowances for 13 comrades
(80\$ SVN for each person): 1.000\$ [sic]

Food allowances for 13 comrades
(360\$ SVN for each person): 4,680\$

Operational expenditures: 400\$

5,000	80	
5,000	<u>13</u>	
3,200	240	
3,300	<u>80</u>	
<u>3,700</u>	1040	
20,200	<u>14040</u>	
840		
19,360		
<u>3,755</u>		
	14,040	
	1,040	
23,115	4,680	
	<u>400</u>	23,115
	20,160	<u>20,160</u>
	<u>20,160</u>	
		02,955
	40,320	
	<u>23,115</u>	
	17,205	

Make positive efforts to frustrate [enemy] pacification activities and to disorganize the People's Self-Defense units and seize their weapons.

Smash his plan to increase the number of troops.

Encourage the people to go out to work in the fields. Return the people to their native lands. Stay close to our areas of operations.

Enlarge [liberated] areas, intensify our movement in cities, take care of the people's living conditions, and increase secret self-defense forces.

Employ secret guerrillas to attack [enemy] storage facilities and airfields.

Provide concentrated or separate leadership according to each primary or secondary objective.

Insure the success of attacks in the rainy season. Be ready to counter enemy activities in the dry season.

Enlarge our base areas firmly hold our base areas.

Insure that we get adequate material supplies.

Attack the enemy and equip our troops with captured enemy weapons.