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7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>George S. Lapinskes</i> GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY: (C-Jun 71) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents and concerns two letters, one signed by Van Dung for CP.24 ((possibly Hoai An District Party Committee of VC Binh Dinh Province, VC Region 5)), and the other signed by Ba for IA.B ((possibly an agency of VC Binh Dinh Province Party Committee)); and a political training document ((possibly prepared by Hoai An District Party Committee)). The letters, dated 5 September and 31 December 1970, reveal that VC control of the population was to be achieved by initiating ideological campaigns among the people. The training document sets forth the requirements for defeating the enemy pacification program, boosting agricultural production, and increasing three-pronged attacks.

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~~FULL TRANSLATION~~

Item 1 of C.T. 1286

CP 24 ((possibly Hoai An District Party Committee, VC Binh Dinh Province, VC Region 5))

No. 83/VP

TO: All subordinate units and villages

Operational Phase N26 began five days ago, but only An Tin and An Phong Villages reported the following information to the Current Affairs Committee of CP 24:

An Tin Village killed one deputy hamlet chief and An Phong Village killed one deputy hamlet chief and three Regional Force members (according to a personal letter from An).

The Current Affairs Party Committee commends these village units, because they have successfully carried out activities and complied with procedures concerning the submission of requests and reports. We have not yet received reports from other villages. We request that these villages send their reports to the office ((of the Current Affairs Committee)) immediately and make summary reports and send them to higher echelons. In these reports they should mention activities, failures or successes, and difficulties and reasons for these difficulties so the Current Affairs Committee can easily follow the situation and provide sound leadership over activities.

The Current Affairs Party Committee calls the attention of all units and local areas to the following points:

1. In order to ensure the continuation of combat activities, all villages are ordered to postpone the opening of a reorientation session until ~~BRVHPJEPBNJPE~~ ((encoded date)).

When all units have finished holding the political reorientation session, they must operate immediately and the villages can, in turn, hold a political reorientation session. Presently, villages must intensify their activities and must submit regular reports to CP24.

2. We must restudy the resolution concerning N26 of Hoai An District Party Committee and the plans of local areas in order to have measures to overcome difficulties and strengthen determination.

3. A short meeting must be held to assess activities in local areas and to point out basic weaknesses and strong points in order to help N26 gain great victories. All units must make reports on the results of activities and forward their reports to the Current Affairs Committee of CP24.

Sep 5, 70  
For the CP24/S/  
Van Dung

IA B ((possibly an agency of VC Binh Dinh Province Party Committee)).

No. 119/VP.

TO: All secretaries and the Current Affairs Committees of PU ((possibly Hoa An District Party Committee)).

(Also to all members of Xu ((possibly VC Binh Dinh Province Party Committee)).)

Recently, there have been many changes in the X ((possibly province)) which are favorable for us. After the withdrawal of the 4th US Division, the Puppet ((RVNAP)) and the ROK troops had to define missions and areas of responsibility. The mobile forces in the X ((possibly province)) were considerably reduced. Furthermore, the enemy had to disperse his forces to counter us in many areas. To keep pace with this situation, the enemy was forced to upgrade his troops and accelerate conscription. However, the quicker he developed his forces to replace the US troops, the more heterogeneous he became and the more his combat abilities weakened. The Puppet Government and his troops were demoralized. They lost confidence in the Vietnamization plan and the pacification program adopted by the US and the Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm ((Government)). It is evident that the acceleration of the upgrading plan has weakened the enemy regular forces in local areas. This is a new enemy shortcoming and we can take advantage of it to disintegrate his troops.

The enemy has prepared to launch sweep operations against our bases in mountainous areas in order to coordinate and support the "accelerated pacification program" in lowland areas which was named the "Quyết Thắng Campaign". This campaign is aimed at preventing our attacks at the beginning of the summer of this year. He also intensified his attacks on our organizations in rural areas and cities. Because of these weaknesses, the effectiveness of the enemy sweep operations and attacks has been limited.

The enemy has been deescalating the war. The US has gradually withdrawn its troops from SVN. Therefore, large-scale operations will gradually decrease, and the enemy still displays big gaps in cities, rural and mountainous areas. It is recommended that you keep abreast of the evolution of the enemy situation in local areas in order to promptly discover his shortcomings. We should take advantage of the opportunity to attack the enemy in order to gain achievements which match our abilities.

Because the enemy has many weaknesses, the people's movement has created many very favorable conditions for us in the initiation of a movement to kill tyrants, break the oppressive enemy control of the population, win over the people, and rapidly strengthen our area. On 7 Dec 70, more than 40,000 students and people in Qui Nhơn City conducted violent protest demonstrations against the enemy for two days. That event proved that the people can rise up anywhere and showed an example

of the Party's proper evaluation of the enemy position and strength. We have a new change which is favorable for us in the Vietnamization of the war. The event of "Qui Nhon" has proved our full capability in development of forces in cities and rural areas and taught us a valuable lesson on uprisings.

The recent development of the general situation in all three areas of our province has consolidated our confidence. We are sure that we are going to gain the greatest success and fulfill the main mission assigned by the Party.

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In this situation, we can reaffirm that the requirements of annihilating the enemy, seizing control of the population and strengthening our revolutionary forces and resolutions set forth by the XU and the Current Affairs Committee of XU are correct and appropriate. We should make more efforts and provide guidance to turn possibilities into reality.

At present, our greatest concerns are:

The Party Headquarters made a new change through the three ideological indoctrination phases, and a number of cadres improved their leadership capabilities to a higher degree through the training sessions held to learn from past experiences by the region and the specialized training sessions by the province. However, in general, there are still the following important problems which have adverse effects upon the performance of the mission of gaining control of the people:

1. Our cadre have not properly evaluated the favorable change in the balance of friendly and enemy forces now or for the future. As a result, they do not fully understand the urgent requirements and great plan of .... ((blank)).

Our cadre and Party members did not have confidence in victory or the determination to gain great victories. The situation proved that local areas have not made preparations ((for the forthcoming phase)) as enthusiastically as for the recent ((Campaign)) 180. It is too late for the various areas which have not yet completed their future plans to send them to X for consideration.

2. Our cadre did not fully understand preparations for uprisings or the method of exerting leadership.

3. Regarding leadership over H2 and H3 operational phases, the Party Committees of P and Y do not fully know requirements of the next climaxing phase.

If we do not make every effort to overcome these three shortcomings, we will fail to exert proper general leadership. Therefore, we offer the following guidelines for you to study and apply to the future mission.

1. The four requirements to gain control of the people during operational phases H2 and H3 should be attained:

1. Conduct large movements and do not initiate separate movements which were formerly conducted in every hamlet and village. The most important problem is that we must motivate the people of inter-hamlets and villages to rise up simultaneously.

2. Continuously and increasingly conduct broad phases. We will not attain the requirements for gaining control of the people in local areas until we accomplish the missions of operational phases H2 and H3.

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3. When we gain control of the population, we should make every effort to maintain it. We should fight the enemy counterattacks. We should seize control of the people and better their living conditions. This is an essential requirement. If we gain control of the people but fail to maintain it, we will never gain victories.

4. Strive to develop our forces politically, militarily, and economically.

2. The method of leadership:

Emphasize the three following main points:

1. Know how to initiate a broad ideological campaign among the people in order to accelerate the spontaneous uprising stage.

2. Make progress by leaps and bounds in building and developing our forces.

3. Motivate the people to attack the enemy and break his oppressive control by violence in the proper forms and at the proper time.

Following are some of our recommendations for study and application.

a. Initiating ideological campaigns among the people.

Through meritorious achievements gained by a number of local areas and through the uprising of the people and students in Qui Nhon ((City)), we realize that we must promote the slogan, "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom." This slogan will heighten their nationalism and class viewpoint so that they can rise up to defeat the aggressors and their henchmen. However, in the current situation, our urgent mission is to encourage the people to follow the motto, "Nothing is more precious than the ownership of our own land and villages". But this motivation has not resulted in a real uprising; therefore, we must outline specific plans for each activity phase. We should carefully study ways to expose enemy oppression of the population in local areas.

He has forced the people to join the People's Self-Defense Force, killed the people, raped women, burned the people's houses and deprived them of their property. We should conduct attacks against enemy weak points in order to maintain the people's rights and create favorable conditions for the people to rise up to destroy the oppressive enemy machinery in hamlets and villages. We must seize and maintain control over the population. (Learn from the experiences of the uprising in Qui Nhon.) We should indoctrinate the people to understand that the Vietnamization of the war and the enemy pacification program are cruel schemes against all the people in both rural areas and cities. If we do not unite to struggle against the enemy, the entire nation, the family, and the individual will be destroyed. (Show the people the evidence in local areas.)

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We must also indoctrinate the people to make them understand that the enemy Vietnamization program is a desperate solution. He has been driven to a standstill, his forces are reduced, and his troops' morale is low. The salient enemy shortcoming is his inability to win the support of the people. Therefore, the people do not believe in his capability to defeat us. We should take advantage of the latest incident in Qui Nhon ((City)) to raise the following questions for the people to discuss in rural areas: Why could the people and students in Qui Nhon rise up to attack Americans in the city both day and night and gain greater achievements than ever in an enemy controlled area? Make a comparison of the balance of friendly and enemy forces in Qui Nhon and those in local areas. Why did the people in rural areas fail to rise up or rise up less than those in Qui Nhon? We can conduct a struggle as successfully as the people and students in Qui Nhon did. We should exert our leadership to uphold the meritorious deeds of the people and students in Qui Nhon and to urge our cadre, Party members, soldiers, and the people to follow the example of the people in Qui Nhon and then exceed their deeds.

In the face of the bombing on NVN by the US aggressors, we must disseminate the appeals of the Central Party Headquarters, the Democratic Republic of ~~Vietnam~~ and the NLF SVN to urge the people to defeat the enemy, liberate SVN, and protect NVN, the big rear base. If the enemy attacks NVN once, we should retaliate with five or 10 attacks. Our people vowed to unite with two friendly countries, Cambodia and Laos, to kill the enemy and defeat the US troops and chase them out of Indochina.

You should learn from past experiences discussed at the province civilian proselyting conference in order to indoctrinate the people in your own districts.

b. The strengthening of forces.

I am sure that you fully understand the importance of this task, but face many difficulties. Therefore, the performance of missions is slow and this adversely affects many other fields.

As a result of recapitulative conferences held in the province, and especially the event in Qui Nhon, we have learned from many experiences. Only three days after the struggle had broken out



everywhere on a continuous basis.

In hamlets where the situation is favorable, the Current Affairs Committee of PN must provide proper guidance to achieve victory. In areas where our activities are still weak, we should make every effort to initiate uprisings by motivating energetic people to move to other hamlets to stimulate the local inhabitants to rise up.

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In hamlets where the people's uprisings are strongly suppressed by the enemy, the surrounding hamlets and villages must use all means to support them. We will never leave them isolated, because the enemy can take advantage to regain control of the local population.

Our uprising movement to gain the support of the people is an urgent matter. There is no need to wait for a military attack before staging an uprising. The uprising should be instigated whenever conditions permit.

In areas where uprisings are successful, we must build our strength. Production should be increased and the people's living conditions must be improved.

We must turn these hamlets into combat hamlets. The construction of combat villages is of great importance. Not until we gain control of the entire village can we consolidate it into a combat village. The important thing is that we must purify the people, group them into organizations, make them aware of our Resistance, and train them in our three-front attack strategy in order for them to be able to face the enemy counterattack and defend themselves. We will build our fortification network (offensive and defensive).

X

X

As for the leadership in H2 and H3, you should take the following points into consideration:

1. Relying on our suggestions and depending on the local situation, you should select areas for an uprising. The district Party Committee should provide specific guidance for hamlets. The village Party Committees and Chapter Party Committees should provide specific guidance for sub-hamlets. Hamlets with more favorable conditions will proceed first to ((implement operational phases H2 and H3)). Hamlets with relatively favorable conditions will start in the second phase ((sic)) and the others will proceed in the third phase ((sic)). Weak hamlets within our area must try to catch up with the others. Better hamlets which are outside the area will be placed under the control of village committees.

In hamlets belonging to second objective areas, we investigate and categorize people in order to group them into organizations. We must have a thorough understanding of the enemy situation in order to attack targets successfully.

2. You must select bold and qualified cadre in "P" ((sic)), improve and train them carefully, and assign them specific missions. The Current Affairs Committee of PU should put full confidence in their abilities.

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and send these comrades to the most important hamlets of the district to motivate the people to rise up. Cadre with better backgrounds will be assigned to more critical areas. The Current Affairs Committee of PU must discover prominent elements active in the movement and send them to villages to receive training from the mobile training element of PU (which includes organizing and training cadre and other teams in charge). Prominent elements in hamlets are also to be sent to district to receive training from the Current Affairs Party Committee of PU. Training materials should be based upon summary reports of the province civilian proselyting conferences. PU and the Current Affairs Committee of PU must provide proper training activities. There must be an element in charge of training and improvement of hard core cadre. This element will be placed under direct leadership of the Current Affairs Committee of PU. Through the results of all the training missions, we will evaluate the victory of H2, H3.

3. All cadre, no matter whether they are political, military or of a special branch of P, must have a thorough grasp of the three main tasks in civilian propaganda, strengthen our organizations, and motivate the people to uprising. Only when these tasks have been carried out can we develop other missions.

4. We must consolidate our commo-liaison network, legal or illegal, from hamlets to provinces. Reports on the commo-liaison situation should be submitted to the Current Affairs Committee. In the course of an uprising, besides reports on emergency events, the Current Affairs Committee of PU must send daily reports to IAB ((sic)). Reports to X ((sic)) should be made every 3 days with the following contents: How were the tasks of motivating the people and strengthening our forces carried out? How did the uprising movement proceed? In what villages? Point out advantages as well as disadvantages so that IAB can provide appropriate instructions.

The Current Affairs Committee must assign a number of qualified legal cadre to hamlets and villages to collect information on the local situation or disseminate policy and guidance of the Current Affairs Committee of PU.

Study this letter thoroughly in order to correct deficiencies before operational phases H2 and H3.

On behalf of the Current Affairs Committee of PU, we ~~wish~~ like to wish you and all the members of Party Headquarters a happy new year, unity, and final victory.

31st January  
/S/ Ba

Training for the Party and Group members and underground key cadre during the political activity phase.

### PART ONE

#### A. SITUATION OF THE PROVINCE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR TO DATE.

##### I. ENEMY SITUATION:

Being continuously defeated by our General Offensives and Uprisings, especially strategic raids by our army and people in cities and bases during Mậu Thân New Year ((Tet 1968)), the US imperialists were forced to deescalate the war and unilaterally withdraw their troops ((from SVN)). However, they are very obstinate. They deescalated the war and withdrew US troops in compliance with the Vietnamisation plan to prolong this war. They also proceed with their pacification plan in an attempt to pacify the rural area. The enemy has increasingly conscripted and increased the number of Puppet troops to replace US troops. He strengthened his defense of the cities and bases while increasing his attacks, destruction, and plunder of the people.

In the battlefields of our province, the enemy has concentrated and implemented his rural pacification plan. He has made our province a pilot area for his pacification activities and Vietnamisation plan. From mid 1969 to the beginning of 1970, the enemy fiercely attacked and destroyed several districts in the northern part of the province, carrying out his plan of encroachment. He started building posts in our liberated areas and exercised his oppressive control over the population, causing us a number of difficulties and casualties.

Since the beginning of 1970, thanks to the determined leadership of Party Headquarters echelons, our army and people in the province have fiercely attacked the enemy, especially during Campaign 180. The enemy, therefore, has suffered a serious defeat in carrying out the pacification plan. He has to recognize the failure of his pacification plan, because he can only establish some key positions in the province, but cannot control the population. We inflicted serious losses upon the enemy and killed a number of his henchmen and tyrants in villages and hamlets.

Since Jul 70, to expedite a special pacification plan, the enemy has established a restrictive ((GVN)) administrative machinery. He upgraded his troops by conscripting the people to increase the strength of his People Self-Defense Force and establish Regional Force inter-units. His attacks became fiercer during Campaign 180 and he tried to regain control of the areas that he had lost.

The enemy has mustered reactionary factions, strengthened psywar and Chieu Hoi activities, and resorted to more barbarous and cunning plans. US and ROK troops have continuously attacked and destroyed our forces stationed in the border areas, including our rear bases. Their objective is to block the corridors, prevent our attacks, and support their pacification program in the delta.

Through these schemes, the enemy has temporarily gained some good results and caused some difficulties and losses to us. However, from the beginning of 1970 to the present, our continuous and violent attacks during the past ten months have inflicted many defeats to the enemy, especially during the Spring-Summer Campaign. For these reasons, the enemy not only failed to implement his pacification plan, but was fiercely attacked and pushed back by friendly forces. His oppressive control in villages and hamlets and his main force units were completely destroyed. Many tyrants were killed. The enemy's greatest defeat was clear, because he could not control any areas or any of the population. On the contrary, the people rose to struggle for their rights in ((enemy)) controlled areas, including the border areas of province capitals. They caused great difficulties and damage to the enemy. The enemy pacification activities were defeated and his fighting spirit was lowered. He concentrated his forces to attack our rear bases, but he did not attain the objective.

Although the enemy upgraded troops and tried to use Puppet troops to replace US troops, a large part of his strength, particularly his high ranking personnel, tyrants, and control forces in local areas were destroyed. A number of his other forces were also disintegrated. As a result, the number of recruits was no greater than KIA's, so the replacement of US troops by Vietnamese troops has not been implemented on the battlefield. The organization of the Puppet troops is disordered. Both quality and quantity are bad. Ideology and morale are increasingly lowered. He is often afraid of our attacks.

The enemy has tried to reinforce his defensive system in cities and bases, but we continuously attack him. Our movements in cities are strongly developed, causing more troubles to the enemy rear areas.

The enemy economy is in ruins and inflation has greatly increased. The life of the people, soldiers, and the Puppet Government employees in his controlled areas is difficult.

The enemy is more isolated politically than ever before. There are contradictions in the Puppet's internal affairs and sharper contradictions between the Thieu-Ky clique and the third force.

For the past ten months, especially in the Spring-Summer ((Campaign)), the enemy Vietnamized the war with great effort. He caused a number of casualties to us. However, he also suffered greater defeats, particularly to his pacification program, in the attack of our rear areas, and in the defense of his cities and bases.

The enemy has large ((regular)) forces and several other types of troops, but he is still weak and his fighting spirit is poor.

The enemy has been driven into a defensive position. He has become increasingly confused and has exposed many new shortcomings in southern and northern ((Binh Dinh)) Province, in the city, and rural delta and mountainous areas.

**II. FRIENDLY SITUATION:**

During the last six months of 1969, the enemy fiercely conducted his pacification attacks over a large area and caused us some defeats and difficulties. Since the beginning of 1970, especially during the Spring-Summer Campaign, we tried to overcome these difficulties, stepped up three-pronged attacks and countered pacification activities. We broke the control of tyrants and broke the oppressive enemy control over the population. We succeeded in gaining control of the people, intensifying destruction, and disrupting the Puppets troops. We oppressed the enemy administrative machinery, tyrants, and pacification personnel. We strengthened the movement in province capitals, gained victories, and consolidated and heightened the quality and quantity of our activities throughout the three regions. We attained a great victory in the Spring-Summer Campaign.

During the first three months of 1970, we continued our counterpacification movements, broke the oppressive enemy control of the population and gained control of the people. As a result, the enemy pacification activities were neutralized. At the beginning of Apr 70, we conducted the Summer-Spring Campaign to intensify attacks and uprisings. We defeated the enemy pacification program and motivated 80,000 persons to rise up and seize control of the land.

We put 11,066 enemy soldiers out of action and disrupted 1,425 (including 500 People's Self-Defense Force members). The movements in district seats and province capitals are continuously developed.

Following the Spring-Summer Campaign, we conducted continuous activities on the battlefield. At the beginning of Sep 70, we started our Autumn ((Campaign)). We met all basic requirements in countering the enemy pacification activities, winning over the people, and holding the battleground. Specifically, we maintained the level of achievements gained during the Spring-Summer ((Campaign)). We intensified the movement in province capitals and strengthened all organizations in our areas. We made great progress in building our base areas.

**SPECIFIC SITUATION**

**Military:** We attacked and destroyed many enemy forces and war facilities. Particularly, we broke the oppressive enemy control of the population and conducted deep thrusts into the enemy rear service and base areas. The combat mission of the three forces ((main, local, and guerrilla forces)) is to break the oppressive enemy control of the population, gain control of the people and win them over. The guerrilla warfare movements were expanded in the three areas (particularly after the Spring-Summer Campaign). We had high combat capability, a low rate of casualties, and we increased the annihilation of the enemy platoon-sized units. In short, the armed forces successfully performed the missions assigned by the Province Party Headquarters. They applied the three-pronged attack and seriously defeated the enemy pacification plan. In conjunction with the fighting mission, we took new steps to improve quality and quantity for future activities. During the first ten months of 1970, we put 20,000 enemy soldiers out of action. (During Campaign 180, we put 11,000 enemy troops out of action.)

At the end of 1969, the situation in the rural area was still bad. Since the beginning of 1970, this situation has changed favorably due to three-pronged attacks. We struggled fiercely against the enemy, worsened his situation, and defeated him. During Campaign 180, we motivated the people to rise to kill tyrants, break the oppressive enemy control and gain control of the land. As a result, an increase of 80,000 persons from both the disputed and enemy controlled areas was made. Although the enemy has fiercely attacked our force in his special pacification campaign since July 70, our forces have remained close to the people. Generally speaking, we maintained the offensive potential and our movements in some areas were successfully developed.

In the mountainous areas, we were determined to counter sweep operations and defeat the enemy attacks and his attempt to destroy our bases. We destroyed a large part of the US and ROK forces, causing them great casualties. They failed in their attempt to overrun our bases. The more we fight the enemy, the more we gain the initiative on the battlefield. We restored the normal situation to our base so that we can resume daily activities. We destroyed a great number of enemy aircraft and war facilities.

In province capitals and border areas, we continuously destroyed elements of the important enemy force and the enemy situation in cities and towns became tense. The revolutionary forces in province capitals have been activated and are continuously developing. Stepping stone areas were consolidated. Party Committees of all echelons and branches made a proper step to strengthen revolutionary forces. There was progress in the development of local forces and three-pronged attacks were conducted successfully.

We paid more attention to the strengthening of rear bases and ((food)) production, thus overcoming a great part of the difficulties in our supply missions.

Ideological preparations and organization tasks were successful. Specifically, our political reorientation task met all basic requirements. This helped the Party Headquarters properly estimate the enemy and friendly situation and clearly anticipate future policy, duties, and leadership. Following the study of Uncle Ho's testament, we heightened ideological concepts and the will to fight; overcome rightism and individualism; acquired virtues and developed revolutionary activities. In this political reorientation session, we summarized all achievements of the Party, including the leadership of cadre and Party members. A number of the Party Committees' leadership was substantially improved.

Through the fierce struggle, we defeated an important part of the enemy Vietnamization plan and his rural pacification plan and achieved great victories. The movement in our province was maintained and reached a new step, thus creating more favorable conditions for us to gain greater victories.

Despite the above great victories, the movement in the provinces had the following shortcomings:

Since the beginning of 1970, the situation in our province has turned in our favor. 180 companies of the 4th ((US)) Infantry Division and E22

((possibly the 22nd RVNAF Infantry Regiment)) were sent into forces to Cambodia. The province was poorly defended and the enemy troops were demoralized. However, we failed to take advantage of the situation to step up the local ((revolutionary)) movement. In the offensive and strengthening of forces, the following shortcomings and weak points were still noted:

The guerrilla warfare movement was slow. In some areas, it was improved, but the guerrillas' capabilities were not fully developed. Generally, guerrilla activities were conducted continuously. The strengthening of local troops was slow and this affected their missions of killing tyrants and breaking the oppressive enemy control. The majority of the armed forces did not participate in the motivation of the people. They did not understand the purposes of the motivation, or did not closely coordinate the three forces in combat as well as in strengthening forces.

We attained greater successes in killing tyrants, breaking the oppressive enemy control, winning over the people and gaining control. But in comparison with favorable conditions and requirements of the people in the recent period, the successes attained were far below the criteria. The movement of the masses was not strongly developed and the offensive was not continuously and fiercely conducted. Therefore, in some areas we were easily confused by enemy counterattacks. Because of many weaknesses, we failed to win over the people, motivate the people, and strengthen the forces to conduct spontaneous uprisings. The methods of motivation of the people were still based on the old principles. The motivation was usually conducted by illegal forces. Some areas did not thoroughly understand the operating procedures and the methods of motivating the people. They did not have good ideological concepts. Some Party members were not determined to stay close to the people.

The people's movement in the district seat and province capital was improved, but the strengthening of forces was not in accordance with the requirements of the current situation. In comparison with the province capital, the movement in the district seat was not developed. The political struggle and military proselyting movements were not well developed. Specifically, the struggle against conscription was not properly conducted. We could not initiate the movement to disintegrate the People's Self-Defense Force. We missed good opportunities to disintegrate a great number of Puppet troops. We could not organize the fifth columnists nor could we initiate military revolts or an anti-war movement. In general, military troop proselyting was very weak.

The strengthening of forces and especially the establishment of Party Chapters in village and hamlets, the strengthening of guerrillas, and the organization of the people's groups were very slow. Strengthening methods were improper. Therefore, we did not develop agencies widely, especially the organization of armed, political and military proselyting forces. We did not meet requirements in purchasing and requisition of food. In rear service areas, attention was not paid to the motivation of the people to participate in farm production to provide food for the battlefield. The motivation of youths to participate full time in the guerrillas was poor.

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Through indoctrination, rightist and individualism have been reduced, but we must still improve our attitudes. Illusion about peace, wait-and-see attitude,

reliance on negotiations, and lack of drive in task performance still prevailed. In many areas, Party members and cadre neglected or did not provide proper and close leadership and guidance to the people and soldiers and failed to correct erroneous thoughts promptly.

The cause of the above weakness and shortcoming is that Party Committees did not understand or implement the Party policy lines. They did not provide guidance for specific missions in local areas. They did not concentrate efforts on principal missions or realize the connection between the offensive and the strengthening of forces. They did not try to eliminate rightism and individualism which are great obstacles to activities. The organization and the implementation of tasks were weak; the correction of weaknesses and shortcomings was slow. The coordination between Party Committees and branches was loose. The leadership was not efficient or improved. During the last ten months, the following points were noted:

The enemy made great efforts to carry out his Vietnamization plan, pacification of rural areas, and conscription of youths to upgrade his troops. He caused us new difficulties and casualties, but we successfully frustrated his pacification plan. The enemy recruited additional youths to increase Puppet troops, but his organization was poor and troops were demoralized. Especially his auxiliary forces ((meaning Regional and Popular Forces)) and administrative strength were down and destroyed. The rest were more and more demoralized. We also disorganized a great segment of the People's Self-Defense Force in the province.

In comparison with enemy strength, we were in a favorable situation. The US troops withdrew. The number of Puppet troops increased, but their morale was weak. The enemy forces were thinly dispersed and created favorable conditions for our forces to attack them. Our military and political forces were well trained and were able to conduct fierce attacks. Recently our strength has been developed and improved. We developed the people's force and strengthened the Revolution.

The ((revolutionary)) movement was successfully developed in the province capital. There were changes in friendly and enemy positions. The enemy strived to create a strong position, but he failed to take the initiative on the battlefield and was greatly confused. We continued to maintain and develop the offensive position in all three areas.

We conducted fierce counterattacks. The enemy was isolated politically and diplomatically. He was demoralized, while we were enthusiastic and our people and armed forces were growing ever stronger.

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## B. FORTHCOMING MISSIONS.

### I. ENEMY SCHEME:

The general enemy plan, as said above, particularly in our province, is to intensify his activities to implement the following specific plans: He will continue to step up his special pacification activities. The main objective

is in lowland and rural areas. He will concentrate on pacifying our newly controlled areas. The enemy will conduct attacks to wipe out our forces and separate them from the people. He will strengthen administrative machinery and intensify deceitful and demagogic psywar activities to undermine the morale of the people. He will sow illusions about peace among the people, destroy our economy, rob civilians of their property, make the people more miserable, and force them to rally to him. He will resort to any scheme to deceive the people and bribe his lackeys in areas which he temporarily controls.

The enemy will continue to employ Regional and Popular Forces to implement his pacification plan. He will use the US, ROK, and Puppet main force elements to support his pacification plan.

The enemy will resort to any cruel and wicked measures to conduct fierce and continuous attacks to implement the plan to relocate the people. He will destroy revolutionary agencies in local areas. He will employ Special Forces to conduct ambushes and small raids against us and search and destroy our forces. He will employ defectors for these tasks.

The US troops will continue to withdraw according to their plan. They will strengthen the army and assign the Puppet troops a number of new areas of operations. They will strive to conscript youths and upgrade troops in order to increase the Puppet strength to replace theirs. They will upgrade troops and strengthen Regional Forces to enable them to carry out their pacification plan in local areas while the Puppet troops will play the role of mobile force to sweep our bases and attack our main forces. In the coming dry season, the enemy will concentrate main forces, infantry, and Special Forces to conduct air strikes and artillery fire against our bases, block our corridors, attack and destroy our storage facilities, production sites, and agencies in order to cause us difficulties.

The enemy will continue to rally reactionary factions into a force to attack us. Although he has been defeated and is driven into a defensive position, he still remains very stubborn and cunning. The US troops still have great war potential and a large strength and still holds many critical areas of operation. These are his strong points. However, in the course of the fierce struggle between friendly and enemy forces, the enemy has displayed his basic weak points.

a. The enemy has been defeated, so he is forced to deescalate the war and withdraw his troops. He has to disperse his troops in many battlefields. Therefore, the enemy forces have decreased in many places.

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For that reason, the balance of force has turned favorably to us.

b. Since the US troops withdraw, large-scale attacks have decreased even though the enemy has made great efforts.

c. As we have mentioned above, the enemy still has shortcomings, especially in areas where the Americans are going to withdraw. We have favorable conditions to launch stronger attacks. There are many dissensions among the Puppet troops. They are encountering many financial and economic difficulties.

## II. OUR DIFFICULTIES AND ADVANTAGES:

The present great difficulties are the following:

The enemy intensified activities to carry out his Vietnamization plan by attacking the revolutionary movement fiercely. He is stepping up pacification in rural areas, intensifying attacks against revolutionary agencies and our rear bases. He may cause us many more difficulties.

The political and armed forces are not developed. The mobilization of youths to participate in the guerrilla forces is not effective. We meet financial and economic difficulties. Our rear service units do not meet our requirements. Party members have not eliminated individualism and rightism.

Our sense of organization and task performance are poor, especially in agencies.

### Our basic advantages:

The US imperialists are seriously defeated. They are deescalating the war and continue to withdraw their troops. The more they deescalate the war, the more they will become weak. We have favorable conditions to launch stronger attacks in order to attain greater successes.

We are able to frustrate the enemy pacification plan in rural areas and win over the people to gain control, especially in areas where he implements his Vietnamization plan.

The ((revolutionary)) movement in province capitals is developed. The situation is advantageous for the movement to expand rapidly.

Under the efficient leadership of higher echelons and the Party Committee, we have gained more and more experiences. Particularly, after the political reorientation, the ideological attitude of Party Headquarters members and the people has been much improved. We also receive substantial support from the big rear ((NVN)) and from the entire region and SVN.

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## III. FORTHCOMING MISSIONS:

Our general missions are to motivate the entire Party, troops, and people in the province to contribute all efforts to strengthen the Resistance against the US. Intensify three-pronged attacks to defeat the enemy plan of Vietnamization, especially the enemy accelerated pacification program and his operations against our rear base areas. Step up the people's uprising movement and motivate them to kill tyrants, regain control of the population, oppose the enemy conscription plan, disrupt Puppet troops, strive to establish base areas, and increase agricultural production in order to cope with the situation.

To achieve our mission, we should fully understand all prescribed guidelines.

To implement principal missions of the province, we should destroy the enemy pacification plan, kill oppressors, win over the people, and strengthen our areas.

Fully understand that we should attack the enemy and strengthen our areas at the same time. To attack the enemy is to strengthen our areas.

We should fully understand the following important tasks: Oppose the enemy conscription, disrupt his pacification plans, kill oppressors, win over the people, and lower the morale of Puppet troops. We should strive to strengthen our areas, intensify the recruitment of village and hamlet agents during the third phase, and know that the strengthening of the people's association is our main task.

### SPECIFIC TASKS:

#### 1. Military:

Our immediate tasks are to coordinate with three-front attacks and to intensify our activities in three areas, especially the rural area, to frustrate the enemy special pacification plan and his accelerated pacification program to gain control of the people. Destroy enemy strength and war facilities. We should break the enemy ((oppressive forces)), hold the battlefield, and strive to strengthen armed forces, especially village and hamlet guerrilla forces and district units. We should not only pay attention to the quantity, but also to quality. On that basis, we should gain sufficient time to achieve a greater victory.

In base areas and our controlled areas, we must be ready to counter the enemy pacification and land encroachment plan. Set up defensive systems and establish combat hamlets and villages in lowland and mountainous areas in order to hold our controlled areas to smash the enemy Special Forces, patrols, and tactical heliborne raids. Shoot down enemy aircraft spreading toxic chemicals. Motivate youths to join our armed forces and guerrilla units.

#### 2. Frustrating the enemy special and accelerated pacification plans, killing oppressors and winning over the people:

Motivate the people and armed forces to intensify three-front attacks and be determined to defeat the enemy special and accelerated pacification programs. Consolidate our controlled areas. Actively break the oppressive enemy control, win over the people, destroy enemy relocation centers to extend our control and return the people relocated by the enemy to their former villages. We must try to strengthen our forces and

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prepare to motivate the people to rise up and defeat the enemy rural pacification scheme.

#### 3. Strengthening the rear base:

The base area is a key factor of the revolutionary victories. In mountainous areas, our rear bases occupy an important military, political and economic position. Therefore, we should strive to consolidate these base areas in all fields, enabling them to support a protracted war and to create favorable conditions ((for the development of our forces)) for the forthcoming phases.

4. Intensifying counterconscription and disorganization of Puppet troops.

In order to carry out his Vietnamization plan, the enemy conducted his pacification operations in rural areas. He has conscripted youths to upgrade troop strength. These are the two primary objectives of the Vietnamization plan. Therefore, to frustrate the Vietnamization program, we should defeat his pacification activities, counter his conscription, and destroy Puppet forces.

Our military proselyting activities play an important strategic role in the frustration of the enemy Vietnamization plan. They are a decisive factor for victories in the present anti-US Resistance for national salvation. Therefore, we should make the Party, army, and people fully understand the role of military proselyting activities so that they can be determined to perform their immediate missions. Make them realize that counterconscription and disruption of the Puppet troops are the important tasks of our Party Headquarters. All echelons, branches, and associations must understand the slogans for the alliance of all workers, farmers and soldiers ((in their struggles against the GVN)). At present, enemy conscription and friendly counterconscription are urgent. Therefore, the people are required to participate in counterconscription, which is the most urgent mission. We must make the people, especially youths, clearly understand the enemy conscription plan and motivate them to counter it by all means. Indoctrinate youths to escape if they are drafted by the enemy and to be determined not to join the Puppets to die for the betrayers. Coordinate counterconscription with motivation of youths to join the Revolution.

We should indoctrinate the Party, army, and people to understand the primary task of civilian proselyting. Strengthen the people's movements, spread propaganda among Puppet troops, and demoralize and disorganize them by conducting political and ideological attacks. On the basis of political attacks, we are required to motivate Puppet troops to defect from their ranks. Initiate military proselyting movements in many forms by motivating ((the people and youths)) to counter the US and Thiêu-Kỳ-Khiêm ((clique)), refuse to join the enemy, and participate in military revolts, killing tyrants and restrictive personnel, and breaking the oppressive enemy control.

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Most of the People's Self-Defense Force personnel are receptive civilians. They were forced to participate in this organization. The rest are tyrants and reactionaries. Therefore, we should not attack the People's Self-Defense Force, but we should try to indoctrinate them and motivate them to rise up with the people to counter the enemy pacification plan, kill administrative personnel, and gain control of the people.

5. Intensifying production:

Make the entire Party Headquarters, army, and people fully understand the significance of the movement to increase ((farm)) production. Consider farm production the key mission. Mobilize all soldiers and people to carry out the slogan of fighting the enemy while increasing farm production in order to better the living conditions of the people and meet the requirements of the Resistance. In lowland areas, intensify the leadership over farm production,

alternate crops, and pay attention to growing seeds. On the average, each individual must produce 500 kilograms of manioc. Motivate the people to hold orchards and ricefields, struggle against the enemy pacification activities, his relocation of the people, and his destruction of ricefields with bulldozers. We should maintain production activities and quickly restore our farm production. In expanded areas or in areas where the people were fanned out for production, we should motivate the people to strengthen solidarity and develop mutual support to solve difficulties. Organize work rotating sub-cells and actively struggle against the enemy destruction of our production. Motivate the people to demand that the enemy repair river banks and dams so that they can farm. ~~Allocate~~ land to farmers according to the Party land reform policy. In flooded areas, we should quickly stabilize the people's living condition and help them in farm production.

#### Requisition and purchasing of food:

The purchase and requisition of food must meet the requirements concerning supply and storage. We should purchase and requisition food in the forthcoming winter-spring phase and work out a specific plan of leadership to avoid failure in requisition. In lowland areas, try to meet our prescribed requirements and create favorable conditions for collecting money and purchasing rice from enemy controlled areas and transporting it to our areas. Coordinate the motivation of the people to rise up to gain control with the purchasing and requisition of food. Successfully organize transportation trips and conceal food.

#### 6. Ideological and organizational tasks:

In order to perform the forthcoming ideological task, we should have a great ideological development to gain great victories in the coming days. We should persist in fighting until we win completely, fully understand the guideline and policy of the Resistance, and oppose illusions of peace, rightism, individualism, and pessimism.

Motivate Party members in the Party Headquarters, soldiers, and the people to conduct political struggles to heighten our revolutionary pride. Fully understand that our present mission is to frustrate the Vietnamization scheme of the imperialists, oppose the enemy conscription plan, and disorganize the enemy

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Puppet troops in order to achieve great victories.

~~Should~~ motivate the people to conduct political struggles now and during the second campaign in coordination with political movements and civilian proselyting in 1971.

#### ORGANIZATION MISSIONS:

Recruit trainees for the first Ho Chi Minh Party members training course and prepare for the second course. Strengthen "Four-Good-Quality" Party Chapters and consider the Party development task a nucleus for the development of other tasks. Concerning the recruitment of village and hamlet agents, we should first strengthen the people's organizations in order to meet the requirements of the present and forthcoming movements, and overcome weak points in the organizational task.

Pay special attention to strengthening the machinery of various branches and services in hamlets and villages and the improvement of the health and living conditions of our cadre, soldiers, and people.