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RESOLUTION ADOPTED DURING A CONFERENCE OF **VNB** ((possibly VC An Giang Province Party Committee, VC Region 2)) IN EARLY OCT 70
-----SITUATION AND IMMEDIATE TASK OF THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF **VNB**CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION:A. Enemy pacification activities:

In **accordance** with the general strategy and plan adopted throughout the SVN battlefield, the enemy, in recent years, has tried to conduct pacification activities in an attempt to implement the Vietnamization plan in our province ((possibly VC An Giang Province)). To carry out the above mentioned plan, the enemy has divided the battlefields and deployed his troops as follows:

1. The Seven Mountains area (Tinh Bi[^]en and Tri T[^]on ((possibly districts of VC An Giang Province))):

Tinh Bi[^]en and Tri T[^]on are friendly base areas. These areas offer favorable conditions for us. They are composed of many ((VC)) liberated and disputed villages and hamlets. The enemy, even in these areas, conducted successive attacks. Therefore, the Puppet Government has chosen these areas as immediate objectives for the pacification plan, and deployed three to five or six regular battalions from the central ((headquarters)) and four inter-companies in four bases: Vinh Trung, Ba Xoai, Vinh Gia, and Nui Dat, and in the third precinct, sub-sector, and sector.

At times the number of artillery pieces increased to 30. In coordination with ground forces, the enemy used air power to conduct repeated bombings.

The targets at which the enemy concentrated his attacks were guerilla forces at the following locations: Mai Trung, Thoi Son, Nui Dai Nho, Nui Dai Lon, Nui To, and the areas of activity surrounding the bases of Vinh Trung, Ba Xoai, Tri Ton, and Tinh Bi[^]en Districts.

In Nov 70, the enemy attacked and encroached on the Seven Mountains area. He used his forces as follows:

In Nui Cam: The 66th RVNAF Ranger Battalion, the 816th and 817th RVN Regional Force Companies, and two engineer battalions (9th and 403rd RVN Battalions).

In Nui Dai: One battalion of the 6th Regiment, 9th ((RVNAF)) Division, the 97th RVNAF Ranger Battalion, and four Regional Force companies (941st, 942nd, 514th, and 819th RVN Companies), and one Special Forces company in Ba Xoai.

In Nui To: Two RVNAF Ranger battalions, (42nd and 85th Battalions), three battalions of the 14th Regiment, 9th ((RVNAF)) Division, two ((central)) Special Forces companies, and three ((RVN)) Regional Force companies.

Armored cars: The 12th and 2nd Groups.

Reserve forces: 94th RVNAF Ranger Battalion and **B20 Battalion.**

The total enemy strength in the mountainous areas consists of: 12 battalions (9th ((RVNAF)) Division and Ranger), 12 Regional and Special Forces companies, and two M-113 APC companies.

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At present, the enemy is attacking and controlling three hills: Núi Cầm, Núi-Dai Lợi, and Núi Tô. He used bulldozers to clear one square kilometer on both Núi Cầm and Núi Dài.

In addition, he emplaced four artillery pieces at Núi Cầm and was preparing to build bunkers.

In coordination with air and artillery strikes, he used bulldozers and M-113 APC's to destroy rice fields, gardens, houses, and pagodas. He prohibited the people from making their living in mountainous areas or in their former fields. He also used his forces to relocate the people of three liberated villages: An Tạc, Cồ Tô, and Ô Lâm; and in areas bordering our bases in Thới Sơn, Ba Chuc, and Nhon Hung ((sic)).

In coordination with local tyrants, the enemy concentrated Phùng Hoàng policemen to attack our installations. He also conducted typical terrorism, such as raping women and disemboweling people. He extorted approximately 10,000\$ ((SVN)) from each family in the area to frighten the people and oppress our movement. Along with these activities, the enemy tried to step up psywar and Open-Arms activities. He bribed the people, practiced demagogy by lending money and issuing seed rice to them, and schemed to lure our cadre's wives and dependents into debased luxury. Where the situation is disputed, he gathers the people and the families with members working for the Revolution to live in or near his posts to use them as insurance against our surprise attacks.

The enemy is striving to reorganize the People's Self-Defense organizations which were disorganized by us, to stabilize local oppressive control ((over personnel)) who were demoralized, and step up conscription. Particularly in Khmer ((Cambodian)) areas, he sent youths to an ((intelligence)) training course. After that, he sent them back to their former positions. These youths served as intelligence agents in local and ((VC)) liberated areas.

The above activities were aimed at wiping out our base areas in order to reoccupy and regain control of the mountainous areas. These activities were also aimed to destroy our revolutionary organizations, cut liaison between the people and Revolution, interrupt our support for the people to return to their former villages, step up conscription, demoralize cadre and soldiers, and weaken the people so as to consolidate his oppressive machinery and win over the people to gain a strong position.

Generally, in each hamlet, one or two posts were set up and controlled by the ((RVN)) Popular, Regional, and People's Self-Defense Forces and policemen. In J ((sic)), 30 posts, 12 blockhouses, 23 posts on high ground, and 19 posts in the field were set up and controlled by his Regional and Popular Forces in eight villages of Tinh Bien District. On the average, each village had from 40 to 80 People's Self-Defense Force ((personnel)) with arms and guard posts.

In every village he organized his oppressive control and those members of his administrative machinery exiled from liberated and disputed hamlets.

In mountainous areas, we have concentrated fierce attacks against the enemy on three fronts. We have bitterly attacked the enemy regular forces and strong bases, destroying much of his strength and war facilities. Regional Force units were punished and killed when conducting attacks against friendly forces, so they were confused. They also realized the defeats their main forces have met in sweep operations and that their tyrants and oppressive control ((personnel)) have been killed. For these reasons they failed to carry out their missions.

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They recognized that the above activities would result in immeasurable effects, and **consequently they** did not work wholeheartedly. A number of posts were deactivated. The puppet and local ((RVN)) administrative personnel explained their ((new policy)) to the people.

In enemy controlled areas, the oppressive machinery was slack. In many hamlets and villages, our comrades stayed close to the people to carry out missions and to motivate the people's struggle movement to attack the enemy.

2. Weak rural areas:

In the border area and Thoai Sơn Núi ((Mountain)) Sập area, where we can easily receive reinforcements for the armed forces, the enemy used his forces at sub-sector level. (For example, at Núi Sập, the enemy placed five Regional Force companies; two artillery pieces were placed at the TCAP ((possibly Tân Châu-An Phú Districts)) border; and five Regional Force companies and two companies of religious sects ((were also emplaced at Núi Sập)).

Sometimes, there were from three to six main force battalions, aircraft, from six to 10 artillery pieces, M-113 APC's, and armed boats to support a sweep operation.

While attacking, he built up posts and check points in our liberated areas. Generally, the post system on the border was very dense. For example, in Vĩnh Xương, a small village, there were eight, and Tân An Village had over 20 posts. In deep areas, he established posts in a dispersed manner (three to four posts in each village). In military activities, he used mainly Popular and People's Self-Defense Forces. When launching a sweep operation against our ((VC)) forces, the key enemy force was the Regional Force from the sub-sector.

Except for newly liberated uninhabited hamlets, local hamlet ((RVN)) administrative machineries were set up throughout all areas. Most of these ((RVN)) administrative personnel belonged to Categories B and C (in TC, AP), and Categories A and B in (Châu Thành, Phú Tân, and Châu Phú).

In the pacification program, the enemy assigned Phường Hoàng organizations to take charge of pacification programs in local areas. He sent a number of hamlet local ((RVN)) administrative personnel to a course at Vũng Tàu for training to work among the people to display that he was familiar with the people, urge the people to expose us, and to oppress the population. In addition, he assigned policemen to hamlets to organize the people's intelligence system and set up special intelligence sections in the village to work among the people. Then he categorized families to terrorize, arrest, bribe, and cause dissension among the people.

The enemy tried to set up armed forces, upgrade the force, and conscript soldiers. The main objective was to build three categories of the People's Self-Defense Force: Assault, armed, and semi-armed units. Some villages were equipped with over 500 rifles (for instance: Phu Tan ((area))). The enemy mobilized the population in local areas without paying them. In addition, he drafted the people and prepared his mobile forces for activities.

According to enemy policy and cunning and cruel schemes, the Puppet troops and Government were forced to arm themselves and served as henchmen.

Therefore, the enemy failed on the battlefields and tyrants in local areas were punished by us. In addition, the enemy utilized the following policies: Land reform, austerity tax, conscription, and bribery.

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He was opposed by the people and the above policies caused conflict between the Puppet troops and Government. Furthermore, the enemy fighting spirit decreased considerably. Enemy posts received no reinforcements from higher echelons. His soldiers wished for peace, but they were afraid of the people's reaction.

Recently, our eight points have deeply influenced the enemy rank and seriously disorganized his internal organization. Conduct of the enemy special pacification program would meet difficulties. The people had many favorable opportunities to fight against the enemy schemes.

3. Province capital and district seat areas.

The enemy scheme was applied equally in the province capital, district seat, and weak areas. The main objective was to use police and field police forces coordinating with surrenderers to search towns continuously to inform on and capture our underground key cadre and revolutionary families.

At present, the enemy is strengthening his various police forces. Each province capital has over two companies. He also organized many police sub-sections to carry out missions in the villages. In the province capital, Regional Force strength decreased because the enemy thought that these areas were secure.

To accomplish the general scheme, he deployed his henchmen disguised as men of religious sects and the ringleader of tyrants in the Khmer ((Cambodia)) population to organize reactionary political associations, to conduct a religious training course, to corrupt youth against the Communists, to spread propaganda for psywar, and to use money to deceitfully bribe the people. They were led by the political reactionary policy of religions and narrow nationalism.

By analyzing activities in weak areas, the enemy judges his pacification. As compared with 1969, he upgraded his forces and conscripted troops more successfully. Besides the People's Self-Defense Force, the enemy conscripted more than 5,000 ((new)) soldiers this year.

In liberated and disputed areas, the enemy destroyed terrain features in guerrilla's penetration areas, such as in Thôi Sơn, Mai Trung, and Ba Chuc ((Villages)). In addition, he occupied many key positions on Núi Cấm, Núi Đại Lỗn, and Núi Tô Mountains. He also relocated the people in three villages in the Núi Tô Mountain area and some people who lived in areas next to our bases (Nhơn Hưng, Thôi Sơn, Ba Chuc, and Vật Lại (Khánh Bình)).

The above facts prove that the enemy still has the capability to concentrate fierce attacks against some main areas in order to relocate the people and encroach on the ground.

This year, we killed over 12,000 soldiers. However, the enemy has filled the gap by conducting conscription. This gave him an additional 5,000 troops.

Enemy espionage activities aimed at suppressing and dividing the people were remarkable. His psywar and Chiêu Hồi activities convinced some of the people's families to reside in his areas.

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The enemy succeeded in carrying out his plan, because we did not realize his cunning **and cruel** scheme to implement his pacification plan and relocate the people. We have not concentrated forces by conducting three-front attacks in local areas. We paid attention to armed activity only and relied on forces outside the area to liberate it. This situation allowed the enemy to step up his pacification program. He concluded that his problem was in carrying out the Vietnamization plan. He established and restored restrictive administrative machinery in rural areas.

However, through the pacification activity, the enemy recognized that in Châu-Dộc Province, he had established three types of hamlets, including 22 hamlets of Category A which the enemy has completely organized, 215 hamlets of Category B, and 77 hamlets of Category C which the enemy **has not** activated. It proved that the situation in the province **was not stable**. Many other hamlets failed to control the people.

The enemy has many weak points.

The main plan of the enemy is to conscript troops and relocate the people. The enemy adopted many cruel and dangerous schemes. He disregarded the lives and interests of the people, so he met a drastic and continuous resistance from the people. Especially in areas where the enemy was concentrated, rice fields and gardens were devastated. He destroyed hamlets and villages, killed the people and raped women (as in mountainous areas). The enemy **cannot** suppress the revolutionary movement and oppress the people; on the contrary, the enemy caused the people to hate **him**. They all realized the enemys' **cruelty**. The movement in these areas is becoming more developed and already stronger.

Most of the religious people, members of ethnic minorities, and soldiers' dependents understood that their leaders were the traitors. Previously, they were the henchmen of the French and **Japanese** imperialists and now work for the US imperialists. These traitors have driven their relatives to sacrifice in the front and to live a hard life. For that reason, in some places, when we conduct motivation or bring interests to the people, they respond to our appeal immediately to oppose the **enemy political and financial** organizations. They also opposed the enemy conscription and guard duties. Besides, the enemy internal organization was further weakened. Most of the local administrative personnel worked only for form's sake, **but** they were forced by higher echelons to directly oppose the Revolution. So, they stopped working to avoid the enemy pressure which forced them to counter the Revolution.

B. The people's situation.

Carrying out his schemes of pacification, the enemy used his violent and

tyrannical forces to conduct attacks against the people using such tactics as murder, imprisonment, oppression, concription, robbery, and living in vice... ((sic)). He disregarded the opinions and anger of the people. Therefore, **dissension rose between the enemy and the people**. For that reason, the people's struggles were raised constantly.

In reality, the morale of the people in each area was **different**.

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a. Base and adjacent areas:

Presently, the people in these areas are herded to enemy controlled areas.

Their living conditions are wretched.

Their houses were **burned** and their **rice fields** destroyed. They had no houses in which to **live and no means** to make their living. They were **terrorized**, and their sons were drafted by the enemy. They, therefore, displayed a deep hatred for the enemy.

They have lived and fought in the liberated area, upheld the people's democratic administration, conducted indoctrination **on revolutionary class tradition**, and acquired many combat experiences. As a result, although temporarily living under oppressive enemy control, they constantly look forward and put full confidence in the final victory of the Revolution. While living in liberated areas or even being held in enemy controlled areas, the people have continuously and bravely fought the enemy.

The purpose and requirements of these struggles **are** aimed at frustrating the enemy pacification program.

Especially brave were the struggles against the establishment of Vong Dai Trang ((White Belt)) in Ba Chúc, Thới Sơn, Mai Trung, Ba Chúc, and Vinh Trung in order to keep their **rice fields** from being destroyed by the enemy. The armed struggles, equipped with knives and scimitars, punished tyrants ((GVN officials)) for causing casualties among the people (in Ba Chúc) by forcing them to defoliate. The people demanded to punish and annihilate those ((Puppet troops)) who robbed the people of their property and raped women. They drove the enemy pacification support elements and pacification ((teams)) away from highlander's villages (Châu Lăng, Ô Lâm, and An Túc). Along with guerrilla units, they sniped at Puppet troops and destroyed posts to drive the pacification personnel away from hamlets (Thới Thuận and Thái Sơn). Enemy troops' dependents and revolutionary people fought to protect those families whose sons participated in the Resistance (Lạc Quới, An Nông and Ba Chúc).

They motivated Buddhist monks, religious leaders, and hundreds of people to demand the return of a number of youths who were drafted, and boycotted the People's Self-Defense Force. These struggles **have** spoiled or disrupted the enemy conscription plan (Tịnh Biên Tri Tôn). Despite the strict enemy laws, the people have increased production, returned to their rice fields to farm, looked forward to the Revolution, and have given support to our cadre and soldiers in their difficult cases. Specifically, hundreds of people disregarded the enemy orders to farm in bordering areas, remote **rice fields**... (TAAP, CP, CT).

The people boycotted various political reactionary organizations and intelligence organizations under the guise of economic **policies**. (Motivate aged men and women, youths, and women to increase production, raise cattle, and eliminate illiteracy.) They enthusiastically participated in various liberation organizations and our ((hard-core elements)). In each village, there were about 500 to 2,500 people who participated in organizations (Tri Tôn, Tịnh Biên).

It is clear that the people have a firm political attitude and revolutionary enthusiasm. If we apply guidelines and policies in accordance with the local situation and their capabilities and maintain their legal status, we will lead the movement successfully.

b. Weak areas, province capitals, and district seats

Presently, the enemy is striving to carry out the plan of Vietnamization of the war in these areas. Specifically, he trained all of the people to be soldiers in **military** and guard activities. The people's living conditions and their daily activities have, **therefore**, been unstable.

Furthermore, he intensifies his terrorism, robbery, and **deceitful** propaganda.

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Though we could not conduct propaganda widely among the people, they have read the progressive ((GVN)) legal status daily newspapers, listened to Hanoi and Liberation Radios, kept abreast of information relating to our victories, the just revolutionary cause and generosity. Therefore, they fully realized that the Americans are merely aggressors, the Puppet Government is their traitorous henchmen and the current regime is unjust. High and low ranking Puppet officials are ambitious and greedy for power. The enemy has protracted the war, causing death and famine to the people. Puppet Government officials and personnel cannot support their families with their own salary; therefore, they do additional work or help their wives in business. During the year, many struggles for social welfare and democracy have been staged throughout SVN to oppose enemy conscription and the enlistment of the people in People's Self-Defense Force units. Especially in the city, thousands of students have participated in the struggle against military training for students. They have celebrated requiems for dead Vietnamese residents who were massacred by the Lon Nol ((Cambodian Prime Minister)) **regime**.

They have laid bare the cruel and cunning enemy face, regained their legal interests, and caused considerable difficulties to the enemy special pacification plan.

The people also realized that, for the Revolution's sake, we fight for the just cause, democracy, and the people's living conditions. If we side with the Revolution, we will have **rice** fields to cultivate. Theft and oppression no longer existed. The common wish of the people is peace, independence, the withdrawal of US troops, and the restoration of freedom. However, the people still balked at the protracted **war, and were afraid of** activities conducted by our armed forces which caused destruction of their houses and death. Some of the people, and especially higher social classes, have been corrupted and deceived by the enemy. They displayed skeptical attitudes and did not fully understand the enemy. Some of the people who had received aid from Americans were satisfied with the presence of the Americans in SVN and displayed a passive attitude.

Only in our area of operation were the people's struggles intensified and conducted on a large scale.

In short, at present in weak areas, the people were able to conduct economic and political struggles and gradually seize power easily. If we make the people's pressing interests our goals, we will be able to conduct wide and successful struggles causing considerable difficulties to the enemy in his pacification and Vietnamization plans.

C. Our counterpacification activities.

As outlined in the above report, the enemy launched fierce counterattacks against us causing several difficulties and casualties to friendly forces during the 1969 Summer and Autumn Campaigns.

However, after the 136th Political Indoctrination Session and before starting the ABC operation phase, various levels, units, and local areas have realized that the enemy was heavily defeated while we gained victories throughout the battlefields. Especially, our provinces have obtained considerable achievements.

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On this basis, we have been determined to overcome difficulties and hardships, launched simultaneous attacks, and made preparations for phase ABC. We succeeded in motivating all ((of the people)) to take to the street, or to remain in their former places. In some areas, preparation of objectives was performed successfully. We also succeeded in transporting weapons for the units as well as keeping food provisions in reserve in local areas. In Châu Thành and Châu Phú, we failed to stay close to the people.

It proved that our Party Headquarters had much confidence in the capability of our local area in developing the movement according to the general resolution.

For that reason, we have gained great achievements since the beginning of phase ABC.

Since the beginning of phase ABC, our armed forces wore down and destroyed over 151,000 enemy troops and many war facilities. Especially in Bay Nui ((Mountain)) area, we conducted successive attacks; our main forces launched violent attacks such as in V. Trung, Ba Xoài, Núi Dát, and Tri-Tôn City bases. We overran some enemy military posts, and strongly expanded the liberated areas in three villages: Cỏ Tô, An Túc, and Ô Lâm. We properly performed our missions of oppressing the enemy main forces to provide favorable conditions for our troops to rush into areas to attack the enemy.

Our armed forces used small sapper units and secret guerrillas to coordinate with the support of the people to attack tyrants and the oppressive enemy controls over the population (pacification support, Phường Hoàng, police, intelligence collection, reconnaissance personnel, etc ((sic))).

In Bay Nui area, we annihilated four pacification groups and wore down **four others.**

Local troops and city special action forces conducted overall activities, and took advantage of people's hatred to motivate them to struggle against ((GVN)) local administrative personnel and spies in coordination with eliminating traitors and breaking the enemy oppressive control of the population. They isolated the enemy pacification personnel, provided efficient reinforcements for agents ((in local areas)), and motivated the people to rebel. They also succeeded in recruiting agents in the enemy military posts.

As for the leadership of the people's struggle movement, we motivated over 40,000 people to struggle against all echelons of Puppet troops and enemy military posts. The struggle (in mountainous areas) was rigorous. It was to concentrate attacks against enemy pacification, relocation of the people, destruction of rice fields and terrain features, forcing youths to join civil defense units, conscription, ((enemy)) forced labor, and demand the right to return to their former homes in deep and border areas. Over 8,000 people in O Lam, Co To, and An Tuc Villages successively struggled against the enemy and were relocated into (**resettlement centers**) many times. But the enemy had to pay 10,000,000\$ ((SVN)) to the people in damages and settle the problem of houses, pagodas, and rice fields for the people. 305 families in a hamlet of Phú Hữu were against the enemy pacification

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organization, tyrants, and local ((GVN)) administrative personnel. They organized into groups to provide mutual support, increase farm production, and struggle against the enemy scheme.

The struggle movement in Châu Đốc and Long Xuyên Province Capitals was the most significant. We paid attention to strengthening relationships, legal and semi-legal organizations, and the rights of the people of all classes. Thousands of students were against the enemy **mandatory military training program** and his terrorist activities against them. They opposed the massacre of resident Vietnamese by the US, Puppet, and Lon Nol ((Cambodian Government forces)), and motivated hundreds of public servants, teachers, workers, and personnel in charge of public works to demand raises to meet the present living conditions. The leadership of the people's movement succeeded in using many meaningful forms, such as conferences, meetings, resolutions, Saigon newspaper advertisements, handbills, holding overnight commemorative services for dead Vietnamese residents to win the sympathy of police, **and legal organization of** students, Buddhists, teachers, and Puppet personnel of provinces. We will soon have many favorable conditions. When the US withdraws troops, the enemy economy will be exhausted and the people's **salaries will be** reduced. The miserable life of the people will cause conflict among Puppet military ranks, Puppet administrative personnel, the people, and the enemy.

As for breaking the oppressive enemy control and gaining control ((of the populace)), we succeeded in strengthening the control of six hamlets and over 40 hamlets under mixed control. Agencies for breaking the oppressive enemy control were established in cleared hamlets. Local area units, guerrillas, and special action units successfully executed deep thrusts into areas using armed propaganda, strengthened agencies, and annihilated ringleaders of tyrants in some places (the villages of Châu Đốc, Thới Sơn, Lạc Quới, Xuyên Tô, Tân An 1, and cities of T-Biên, Huế Đức, Châu Lăng, and so on). Secret guerrillas, secret security, and secret current affairs sections destroyed many enemy units and individual tyrants, such as in Châu Đốc City. They killed officers, village local ((RVN)) administrative personnel in city core areas, and tyrants in the daytime (TS ((sic))) in Lạc Quới Market and strategic hamlets (Lê Tri, Châu Lăng) near Tịnh Biên City in the city core area of Huế-Đức.... ((sic)). Recently, in some areas, they succeeded in motivating the people to help them kill ((enemy tyrants)). Simultaneously, they paid attention to indoctrinating Puppet administrative personnel. They used the people to suppress traitors, and convinced many **enemy posts** and Puppet personnel to support them. They also motivated youths to oppose conscription and support the people's resistance.

In coordination with armed and political activities, we motivated the people to conduct military proselyting attacks and indoctrination courses ((for the people)) in order to enlist their support, used thousands of soldiers' families for spearheads in struggles, and coordinated with the people to keep

in their outposts. We motivated the people's sons or brothers to desert their ranks or initiate antiwar movements. We also motivated them not to obey their officers' orders.

In some places, such as **district seats of Tri-Ton, Châu Lăng, Ba Chúc Hoa Lạc** and villages near **Châu Đốc**, we gave ((enemy soldiers)) direct indoctrination. We left the indoctrination of captured enemy People's Self-Defense Force personnel to their families.

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By doing so, we disorganized many enemy People's Self-Defense Force units. Through the above activities, many large-scale struggles were staged. For example, thousands of soldiers' families rushed to Vinh Trung Base to demand the return of their husbands, sons, brothers, or deceased relatives, etc ((sic)). When leaving **Thối Thuận Outpost (TS ((sic))**), enemy soldiers were not allowed to carry weapons. They had to wear shorts. They also had to ask permission from the people before they opened fire. We motivated the people to turn enemy pacification teams, ((RVNAF)) regular personnel, and Regional Force units away from hamlets. Many companies were indoctrinated by the people to refuse to be used as reinforcements or to participate in sweep operations (in **Thối Sơn, Vinh Trung, T. Biên**). Our cadre and units were supported by many People's Self-Defense Force groups to conduct activities among the people (**Phú Hữu, Hoa Lạc, Ar Nông, etc ((sic))**). Hundreds of soldiers' families coordinated with the people and revolutionary dependents to oppose the enemy terrorizing our cadre and soldiers' families in weak areas (**L. Quới, Tân An, P. Hữu**).

Through the struggle movements of the people, we found many good elements and strengthened our forces in all fields.

Since phase ABC, we recruited over 150 Party members. Some villages had many ((GVN)) legal hamlet Party Chapters and established village Party Committees (**Ba Chúc, Tân An, Thối Sơn**). Recently, through the resolution, cadre and soldiers in some areas realized the five requirements and missions of the province. They properly used the guidelines. Many of them succeeded in staying close to the people, consolidating the development of agencies, and guiding the people to attack the enemy. (In **Phú Tân, T. Sơn, A. Nông, N. Hùng, B. Chúc L. Quới, V. Giáp, L. Tri, T. Tôn V. Tế, V. Trạch, X. Thoại Sơn**.) Many hamlet Party Chapters and Party members were given political reorientation so they would understand the mission of leadership over the people, and successfully initiated the movement to attack the enemy. In addition, they paid attention to the development of secret guerrilla, secret security, and secret self-defense forces and improvement of their qualifications. They annihilated many tyrants and succeeded in strengthening the movement in local areas (in **B. Chúc, L. Quới, T. Sơn, A. Phú, TXCD, H. Đức, and etc ((sic))**). In Long Xuyên Province Capital, they took advantage of opportunities to conduct legal meetings and to win the majority of the people. They used students to urge the people of all classes to rise up, and succeeded in developing their agencies.

Even though we tried to attain some achievements through frustrating the enemy and his pacification plan, we failed to meet requirements, because we still have some shortcomings.

1. We wore down and destroyed much of the enemy strength, but we did not meet the requirements of breaking the oppressive enemy control, did not recruit in time, did not make the best use of **armed** forces in local areas to attack the enemy, and did not prepare battlefields for outside forces to annihilate the enemy.

2. Our cadre still displayed a complacent attitude and relied on higher echelons. Although they made great efforts, they relied heavily on outside forces. Furthermore, they did not pay attention to stepping up the local movement. For that reason, they failed to exploit favorable opportunities to change the balance of forces.

3. We have launched separate attacks against the enemy, but have not coordinated three-pronged attacks, especially in breaking the oppressive enemy control of the population and killing tyrants. We have failed to motivate the people to participate in attacking, demoralizing, breaking the oppressive enemy control of the population, and winning over uncommitted elements.

4. We have not widely motivated and organized troops' dependents into a force to conduct repeated attacks against the enemy. We also have not strengthened solidarity among troops' dependents and revolutionary families to develop and strengthen our struggle forces. Therefore, the movement has not been widely developed to launch continuous attacks against the enemy to meet our requirements.

At present, we have not understood the suffering of troops' dependents and war victims. Therefore, we have failed to motivate them. For that reason, our political troop proselyting activities were limited.

5. In leadership and organization, we have not controlled our task in a timely manner nor gained experiences. Therefore, we could not strengthen our strong points.

Due to the above weaknesses, the enemy had favorable conditions to drive our agents out of ((our controlled areas)) and gradually strengthen his oppressive administrative machinery. Therefore, our operations in the area were reduced. Although we have met many difficulties, we have continued to maintain and develop our activities in hamlets. We have determined to understand the five requirements clearly to correctly apply all guidelines and keep the legal initiative of the people. If we know how to assess enemy shortcomings, and at the same time launch attacks against him, we will gain glorious victories and so on ((sic)); we will change the situation ((in our favor)).

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