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15. SUMMARY:
 (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 9 October 1970 and concerns a record prepared by an unidentified member ((possibly of Sub-Region 5, COSVN)). The record, undated, contains instructional material for political reorientation of low level cadre. The record reveals the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAP)) and friendly ((VC/NVA)) situations in South Vietnam and the entire Indochina theater of operations; and outlines missions for the last half of 1970.

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SITUATION AND IMMEDIATE MISSIONS

I. THE ENEMY ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) AND FRIENDLY ((VC/NVA)) SITUATION IN SOUTH ((VIETNAM)) AND IN THE INDOCHINA THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

It is now necessary for us to review the course of our violent fight to gradually gain the ultimate victory, the enemy's schemes and treacheries, and the successive and great failures the enemy sustained during forced de-escalation. This must be done to accurately estimate the balance of power between the enemy and ourselves, positively assess the opposing forces on the battlefield, and realize the correctness of the policy of conducting a continual fight to defeat the enemy step by step, gaining **piecemeal** success until a decisive victory is obtained and the basic goals of the SVN Revolution, as outlined by Resolution 9, are achieved.

A. The US change in strategy and the Vietnamization program. 31.

Since they were defeated in their unconventional war, the US imperialists were forced to send more troops to South Vietnam and wage a limited war. They escalated the war, brought in more than half a million US troops, mobilized their air force and navy, and attempted to attack and destroy North ((Vietnam)), hoping to defeat us militarily. However, they failed miserably and were forced to de-escalate the war. They shifted to a new strategy and attempted to attain a strong position by Vietnamizing the war, gradually withdrawing their troops, and consolidating the Puppet Government ((GVN)) and Army ((RVNAF)). In so doing, they hoped to maintain their neo-colonialist position ((in South Vietnam)) to some extent.

The backbone of their Vietnamization program is pacification and enlarging the area, especially populated areas, under their control so that in the end, they will have **strengthened** the Puppet Government and Army and stabilize urban conditions in order to prolong the war and obtain a favorable political solution. It is obvious that the US imperialists had to de-escalate the war because of their defeats. Yet they still refuse to yield to us. Instead, they have ambitiously tried to attain a strong position and have resorted to cunning schemes. They still have a large amount of war equipment and considerable military forces at their disposal. They **still** hold the cities and critical populated areas. 31

B. Enemy's major attempts and failures:

In accelerating his Vietnamization program, the enemy focused tremendous efforts on pacification. He resorted to unprecedented cunning 31.

and savage measures which took our cadre in some areas by surprise. Because they were unable to accurately assess the enemy's schemes, our cadre were confused and failed to take timely countermeasures.

From late 1968 through 1969, the enemy concentrated his efforts on driving our units and agencies out of populous areas. He also made great efforts to destroy our revolutionary infrastructure, relocate the people, set up military posts to enlarge his areas, establish oppressive machinery, and gather manpower and material. His primary goal was to gain and hold a major part of the rural areas, to re-establish and consolidate low level Puppet Government units and forces, and to strengthen the defense system for cities. This would enable him to release the Puppet ~~main~~ force from pacification duties and use it to gradually replace withdrawing US troops on the frontlines. This would also help to enlarge the area of control of the Puppet Central Government and restore its authority.

The enemy has caused us temporary difficulties. A majority of the people were resettled along communication lines or in open areas. Our agencies and units were restricted in their operations, lodging, and messing. Instructions dispatched by higher echelons were slow in reaching subordinate units. In many places, ((VC)) movements were hampered or neutralized. Nonetheless, the enemy forces at the front sustained heavy casualties and were in confusion. The enemy was still incapable of destroying or driving our agencies and forces out ((of populated areas)). Meanwhile, the friction between the enemy and the people grew more acute, and he was

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unable to suppress the people's struggle, which became increasingly widespread and violent. Local Puppet governments were still in confusion and in some areas, they were paralyzed or worked only perfunctorily. The ((Puppet)) Central ((Government)) failed completely in its effort to unite the political factions or to ~~meet~~ new economic, political, and internal difficulties. The structure of society ((in SVN)), especially in cities, has consequently become more complex and confused.

After a year of Vietnamization with strenuous efforts in pacification, the enemy obtained only marginal results. As a consequence, in early 1970 he embarked on another attempt. He intensified attacks on our bases and the border areas, concentrating on our corridors, storage facilities, and agencies. He hoped to inflict great losses upon us and weaken our fighting capabilities. In addition, he continued to pacify and encroach upon a number of our areas and tried to complete his scheme of destroying our infrastructure. He strengthened his Regional and Popular Forces and assigned them to maintain security so that he could send his regular forces to the front to replace US troops. To achieve this goal, the enemy increased pressure upon the neutral regime in Cambodia and later overthrew it. However, he did not anticipate the violent outbreak of the Cambodian Revolution or the determined opposition from us and the Sihanouk faction. He concentrated a large contingent of his forces and conducted large-scale operations deep in Cambodian territory, intending to wipe out our storage facilities and agencies, consolidate Lon Nol's regime, change the situation to obtain the initiative, and insure success for his Vietnamization program.

Yet he became more isolated politically and sustained serious military defeats. Many large areas ((in Cambodia)) were liberated ((by VC/NVA)) and it became obvious that the enemy was seriously bogged down.

This was the most daring major enemy campaign since his de-escalation of the war began, but also his greatest failure in the political, military, and diplomatic fields. He sustained serious reversals in all three areas and met with widespread opposition. The overall results of his action constituted a new failure for him in the Indochina theater of operations. His air, artillery, and infantry forces were thinly deployed. He was more vulnerable in SVN, and his pacification program was endangered. Meanwhile, he lost large areas in Cambodia and southern Laos. His scheme of organizing a military alliance between his henchmen in Indochina failed.

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C. Our leadership and great victories.

After the historic victories in the early spring of 1968, all echelons of our Party, our people, and our army made many great efforts to surmount hardships. We continuously stepped up military and political offensives in coordination with the diplomatic offensive ((against the US and GVN)). We strove to kill as many enemy soldiers as possible and build, improve, and consolidate the revolutionary forces. We have been determined to frustrate the Vietnamization scheme of the US and achieve the basic goals of the Revolution. In implementing Resolution 9 and in fiercely fighting the enemy, all echelons have provided increasingly effective leadership in countering the pacification program. The enemy's program, therefore, had to be delayed and altered. Still, the results of the program were poor. While the enemy was attacking and destroying our base areas, resettling the people, and setting up more posts, the areas he controlled and considered pacified and the strategic hamlets in district seats and provincial capitals became weak. In many places, the people seized control. At present, there are indications that the people will move out ((of the strategic hamlets)) to resume farming activities; that they will break loose from the oppressive enemy control and annihilate tyrants, concentrate their forces to attack the enemy and achieve piecemeal victories, and to proceed to thwart the enemy pacification program. We provide instructions for our personnel and took countermeasures as the US engineered the coup d'etat in Cambodia and expanded the war to that country. As a result, during the recent ((1970)) Spring-Summer Phase, we were able to swing the situation in our favor. When compared with our situation in the spring of 1968, we have had our greatest successes in opposing the enemy pacification program, in the destruction of the enemy, and in the development of the urban ((VC)) movement. In addition, we coordinated with the Cambodian and Lao Revolutions and won great victories.

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For example:

1. We struck hard at US and Puppet troops along the borders and fiercely attacked their pacification support units. We inflicted heavy casualties, weakened their troop's morale and reduced their personnel strength. (As a result, an antivar movement manifested itself in many forms and the number of deserters increased).

At the same time we penetrated deep into fringe areas, annihilated tyrants on a larger scale, broke the enemy's oppression,

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expanded our control over the people, and continuously intensified the struggle movement in the cities. As a result, the enemy forces on the front-lines were seriously demoralized and further weakened with each passing day. His pacification teams in the rear areas received less and less support. We continued to develop our combat activities and encircled and put pressure on enemy posts by using various stratagems and tactics.

2. The K ((possibly Cambodian)) Revolution developed by leaps and bounds, and vast rural areas and many district seats and province capitals were liberated. In addition to these exploits, the great victories in central and southern Laos and the foundation of the ~~Indo-Chinese~~ Revolutionary Front, a unified front of the ~~Indo-Chinese~~ people, have dispersed enemy forces, inflicted heavy personnel losses on them in Cambodia, and seriously bogged them down. The grandiose and perilous attempt of the US to gain the initiative only drove them onto the defensive. Nixon's policy of expanding the war by using ~~Indo-Chinese~~ people to fight ~~Indo-Chinese~~ people has been seriously frustrated since its inception. 3.

3. Due to the great success of SVN, Cambodian and Lao ((revolutionary forces)), a vast base and corridor area has taken shape, creating favorable conditions for the development and strengthening of mutual support and coordination between the battlefields in SVN, Cambodia, and Laos. This has frustrated the US and Puppet attempt to gain the initiative and avoid defeat in SVN by attacking our bases along the border, and has bogged them down even deeper in this conflict.

4. The ~~above~~ mentioned success enhanced the ~~Indo-Chinese~~ people's political and diplomatic prestige throughout the world and helped them to gain the sympathy and support of many people and peace-loving and progressive governments and organizations. In close coordination with the political front in Indochina, our diplomatic front is instigating and supporting the people's antiwar movement in the US, and arousing discord and dissension among US leaders, and their henchmen and officials. We have succeeded in driving the bellicose US clique and their henchmen into a state of isolation from the people in the US and around the world. 1. 6

We have gained a firm strategic position on the unified ~~Indo-Chinese~~ battlefield and have increasingly stymied the American aggressors.

D. Friendly and enemy positions on the SVN and ~~Indo-Chinese~~ battlefields:

The new developments of the war in Indochina have the following characteristics:

1. In SVN the US and Puppet still have a considerable military force and an extensive network of military posts in a multiple-stage defense system. They are still able to oppress the people; however, they have displayed many insurmountable weaknesses and vulnerable points:

a. The enemy is unable to resolve the discontent and friction that his forced relocation of the people caused among the rural population, including many Puppet officials and servicemen and their families. This constitutes the enemy's weakest point and it gives us the political advantage. It is for this reason that the people have fled from the enemy's oppressively controlled areas and returned to their native land to increase ((farm)) production.

b. The strength of the oppressive forces and pacification teams was great, but their personnel were demoralized and disunited because of the repeated failures of the US and Puppet. Due to the ineffective support provided by the ((RVN)) Regular Force and our intensive attacks on a number of tyrants and units, pacification activities became disorganized, enemy military posts were driven onto the defensive, and ((GVN)) administrative personnel and spies at low levels became confused and less aggressive. 3.

c. Since the US shifted the war burden to the Puppet Government, the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique has set up a dictatorial and fascist regime in SVN to exploit the people's manpower and property to pay for their military, political, and economic expenditures.

Therefore, the people of all social classes are facing more difficult living conditions. As a result, their reaction has become more widespread and stronger. This is why the seething struggle movement in cities has continuously demanded social welfare, democratic rights, peace, US withdrawal, the overthrow of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem Government, and the establishment of a peace government. The movement has become widespread and has gained the support of the people of the laboring and middle classes, the personnel of enemy organizations, and political factions opposing the US and Puppet Government. In comparison with past activities, the enemy has resorted to unprecedented cruel and cunning tricks to implement the pacification plan. However, his success has been limited and uncertain because the Party and people, through their great efforts, have sustained hardships and surmounted difficulties to counter the enemy's pacification plan. Faced by the rigors of war, our forces and agents continued to hold their positions ((in enemy controlled areas)), successfully maintained and developed the movements in rural and urban areas, and disrupted the Puppet Government at low levels. As a result, the enemy's higher echelons have increasingly been thrown into a state of dissension and isolation, the Puppet Army has suffered heavy casualties, the antiwar movement is widespread, and the number of deserters has increased. These significant accomplishments have created favorable conditions for us to obtain greater victories and turn the situation in our favor.

2. In order to avoid the possible failure of the Vietnamization program, prevent ((the development of)) the Cambodian Revolution, and maintain Cambodia's influence in Indochina and Southeast Asia, the US staged a coup d'etat in Cambodia. Contrary to its expectations, the situation evolved in favor of the Cambodia Revolution and brought about the formation of the ~~Indo-Chinese~~ Front against the American aggressors and the expansion of their bases and corridors. 3.

This adverse situation forced the US to take the defensive and maintain many Saigon Puppet battalions ((in Cambodia)) to bolster the very weak Lon Nol clique. For this reason, the ((US)) support ((on the SVN battlefield)) was weakened, and it is now possible that enemy forces may be killed in greater numbers. It is obvious that Cambodia is the battlefield where the US has its lowest combat capability and where it may easily be driven onto the defensive. The situation created favorable conditions for us to attack and wipe out many US and Puppet forces and provide effective support for areas in Cambodia and in SVN. We must make the best use of our new advantages and the new enemy weaknesses and deficiencies to gain great 3.

victories and fulfil the role of a primary battlefield ((possibly Sub-Region 5)) which has a great impact on the general situation in Indochina. Only by frustrating the pacification and Vietnamization plans and reversing the situation in SVN, can we force the US to give up in both SVN and Indochina.

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However we failed to make the best use of our advantages and the enemy weaknesses and deficiencies to develop the movement to a higher degree, partially break the oppressive enemy control of population, and expand liberated areas. A careful analysis of the balance of forces on the battlefield shows that we lack subjective conditions. Our revolutionary agents do not maintain close relations with the people and the organization and leadership of the struggle movement has been ineffective. The training and replenishment of local and guerrilla forces have been inadequate, and the performance of missions has not been successful. The main factor which has limited our offensive capabilities and ability to strengthen our forces and created some difficulties is the fact that our cadre did not anticipate the change in the enemy's course of action in time and did not fully understand our primary mission of counterpacification and its new characteristics.

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Therefore, the operation, organization and procedures, and guidelines prescribed by NT ((possibly Năm Trường, aka OOSVN)) in early 1969, and by Resolution 9, and succeeding directives were not thoroughly understood nor properly implemented by agencies at all echelons.

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We should note and analyze our shortcomings and weaknesses in order to correct them. Furthermore, we should realize that our leadership has sometimes failed to keep abreast of the changing situation. However, we should never underestimate the great efforts of our cadre, people, and army, or lose confidence in our sound guidelines and policies. We would have gained more victories if all local areas strove to correct their shortcomings. However, because of the present balance of power, we could not make as many changes in the situation as we wished. In the fierce conflict between the enemy and ourselves we have still achieved a meaningful step toward success which provided favorable conditions for us to achieve greater victories. We should thus exert intensive efforts to fight the enemy and drive him out of his positions in areas where he is bogged down and has failed in his pacification and Vietnamization programs. We should do so to expand our control, develop our forces in all aspects, and turn the situation in our favor. The enemy is very stubborn. He is still strong enough to continue fighting and is not going to yield to us easily.

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II. FORTHCOMING MISSIONS:

1. Missions in the Last Half of 1970:

A. In compliance with the General Offensive and Uprising policy, the immediate missions of the Party, people, and army of the entire Sub-Region ((5)) are as follows:

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Develop our recent achievements; exploit the forthcoming advantages; overcome our shortcomings, weaknesses, and difficulties; urgently develop our forces in all aspects in all areas; and intensify the General Offensive and Uprising and expand its area of operations. The purpose of all of this is defeating the enemy's plan ((of defending cities and towns and expanding his control of rural areas)) in areas of emphasis and throughout Miền ((SVN)) and to frustrate the US Vietnamization program. We should also coordinate activities with the Laotian and Cambodian revolutionaries to defeat the US imperialists and their henchmen and achieve the revolutionary goal set forth by the three countries.

In execution of the above immediate missions and the directive prescribed by COSVN, and based on the real situation **during the last half** of 1970, Sub-Region ((5)) should: Develop recent achievements; take advantage of forthcoming favorable opportunities; and exert tremendous efforts to rapidly increase political power, the armed forces, and Party and government capabilities in all areas. On this basis we should step up attacks by the armed forces and the uprising of the political forces in order to destroy a large portion of the enemy's potential; defeat the US-Puppet plan of pacifying rural areas and building up and consolidating the Puppet Government and Army; consolidate and expand our control in rural areas; and **cause** disturbances and break the enemy's oppressive control in province capitals and district seats. In addition, we should strengthen the **political, economic, and military power** in the rear base in order **to secure a solid position** from rear areas to areas surrounding cities, and establish a continuous encirclement position around Saigon in order to significantly change the balance of enemy and friendly positions and forces in Sub-Region ((5)). In coordination with the rest of Miền ((SVN)), we must strive to defeat the US imperialists' Vietnamization plan, especially at the village level, and proceed forward to attain the decisive victory.

B. In execution of the above missions, the Sub-Region must meet the following requirements:

Concentrate all forces and capabilities in all areas to totally thwart the enemy's pacification plan, and consolidate and expand our control both in rural areas and areas surrounding province capitals and district seats, applying different scales and methods of operation.

Deplete and destroy the manpower and war facilities of the US and Puppets. Concurrently, disorganize one Puppet element, and paralyze a major part of their troops both in quantity and quality. Then disrupt their finance-economy and rear service activities so that they will be unable to replace the US troops, and so that their Regional and Popular Forces will be unable to hold the pacified hamlets and posts.

Develop the strength and qualifications of the revolutionary forces, including the armed forces, political forces, the Party Youth Groups, and revolutionary organizations and governments in all areas. Insure that the overt and covert forces will firmly hold ground, develop their strength and capabilities to the highest degree, and perform activities with ever increasing efficiency in accordance with operating procedures.

Increase production, especially in rear and intermediary line areas. Make steady efforts, to lead the people back ((to their former homes)). When control over an area is regained, develop culture ((sic)), take care of the people's welfare, and improve the people's living conditions; then, mobilize manpower and material resources for the battlefield. We must also encourage the people to practice self-sufficiency in all fields.

To meet the above requirements, we must ideologically and politically indoctrinate cadre, Party members, and members of the armed forces on a regular basis, and motivate the people on a broad scale. We must also maximize their efforts, determination, and confidence in the final victory, and encourage them to devote their energy to performing the Party's political missions. We must correct their erroneous concepts which can hinder the development of the Revolution, especially the fear of a protracted war, rightism, and a wait-and-see attitude.

We must fully understand ((the impact of)) the above mentioned missions and requirements in all aspects and in different areas. Each area must fulfill the following main requirements:

Areas bordering cities:

Urgently motivate the people to activate and develop political and armed forces at hamlet level.

Help the people counter the enemy's pacification activities, kill tyrants, and break the enemy's oppressive control to expand our control over hamlets and quarters, then establish a defense system with mutual support in hamlets. Make many areas penetration bases to be used by the political and armed forces as stepping-stones to obtain access to enemy areas.

The political and armed forces must maintain close contact with the people to help ((friendly units)) to encircle enemy posts and proceed toward the encirclement of Saigon.

On the basis of strengthening forces and expanding movements, we must mobilize manpower and material resources for the battlefield.

Intermediary line areas:

Motivate the people to constantly rise up. Make the best use of the three types of forces in order to thwart the enemy's pacification program and destroy his oppressive administrative machinery at low levels, such as hamlet administrations, Civil Self-Defense Forces, reactionary organizations and spies. Paralyze the village administration and the Popular and Regional Forces, compelling them to stay in posts. Disorganize a number of Cum

((possibly elements)) of the Popular and Regional Forces in villages, and liberate a few villages.

We must try to expand our controlled areas by countering pacification activities; this is especially important in penetration bases and the corridor lines leading from the rear to the areas bordering ((cities)).

Intensify attacks against the enemy in all fields, especially the armed movement to paralyze and destroy the enemy's infrastructure, and pin down his main force in this battlefield ((Region 5)) in support of friendly units in other battlefields.

Develop and consolidate the armed forces, the Party,

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the Group, and the revolutionary government in all villages in order that the strength of the Revolution will be greater than that of the enemy.

Motivate and guide the people to leave ((relocation areas)) to resume farm production activities and protect their agricultural products ((against enemy theft)).

Mobilize manpower and material resources to the fullest to serve the frontline and transport food supplies to the rear.

Province capitals and district seats:

Use every method, every measure, and every element to conduct propaganda, indoctrination and motivation among the people of all classes in province capitals and district seats. Eagerly strengthen and preserve our forces. Activate liberation groups and rally the people in either legal or semi-legal organizations. In addition, recruit guerrillas and secret special-action teams, and Party and Group members in all areas with special attention paid to the workers, poor city dwellers, and students. Ensure that our agents are planted in each enterprise, school, street quarter, and labor group, and that they operate secretly.

Step up the struggle of the people of all classes, who demand practical democratic rights and welfare, and protest the enemy's reactionary policies by using the political slogan, "Oppose the US imperialists' aggressive war." Concurrently, increase the killing of tyrants and breaking of the enemy's oppressive control, with emphasis on ringleaders in an effort to throw him into permanent confusion.

Rear base areas:

Gradually build bases, perfect in economic, political, and military aspects. Specifically, heighten the people's level of consciousness, intensify the guerrilla warfare movement, and increase and maintain agricultural production. Increase cultural and social activities and help the people increase their income.

Endeavor to strengthen and develop the armed forces, political forces, the Party, the Group, and the revolutionary government. On this basis, motivate the people to serve the frontline. In the ethnic minority areas, stress our policy toward them by improving their standard of culture, and help them get rid of superstition.

C. General missions and requirements in areas which have close relations with one another and which cannot be separated: That means that only when we meet a certain requirement will we have conditions necessary to fulfill another requirement, and only when we fulfill the requirements in a certain area, will we have conditions to strengthen another area. For this reason, areas must support one another. Each area and specialized agency must do their best to accomplish their main missions, then they will be able to perfectly achieve their common missions.

But in this period of time, there is a problem which governs all tasks, that is the frustration of the enemy pacification program and the strengthening of our forces.

That is why this mission is the principal one for the entire Party. The entire Army, people and specialized agencies must make efforts to frustrate the enemy pacification program by fulfilling the following requirements:

Requirements of thwarting the enemy's pacification program:

The majority of the enemy's pacified hamlets in rural areas are weak and undeveloped. All hamlets have a Civil Self-Defense Force and administration, and some of them also have reactionary political and economic organizations. But most of them are only strong in appearance. A few hamlets have armed assault defense platoons, but these platoons only operate under pressure. Some pacification cadre disguised themselves as hamlet administrative personnel, security agents, and as popular force members to operate, but they are very afraid of us. Village Popular and Regional Forces and members of administrative groups generally do not dare ((fan out to attack us)) with the exception of a number of elements and administrative sections which often conducted ambushes at night-time.

During the day they conducted search operations in coordination with regular force troops stationed in the sector. In the past, our forces in low level areas ((possibly villages)) sustained numerous losses and secret forces were not properly developed. For these reasons, our village forces were still inadequate. In some places, secret personnel attempted to increase activities; however, their operations were still ineffective. The people's organizations were poorly developed and guerrilla forces were inadequate. Recently, the enemy's pacification activities decreased and routine activities were neglected. In the meantime our destructive attacks increased and we strengthened our positions in various areas. The decrease in enemy activities enabled us to hold our positions. The enemy concentrated his oppressive control in towns and cities more than in rural areas.

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To frustrate the enemy's pacification scheme, we must fulfill the following requirements:

In rural areas: Disorganize the enemy's assault and Peoples' Self-Defense forces, annihilate hamlet tyrants and reactionary organizations, and cause irremediable losses to his Regional and Popular Forces and village administrative personnel. In hamlets, our troops must encircle enemy posts and eliminate covert enemy agents.

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In towns and cities: We must annihilate enemy hamlet administrative personnel, the People's Self-Defense Force, and reactionary and oppressive organizations in order to disorganize the enemy. We must promote political struggles, DV ((civilian proselyting)), and CT ((political)) and BV ((military proselyting)) activities. By using our political and armed forces, Party and Group members, people's organizations, and revolutionary government personnel in all hamlets, enterprises, slums, and schools in towns and cities, we must expand and strengthen our control in rural areas, loosen the oppressive enemy control, and exercise limited control over towns and cities. We must motivate people who have been relocated to resettlement centers to return to their former lands in order to populate cleared areas ((unpopulated after relocation of the people)). Only on this basis can we mobilize manpower and material resources to support the front and fulfill the revolutionary requirements.

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Three-pronged attacks must be conducted as a part of counterpacification activities. The effectiveness of this type of action has been proved by the success of the Revolution in South Vietnam and counterpacification activities. Some of our local areas have successfully carried out missions due to proper implementation of three-pronged attacks. Other areas failed to achieve their missions due to poor coordination of three-pronged attacks. Therefore, we were unable to face the enemy's counterattacks. Specifically, counterpacification activities must be coordinated with three-pronged attacks as follows:

Political field: Our immediate mission is to motivate and organize the people. We must propagandize the people by teaching them about Uncle's testament and independence and freedom, and by informing them of enemy cruelties in local areas. We must organize, train, and guide the people to rise up, disrupt, and counter enemy pacification and political and economic organizations, and to demand to be allowed to return to their homes. Proper political and economic slogans must be adopted according to each class of people and each local area. Gradually move from a small-scale to a large-scale struggle, such as countering enemy oppression by resisting oppressive control and crushing the People's Self-Defense and Popular Forces. From countering enemy attacks in hamlets, we must proceed to small attacks. Motivate one school and one enterprise and expand their

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progress to several schools and enterprises to counter pacification. To successfully carry out this mission, the leading agency must develop its political and armed forces to improve leadership.

Military field: To intensify civilian proselyting activities to motivate and organize the people we must coordinate the armed forces with political and Party forces. In addition, we must promote and improve guerrilla warfare, develop the district forces, and train troops presently deployed on various battlefields.

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These measures are aimed at intensifying our offensive activities to inflict heavy losses on enemy pacification teams, Regional and Popular Forces, and forces assigned to support pacification, espionage, and administrative personnel. We should coordinate popular uprisings with other activities to disorganize People's Self-Defense Force units and reactionary enemy organizations. In order to disorganize the enemy infrastructure, seriously damage the Regional and Popular Forces, frustrate enemy ambush tactics, and destroy his system of blockhouses and small posts to place him in a passive position we should closely coordinate the three types of forces throughout the battlefield and should attack the enemy continuously. We should promote the combat efficiency of guerrillas and local troops to enable them to destroy and oppress Regional and Popular Force members, espionage agents, and administrative personnel in their own areas. Mobile units located in various sub-regions should successfully perform their activities and destroy company and battalion-size regular force units.

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Military proselyting activities:

Through civilian proselyting activities we can motivate people's organizations and the families of enemy soldiers to intensify military proselyting activities. We can employ fifth columnists to distribute leaflets and letters, and can use loudspeakers and slogans to motivate, propagandize, and indoctrinate enemy soldiers. We should encourage them to maintain a passive attitude in their search ((and destroy)) operations and ambushes, and to support the people's struggle. We should coordinate the people's struggle with counterpacification activities and lead enemy soldiers in the struggle to fulfil their interests and obtain their rights and democracy. We should motivate them to oppose the enemy's oppressive regulations and to refuse to participate in patrol activities, terrorism, and operations in Cambodia as US mercenaries. We should instigate desertion and insurgency in enemy posts to support our combat activities. We should coordinate the people (('s struggles)) with armed activities to frustrate the enemy pacification program and his strengthening of the Puppet forces. We should disrupt the People's Self-Defense Force and extensively damage the Regional and Popular Forces to keep them on the defensive and in their posts. We should prevent regular forces from performing mobile activities. To fulfil

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the requirements mentioned above, we should develop and strengthen military proselyting forces, organize the families of ((enemy)) soldiers, consolidate the military proselyting machinery, and win the support of receptive youths and members of the Party and Group who were conscripted by the enemy. We should train them and assign missions according to their capability. We should immediately employ them in our counterpacification activities or plant a number of them in enemy organizations for future activities. In the leadership task, we should develop a specific plan ((for military proselyting activities)) for each post and should employ key military-proselyting agents in continuous activities to keep abreast of every enemy soldier, post, and unit. If this is done we will be more successful in fulfilling the requirements in the coming months.

We should employ three-pronged attacks to motivate the people to continue farm production and contribute manpower and materiel to aid the development of revolutionary forces. We should also consolidate our control.

We should gradually frustrate the enemy pacification program, and loosen his oppressive control to extend our control over the people. We should motivate the people to continue farm production, support the guerrilla warfare movement, and maintain surveillance of enemy espionage activities. We should provide for the welfare, health, and culture of the people to improve their living conditions.

To insure firm control, we should strengthen and develop the armed and political forces of the Revolutionary government in quality and quantity. This will necessitate an increase in the number of Party and Group members and intensified development of Four-Good-Quality Party and Group Chapters. This is the major requirement to insure ((continued)) attacks against the enemy and ((maintenance of)) our firm control. Depending on whether our forces in an area are strong or weak, we can determine whether our control in this area is firm or not.

We should motivate the people to contribute manpower and materiel to the Revolution to enable us to carry out counterpacification activities, extend our control, improve the people's living conditions, intensify our ((revolutionary)) movement, and implement our policies. We should promote self-sufficiency and set specific requirements for manpower and material contributions for each village hamlet and ((revolutionary)) family. We should eliminate passive and rightist attitudes.

In thwarting the enemy pacification program, close coordination must be maintained between three-pronged attacks, between various areas, and between offensive activities and strengthening our forces. Therefore, coordination must be emphasized in activity plans and methods of implementation applied by hamlets and villages during monthly activity phases and in other plans. Party Chapters will provide leadership on coordination, and specialized agencies will be in charge of ensuring that coordination is established. Party members and cadre must display a high sense of coordination concerning their activities. In the present situation, in places where we are short of cadre and Party members, one cadre must undertake all the above activities. There must be close coordination between overt and covert forces, and between in-place forces and those from other areas. Activities must be reviewed to promote operational efficiency. More attack tactics and methods of developing forces should be devised to insure the slow but steady progress of our activities. Different aspects of activity should be closely coordinated to enable us to intensify our counterpacification activities, expand our controlled areas, and attack enemy pacification teams with larger forces.

D. Guideline for our offensive and strengthening of forces.

Our leadership must be efficient to enable all areas to advance so that they can effectively support each other in forcing the enemy to deploy his forces thinly to weaken him. Each echelon should choose a primary area of operations where it will focus all efforts for a prescribed period of time to achieve the ~~above~~ mentioned tasks. This is to fulfill the requirements, promote the ((local)) movement, develop ((local)) forces, and gain experience to be applied during future leadership. All of these factors have an overall effect on the battlefield.

*thin en
forces*

Therefore, the chosen areas must occupy the most sensitive position on the battlefield and present favorable conditions for force development. In accordance with the requirements, the sub-region will choose area....((unspecified)) as its main area of operations. Each district must meet the following conditions in selecting its area of operations:

The primary area of operations is responsible for correctly implementing missions assigned by the sub-region. Specific plans suitable to the characteristics of each village must be formulated.

The sub-region's primary area of operations include several villages ~~of the same~~ districts. The area of operations of a district is composed of several hamlets of various villages. Due to these characteristics we should apply proper principles and methods of action. The major ones are:

Assemble all types of forces, including political and armed forces, in the primary area of operations. The leadership committee of the sub-region and various branches and organizations must also send Chapter Party Committee members, personnel, or competent cadre to the area. In addition, the sub-region must also send the major part of its mobile armed forces to the area.

*set up
steering
committee*

Set up a unified steering committee consisting of sub-region Party Committee members, members of various branches within the sub-region district Party Committee members. This committee is responsible for executing the resolutions passed by the sub-region and guiding and urging troops of the sub-region and districts assigned to the area ((of operations))

to implement missions assigned by the sub-region, then reporting lessons learned to the Current Affairs Committee of the sub-region and various branches to facilitate further guidance.

The steering committee must hold regular activities in order to grasp the situation and thoroughly understand the guidance of the sub-region, correct the ~~the~~ shortcomings and bring into full play the good experiences, but it should not be heavy and mechanical. It is not an echelon. The relationship between the districts, villages, and the steering committee is: between the steering committee and the district it is the relationship which concerns prodding, controlling, and guiding in the primary area of operation; the relationship between the steering committee (including the comrades members of the District Party Committees) and the village is the relationship ~~between~~ which concerns guidance, prodding, organization aimed at helping the villages implement ~~the~~ the policy. The relationship between the steering committee and the armed forces of the sub-region and districts, responsible for this area, is the relationship which concerns the guidance and usage of combat actions (through the comrade in charge of military affairs on the steering committee).

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E. In order to effectively implement the cited tasks, we are required to clearly understand the following basic points and improve our guidance.

1. We should clearly understand that the US imperialists are sustaining serious defeats. Internal dissension, recently mentioned by TWC ((COSVN)), is increasing. To overcome the difficult situation which is forcing the enemy into a strategic deadlock, the enemy escalated the war. Although defeated, the enemy was compelled to expand the war. Although the US intended to de-Americanize the war and pull out its troops, they had to send their troops to Cambodia. Even though the Puppet Army was seriously weakened, it was forced to send its troops to Cambodia. Thus, the enemy not only failed to implement its strategic schemes, but also fell victim to serious confusion in the military, political, and economic fields.

This caused great difficulty and deep dissension not only in the United States and South Vietnam, but also throughout the world. Based on that situation, we can clearly understand that the two possibilities anticipated by the Central ~~Headquarters~~ Headquarters are still valid. The first possibility is obviously developing. Therefore, in conducting the war, we must understand the policy of the protracted war. We must focus maximum efforts on motivating the entire Party, army, and people to rush forward to launch continuous attacks against the enemy and strengthen our forces. We must closely coordinate with the Lao and Cambodian Revolutions to defeat the US and its henchmen to quickly gain a decisiva victory.

2. In order to achieve our purposes and the first possibility and to positively defeat the US aggressors under any circumstances, Party Committees at all echelons and military and civilian forces must make greater efforts to maintain their sense of self-help for self-improvement

by weaknesses
B.

11
1st
possibilities
attacks

in performing all types of tasks. To successfully attack the enemy and strengthen our forces, personnel and cadre at all levels must contribute their energy, and should not rely on the higher echelons. Our sub-region is located in an immediate enemy objective. Though the enemy is seriously defeated, he is trying desperately to hold onto his area of operations and conducted fierce attacks against friendly forces. Presently we are encountering many difficulties. Therefore, we must double our efforts to satisfactorily accomplish our daily missions and settle basic problems. We must intensify the people's political uprising movement, the armed activities of the three types of forces ((main, local, and guerrilla forces)), military proselyting activities, and farm productions. Routine activities must be closely coordinated with those of the climaxing phases.

not rely on higher echelons

Based on the results of missions, each comrade, unit, and cadre at all echelons should check his ideology and working attitudes to determine if they have improved. In order to improve themselves and to successfully carry out their missions, they should improve their revolutionary concepts, their concept of the use of violence, and their viewpoints of the people, and thoroughly understand the Party's policies and guidelines.

3. We must strive to improve our leadership and take specific measures to provide effective guidance. This must be considered an urgent and decisive factor for successful implementation of missions. All Party Committee members and branches in the sub-region, as well as districts and villages, must clearly understand the following points:

We must consider the strengthening of villages and hamlets as a key task, the establishment of the Party Chapter a primary task, and the organization of the people and guerrillas as an important mission. Cadre at all echelons in the sub-region and districts, and Party Committee members of all branches must concentrate their efforts on strengthening hamlets, Party Chapters, ((civilian)) associations, and secret guerrilla forces. According to the sub-region's plan, districts must place special emphasis on developing villages and hamlets.

Particularly during the present situation, the district Party Committees and various branches must strengthen their forces qualitatively and quantitatively. All branches in the sub-region must improve their leadership and guidance. Branches which have many incapable personnel must be reorganized. These personnel should be reassigned to combat units and their capabilities developed.

]

]

Party Committee members and branches must try to develop collective and democratic leadership and individual accountability. They must strive to assess the situation accurately. Specific measures must be taken to effectively control and guide personnel. Cadre at lower echelons must be responsible for reporting their activities to higher echelons. Strive to consolidate signal and liaison systems with various facilities. Continue to hold meetings at all echelons. During these meetings present specific subjects to aid effective implementation of the resolutions of higher echelons. Cadre in charge of branches must have a high sense of responsibility, organization, and discipline, and great determination to implement resolutions. They must develop to the greatest extent the leading role and important functions of branches in studying and guiding their personnel to accomplish their missions.

*reporting
implementing
resolutions*

We should counter the tendency to practice democracy in form only and individual irresponsibility, both of which are common in branches.

All echelons should work out specific plans for implementing resolutions and directives.

We should strongly oppose the tendency to draft plans with specific criteria and then neglect to put them into practice. Specific plans should be drafted according to the balance of forces in local areas and the general development of the situation to take measures for successful implementation ((of missions)) and appropriate assignments. Missions should be suitably assigned to personnel with strict control, motivation, and proper guidance during the course of their performance. We should strive to make our activity plans more appropriate and specific. We should carefully review and study our successes as well as our failures to facilitate development and correction. Cadre of higher echelons must clearly understand the plans and methods of performance. They must regularly urge and control their personnel. The Party Chapter must also regularly check and motivate cadre and Party members to operate satisfactorily.

*Plans
not
implemented*

In light of the split battlefield, it is necessary to consolidate the steering elements of ((subordinate)) Party Committees and branches in various areas and increase the membership of steering committees in areas bordering cities and intermediate areas. In the meantime, various branches must select and appoint capable cadre to the steering committees of various areas. By doing so, we can facilitate the leadership tasks of steering committees and branches. In addition, we must heighten the sense of responsibility of steering committee members and other concerned cadre and give them appropriate authority while still ensuring collective leadership. We must strengthen the relationship between the steering committees of various areas and the central steering agencies (such as the Current Affairs ((Committee)), Sub-Region Party Committee, sections, branches, and District Party Committees)).

*steering
committees*

4. Intensify the wartime leadership of ((subordinate)) Party Committees, and properly employ friendly forces. We must strengthen the leadership of ((subordinate)) Party Committees in general and Party Committee members in particular, and provide direct leadership for various sections, branches, and subordinate forces to carry out the political tasks set for local areas. Various sections and branches, as well as armed and political forces, must unconditionally and absolutely execute the political tasks set forth by ((subordinate)) Party Committees. They must...

facilitate the wartime leadership of ((subordinate)) Party Committees. The above tasks must be carried out at all echelons. The sub-region Current Affairs Committee will provide specific guidance to each area to aid correction of the deficiencies of various echelons and branches.

2. Primary tasks to be completed during the rainy season.

(See Directive 14/CTK, dated 5 Aug 70, prepared by A.15.)

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Dir 14
compare w/
26

Future tasks of district Party Committees.

First of all, district Party Committees will have to conduct political reorientation ((sessions)) and disseminate new resolutions to all Party Chapters and Party members. They must improve the people's knowledge and morale, improve the leadership and working attitude of the Party ((Committee)) Headquarters, and increase their determination to defeat the enemy, as well as the determination of the entire army and civilian population in the district. They must make positive efforts to perform political reorientation at village and district levels during the prescribed period.

17.

After political reorientation, district Party Committees must formulate an effective activity plan to settle the problems of local areas and turn the situation in our favor.

Draw up plans to motivate the people to implement the new resolution and intensify all activities.

Provide specific guidance for all Party Chapters so that they can successfully conduct political reorientation, outline their activity plans, and motivate the people.

Coordinate political reorientation with the task of providing leadership ((to subordinate levels)). Do not overlook any of these activities.

Following political reorientation, district Party Committees and Party Chapters must improve their leadership skills and put what they have been taught into practice.

Intensify political and military proselyting activities throughout the district, disrupt enemy pacification activities and oppressive control of the population, and gain control. (Strictly observe the directive concerning activities in weak areas and areas bordering cities.)

Strengthen and properly employ district forces, extensively develop hamlet and village guerrilla warfare, including secret guerrilla ((forces)), and consolidate combat villages.

gover

Strengthen and consolidate the ((Revolutionary)) Government; intensify security, economic and financial activities; and improve the people's living conditions.

Develop Four-Good-Quality Party Chapters, step up civilian proselyting activities, ensure development of our organizations, and promote the aggressiveness of the masses.

Based on specific activities and results gained in the performance of tasks and in the movements to assess the results of the political reorientation course, gain experience in accordance with the spirit of political reorientation to facilitate greater results in future activities. The SVN revolutionary movement has gained great and glorious achievements which have brought the anti-American resistance for national salvation to a new phase. In the immediate future, the struggle between friendly and enemy forces will become more violent and complex, and we will have to surmount many hardships and difficulties. However, our fundamental advantages will increase due to the fact that the US imperialists and the Puppet Government are encountering insurmountable difficulties and will certainly be defeated.

In this historical hour, the entire Party, army, and people must aggressively rush forward to overcome all difficulties and hardships, make strenuous efforts to rise up and continuously attack the enemy in the three strategic areas, be determined to perform the immediate and important task at any cost, and gain decisive victories in the immediate future.

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----

TRƯỜNG HỌC VÀ NHỮNG VỤ CÔNG VIỆC KHÁC

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1. CHIẾN TRANH VÀ NHỮNG VỤ CÔNG VIỆC KHÁC

Chiến tranh là một hình thức đấu tranh quyết liệt và giành quyền lợi cho nhân dân. Mọi người dân đều có trách nhiệm tham gia vào chiến tranh. Mọi người dân đều phải chấp hành nghiêm chỉnh các quy định của pháp luật. Mọi người dân đều phải chấp hành nghiêm chỉnh các quy định của pháp luật. Mọi người dân đều phải chấp hành nghiêm chỉnh các quy định của pháp luật.

2. NHỮNG VỤ CÔNG VIỆC KHÁC

Mọi người dân đều phải chấp hành nghiêm chỉnh các quy định của pháp luật. Mọi người dân đều phải chấp hành nghiêm chỉnh các quy định của pháp luật. Mọi người dân đều phải chấp hành nghiêm chỉnh các quy định của pháp luật. Mọi người dân đều phải chấp hành nghiêm chỉnh các quy định của pháp luật. Mọi người dân đều phải chấp hành nghiêm chỉnh các quy định của pháp luật.

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... của quân chúng ngày càng rộng rãi và quyết liệt, ...
... của họ trong cố gắng tập hợp các đồng phái chính trị, ...
... và binh tổ, chính trị, nội bộ/lên cho tình hình này lại một lần ...
... và công rồi ra hơn.

... hiện Việt nam hóa chiến tranh với những ...
... quân và Đập bành, nôm từ đầu năm 1960 ...
... năm, tập trung các đơn vị quân lực địa vào các ...
... nhất là hành lang và các ...
... của ta suy yếu. Tuy khác theo ...
... là hoàn thành cho được ...
... lực lượng dân vệ bảo an dân bảo an nhân tố ...
... ra phía trước thay cho tỷ đối chọi với ta. Vì vậy ...
... nhưng chúng không ngờ cách ...
... của ta và của bạn, của phái ...
... lực lượng quan trọng ...
... với tỷ để quét sạch kho tàng ...
... để giành quyền chủ động ...
... thì chúng lại càng bị cô lập hơn và ...
... nhiều vùng rộng lớn đã được giải ...
... của ta.

... bước cổ giăng lữ. Các bạn ...
... và tay sai của ...
... bị đánh nặng, cảnh đau cả trên ...
... bị ca lầy thối bại một ...
... lực lượng phi pháo và bộ binh ...
... và bị hao tổn về kế hoạch ...
... chức liên minh quân sự giữa ...
... được.

... những thắng lợi to lớn của ta, tiếp theo ...
... các cấp Đảng bộ và quân dân ta đã nỗ lực ...
... liên tục đẩy mạnh tấn công ...
... ra các tiêu diệt nhiều ...
... lực lượng cách mạng, ...
... Việt nam hóa chiến tranh của tỷ, thực hiện các ...
... qua trận khai M 9, qua thực tiễn chiến đấu ...
... phong trào dân ...
... cho kế hoạch ...
... những thắng lợi to lớn ...
... và công ...
... giải phóng binh định và ...
... nhiều nơi mở rộng quyền ...
... phá lỏng thể hòa hợp ...
... công tác phổ ...
... của ta đã kịp thời quyết ...
... của ta đã giành ...
... phát triển phong ...
... đồng thời chúng ta lại phối hợp ...
... thắng lợi thật to lớn. Các ...

1/- Ta đã đánh quân tây và quân ngụy ở tuyến biên giới của ta và họ tuy bình định lần cho chúng thất bại nặng, ta rút 1 bước về phía bắc và cả cố lượng (nhiều nước gỗ và hình thức phân chia...), số của và nghị đồng hơn trước đây). Song thời ta đã lường sâu hơn là... nhưng trào diết ô ô như khi hợp giành quyền làm chủ ở vùng này, chúng ta và của phong trào đã tập lên thế đấu tranh khá sôi nổi và liên tục. Họ đã tập ra tình thế quân địch bị diệt bị bao huyệt, hoang tàn... trước mắt của chúng, hình ảnh ở phần sau thiên các yếu trợ giúp... Ta cũng phải triển thế chiến đấu, thế làm chủ vậy ép dồn bớt địch bằng chiến đấu ở các mức độ.

2/- Các cuộc phát triển nhảy vọt giải phóng nhiều vùng... ở vùng này và hàng chục thị trấn thị xã, cùng với những... ở vùng và họ tạo và sự hình thành một trận cách mạng của các nước... chúng ta 1 chiến trường thống nhất của các dân tộc Đông Dương, làm cho địch bị căng kéo, bị tiêu diệt nhiều ở... buộc xâm lược... có gắng lên lao ngọc hiểm để giành chủ động nhưng vẫn bị động và... chiến cách mở rộng chiến tranh đứng người nông dân đương cảnh người... của nhân vật phải thất bại nặng nề bước đầu.

3/- Trên cơ sở những thắng lợi to lớn của miền Nam, K và Lào, những cơ sở và hình lang rộng lớn đã hình thành, tạo nên điều kiện... phát huy tác dụng thúc đẩy bộ trợ phối hợp với các chiến trường... miền Nam, K, Lào có thể đứng vững chắc nhất, làm cho kẻ địch... phá vỡ cũ biên giới không gỡ được thế bị động và thất bại của... lại bị ta lấy nặng nề hơn.

4/- Những thắng lợi to lớn nói trên đã nâng cao 1 bước nữa về các mặt chính trị, ngoại giao của các dân tộc Đông Dương trên trường quốc tế... đã tạo nên thế được sự đồng tình và ủng hộ rộng lớn của nhân dân thế giới, của các chính phủ và các tổ chức tiến bộ yêu chuộng hòa bình. Sự trợ giúp... của ta phối hợp chặt chẽ với một trận chính trị trên chiến trường... đang đang thúc đẩy hệ trợ phong trào phản chiến của nhân dân Mỹ, các lực lượng công nhân hóa chống đối trong nội bộ bọn cầm quyền Mỹ và... và những bọn này với nhau làm cho bọn hiếu chiến Mỹ và bù nhìn... cũng bị cô lập trước dư luận thế giới và nhân dân Mỹ.

Chúng ta đã giành được một thế chiến lược rất vững mạnh trên trường quốc tế đang thống nhất làm cho xâm lược Mỹ sa lầy bị động 2 1

0.- Thế ta và địch trên chiến trường miền Nam và Lào:

Thế trận nổi giữa ta và địch trên chiến trường Đông Dương có thể... chiến như sau:

1/- Ở chiến trường miền Nam, tuy Mỹ ngụy còn lực lượng quân sự... hệ thống đồn bốt hình thành thế phòng thủ... miền Nam, ta và địch không chế nhân dân ta với nhiều hình thức... cũng được điều sơ hở lớn không khác phục nổi:

a)- Cường bức hòa dân đã làm căng thẳng và nâng cao... nhân dân nông thôn có cả nhiều người trong này... quân địch không giải quyết nổi. Đó là chủ yếu nhất của... ta về chính trị và là căn bản của tình hình quân... một nước cũng rộng mạnh, không thể sống trong vùng... của ta.

tiền, thành tựu cách mạng đều tập trung vào lợi ích của lực lượng công nhân, có thể nói là một lợi ích.

- Từ đây, tổ chức quan chức bằng ra sản xuất, học về sản xuất công việc của họ đồng góp phần vào lợi ích và tiến bộ, nói về công nhân lương thực và phía sau.

Về mặt chính trị, chính sách:

- Từ đây, nơi hình thức mới biến pháp, nơi lực lượng tuyên truyền giáo dục phát động; nơi từng lớp nhân dân trong xã hội các tầng lớp, các giai cấp khác nhau xây dựng bảo vệ theo lợi ích của dân chúng, hợp quần chúng trong các tổ chức lớp pháp luật pháp, dân quyền, biết đồng nhất, đang viên, đưa viên đều làm các việc, các công việc, lớp pháp nhân thì, học sinh của bảo vệ lợi ích nơi thành học, nơi được phổ, nơi học lao động đều có cơ sở, hoạt động được phương khác biệt.

- Trên cơ sở đó tổ chức lãnh đạo các tầng lớp dân chúng cho quyền lợi dân sinh dân chủ thiết thực chống lại các chính sách phân biệt đối xử, lợi ích lợi ích với nhau hiện chính trị công nhân trước mắt lực lượng cơ sở. Đồng thời liên lạc các đảng phái khác để có thể hòa nhập vào các đơn vị, đơn vị khác làm cho việc thực hiện; tuyên bố lợi ích không có định cả mặt chính trị, tổ chức các tầng lớp.

Vấn đề của phía sau:

Trong bước xây dựng căn cứ hoàn chỉnh về các mặt kinh tế, chính trị và văn hóa của ta:

- Tăng cường giáo dục cho quần chúng đẩy mạnh phong trào đấu tranh chính trị đẩy mạnh bảo vệ sản xuất tự cường tự lập. Phát triển văn hóa và học hỏi học được các đơn vị.

Điều các công cơ phát triển lực lượng vũ trang, chính trị, kinh tế, văn hóa chính quyền cách mạng, trên cơ sở đó đồng viên quan chức pháp và cho tiến bộ. Đối với vùng dân tộc cần chú ý và chính sách dân tộc tăng các văn hóa tăng bước giải quyết nạn đói đói.

2/ Về phía vũ và you cần chú ý từng vùng có nội dung là: đầu tiên với đầu tiên cho đầu tiên là có lợi cho các tầng lớp, nói về các điều kiện như bạn của ta, có thực hiện tốt các yêu cầu và xây dựng thì nói về điều kiện đưa vào kiến tạo, vì là do các vùng bạn của ta tạo nên như, nơi vùng, nơi ngành công tác phải có các điều kiện như vũ của you của mình thì nói hoàn thành tốt được nhiệm vụ của ta. Thứ hai thời gian này có 1 you cần chỉ phải toàn bộ các tầng lớp, Thứ ba thời gian này xây dựng thời gian do quyền lực của ta, Thứ tư là các công tác này là nhiệm vụ trọng tâm trong toàn đảng bộ, toàn quân đội các ngành phải tập trung thực hiện cụ thể các mặt danh pháp chính trị của ta.

Đến với danh pháp bình đẳng:

Định hình dịch bình đẳng và danh pháp bình đẳng của ta nói chung ở đây, trên đại bộ phận áp bình đẳng của dịch đều long nhiều so là các cơ sở có tổ chức phòng vệ dân sự, tổ ap vũ 1 số nơi có tổ chức phân công chính trị, kinh tế. Nhưng phần đông có hình thức một ít không có tổ chức sự dụng trung đại phòng vệ xung kích trong bị thực áp lực công, 1 vài nơi tổ ap là căn cứ bình đẳng hay an ninh trong dân và lực lượng một đồng nhưng rất sơ sài. Dân vệ, bảo an tổ ra chúng có lợi ích của ta được 1 số đại và 1 số ban tổ hoạt động như ban dân.

phần này

