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TRANSCRIPT: SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE

WASHINGTON-- FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY
OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 9:

SECRETARY ROGERS: I WOULD LIKE TO JUST SAY A FEW WORDS BEFORE
I TAKE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE.

FIRST, AS YOU KNOW, THE ADMINISTRATION IS VERY PLEASED ABOUT
THE REPOSE TO THE INITIATIVE; ESPECIALLY THE RESPONSE IN THIS
COUNTRY, WHICH IS UNIFORMLY FAVORABLE. IT IS BI-PARTISAN IN
NATURE AND IT CLEARLY SHOWS THAT ALL SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION IN
ALL PARTS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S
INITIATIVE. AND WE THINK THAT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE
WE THINK THE ENEMY HAS, OVER THE YEARS, RELIED ON THE DIVISIONS
IN OUR OWN SOCIETY IN THE HOPE THAT THAT DIVISION WOULD CAUSE
US TO LOSE OUR RESOLVE IN CARRYING OUT OUR POLICIES.

AND WE HOPE THAT BECAUSE OF THE SUPPORT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS
RECEIVED FOR HIS INITIATIVE HERE AT HOME THAT THE ENEMY WILL
SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS, THOUGHTFULLY CONSIDER THEM,
AND MAKE A SERIOUS RESPONSE.

NOW, AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT INTER-
NATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE HAS BEEN MOST
ENCOURAGING. ALL OF THE NATIONS IN THE AREA HAVE PUBLICLY
RESPONDED FAVORABLY, SUGGESTED THAT THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD SERIOUSLY
CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS AND COME BACK WITH A THOUGHTFUL RESPONSE.
NOT ONLY THE NATIONS IN THE AREA, BUT THE NATIONS AROUND THE WORLD --
IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA, THE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS,
CERTAINLY MOST OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS. AND WE ARE, THEREFORE,

ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT WE THINK THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE ITSELF WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY WILL SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE.

AND I WOULD LIKE, ALSO, TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL AS A PROPOSAL THAT IS TO BE EITHER ACCEPTED OR REJECTED. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE KNEEJERK REACTION WOULD BE WHAT IT WAS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE A FOUNDATION ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN.

THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT WE HAVE NEVER HAD EVER SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED IN PARIS ANY NEGOTIATIONS IN THE REAL SENSE OF THE WORD. WE HAVE NEVER EXCHANGED IDEAS. WE HAVE EXCHANGED POINTS OF VIEW, SPEECHES, BUT NEVER HAD AN HONEST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ABOUT HOW TO SETTLE THIS CONFLICT.

THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE PROVIDES SUCH A FOUNDATION. AND, IF THE OTHER SIDE IS INTERESTED IN PEACE, WE ARE SATISFIED THAT WE COULD FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD BE FAIR TO ALL CONCERNED.

AS THE PRESIDENT SAID -- BECAUSE THE TRAGIC WAR IN NIGERIA HAS ENDED, BECAUSE WE HAVE AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT A CEASE-FIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- IF A CEASE-FIRE COULD BE ACHIEVED IN INDOCHINA IT WOULD BE THE FIRST TIME SINCE WORLD WAR II THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR COMBAT IN THE WORLD. AND WE HAVE A FEELING THE TIME IS RIPE;

WE HAVE A FEELING THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY DEMANDS THAT PEOPLE ACT SENSIBLY AND FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT WAR ITSELF IS NOT A VIABLE POLICY IN ANY AREA OF THE WORLD.

AND SO WE ARE VERY HOPEFUL THAT THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL WILL BE ACCEPTED, WILL FORM A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND, HOPEFULLY, PEACE IN INDOCHINA.

MR. HIGHTOWER?

Q MR. SECRETARY, DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAVE ANY INDICATION FROM THE COMMUNIST SIDE OF ANY KIND THAT IT WAS INTERESTED IN PROPOSALS OF THIS SORT; OR DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER BASIS ON WHICH TO ASSESS NOW WHAT THEIR LONGER RANGE REACTION IS LIKELY TO BE?

A MR. HIGHTOWER, WE HAVE NO REASON -- BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE, OR WITH ANY OF THOSE ALIGNED WITH THEM -- TO THINK THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THIS PEACE INITIATIVE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION WHICH SUGGEST THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THAT THEY WOULD BE ATTRACTED TO THIS PEACE PROPOSAL. LET ME SAY THAT ONE OF THE THINGS THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS CLAIMED ALL ALONG WAS THAT WE NEVER AGREED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. THEY SAID IF WE DID AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL THAT IT WOULD BE A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FORWARD.

NOW THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO THAT PRINCIPLE -- AGREED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OF INDOCHINA, AS LONG AS IT IS PART OF A GENERAL AGREEMENT SETTLING THE CONFLICT.

CERTAINLY, THE FACT THAT THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM HAS SUCCEEDED SO WELL -- ALMOST BEYOND OUR EXPECTATIONS -- WE THOUGHT IT WOULD SUCCEED, BUT IT IS SUCCEEDING BETTER THAN WE EXPECTED. THE COMBAT ACTIVITY IS DOWN TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT; AND, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS SPEECH, OUR CASUALTIES ARE WAY DOWN. SO WE ARE MAKING THIS PROPOSAL FROM A POSITION NOT OF WEAKNESS BUT OF STRENGTH. WE ARE MAKING THE PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME BECAUSE WE FEEL SURE THAT THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM WILL SUCCEED AND THAT WE WILL HAVE AMERICAN FORCES OUT OF COMBAT IN VIET-NAM BY MAY 1ST.

BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT ANY PROLONGING OF THIS CONFLICT IS MOST UNDESIRABLE AND MOST HARMFUL TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND TO ALL OF THOSE INVOLVED, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE WAR END NOT ONLY FOR OUR AMERICAN FORCES BUT FOR THE VIETNAMESE FORCES AS WELL. AND, FOR THAT REASON, WE THINK THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE ATTRACTED TO THIS OFFER. WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT IT PUBLICLY; CERTAINLY NOT IMMEDIATELY. BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH WE HOPE CAN BE CONDUCTED IN PRIVATE AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

NEXT WEEK, I WILL RAISE THE SUBJECT. AT THIS TIME, I HAVE NO FURTHER STATEMENT TO MAKE ON THE MATTER.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, ONE OF THE REASONS IT IS EVIDENT WHY THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN SO WIDELY WELCOMED BY MANY PEOPLE ON THE HAWK AND DOVE SIDE IS, IN FACT, THAT THEY ARE READING DIFFERENT THINGS INTO IT AS THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION. TO SOME OF THE PROPONENTS OF A CEASE-FIRE, IT MEANS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE EXISTING TERRITORIAL CONTROL THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE HOLDS IN INDOCHINA. TO OTHERS IT EVIDENTLY MEANS FREEZING IN PLACE THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT HEADED BY PRESIDENT THIEU. WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION IS OF A STANDSTILL CEASE-FIRE?

A. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT IF THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTED THAT ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN, HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN, TO DETERMINE THE MODALITIES OF THAT CEASE-FIRE. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THAT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE ITSELF.

WE HAVE MADE A VERY CAREFUL STUDY OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF THERE WAS A CEASE-FIRE STANDSTILL, CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE, AND WE HAVE CONDUCTED THAT STUDY OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

NOW, A YEAR AGO WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL TO PROPOSE A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE. BUT, AS A RESULT OF THE STUDIES THAT WE HAVE MADE, AND AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SITUATION, WE ARE QUITE CONVINCED THAT IT IS PRACTICAL NOW TO WORK OUT A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE.

NOW, THE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE WOULD NOT IN AND OF ITSELF BE EXPECTED TO HAVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WOULD RESULT FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD OCCUR BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. AND THAT, OF COURSE, IS PROVIDED IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. SO WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THERE WOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE, IN WHICH WE WILL TAKE PART IF IT SEEMS DESIRABLE, OR THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. IN ANY EVENT, WE DON'T THINK OF THE CEASE-FIRE AS A PROVISION WHICH WILL IN AND OF ITSELF HAVE ANY POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. WE EXPECT THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES TO FLOW FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER TOP OFFICIALS HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT SERIOUS DIPLOMACY SHOULD BE CONDUCTED SECRETLY AND IN PRIVATE. IN VIEW OF THAT, WHY WASN'T THIS PROPOSAL PROPOSED TO THE COMMUNISTS IN PARIS IN PRIVATE?

A. WELL, I THINK THERE ARE GREAT ADVANTAGES TO QUIET DIPLOMACY; BUT IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN DIVISION IN OUR OWN COUNTRY, AND BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN SOME OPPOSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SOME OF THE ACTIONS OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN THE PAST, WE THOUGHT IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT ON IT WHICH WOULD BE SO FORTHCOMING THAT IT WOULD BE WIDELY ACCEPTED, NOT ONLY BY AMERICANS BUT BY PERSONS ALL OVER THE WORLD. AND THAT IS WHAT HAPPENED. WE THINK THAT FACT WILL CAUSE THE OTHER SIDE TO THINK TWICE BEFORE THEY REJECT IT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHETHER OR NOT SUCH OPPOSITE FORCES AS THE VIET CONG, THE PATHET LAO IN LAOS AND SIHANOUK'S PEOPLE, REPRESENTING PART OF CAMBODIA, THE CONTESTED PART, WOULD ALSO BE PRESENT AT AN EXPANDED PEACE CONFERENCE?

A. WE HAVEN'T ATTEMPTED TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT ABOUT WHO MIGHT ATTEND AN INDOCHINA PEACE CONFERENCE BECAUSE WE THINK IT IS PREMATURE. WE DO FEEL THAT THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES ARE THE GOVERNMENTS NOW IN POWER AND THOSE WHO ARE OPPOSED TO THEM ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

AS FAR AS SIHANOUK IS CONCERNED, HE DOESN'T ENTER THE PICTURE, I THINK, HERE. THE FORCES IN CAMBODIA FACING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA ARE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, A BROADER QUESTION. PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE MID EAST TRUCE VIOLATIONS, SOME PEOPLE HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION IF THE EGYPTIANS HAVE, APPARENTLY WITH SOVIET COOPERATION, CHEATED ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT AGREEMENT, WHAT POINT IS THERE THEN IN GOING AHEAD WITH OTHER BROADER AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS IF WE HAVE NO FAITH IN THEIR WORD? WHAT IS YOUR VIEW? IS THERE ANY POINT TO GOING AHEAD AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS ARE TAINTED BY THIS?

A. YES, I THINK THERE IS A POINT IN GOING AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS. OTHERWISE, YOU WOULD GIVE UP; THERE WOULD BE

NO POLICY. I HAVE ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS. AND WE HAVE NEVER ENTERED INTO AGREEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF GOOD FAITH ALONE. WE HAVE ALWAYS PROVIDED FOR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. THAT IS WHY IN THE S.A.L.T. TALKS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ITEMS FOR CONSIDERATION IS THE VERIFICATION.

AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCERNED, WE ARE DISAPPOINTED -- DISAPPOINTED NOT ONLY IN THE MISSILE SITES IN THE 50-KILOMETER ZONE, WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED WITH, IF NOT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION, CERTAINLY WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED IN THE RHETORIC THAT THEY ARE USING, RHETORIC WHICH IS REMINISCENT OF THE COLD WAR DAYS, VERY STRIDENT IN TONE. BUT, HAVING SAID THOSE THINGS, WE DON'T CONCLUDE THAT THE ANSWER IS, "DON'T TRY TO GET ALONG WITH THE SOVIET UNION." WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE. WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE REALISTICALLY AND IN FULL REALIZATION THAT THERE MAY BE VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS. WE ARE GOING TO PROVIDE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES TO BE SURE THAT WE ARE NOT AT A DISADVANTAGE IF VIOLATIONS OCCUR.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WITH THAT PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION IN MIND, WOULD YOU TELL US WHAT IT IS THE U. S. IS TRYING TO GET IN THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS, AND HOW WOULD THEY BE VERIFIED IN THE SENSE YOU HAVE JUST EXPLAINED?

A. WELL, IN THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS I DON'T BELIEVE WE HAVE A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION. WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO ELIMINATE THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE SITUATION WHICH CREATE VERY SERIOUS TENSION IN THE AREA. AND I AM SPEAKING ABOUT IMPEDIMENTS TO TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, TRAVEL, AND THE LIKE.

NOW, IF THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED IN REDUCING TENSIONS IN EUROPE -- AND CERTAINLY BERLIN IS A GOOD PLACE TO START -- WE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT IT FAIRLY SOON. SO FAR WE HAVE BEEN TAKING SOUNDINGS IN THE FOUR POWER TALKS, BUT WE HAVEN'T UNTIL THE LAST MEETING OR SO GOTTEN DOWN TO THE SERIOUS QUESTIONS. BUT IN TERMS OF VERIFICATION IT IS NOT GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT. WE WILL KNOW WHETHER THEY LIVE UP TO THE AGREEMENT,

IF THEY MAKE ONE, OR NOT.

Q. BUT YOU MENTIONED S.A.L.T. AS BEING SELF-ENFORCING, I BELIEVE.

A. OH, NO, JUST THE OPPOSITE. I SAID ONE OF THE QUESTIONS IS VERIFICATION, ONE OF THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN S.A.L.T. IS HOW DO YOU VERIFY AN AGREEMENT?

Q. WELL, IN THE BERLIN CASE, THE PROBLEM FOR 25 YEARS HAS ALWAYS BEEN, FROM THE AMERICAN STANDPOINT, HOW TO MAKE THE RUSSIANS LIVE UP TO ANY OF THESE TRANSIT AGREEMENTS. WHAT NEW ELEMENTS DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE, IF ANY, TO SEE THAT IN ANY SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT WE CAN MAKE THEM LIVE UP TO IT IN THE TERMS OF CONSIDERING WHAT HAS PASSED?

A. WELL, WE HAVEN'T GOTTEN TO THE POINT OF DECIDING WHETHER THEY ARE EVEN GOING TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT THAT REDUCES THOSE TENSIONS. IF WE GET TO THAT POINT, WE CERTAINLY WILL PROVIDE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES WHICH WE THINK ARE ADEQUATE. I DON'T BELIEVE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT. I THINK WE CAN PROVIDE IT; AND WE FULLY INTEND TO.

Q MR. SECRETARY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS FLATLY DENIED THAT RUSSIAN-MANNED MISSILES HAVE BEEN MOVED INTO THE SUEZ CANAL CEASE-FIRE ZONE. DO WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE MOVED THESE MISSILES IN THERE?

A YES, WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE MOVED MISSILES IN. AND THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT THEY HAVE MOVED MISSILES IN. WHEN I SAY "THE," I MEAN THERE HAVE BEEN SA-3 SITES CONSTRUCTED SINCE THE DAY OF THE CEASE-FIRE, AND WE ARE CONVINCED, I THINK BEYOND A DOUBT, THAT THE SOVIET PERSONNEL ARE THERE TO ASSIST IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND MANNING OF THOSE SITES.

IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTICE THAT IN THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WE HAVE HAD WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE HAVE BEEN VIOLATIONS AND WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE VIOLATIONS HAS NEVER ARISEN. I THINK IT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THAT IS THE CASE. AND WHEN I TALK TO MR. GROMYKO I CAN GIVE HIM THE EVIDENCE OF THE VIOLATIONS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, SOME OF THE RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS IN WASHINGTON ARE SAYING TO PEOPLE WE TALKED TO WHEN THEY ARE CHARGED WITH

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NOT CONSTRUCTING A SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WATCH THAT CAREFULLY. IT IS ONE OF THOSE THINGS THAT WE CAN DETERMINE WITH CERTAINTY, AND WE WILL WATCH IT.

INsofar AS THE AIR CORRIDOR MATTER IS CONCERNED, OF COURSE THAT IS SOMETHING THAT THEY HAVE DONE BEFORE. THE SOVIET UNION CLAIMED IT WAS AN ACT COMMITTED BY A SUBORDINATE OFFICIAL AND WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DO IT. WE ACCEPT THAT EXPLANATION WITH SOME SKEPTICISM.

IN ANY EVENT, WE HOPE THAT THIS IS NOT A SIGNAL - THAT THESE THINGS DO NOT SIGNAL A CHANGE OF POLICY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE THESE MATTERS WITH THEM, TO HAVE ACTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. BUT CERTAINLY THE MATTERS THAT YOU REFER TO CAUSE US TO HAVE SOME SECOND THOUGHTS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YESTERDAY WHEN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ISSUED THEIR STATEMENT ON THE FIVE-POINT PEACE PLAN, WHICH THEY SUGGESTED WAS ALSO THEIR OWN PLAN, THEY TOOK PRESIDENT NIXON'S POINT FOUR ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, MADE IT POINT FIVE AND CONSIDERABLY REWORDED IT, AND SPOKE SPECIFICALLY ABOUT ELECTIONS. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THE DISPARITY, AND COULD YOU TELL US WHETHER THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STANDS PREPARED TO FIND A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, RATHER THAN ONE THAT WOULD REQUIRE ELECTIONS?

A I DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS A DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO STATEMENTS. THE PRESIDENT, IN HIS PROPOSAL, SET FORTH CERTAIN GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT WE THOUGHT SHOULD APPLY. THEY ARE NOT INCONCERNING WITH THE STATEMENT THAT PRESIDENT THIEU ISSUED.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR PRESIDENT THIEU AND HIS GOVERNMENT IN THE DAYS AHEAD MAKE SOME PROPOSALS AND HAVE SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT POLITICAL FUTURE.

WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

Q WOULD YOU HAVE ANY DIFFERENCES WITH PRESIDENT THIEU IN THE MATTER OF THE FIVE-POINT PLAN? OR WOULD YOU HAVE ANY DIFFERENCES WITH PRESIDENT THIEU IN THE MATTER OF THE FIVE-POINT PLAN?

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REASON OF THE CAMBODIAN INVASION HAS BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL, BECAUSE
THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SURVIVED - IT SEEMS TO BE MOVING
IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER - AND BECAUSE THE LEVEL OF COMBAT ACTIVITY
HAS DECREASED, THAT THEY MAY BE INCLINED TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE.
NOW, HOW THEY WOULD AGREE TO THAT, WE DON'T KNOW. IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT THE DECREASE WHICH IS QUITE OBVIOUS IN THE LAST
YEAR WOULD JUST CONTINUE. OR IT MIGHT BE THAT THEY WOULD
AGREE IN A PRIVATE MEETING OF SOME KIND.

IF YOU GO BACK AND LOOK AT THE AGREEMENT ON THE BOBBING
HALL AND TRY TO FIGURE OUT WHAT THE AGREEMENT WAS, I CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT IT IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO KNOW, BUT APPARENTLY THERE
WAS SOME KIND OF AN AGREEMENT.

WE WOULD HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD GIVE SOME INDICATION
THAT THEY AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL PROVIDED A
FOUNDATION FOR NEGOTIATION, AND THAT THEY WOULD ENTER
INTO TALKS LEADING TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD EXPECT
THAT THOSE TALKS PROBABLY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WOULD BE PRIVATE
TALKS - AND IF THEY ARE PRIVATE TALKS, WE HOPE THAT WE COULD
KEEP THEM PRIVATE.

NOW, WHAT THE TIME FRAME OF THAT IS APT TO BE, I AM NOT SURE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, MAY I ASK YOU THIS ON THE MIDDLE EAST?
GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS SAY THEY WILL NOT RETURN TO
THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT TAKING THE MISSILES OUT, AND THE
REPEATED DENIAL OF THE VIOLATIONS, WHAT DO YOU MEAN, WHAT DOES
THE UNITED STATES MEAN BY THE WORD "RECTIFICATION"?

A. WELL, "RECTIFICATION" MEANS A SITUATION WHICH WE WOULD
HOPE AN AGREEMENT WOULD SATISFY BOTH PARTIES, AND THEN
TO START NEGOTIATIONS. LAUGHTER

Q. AND YOU, MR. SECRETARY

A. YES, MR. SECRETARY.