

PRINCIPAL REPORTS

FROM COMMUNIST RADIO SOURCES

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PRB IV
WAR /
FILE / SUBJ.
DATE / SUB-CAT.
10/70

29 October 1970

***** S P E C I A L *****

U.S. VIETNAMIZATION-OF-THE-WAR PLAN WILL CERTAINLY BE DEFEATED

The following article from the October 26, 1970 issue of Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the official NVN Army newspaper, "by Chien Binh" (the by-line believed to express official DRV policy) reiterates the standard North Vietnamese attacks on Vietnamization. The major thrust of the article however is a discussion of Hanoi's expectations on the diplomatic front vis-a-vis the American political arena.

26 OCTOBER QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
ARTICLE BY CHIEN BINH: "THE U. S.
VIETNAMIZATION-OF-THE-WAR PLAN
WILL CERTAINLY BE DEFEATED"

[Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1115 GMT,
26 October 1970]

After being implemented for more than one year, the U. S. Vietnamization-of-the-war plan has experienced preliminary failures. In Nixon's hands, the difficulties of the war of aggression bequeathed by Johnson remain unsolved, and, in addition, new difficulties have been added. The factors of the failure of Nixon's new strategy have become more manifest. The Vietnamization-of-the-war plan will certainly be defeated completely because of the following four decisive factors:

Nixon can by no means change the balance of forces on the battlefield, which has been more and more disadvantageous to the Americans. U. S. military forces on the Vietnamese battlefield have been decreased more and more. Nixon cannot change that. Daily casualties, low combat spirit, and the reduction of troops strength, especially when 300,000 troops have been withdrawn, have greatly influenced the balance of forces on the battlefield. Nixon and his advisors have proposed many measures to avoid disadvantages, but these measures are either inefficient or are bad measures that have brought about more disadvantages than advantages to the Americans. The Americans have endeavored to increase the strength and improve the equipment of the puppet armies, along with using dollars as bait to motivate a number of satellite countries to contribute more mercenaries. On their U. S. masters' orders, Thieu, Ky, Khiem, and Lon Nol have actively carried out press-ganging activities and have gathered additional conscripts. However, no matter what their endeavors, the new recruits are unable to replace the increasing casualties and the withdrawing U. S. troops. Moreover, the fact that U. S. combat infantry troops have been forced

to withdraw also has dealt a heavy blow to the morale of the puppet troops and of the remaining U.S. troops. Desertions have soared among puppet troops, and the U.S. troops' combat spirit has suffered an obvious decline. Their discipline and morale have become so poor and have affected the combat efficiency of U.S. troops in Viet-Nam so seriously that many U.S. officers do not believe that they can send their soldiers to engage in fierce battles any more (AP 13 October 1970).

The Nixon clique has extended the war throughout Indochina, considering it a strategic measure to cause difficulties to its adversary. However, although it has the Lon Nol army at their disposal, the Americans have had to cope with a new enemy on a new front. Nixon's adventure has led to the unavoidable effect that the balance of forces is even more disadvantageous to the Americans from a twofold aspect: U.S. military forces have become more thinned out on a wider battlefield whereas the Americans' enemy possess additional, new resistance bases and the added strength of the entire Khmer people, who have risen in resistance.

The Americans have actively used air forces to harass the supply lines of the revolutionary forces in the hope of curtailing their supplies and of stopping their offensive. However, although U.S. air forces can cause certain difficulties to the enemy, certainly, they cannot curtail the supply lines. Even McNamara admitted that. The total failure of the U.S. war of destruction against North Viet-Nam clearly exposes the inefficiency of U.S. air forces.

At the start of the key phase of the Vietnamization-of-the-war plan, the balance of forces on the battlefield has become even more disadvantageous to the Americans, because of these noteworthy points: the Americans had to stop bombing, strafing, and harassing the North and to withdraw their combat infantry troops from South Viet-Nam; the Vietnamese people enjoy better conditions for fighting while developing their strength; and the three Indochinese peoples are fighting with militant solidarity and possess vast resistance bases that are linked together to form a very steadfast battle position.

The problem of victory or defeat in a war always depends on the balance of forces between the two sides on the battlefield. The Americans have resorted to every trick to assist the puppet troops and to create a position of strength. However, the balance of forces on the battlefield has become more and more disadvantageous to them. The balance of forces on the battlefield is not the same at all times, but it changes quantitatively at some times and qualitatively at other times. Because the U.S. troop strength has decreased in the key phase of the Vietnamization-of-the-war plan, the war will have a new development. It will reduce the combat ability of both U.S. and puppet troops on the battlefield.

Nixon cannot help the Saigon puppet government stand on its feet. In order to do this, it is necessary to have a consolidated and powerful puppet government, a steadfast political structure that links Saigon and the rural areas. According to Kissinger, Nixon's number one advisor, this is the only way for the Americans to follow in order to win in Viet-Nam. (Foreign Affairs Magazine, January 1969). This is also what Nixon aims at most ambitiously in his Vietnamization-of-the-war plan. However, this ambition is a questionable factor in the Americans' hoped-for victory and a most significant source of their defeat. Although the Americans have made all-out efforts to provide the Saigon puppet government with the appearance of national independence and a political prop having a broad social base, how can Nixon cover up the U.S.-puppet face of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique, which is composed of the professional country-sellers who have had to cling to their U.S. masters in all aspects--rice, salary, and weapons. Almost every week, Thieu has had to consult Bunker regarding both important and unimportant affairs. In case of important affairs, the President lackey has to meet the Ambassador master for instruction many times. In both their statements and acts, from the inflation of the piaster and the massacre of the people to whether or not Ky may visit the United States, the Vietnamese traitors have had to strictly obey U.S. orders. All military, political, economic, social, and diplomatic activities of the Saigon puppet administration are aimed at serving the U.S. aggressors.

Whether a government is stable or not will mainly depend on whether it is supported by the people or not. How can such cruel and reactionary traitors as Thieu, Ky, and Khiem win over the people's hearts in order to become stable. The Americans have endeavored to urge their henchmen to extend their social base in the hope of creating a broad political prop, but how can Nixon assemble and unite monopolist politicians when to divide and rule is the basic maneuver of the Americans' policy toward using their henchmen and when the competition for survival is the *raison d'etre* of the Vietnamese countrysellers.

The Americans have forced the puppet government to implement the pacification program, but the Americans' and their puppets' pacification measures have been the cruelest maneuvers which have offended the people the most and have more and more aggravated the contradictions between the people and the bondage machinery of the puppet government.

The Americans' and their puppets' governmental measures are creating the very factors that will topple the puppet administrative machinery. The more the Americans implement the Vietnamization-of-the-war plan and withdraw U.S. troops, the more the henchmen will become confused about their dark destiny.

The Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique is resorting to dictatorial and fascist maneuvers in the hope of saving its existence. This is a sign of the crisis and panic of the dominating clique. The more dictatorial it is, the more it will sustain internal contradictions and the more divided its forces will become. The more fascist it is, the more the intermediate strata will side with the revolutionary masses. The crueler it is, the deeper the people's hatred will become.

The Vietnamization plan, which Nixon believes will help the puppet administration stand firm on its feet, has actually quickly created favorable conditions for the South Vietnamese to constantly arise and to destroy the Saigon puppet administration. The French magazine "National Defense" in May 1970 wrote: "If fully implemented, the Vietnamization policy will lead to the collapse of South Viet Nam." Thus Nixon's strategy, by its nature, has frustrated the number 1 objective of the United States.

Nixon can never stabilize the situation in the United States. Recently after launching the so-called new peace initiative, Nixon noisily boasted that he has gained wide support in the United States, and that a united front has been formed in behalf of his initiative, according to UPI on 9 October. Can Nixon stabilize the political situation in the United States? No, he cannot do it through his boasting that the United States is going to achieve peace in Viet Nam, or that the war is going to end in Viet Nam, according to UPI on 8 October. In the beginning Nixon can fool a number of people, and can gain the sympathy of many U.S. Senators, but this is a temporary success. Trickery cannot have a long-term effect. Waves of protests have continued to rise against Nixon. Many U.S. papers have strongly criticized Nixon for clinging to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique and for refusing to withdraw all U.S. troops from South Viet-Nam. The newspaper "The World" on 10 October wrote: "Washington's proposal on Viet Nam is but a trick. Nixon has tried to avoid all statements about the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Viet-Nam." The New York Times newspaper on 10 October stated that Nixon's cease-fire proposal is obviously aimed at maintaining and strengthening the military posture of the United States and South Vietnamese --that is puppet--armed forces in South Viet-Nam. The "International Herald Tribune" newspaper on 13 October wrote: "A regrettable fact is that through Nixon's peace proposal people have the feeling that he is closely bound to the war. It is certain that the conflicts will continue to develop in Southeast Asia, and there will be no way out for the U.S. troops." In recent days, many U.S. people--in Burlington, New Jersey, and Columbus--staged demonstrations against Nixon and for the end of the aggressive war in Viet-Nam. The American people are also preparing for the 31 October, the day of action to demand the U.S. troops withdrawal from Indochina. Thus, however cunning he may be, Nixon cannot defuse the U.S. public opinion bomb, and this fuse is the U.S. imperialists aggressive war in Viet-Nam. Since, Nixon is not ending, but is continuing the war through his Vietnamization plan, therefore he can never defuse the public opinion bomb. Nixon is also facing great economic and social difficulties in the United States. As a result of the

the withdrawal of part of the U.S. forces from Viet-Nam, the war expenditures in Viet Nam have decreased, but very little. Nixon has not only gone through the second year of the Vietnamized war, but he is also enduring the disastrous consequences of the U.S. aggressive war which thus far has lasted 10 years. The total U.S. war expenditures in Vietnam had reached 13 billion U.S. dollars as of June 1970. If other expenditures that are connected with the war in Viet-Nam are included, this figure may amount to 300 billion U.S. dollars. This tremendous expenditure has seriously affected the U.S. economy, finance, and society. The economic recession is prolonged, and production is decreasing. Although the United States has boasted about its riches, its debts amount to 373 billion U.S. dollars or more. Inflation, the worst in the past 100 years, is bringing about disastrous consequences in many aspects. Prices have soared, and taxes have increased.

As the aggressive war in Viet-Nam is an unjust war, the Nixon clique cannot apply wartime measures to solve its economic, financial and social difficulties. The dissatisfaction of the various strata of U.S. people with the U.S. administration has become ever more serious. Series of struggle movements have cropped up demanding that the administration end the costly war--in human and material resources--in Viet-Nam. As a result of these economic and financial difficulties, Nixon has had to prolong the 10 percent income tax increase, to reduce education and public health budgets, and to indefinitely postpone the implementation of other social welfare programs.

In any war, the rear is a factor that constantly decides the victory. Nixon has prolonged a war of aggression that the U.S. people do not accept. Therefore, the U.S. rear has been the scene of insurmountable troubles and difficulties in all aspects--political, economic, and social--that have created a tremendous pressure that Nixon cannot counteract.

Nixon can never resist an enemy who is determined to fight and win. Nixon understands clearly that a war is not a matter of fighting without understanding the enemy. However, the most profound and most embracing mystery for Nixon in implementing the Vietnamization-of-the-war plan is to understand the enemy of the Americans. Although Nixon has covered up failures, has distorted truths, and has comforted himself with signs of the enemy's imaginary decline, Nixon cannot avoid seeing that in the past year or more, his Vietnamization-of-the-war plan has not developed in line with his expectations and has encountered preliminary, important failures. He has been constantly unable to understand the real capabilities and aims of his enemy. He has not known what his enemy

can do and will do in the future. In front of Nixon are the intelligent and valiant Vietnamese people, who possess fundamental strongpoints which the Americans cannot match. Kissinger himself has admitted: "Their strongpoint lies in the fact that they are fighting in the midst of their own people and on a familiar terrain." Then, how can Nixon expect to be able to change this truth, when he stated that the Vietnamization is to make the other side fight as an expeditionary force? Nixon is running against an enemy who is skilled in strategy, who has dealt the Americans repeated strategic blows, thus defeating right from the outset the U.S. counterattack strategy, who has upset the U.S. strategic posture by launching the Tri-Thien battle, who has smashed the U.S. war of destruction, and who has launched the great general offensive in early 1968, thus completely changing the war situation.

It is wondered how can Nixon prevent his shaken Vietnamization plan from being seriously upset. In the political and diplomatic fields, Nixon has coped with an enemy who is determined, calm, and clear-sighted. Being unable to fool or to intimidate this enemy, Nixon pins his hope on the enemy's difficulties in international relations. But with its anti-U.S. national salvation struggle beaming with justice, and with its correct revolutionary line and international policy Viet Nam is becoming the focus for the formation of a broad international front against the imperialist aggressors. The longer they fight the more victories the Vietnamese people will win, and the stronger and more effective support they will obtain from the USSR, China, the other brotherly socialist countries, and the progressive people worldwide including the American people. Nixon himself has admitted that he is coping with an enemy who is determined and capable of continuing the fight. The Vietnamese people have had an iron-hard determination and have acquired sufficient strength and conditions to fight for a long time until complete victory will be obtained.

We know the weakpoints, the strongpoints, and the deadlock of the Americans. We know how to create favorable conditions to win victories, and how to deepen the enemy's weakpoints, thus driving them into a situation in which the longer they fight the greater difficulties they will encounter and the more bitter defeats they will sustain. Like Johnson in the old days, Nixon, however cunning he may be, is now unable to cope with an enemy who is determined to fight and win and who

knows how to fight and win. This is the main factor which has shifted the balance of forces to the disadvantage of the Americans, driven the Saigon puppet administration to inevitable collapse, and caused the difficulties of the aggressors to pile up in the United States and the world. This is the factor deciding the inevitable failure of the Vietnamization strategy.

Viet-Nam defeated the Americans right at a time when the aggressive war reached the highest point in its Americanization. On the impetus of this victory, nothing can prevent the Vietnamese people from taking advantage of their victories to dash forward and to smash the Vietnamization-of-the-war plan of the Americans.