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<p>1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM</p> <p>2. SUBJECT: Activity Plan for 1971-1972 Prepared by the Commander of VC MR 3. (U)</p> <p>3. ISC NUMBER: A707.000 A748.200</p> <p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 1970</p> <p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 6 January 1971</p> <p>6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>R</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u></p> <p>7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT</p>	<p>8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 0266 71</p> <p>9. DATE OF REPORT: 10 March 1971</p> <p>10. NO. OF PAGES: 1</p> <p>11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1D, 1D1, 1D2, 1J</p> <p>12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)</p> <p>13. PREPARED BY: <i>Edward A. Felix</i> EDWARD A. FELIX, 1LT, MI CHIEF, PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC</p> <p>14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>George S. Lapinskes</i> GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC</p>
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15. SUMMARY: Leave Blank

(C) This report concerns a full translation of a J2, Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam study on the situation in VC Military Region 3 and an activity plan for 1971-1972 prepared by the commander of VC MR 3 and forwarded to HQ, SVNLA and Command Headquarters (in NVN). The document on which this study is based was captured by the 2nd Battalion, 33rd Regiment, 21st RVNAF Division on 6 January 1971 at VR880668 (Kien Giang Province). Interpretation of the document by J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, has not yet been fully correlated with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam interpretation as set forth in this study and may differ in some specific areas. This document is listed under CDEC Document Control Number 1563.

APO 4002, 16 Feb 71

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

COMMUNIST DOCUMENT

NATIONAL DEFENSE MINISTRY

ANALYSIS REPORT

J2/JGS/RVNAF

No. 017/71

PRIORITY

No. 240/TTM/2/TT204

I. SUBJECT: Information obtained from a report on the situation in VC MR 3 and an activity plan for 1971-1972 prepared by the commander of VC MR 3 and forwarded to HQ, SVNLA and Command Headquarters (in NVN).

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

This document was captured by the 2nd Battalion, 33rd Regiment, 21st RVNAF Division on 6 Jan 71, at VR880668 (during an operation in U Minh) and was received at CDEC on 5 Feb 71.

III. CONTENTS:

The document consists of a 15-page message (undated), typewritten, prepared by Nam (aka Sau Nam or ((VC)) Senior Colonel Hoang Duc Anh, Commander of VC MR 3) and addressed to Muoi Khang (aka ((VC)) Lt General Hoang Van Thai, Commander of R ((HQ, SVNLA))) plus one copy addressed to C ((possibly Command Headquarters in NVN)). The document contains a report on the situation and a 1971 activity plan for VC MR 3. From exploitation of this document, the following information was ascertained:

A. Assessment of the general situation in VC MR 3:

1. Organizational and personnel losses in infrastructure installations.

The first part of the message contains an assessment of RVNAF military and political activities, and special pacification and Phuong Hoang programs, revealing that the Communists in VC MR 3 have sustained heavy losses. In the first 15 days of Jul 70, 310 hamlet and village guerrillas of Nam Can and Dam Doi Districts and approximately 100 others of Khanh Binh Tay Village were killed or captured.

Encountering difficulties (in the political field), the Communists in VC MR 3 have recognized that "by checking the records of our ((VC)) personnel in Can Tho Province, we learned that the majority of our cadre, from province Party Committee members to ((ordinary)) Party members, had relatives in the RVN army," and that, "from Jul to Sep 70, the enemy ((RVNAF)) seized portions of Ca Mau, U Minh, and penetration bases in provinces... ((sic)). The present strong point of the enemy is his capability to coordinate and develop pacification activities simultaneously in various areas to support the Vietnamization program. Therefore, everyone is required to smash all enemy schemes by combining forces. It is regrettable, however, that our efforts in ((VC)) MR 3 did not meet the requirements set by our ((VC)) leaders."

2. Casualties of main force units in VC MR 3:

This report disclosed that the combat capabilities of main force units in VC MR 3 were adversely affected because they received no replacements and their strength had been greatly reduced. For instance, from Jun 69 to Sep 70, E273 (273rd Regiment) received no replacements. When K10 (aka 95A Sapper Regiment) first arrived in VC MR 3, each of its battalions had 250 men. At present, each one has 180 men. During two months of the summer of 1970, the strength of D303 Battalion (303rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, VC MR 3) decreased from 150 to 88.

((Page 2 of O.T.))

3. Situation of political, guerrilla, and local forces in VC MR 3:

The message also indicated that the development of guerrilla forces in VC MR 3 was slow and replacements for local force units were poor combatants. At present, from the total 3,100 hamlets, ((VC)) Military Region 3 has 7,000 hamlet guerrillas (on the average, each hamlet has about two hamlet guerrillas), 2,230 hamlet unit cadre, 700 secret guerrillas, and 4,000 village guerrillas. The combat strength of the district and city units is 2,200 to 2,250 and that of the province units is 2,500 to 2,700. On the average, the combat strength of each district was one platoon and that of each province was one combat company and one combat support company.

In addition, according to statistical reports of the Communists in VC MR 3 in Jun 70, there were about 149,000 Farmers' Association members, 88,300 Women's Association members, and 15,000 Youth Group members. Concerning political forces, the document disclosed that there were 80 ((Labor Union)) members, 136 Women's ((Association members)), 35 Students' ((Association members)), and 42 secret guerrillas.

4. Morale and ideology levels of VC cadre and soldiers in VC MR 3:

Since successive attacks were intense and casualties increased, VC cadre and soldiers displayed an unstable morale. Shirking attitudes, pleasure seeking, and fear of protracted war and hardships prevailed among local forces and various civilian Party branches in provinces, districts and villages. Others willfully wounded themselves or committed suicide. In Cần Thơ Province, one fourth of the Party Committee members at province and district levels displayed shirking and pleasure seeking attitudes, including one province Party Committee secretary, three district Party Committee secretaries, one battalion commander, and two district unit leaders. In addition to these demoralized cadre, the remainder displayed the following shortcomings:

Subjectivism, conservatism, and authoritarianism. For example, "A number of high ranking cadre from VC MR 3 persisted in requesting main force units to liberate major parts of Chuông Thiện and Cần Thơ Provinces and disagreed with the primary plan of destroying the enemy to enlarge the areas of influence, especially in Cà Mau where we ((VC)) had favorable conditions. Consequently, villages and hamlets in Cần Thơ and Chuông Thiện Provinces were not liberated, and Cà Mau was occupied by the enemy. It was too late when we realized what had happened and were forced to disperse our troops for reinforcements, thus losing the offensive positions."

As for military leadership, the situation was not accurately assessed; the adoption of combat guidelines was imperfect; discipline was loose; orders and directives were often poorly executed; and the coordination of the three types of troops in the region, as well as on each battlefield, was not consistent.

Most cadre and soldiers did not understand the concepts of "short-term and long-term" ((meaning to wage a protracted war to gain victory in a short time)) or the "three-pronged attack" tactic. They paid attention only to military attacks to gain victory in a short time.

B. Future Activity Plan of VC MR 3:

1. Development of military and political forces:

Efforts should be made to step up the political movement, build up political forces, and strengthen the people's guerrilla warfare movement. Increase concentrated attacks to destroy enemy forces and war facilities. Disrupt the ((RVN)) People's Self-Defense Force organization to expand

((Page 3 of O.T.))

control. Consolidate and develop all forces. Build up base areas to gradually shift the balance of forces to create the conditions necessary for the liberation of the majority of key agencies in rural areas.

2. Theater of operations:

In the military field, according to the recommendation of Sau Nam (Commander of VC MR 3) sent to Mídi Khang (Commander of R), the military region will be divided into many areas of operation as follows:

a. The area from north of the Cái Lớn River through Phước Long ((District)), Ca Mau Province, and both upper and lower U Minh ((Forest)):

Sau Nam stated that this area is the main theater of operations which will "attract many RVNAF units" for destruction. The Communist units will destroy RVNAF battalions, task forces, and regiments. They planned to eliminate Regional and Popular Force units, destroy GVN administrative agencies in rural areas, expand ((VC)) liberated areas, and consolidate bases in local areas to seize control of other areas.

b. The area from north of the Cái Lớn River through Vĩnh Long and Tra Vinh Provinces:

In this area, VC MR 3 planned to step up guerrilla warfare movements, conduct "small but frequent" attacks, seize control of the area and hamlets to prepare conditions for the expansion of ((VC)) controlled areas, and work out flexible activity plans to launch attacks under favorable conditions. Besides local forces of various provinces and districts, E1 and E3 (1st and 3rd Regiments of VC MR 3) are permanently stationed in this area with regional service branches for support. Sometimes, to reinforce friendly forces, E2 and E10 (aka 273rd Regiment and 95A Sapper Regiment) conducted attacks in this area.

c. VC MR 3 request to R for replacements and reinforcements:

Considering the present level of leadership, Sau Nam stated that it will take years for the Communists in VC MR 3 to favorably change the situation on the battlefield. To be successful, R must continually provide replacements and reinforcements for main force regiments in VC MR 3. During 1971, there will be requests for 2,000 replacements and 1,500 in 1972. Approximately 200 tons of weapons and ammunition are projected to be requested each year.

1. Efforts should first be made to halt ((RVN)) operations and destroy Special Forces units to create conditions favorable for developing armed and political forces in local areas. These forces will coordinate with sapper units and military proselyting activities in attacking ((RVN)) posts.

In addition, Sau Nam reported to Múdi Khang (of R) that he was making preparations for a raid of superior force to terrorize the RVNAF troops before conducting attacks on various areas to overrun important targets and force RVNAF garrison troops to surrender.

2. Experiences from attacks against RVNAF operational units:

Mobilize all village and hamlet forces, ((all personnel)) of agencies and bases, and concentrated units to conduct large-scale guerrilla activities to create conditions favorable for eliminating ((RVN)) pacification and land encroachment support units.

((Page 4 of O.T.))

Conduct sustained attacks to heavily damage the "combined command posts of RVNAF operational forces."

3. Experiences on "establishment of penetration areas":

Sau Nam added that, in this situation, if main force units are committed to populated areas to expand control, it is not certain that they can occupy a large area, but only perpetrate "violent attacks to confuse the existing ((political)) movement." Therefore, when conducting an attack to occupy a small or large area, make the best use of in-place political and armed forces and district and province units. If necessary, a well trained element from a main force unit may reinforce the above forces. The major element of the main force unit must attack from an advantageous direction to restrict the activities of the RVNAF units, thus enabling friendly units to establish penetration bases.

However, the document also discloses that a majority of high ranking cadre in VC MR 3 planned to transfer main force units to Cần Thơ and Chương Thiện Provinces, and divide them into D's ((battalions)) and C's ((companies)) to conduct counterpacification activities and establish penetration bases. Sau Nam protested **against this plan.**

IV. CDEC COMMENTS:

1. This is a significant document. It contains a military plan and reveals tactics adopted by the Communists for use in VC MR 3 specifically, and throughout the Mekong Delta at present and in the future.

2. The activity plan, prepared by Sau Nam (Commander of VC MR 3), will affect the activity plans of all Communist forces in VC MR 3. He planned to gradually occupy small areas and opposed the tactic of "conducting violent and large-scale attacks" which the military staff cadre supported.

3. According to the document, An Xuyên Province will be the main theater of ((VC)) operations. This is altogether possible, because R is recorded as having the same plan.

The presence of the 273rd Regiment and the 95A Sapper Regiment, and the redeployment of 18B Regiment to this area are evidence that they are prepared to engage in combat on this battlefield. The **NT1** ((N^ong Tr^uo^ong 1)) Division was also involved in the activity plan of VC MR 3.

4. This may be a plan **by** the Communists to encroach upon rural areas and seize control of the population throughout the SVN battlefield, especially in the **Mekong** Delta.

For General Cao Van Vien
Chief of JGS/RVNAF
For Lt. General Nguyen Van Manh
Chief of Staff/JGS
Colonel, Chief of J2/JGS

((Signed and sealed))

((Distribution))

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