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15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents and concerns an activity plan and an organization chart. The activity plan, dated 15 November 1970, signed by Duong Ngoc Tan, Chief of Section 2 ((possibly Military Intelligence Section, Military Staff, VC Military Region 7)), pertains to the organization of the Military Intelligence Section. The organization chart, dated November 1970, prepared ((possibly by Duong Ngoc Tan, Chief of the Military Intelligence Section, VC Military Region 7)), reveals that Section 2 was composed of the Administrative Section, the ((Technical)) Reconnaissance Signal Unit, and the Transmitter Signal Unit.

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13.03

ACTIVITY PLAN

To be implemented in Nov and Dec 70

I. MISSIONS:

1. Collect information on enemy general activities to support our leadership requirements, control all activities of our ((VC)) armed forces on the frontline as well as those of the local and main force in T ((possibly T7, aka VC Military Region 7)), and protect steering agencies in the rear.

2. Be ready to organize compact ((intelligence)) elements with sufficient personnel and dispatch them to operate in various areas according to directives of higher echelon unit commanders in order to satisfy immediate requirements of common leadership and control combat activities on the frontline.

3. Provide guidance to collect and exploit information on enemy activities according to the direct chain of command as follows:

Follow up enemy military intelligence organizations and espionage activities in villages and districts as well as urge and guide the ((intelligence)) branch to make preliminary reports on ((intelligence activities)) during 1970.

4. Recruit more ((intelligence)) agents and improve their professional skills to broadly develop Section 2 of T ((possibly Military Intelligence Section, Military Staff, VC Military Region 7)). Particular attention must be paid to further developing the technical reconnaissance unit and train six additional short-wave radio operators and two ultra short-wave radio operators.

5. Temporarily postpone the training of technical reconnaissance signal agents for local areas in order to limit and maintain our secret method of exploiting Puppet information through ultra short-wave radios in accordance with the requirements of the new situation.

II. GUIDELINES AND OPERATING METHODS:

A. Guidelines: Specific activities to be conducted in areas bordering cities and weak areas should be considered the major tasks of T and subordinate local areas. On this basis, activity plans and operating procedures of each branch should be appropriately worked out in accordance with mission requirements.

B. Operating Methods: Strictly observe the compartmentalization principle and secure as much information with credible and valuable contents as possible.

Utilization of operating methods:

1. Exploit information from legal agency networks ((meaning personnel having GVN legal status)) and enemy documents.

2. Exploit technical information ((possibly meaning information obtained from radio transmissions)) with various means.

3. Collect information from reports of local areas and units.

### III. ORGANIZATIONAL METHODS:

1. Technical reconnaissance unit: The primary mission of the technical reconnaissance unit is to collect information from enemy local units operating in the 33rd ((RVNAF)) Tactical Zone as well as in part of the 32nd ((RVNAF Tactical Zone)) (Gia Định Sector), and from enemy general reserve forces.

2. In-place (intelligence) cadre: One in-place (intelligence) cadre operating in Hưng Nghĩa springboard ((VC term for a controlled area used to obtain access to uncontrolled areas)) should coordinate with UI ((possibly Biên Hòa City Unit)) to collect information on the enemy ((Biên Hòa)) airfield, the Long Bình area, Biên Hòa City, and

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enemy pacification elements stationed in the local ((RVN)) pacification pilot areas such as Hưng Lộc. One reconnaissance cadre should take charge of the communication and liaison between the Military Intelligence Section of T and UI according to the military intelligence channel. Another in-place (intelligence) cadre should be trained to operate between Military Intelligence Section ((of T)) and ((its subordinate intelligence agencies)) and to collect information concerning sudden events from hamlets surrounding base areas.

3. Staff assistants ((possibly for military intelligence)) may be sent to operate in local units or follow those compact ((possibly technical reconnaissance)) elements on short-term missions.

#### 4. Radio ((equipment)):

a. One transceiver radio

b. One transceiver radio with a hand-cranked generator, which may be placed in either of the following areas:

Main liaison station of T.

Bình Lộc and Định Quán areas near Kilometer Stones 110 and 112 in the Định Quán area.

These two areas may, on request, ((also be provided with the following signal equipment)):

c. One "main" radio with a transmitter in good condition and an unserviceable receiver. The radio was previously taken by the Bà Rịa Province Unit for exchange.

### IV. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AMONG SECTIONS AT VARIOUS LEVELS:

1. UI: In addition to the utilization of radio means, UI should use its legal communication-liaison network to report to the Military Intelligence Section of T in accordance with the prescribed regulations.

2. Ba Ria: Ba Ria has successfully organized its communication-liaison network like that of UI.

3. Sub-Region 4: Sub-Region 4 failed to establish radio and legal communication-liaison networks.

4. The transmission of information from subordinate agencies to T should be conducted on the 10th, 20th, and 30th of each month as prescribed.

Due to the above coordinated organization, communication between various areas and T can be maintained in accordance with the prescribed time schedule.

Date and month ((blank in O.T.)) 1970

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Activity plan in the dry season and organization chart ((of the Military Intelligence Section)).

#### Plan 1


During Nov and Dec 70, consolidate the ((Military Intelligence Section)), and focus efforts on collecting information in support of leadership.

#### Missions:

Concentrate efforts to collect and exploit information in order to ensure effective leadership of the frontline and protect local agencies.

Conduct training to improve professional skills of staff assistants of ((Military Intelligence)) Sections; and heighten the functions and responsibilities of the technical reconnaissance, signal, and crypto detachments.

Stock food provisions and materials for at least two months use.



## Plan 2

Plans and missions in Jan 71.

1. Be ready to organize one compact element to serve the leadership of the frontline in a short period of time.

Technical reconnaissance unit: Three ((persons))

Radio operator: One

Section ((possibly Section 2)): One agent in charge of the enemy situation, one staff assistant for military intelligence, one chief of Section 2, and two signal agents.

2. The plan must be completed during Dec 70 according to the higher echelon's directives.

3. Liaison procedures and missions are the same as those in Plan 1.

## Plan 3

According to the directive in unexpected situations.

1. Assign one cadre of the mobile ((signal)) element to collaborate with other cadre in the direct chain of command.

2. Sub-Section 2 of local areas and units are responsible for using ((signal)) facilities and the intelligence agency network.

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3. As directed, it is possible to use an additional radio set in addition to the main reserve one.

It is requested that sufficient food provisions, materials, and ((signal)) facilities be issued and troops be provided as reinforcements for the technical reconnaissance unit.

Date, Month, Year ((blank))

(Attached is a plan for reorganization of the technical reconnaissance unit and its execution.)

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### Suggestion.

Based on the requirements and activities of various elements and to meet the requirement of the long-range task, we put forth the following suggestions:

#### A. Organization:

1. Assignment of two assistant section chiefs:

One assistant section chief or assistant for material supply of a section at C ((possibly company)) level must be assigned to assume internal ((security)) activities and settle the material expenditures of the branch.

One assistant section chief is to be assigned to take charge of military intelligence and reconnaissance to replace Comrade Nê who has many problems with the Party organization and who, according to a message from Phong 2R ((possibly the Intelligence Staff, COSVN)), signed in Mar 70 by Comrade Bích, will have to be removed from the branch and reassigned to a local area.

2. In compliance with the criteria for assignment of personnel, comrade Lũng, Battalion Executive officer, is to be reassigned to the technical reconnaissance unit as commanding officer so that he can resume his ((specialized)) task.

3. Two comrades at C level are to be assigned to Section 2 as assistants in charge of intelligence studies and reports. We believe that Comrade Lâm Xuân Thao, military intelligence cell leader of Xuân Lộc District, is qualified for these tasks.

4. Five to six short-wave radio operators and two ultra short-wave radio operators, to monitor US radio transmissions, are to be assigned ((to Section 2)). Personnel of the short-wave radio station in Sub-Region 4 may be assigned to other areas because if they remain in that sub-region they will not have the conditions to develop their capabilities. If Phong ((possibly Intelligence Staff)) and the Headquarters ((possibly of COSVN)) approve our request for additional personnel, we will withdraw personnel from various local areas or employ cadre's sons and brothers (males and females) in accordance with the prescribed requirements and procedures.

5. We also request that Comrade Quang of the Map ((sub-section)) be sent to the crypto ((section)) for improvement because his capability is poor and the crypto section is short of personnel qualified for on-the-job training.

6. ((We will send some of our personnel)) along with recruit trainees to the military intelligence or technical reconnaissance courses of COSVN if they are organized.

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7. Two male mess attendants are to be assigned to the technical reconnaissance unit and signal unit and one female mess attendant is to be assigned to the ((military intelligence)) section which is now in urgent need of personnel.

8. Two communication-liaison agents must be assigned ((to the military intelligence)) as reinforcements.

B. Regulations on subsistence allowances:

1. Technical reconnaissance unit: It is requested that each member of the night shift be given 24 kilograms ((possibly of rice)) and a sum of 1,500\$ to 2,000\$ ((possibly SWN)) per month as subsistence allowance.

2. Signal unit: Station chiefs and operators are to be given 24 kilograms ((possibly of rice)) and a sum of 700\$ to 1,000\$ per month as subsistence allowance.

3. ((Intelligence)) study, crypto, and communication-liaison cells: Each member is to be given 24 kilograms ((possibly of rice)) and from 1,000\$ to 1,500\$ per month as subsistence allowance.

In short, with the present difficulties of T, allowances for its personnel must be given mainly in goods.

15 Nov 70  
Chief of Section 2  
/S/ Dương Ngọc Tân

Roster ((lined out in O.T.))

PRESENT ORGANIZATION CHART AS OF NOV 70

((Possibly Military Intelligence Section, Military Staff, VC Military Region 7))

TECHNICAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT.

Order number ((1))	Position ((2))	Total ((3))	Order number ((1))	Position ((2))	Total ((3))	Order number ((1))	Position ((2))	Total ((3))
1	Section chief	1	1	Unit command committee	2	1	Radio station chief	2
2	Assistant section chief	2	2	Short-wave radio operator	4	2	Radio operator	1
3	Staff assistant for enemy situation	2	3	Transmitter radio personnel	3	3	Hand cranked generator operator	9
4	Staff assistant for reconnaissance and military intelligence	2	4	Ultra short-wave radio operators monitoring US ((radio transmissions))	2		((Total:))	12
5	Staff assistant for communication	1		Ultra short-wave radio operators monitoring Thai ((radio transmissions))	1			((personnel))
6	Communication personnel	1	5	Ultra short-wave radio operators monitoring Puppet ((radio transmissions))	4			
7	Liaison personnel	1		((Total:))	16			
8	Orderly personnel	1						
9	Medic	2						
10	Administrative specialist	1		28				
11	Technical supply personnel	1		18				
12	Cartographer	1		46				
13	Crypto personnel	2						
	((Total))	18						

Order number ((1))	Position ((2))	Total ((3))
1	Radio station chief	2
2	Radio operator	1
3	Hand cranked generator operator	9
	((Total:))	12

Section 2

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graph TD
    S2[Section 2] --- TRU[Technical Reconnaissance unit]
    S2 --- TSU[Transmitter signal unit]
    TRU --- TRU_BOX[ ]
    TSU --- TSU_BOX[ ]
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    style TSU_BOX fill:none,stroke:none
    
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Order number	Position	Quantity ((total))	Weapon
1	Section chief	1	1 K-54 ((pistol))

Equipment and weapons

18

Section

Position	Quantity	Equipment	Weapons	Order number	Position	Quantity	Equipment	Weapons
((Radio)) station chief	2	Two sets of 15 volt ((batteries))	AK ((assault rifle))	1	Unit command committee	1	4 PRC-25 ((radio sets))	AK
Radio operator	1	One ((one word illegible)) of the radio receiver is unserviceable	K-54 ((pistol))	2	Maintenance personnel	1		
Hand cranked generator operator	9		30 ((possibly Garand))	2	Short-wave radio ((minitor))	4	Sony ((radio))	K-54
					Transmitter radio personnel	3	1 Standard ((radio))	30 .
					Ultra short-wave radio operators monitoring US ((radio transmissions))	2		
					Ultra short-wave radio operators monitoring Thai ((radio transmissions))	1		
					((Ultra short-wave radio operators monitoring Puppet radio transmissions))	4		
	12 ((personnel))					18 ((personnel)) ((sic))		

Suggestion: ((Blank))

-END OF TRANSLATION-