

# AIRGRAM

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1		
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NEA	CM	INR
		6
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
		15
	FM	
	2	
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	16	10
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
		IVSC
		6

A-296

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

E. O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PINT, VS

INFO: American Consulates General BIEN HOA, CAN THO, DANANG,  
NHA TRANG; CINCPAC; USDEL JEC PARIS

FROM : American Embassy SAIGON

DATE: December 26, 1973

SUBJECT: Father Chan Tin's View of "Political Prisoners": A Case  
Study of Militancy Overriding Objectivity

REF :

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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1. SUMMARY: Several months ago, anti-GVN Catholic activist Father Chan Tin gave the Embassy a copy of a recent study listing 202,000 "political prisoners" allegedly held by the GVN as of June 1, 1973. The list contained some details about where these people were supposedly being detained. It differed markedly from both the GVN's claims and the standard estimates then used by the Embassy. Although we were reasonably confident that our estimates were valid, we nevertheless re-checked them in the light of his statistics. The Mission conducted an exhaustive survey, utilizing all available sources. It conclusively refutes the widely-spread charge, echoed by Father Chan Tin, that GVN jails harbor "200,000 political prisoners."

2. The Mission survey leads to the firm conclusion that the total prison and detention population in South Vietnam in the July-August period (the time frame of our check) was around 35,000. This figure comprises civilian prisoners of all types, not just "political prisoners" however defined. END SUMMARY.

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ENCLOSURES:

- Enclosure 1 - Father Chan Tin's Table of Political Prisoners held by GVN
- Enclosure 2 - Comparison of Tin, GVN, and Standard US Estimates
- Enclosure 3 - U. S. Mission Survey

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

In  Out

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UNCLASSIFIED Page 2

3. The reporting officer called last July 27 on Father Chan Tin, the well-known Redemptorist priest whose anti-government activism has kept him in steady trouble with the GVN (although he himself has remained out of jail and free to voice his criticisms). This year he has been attacking the government on the civilian prisoner issue, and official spokesman Bui Bao Truc has returned the compliment with a series of hard-hitting references to Chan Tin in several GVN press briefings.

4. Chan Tin gave the reporting officer a copy of a two-volume paperbound work (Vietnamese language) titled "Political Prisoners in South Vietnam After the Signing of the Paris Agreement," published a short while earlier by the Committee Campaigning for the Improvement of Prison Conditions in South Vietnam, which he heads. A key part of the report, and the only one that he stressed in his conversation with the reporting officer, was a table showing the alleged "political prisoner" population in South Vietnam as of June 1, 1973. The total figure given is 202,000. This table is reproduced in slightly altered format as Enclosure 1.

#### Chan Tin's Comments on His Figures

5. In discussing his statistics, Chan Tin provided the following explanations and comments:

A. Common criminals are excluded from his table, which comprises solely what he called "political prisoners." Thus, the total prison population is larger than 202,000. In an attempt to demonstrate his objectivity in this regard, Chan Tin noted that his "political prisoner" total for Con Son (8,200) was smaller than the GVN's claimed capacity (9,614) and occupancy (9,898) for that facility as most recently published.

B. Asked to define his category of "political prisoners," he said it includes Communist detainees. (In this respect his definition is significantly broader than that used by some other anti-GVN critics.) He broke the category down into the following rough percentages:

Those arrested "for no reason"	60%
Those arrested for what Chan Tin termed non-Communist dissidence	25%
Those arrested for "Communist activities"	15%
	<u>100%</u>

About half of the 60% arrested "for no reason", he said, have absolutely no inkling of why they are in jail. The other half may have some idea, but he believed the reason is not defensible. The 25% which he listed as dissidents are those he viewed as non-Communist activists arrested on "security" charges, and "they know why they are in prison."

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C. Pointing to the zero total under POW camps on his list, Chan Tin claimed that this too proved his objectivity. He exhibited some skepticism, however, that these camps are really empty.

D. The reporting officer expressed surprise at his inclusion of GVN military prisons, stating that these are presumably just for soldiers under military discipline. Chan Tin replied that many persons are in these jails for political reasons. Then, curiously backing off, he said that the total is only 12,000 and so their inclusion or exclusion makes little difference.

E. Chan Tin stressed particularly his statistics for district and village jails and police interrogation centers. He admitted these were estimates but each one came from "a person who is well informed" about the place. Acknowledging that the police centers have a high turnover, he insisted that one must nevertheless take their occupancy figures at any given moment as part of the total picture. He cautioned against using capacity figures (for these as well as other jails), since GVN cells are often extremely overcrowded.

#### Chan Tin's Estimates Compared to Others

6. Chan Tin's list is the most ambitious effort we have seen documenting the oft-repeated charge that the GVN holds "hundreds of thousands of political prisoners." The figure mentioned most frequently is 200,000, which by coincidence or otherwise is virtually what Chan Tin asserts. The chief importance of his list, in fact, is the boost it gives to the credibility of this statistic in some quarters, including influential circles in the United States. Senator Abourezk inserted Chan Tin's table in the Congressional Record last September 18 (S16787).

7. The only other major attempt we have seen to justify the 200,000 figure in detail appeared in a "white book" published last June by opposition Deputy Ho Ngoc Nhuan. However, there is very little coincidence between Nhuan's breakdown and Chan Tin's. Nhuan went into far less detail, gave significantly larger occupancy figures for the major prisons, and skimmed lightly over the smaller jails with roughly estimated averages. He included Phu Quoc among the big prisons with a figure of 40,000 occupants, thereby damaging his credibility from the start. Phu Quoc, designed in any case for POW's exclusively, is now reliably reported to be empty. Chan Tin avoided this trap and therefore, to this extent at least, must be taken more seriously.

8. Naturally, Chan Tin's figures differ markedly from the GVN's public claims. They also are far from the Embassy's standard estimates going back several years, which have agreed roughly but not wholly with the GVN pronouncements. Enclosure 2 highlights these differences. Comparison is difficult, not only because Chan Tin mentions just "political prisoners" but also because he groups the prison and detention systems in an individualistic way. In Enclosure 2 his grouping has been altered by the reporting officer so that similar categories can be roughly compared side by side. The GVN figures are based on two booklets about civilian prisoners

published this year by the Information Commission. The first of these booklets came out in July; the second was an improved version appearing in November (see Saigon A-146 and Saigon A-281).

9. Although major discrepancies exist in more than one of the categories in Enclosure 2, by far the biggest problem concerns police detention centers and jails below the provincial level. The GVN's July booklet says that jails do not exist below the province level, while the November revision acknowledges an unstated number of facilities where people are held for up to five days. The Mission has included in its estimates of the total number of prisoners of all types held by the GVN a fluctuating total of several thousand being temporarily housed in local lock-ups at various levels down to the villages. We have estimated the capacity of these local lock-ups at about 15,000. Chan Tin adds up local detention facilities around the country and arrives at a total of 101,800 "political prisoners" being held in them, or just over half his claimed total. The other half he places in regular civilian and military prisons.

#### Uncertainties of the Standard Embassy Estimates

10. Based on the extensive knowledge that the US Mission had of the GVN prison system until recently through its Public Safety Advisors, we have been confident that the charge of 200,000 GVN-held "political prisoners" is a gross exaggeration. We estimated the total capacity of the GVN correction and detention systems, including all civilian jails from the national prisons down to the local police lockups, at 51,941 on December 31, 1972. Thus, the figure 200,000 is on the face of it physically impossible. As Enclosure 2 shows, the total occupancy figure on the same date added up to 43,717. This figure includes all categories of civilians held on that date. Since then, the number of prisoners has declined significantly, due to the release of thousands of prisoners on such occasions as Tet and Buddha's Birthday. The 1973 releases of Communist offenders in exchanges with the other side have also reduced the number.

11. However, we have always been aware of the possibility of soft spots in our analysis, although we have consistently believed they do not undermine the validity of our estimates. Since these areas have created some uncertainties, we think the chief vulnerabilities should be explicitly outlined, as follows:

A. Our 1972 end-of-year figures are based on statistics given to our Public Safety Advisors by the GVN. Such statistics were supplied periodically. Even though they were in-house figures, it is conceivable that the GVN's reporting system going up the line from local officials to the central statistics bureau was imperfect. However, no reliable source available to the Mission ever contradicted the general picture presented to the Advisors, who were themselves in a good position to check.

B. Occupancy can, and frequently does, exceed capacity. In short, as Chan Tin pointed out, the prisons are often overcrowded. This casts some doubt on our use of capacity figures as a yardstick. However, the GVN in recent years has

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Page 5

increased its prison capacity significantly to meet the overcrowding problem. Since 1970 at least, the occupancy of the system as a whole has seldom if ever exceeded its total capacity. Even assuming the worst case, it is obviously not credible that a figure in the "hundreds of thousands" would be approached.

C. Our figures have excluded the military prisons, which are designed for AWOL soldiers, etc., and therefore would appear irrelevant to any discussion of civilian prisoners. Yet it may be contended that some civilians are tucked away in military jails, unaccounted for by the system. The number of people considered subject to military discipline adds to this possibility. There is also the problem of deserters -- how do you classify a draftee who deserts the field of battle for political reasons and finds himself in the brig? Chan Tin would doubtless call him a civilian "political prisoner", but the GVN, as every other State including our own, would consider that he broke his oath and the law and classify him accordingly. A further complication is that some military offenders are held in civilian prisons, thus mixing the two categories. But this, if anything, makes the total we have used for civilian prison occupancy look worse than necessary. The errors therefore may cancel each other out. In any case, we judge that any uncertainty created by this factor does not invalidate the general estimates. It is noteworthy that Chan Tin's figure for this category comes to just 12,000, and he did not insist on it in talking to the reporting officer.

D. The police detention system and particularly the provincial interrogation centers have been something of a blind spot in our assessment. It is less easy to follow what the GVN is doing in some of these places than in the national or provincial prisons, and accordingly we must acknowledge some softness in the Embassy's usual occupancy estimates for them. But again, we have been confident that our Public Safety Advisors were aware of the general picture in the detention centers, if not always of the details. They could have picked up any major discrepancies in what their GVN counterparts said about the numbers detained there, particularly since other sources available to the Mission could verify the matter.

#### The New Embassy Survey

12. In general, therefore, we have been confident that our standard estimates are valid. However, our knowledge of the prison and detention system cannot be perfect, and Chan Tin came up with new claims in his list. Accordingly, the Mission decided in August to recheck its estimates in the light of Chan Tin's allegations, utilizing all Mission resources. The results appear in Enclosure 3. They show prisoners held as of July 24, 1973 (or August 22, 1973, in the case of interrogation centers). Where Chan Tin's list cites a figure that can be compared with a Mission finding, his figure is adjacent, in parentheses.

13. The sources of our information are GVN records meant for internal use, i. e., what the GVN is telling itself on this subject. The figures are at least as good as our previous ones obtained by the Public Safety Advisors; and, given the concentrated effort behind the survey, they are probably better.

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14. The results show clearly that Chan Tin's statistics are inflated. In nearly all cases, his number of "political prisoners" is higher than the total occupancy. This is true even for Con Son, which he cited as an example of his moderation. (However, Con Son's occupancy seems to have dropped over the past few months, due perhaps to the post-ceasefire release programs.) The only place where Chan Tin gives a figure lower than the Mission's is Chi Hoa, a major prison where even Chan Tin apparently concedes there are many common criminals.

15. The most dramatic discrepancies concern the provincial prisons and the detention-interrogation system. Chan Tin says there are 37 provincial prisons, and he lists eight other "big prisons" individually in the provinces. He claims these all held 73,000 persons last June 1. In reality, only 35 of the former 37 provincial prisons are now operating. They held 14,291 prisoners on July 24. Not only does Chan Tin have outdated information on the number but he evidently double-counts the eight "big prisons." As for the detention-interrogation centers, Chan Tin puts 68,000 persons in district and village jails and 33,800 in specified interrogation centers. Our sources support the GVN's July claim that there are no district or village jails, and they enumerate exactly 314 persons in nine interrogation centers in the Saigon area on August 22 -- facilities where Chan Tin alleges there were 5,300 detainees last June. While these centers do have fluctuating occupancy rates, nothing can account for this discrepancy except sheer error on Chan Tin's part. Most of these places have capacity figures that don't approach his levels.

16. We can confidently estimate the capacities of many of the interrogation facilities outside of Saigon, and the maximum levels invariably fall below Chan Tin's claimed occupancies. The Quang Ngai Center, for instance, can hold no more than 300 detainees, and the Qui Nhon Center can accommodate just 1,000. According to reliable reports, both are now largely empty. The total occupancy of the installations not cited in the survey may be in the hundreds only. This, of course, is just a guess, but by extension from the 314 figure in the Saigon area it seems logical. We figure a thousand as a maximum estimate for the nationwide interrogation center population.

17. One of our remaining soft spots, despite the survey, is the detention system at the district and village levels. The contention that there are no jails at these levels may be true, but district and village police stations with an informal lock-up capability do exist, as obliquely acknowledged in the November publication of the GVN. Detentions here are meant to be brief and the physical arrangements largely ad hoc. No distinction is made between interrogation facilities, detention facilities, and what might pass for the local jail. It is unlikely that anyone held here enters GVN records unless and until he is passed on to the province level. Thus, the GVN tendency to ignore these facilities is natural. But to counter Chan Tin's charges effectively one must acknowledge the existence of these detainees and figure them in the total number. He patently exaggerates their numbers, and his claim should be met squarely. The real number is certainly very small these days; one could probably put it at no more than a thousand at any given moment.

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Page 7

Added to the interrogation centers, these facilities may bring the detention population to roughly two thousand nationwide. This is less than the number we've been carrying, based on the 1972 year-end figure of 4,060. Such a drop seems logical for the post-ceasefire period, but it cannot be verified.

18. Taking the Mission survey in its entirety, therefore, we reach the conclusion that the prison and detention systems together held about 35,000 persons in the July-August period, broken down as follows:

<u>Category of Prisoners</u>	<u>Occupancy</u>
Inmates of national prisons	15,342
Inmates of provincial prisons	14,291
Communist offenders (held separately pending release)	3,506 <sup>1/</sup>
Detainees in interrogation centers and local lock-ups	c. 2,000
	c. 35,139

Since our detention-interrogation estimate is probably high, a total of under 35,000 is defensible. The real total cannot be far from that figure in any case. This includes all categories of civilian prisoners, not just "political prisoners" however defined. END UNCLASSIFIED

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#### Chan Tin's Error

19. Obviously, if our new survey is right, Chan Tin went drastically wrong somewhere, despite the care he says he put into his estimates. The easy answer is that he was egged on by the Communists, and that he is their agent. He has often taken positions damaging to the GVN and favorable to the Communist side, but this is insufficient evidence to conclude that he is a witting Communist tool.

20. Chan Tin comes through to observers as a quiet but stubborn man. Being a priest, he views people's plights in a human way. He may know of cases of unjust imprisonment and mistreatment in GVN jails from contacts with parishioners. Educated at the Sorbonne, evidently during the era several decades ago when socialist ideas were common currency, he puts the human tragedies he meets into a class-struggle intellectual framework. These traits were illustrated, for example, during the July 27 call on him by the reporting officer. A teenage girl entered his office during the call with a folded note for a relative in prison. She had gotten conflicting reports about where the relative was being held. Chan Tin listened sympathetically, assured her he knew where the relative was, and agreed to get the note to him. After the girl left, he then spoke to the reporting officer about the present situation in South Vietnam in dramatic class-struggle terms.

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<sup>1/</sup> These are the remainder of 5,081 held in this category at the time of the ceasefire. The others have already been released to the Communists in exchange programs negotiated with the Communist side.

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21. Translating these convictions into arguments that would convince a world impressed by statistics, Chan Tin has clearly let his subjective view override his objectivity in his published survey. His thinking apparently led him into ever more extreme positions as he prepared the statistics. Last April, he told an Embassy officer and a visiting Congressional staffer that it was difficult to make an accurate estimate of the total number of prisoners; his own guess at that time was 100,000, though he heard of figures as high as 200,000. He has now gone up to the highest figure circulating among critics for "political prisoners" alone. Perhaps he is convinced emotionally that this figure "must" be correct because it provides him with justification for his commitment to the issue.

22. Also, we believe in this case that Chan Tin has been swayed by his sources, some of whom may be less scrupulous than he. They may be indeed close to the picture, as he claims, but they appear also to have either an ax to grind or an emotion-clouded concept of the numbers that can be held in some of the prisons and detention centers. Chan Tin's total figure compounds these smaller errors. It is thus a fairly typical instance of little flaws, hard to pin down but easy to believe if one is disposed to do so, hiding a gross weakness in the overall result.

Ambassador's Comment:

23. I am again indebted to Mr. Sizer and the other Mission officers who contributed to this report for an exhaustive and painstaking analysis. In the best tradition of the Foreign Service this report, without bias or subjective emotional involvement, presents the facts as best they can be perceived after extensive study and research. It deserves, and I hope it will receive the widest possible dissemination.

24. This report will not convince those who believe only what they wish to believe. It will, I think, be convincing to those reasonable and objective persons who are still concerned with the truth - and, fortunately, the majority of the citizens of the United States still come within this category.

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ENCLOSURE 1

Page 1

FATHER CHAN TIN'S LIST OF "POLITICAL PRISONERS" ALLEGEDLY HELD BY THE  
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, JUNE 1, 1973

(from publication issued July 1973)

Four Special Prisons

Con Son (mostly for political prisoners)	8,200
Thu Duc (for women)	1,500
Tan Hiep (entirely for political prisoners)	2,500
Dalat (for juvenile males)	1,000
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	13,200.

Six POW Camps

Phu Quoc	X
Ho Nai (Bien Hoa)	X
Phu Tai (Qui Nhon)	X
Danang	X
Pleiku	X
Can Tho	<u>X</u>
	X

Military Prisons

Go Vap	2,000
Four Big Prisons (Danang, Nha Trang, Can Tho, Pleiku)	6,000
Other Military Prisons	4,000
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	12,000

Nine Big Prisons

Chi Hoa	2,000
Gia Dinh	3,000
Can Tho	3,000
My Tho	2,000
Thua Phu (Hue)	2,000
Danang	3,000
Quang Nam	3,000
Quang Ngai	4,000
Qui Nhon	3,000
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	25,000

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Thirty-seven provincial prisons

Total for all 37 prisons	50,000
	<u>50,000</u>

District and village jails

Total for all	68,000
	<u>68,000</u>

Interrogation Centers

National Police Headquarters, Vo Tanh St., Saigon	1,000
Capital Police Headquarters, Tran Hung Dao Street, Saigon	200
Ben Bach Dang, Saigon	200
Ngo Quyen, Saigon	200
Bang Ky Bridge, Gia Dinh	800
Hang Keo, Gia Dinh	1,200
Military Security, Nguyen Binh Khiem St., Saigon	500
Capital Military Security, Nguyen Trai St., Saigon	200
Eleven police stations in Saigon	1,000
Four military region security intelligence centers	1,500
Quang Nam interrogation center	1,500
Qui Nhon interrogation center	1,500
Quang Ngai interrogation center	2,000
Forty-two province security stations	9,000
Forty-five province military security stations	2,000
District security stations	5,000
Military region offices of military security	1,000
Other interrogation places	<u>5,000</u>
	33,800

NATIONAL TOTAL	202,000
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Saigon A-296  
ENCLOSURE 2  
Page 1

COMPARISON OF  
FATHER CHAN TIN'S "POLITICAL PRISONER" CLAIM,  
GVN CIVILIAN PRISONER CLAIM,  
AND STANDARD U. S. EMBASSY ESTIMATE

Father Chan Tin's Claim as of  
June 1, 1972

Four "special prisons" plus  
Chi Hoa:

15,200 "political prisoners"

Eight "big prisons" plus  
37 provincial prisons:

73,000 "political prisoners"

District and village jails  
and interrogation centers:

101,800 "political prisoners"

GVN Claim in July and November 1973  
Booklets on Civilian Prisoners

Five national prisons:

Total capacity about 21,000 until  
June 1973; became 20,000 June 2,  
1973, with de-activation of Dalat  
Reformatory; no "political prisoners"

Thirty-Five provincial prisons (no  
others now operating):

Total capacity less than 19,000;  
no "political prisoners"

Jails below province level:

July booklet says they do not  
exist; November booklet mentions  
temporary processing centers  
holding persons no longer than  
five days; no "political  
prisoners"

Standard U. S. Embassy Estimate

Five national prisons:

Total occupancy of 20,501 as of  
December 31, 1972; less since then

Thirty-Five provincial prisons:

Total occupancy of 19,156 as of  
December 31, 1972; less since then

Detention system down to village  
level:

Total occupancy of 4,060 as of  
December 31, 1972; we have assumed  
occupancy roughly the same since  
then, though figure fluctuates

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Father Chan Tin's Claim as of  
June 1, 1972

GVN Claim in July and November 1973  
Booklets on Civilian Prisoners

Standard U. S. Embassy Estimate

Military prisons:

12,000 "political prisoners"

Military prisons:

July booklet does not discuss;  
November booklet says not applicable

Military prisons:

We have assumed these are strictly  
for soldiers under military  
disciplina, and we have no evi-  
dence to the contrary

POW camps

Zero

POW camps:

July booklet does not discuss;  
November booklet indicates  
camps are empty

POW camps:

Empty

TOTAL:

202,000 "political prisoners"

TOTAL:

Capacity of prison system less  
than 40,000 until June 1973;  
less than 39,000 after  
June 2, 1973; no "political  
prisoners"

TOTAL:

Occupancy of prison and detention  
systems totaled 43,717 as of  
December 31, 1972; less since  
then

U. S. MISSION INFORMATION ON ALL TYPES OF CIVILIAN PRISONERS  
DETAINED IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS OF JULY 24, 1973

(Chan Tin's estimates of "political prisoners" as of June 1, 1973, in parentheses)

National Prisons

Chi Hoa	7,911	(2,000)
Thu Duc	1,137	(1,500)
Con Son	5,498	(8,200)
Tan Hiep	796	(2,500)
Dalat Reformatory	<u>N. A.</u> <sup>1/</sup>	<u>(1,000)</u>
	15,342	(15,200)

Provincial Prisons

Quang Nam	504	(3,000)
Quang Ngai	452	(4,000)
Quang Tin	182	
Thua Thien	329	(2,000)
Danang	1,003	(3,000)
Binh Dinh	581	(3,000)
Darlac m	234	
Khanh Hoa	1,354	
Kontum	56	
Ninh Thuan	115	
Phu Yen	412	
Pleiku	406	
Binh Thuan	226	
Tuyen Duc	253	
Gia Dinh	182	(3,000)
Binh Duong	229	
Binh Tuy	92	
Long An	116	
Phuoc Tuy	261	
Tay Ninh	428	
Bien Hoa	761	

<sup>1/</sup> The Dalat Reformatory was de-activated on June 2, 1973, and transferred to the Ministry of Social Welfare. It will become a children's protection center.

Provincial Prisons (continued)

An Giang	251	
An Xuyen	1 68	
Ba Xuyen	457	
Bac Lieu	336	
Chau Doc	368	
Dinh Tuong	386	(2, 000)
Go Cong	270	
Kien Giang	207	
Kien Hoa	399	
Kien Tuong	41	
Kien Phong	175	
Phong Dinh	1, 887	(3, 000)
Vinh Binh	498	
Vinh Long	672	
	<u>14, 291</u>	<u>(73, 000) <sup>2/</sup></u>

Communist Offenders (held in separate locations pending release)

Total	3, 506	(N. A.) <sup>3/</sup>
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Military Prisons

Total for all	-0- <sup>4/</sup>	(12, 000)
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District and Village Jails

Total for all	N. A. <sup>5/</sup>	(68, 000)
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<sup>2/</sup> This total comprises 23, 000 in the eight prisons Chan Tin mentions specifically, plus 50, 000 he lumps together in a separate category of provincial prisons.

<sup>3/</sup> Chan Tin includes Communist offenders among other "political prisoners" and gives no separate figure for this category.

<sup>4/</sup> The information received assumes that military prisons are irrelevant to the civilian prisoner issue. See airgram text for support of this assumption.

<sup>5/</sup> According to the information received, there are no jails below the province level. This is correct, but it ignores the small detention capability of the police at the district and village levels. See airgram text.

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Interrogation Centers 6/

National Police Headquarters, Vo Tanh St., Saigon	83	(1,000)
Capital Police Headquarters, Tran Hung Dao St., Saigon	58	( 200)
Ben Bach Dang, Saigon	15	( 200)
Ngo Quyen, Saigon	2	( 200)
Bang Ky Bridge, Gia Dinh	15	( 800)
Hang Keo, Gia Dinh	70	(1,200)
Military Security, Nguyen Binh Khiem St., Saigon	26	( 500)
Capital Military Security, Nguyen Trai St., Saigon	14	( 200)
Eleven Police Stations in Saigon	31	(1,000)
Others	N.A.	(28,500)
		<hr/>
	N.A. <sup>7/</sup>	(33,800)

6/ The Mission's findings in this category are as of August 22, 1973.

7/ See airgram text.

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