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PRESIDENT SHOULD EXPLAIN U.S. OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES IN VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I heard with the greatest interest the statement of the majority leader today on the grave crisis in Vietnam. It is extraordinary how the views of men, separately arrived at, meet in the face of a grave crisis to which they address themselves.

It seems to me the time has come for Senators to state their position when the President of the United States is taking on an awful responsibility in the grave decisions which he is making, and which could very well, as during the Cuban crisis, expose the United States and the whole world to the terrible scourge of a broadscale war.

I believe it is our duty, therefore, as responsible men, having an especial relation to foreign policy through our constitutional powers, to express ourselves on this subject.

I feel I must express support of our country's policy in retaliating against the staging areas and military installations in North Vietnam, which supported and planned the actions which resulted and are resulting in such tragic casualties for United States and Vietnamese personnel. What has been done was necessary to demonstrate that we will not tolerate overt aggression in South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese and their allies without determined reaction.

But this reaction by the United States is no substitute for a policy. The American people are worried; they are wondering whether we have a policy in Vietnam as well as the will to carry it through. Americans are also worried whether or not a majority of the Vietnamese people still have the will to resist Communist aggression, or want our aid in their resistance. Americans want to know why so few of our allies have come to help in South Vietnam, grateful as we are to those who have. Americans want to know what is the real meaning of the Japanese bid to mediate in the South Vietnamese struggle; what can be the role of India, Thailand, and other Asian countries under Communist Chinese threat; and what is the proper role of Great Britain, which is now helping Malaysia, and of President de Gaulle's France. From those who counsel negotiation, Americans want to know: Negotiate with whom and about what?

The statement by the majority leader expressing the hope that Great Britain and the Soviet Union will exercise their prerogatives as cochairman of the commission appointed under the Geneva accord of 1954 is a very sound one. I express my own hope and feeling that they will. But that, too, is not the policy of the United States. Only one man can make the foreign policy of the United States, and that is the President, subject, at most, to approval in some form by the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for an additional 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Accordingly, Mr. President—and this is a parallel to the very fine statement made by the majority leader—I feel the time has come for the President of the United States to address the Nation, and address it promptly, in the most considered way, and state to the people of the United States and the world the U.S. policy and objective in South Vietnam.

For there is nothing in the U.S. position which is inconsistent with every effort to find an honorable solution to the struggle. The assertion of American will to carry on the fight against communism and our determination to maintain our aid to the South Vietnamese, so long as they wish it and show a will to resist, may in time bring an end to this grave conflict from which South Vietnam may emerge in peace and independence. Yet, while we continue to help the South Vietnamese, we should continue to explore every means, whether by conference or direct negotiation or through the United Nations good offices, to resolve the conflict.

There is really no profound confrontation between those Senators who feel that the war should be extended—no Senator is foolish or reckless in this matter—and those who feel that we should negotiate. Certainly we are ready to negotiate, or to see that South Vietnam negotiates, under properly controlled conditions, in an attempt to settle the conflict there. But it takes two to negotiate; both sides must be receptive to the idea, and a solution cannot be made at the expense of the people of South Vietnam.

The United States is present in Vietnam in pursuance of a policy we have maintained since the settlement which eliminated the French presence in Indochina in 1954—namely, that we would not allow the South Vietnamese people to be overwhelmed by Communist aggression and subversion so long as they had the will to resist and sought our aid. Unless we are convinced that the majority of the South Vietnamese people no longer wish to continue their struggle against the Communists or to have U.S. assistance for that purpose, we cannot desert them.

The war in Vietnam must be considered also in relation to Communist plans to expand their domination over south and southeast Asia. Vietnam is the active front at the moment, but the struggle is being waged to resist the Communist advance into the whole of Asia and the Pacific. Should the balance tip strongly in favor of the Communists in Vietnam, the

rest of this vast region—including not only the smaller countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Ceylon, Burma, South Korea, and Taiwan, but also the larger nations of Japan, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines—would be under dire threat and in serious jeopardy, and Australia and New Zealand would be in a gravely exposed position. Such towering events could change the whole balance of forces in the world against us and in favor of communism.

The American people must be clearly informed that at the heart of the problem lies a question of proportion. For casualties are a matter of heartbreak to each of us; yet we must match the incidence of these tragic losses to the infinitely greater losses of American lives which could be incurred if the position of the free world was radically altered by the capture of large parts of south and southeast Asia for communism.

In the free world, we do not operate in the dark. A great country states what its policy is in the greatest moment of crisis. I do not doubt that this is no new idea to the President of the United States, and that he is fully prepared to undertake this task. But there is a question of timing, and in my judgment the time should be now. With the situation deteriorating daily in South Vietnam, the President should speak promptly, for only the President can speak with authority.

Our people want to know what the position of the United States is. They want the President to make a firm declaration of policy, to tell us how we propose to continue, so all the world can read and understand. Then he will find, as President Kennedy found in the Cuban crisis, that all of us, without regard to party, will rally to his side, and there will be the unity which has always been forthcoming to Presidents when such crises have faced the country.