

Vance P.  
Mr. Roy  
12/11

An Giang Province  
September 12, 1967

Mr. Roy Wehrle  
Dep. Asst. Adm. for VN  
AID/W

Dear Roy:

The attached may be of interest. It would be a much more inclusive and useful piece if it dealt more with some of the classified issues of US policy and GVN corruption, etc.

Plan to be in New York in early December enroute home via Europe. Will meet Betty there and visit my son and his wife a few days before going on to Tulsa and Austin. If you need anything from me, I can come via Washington. Otherwise, we will probably fly direct from New York to Tulsa.

Would love to have news of my only "granddaughter". Perhaps JA will write Betty. Best wishes for the coming months on your new assignment and my love to J.A.

Best to all

H. Aubrey Elliott  
Province Senior Advisor  
An Giang

Sterling J. Cottrell, Acting Senior  
Advisor, IV CTZ

6 September 1967

H. Aubrey Elliott, Senior Advisor, An Giang Province

An Giang Province Project Review

Attached is a "new arrival" review of things in An Giang  
Province as of the date of my arrival.

Hope this will serve some useful purpose by way of  
evaluation of things as they now stand.

THE AN GIANG PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

AN ASSESSMENT - AUG 1, 1967

INTRODUCTION:

From the beginning, An Giang has been different. Lying deep in the heart of the Mekong River delta and close to the Cambodian border, it is part of a region long known as a Viet Cong stronghold. Yet it is an island of security, enjoying relatively normal social and economic conditions. As if repelled by some inner force, VC activities are limited to infrequent skirmishes along the outer fringes and outposts of the province. Always serious to those directly involved, they are in reality, little if any deterrent to normal living for the 470,000 people of the area.

The principal reason for this phenomenon is the fact that the province is dominated by the highly organized Hoa Hao group, a minority religious and political sect of almost two million members, occupying a position of power in several delta provinces and composing about 70% of the population of An Giang province. Strongly anti-communist, economically wealthy by local standards and socially highly organized, this group is basically what makes An Giang "different".

Prior to the Honolulu Conference in February 1966, An Giang had already been given priority status and had even then been the recipient of special attention. Programs designed to emphasize the economic rather than the revolutionary aspects of development were supported with sizable allocations of dollars and piasters. Following Honolulu, the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MRD) agreed to a "large scale and long term" development program, covering every major developmental area. Specific program proposals were submitted for:

1. Agriculture, including the whole spectrum of agricultural services from fisheries, animal husbandry, rural credit and sericulture to agricultural machinery;
2. Public Works, including a significant rock quarrying development, a power cooperative and a garbage processing plant for the provincial capital, Long Xuyên;
3. Education, with elementary, secondary and vocational entities;
4. Public Health, with emphasis on health education, training and to a lesser degree, medical services;
5. Public Administration, including efforts to strengthen governmental services, postal reform and improved public services down to the village level;

6. Public Safety, with emphasis on increased police strength and general preparation for gradual transfer of security responsibilities from military to police;
7. Social Welfare, including services to the indigent, dependent mothers and children and disaster victims;
8. Land Reform, to include land surveys, soil studies and land distribution programs, as well as land reclamation and water control;
9. Industry and Commerce, with special attention to small industry, the development of agricultural by-products and commodity transportation;
10. Information services, including the Chieu Hoi program and public information.

Most, but not all of these specific proposals were accepted. The Ministries involved were scheduled to pick up the tab for their respective financing by the end of 1966. In the meantime, MORD would act as the financing agent, since it was the only Ministry prepared to carry the burden at the time.

Some, but little progress was made during the second half of 1966, as only a portion of the funds were released, and the lateness of the hour together with a major flood disaster permitted the expenditure of only \$5,000,000VN. Considerable energy went into planning, however. In January 1967, after taking a second look, and realizing that An Giang really is "different", MORD authorized a budget of \$123,000,000VN. In effect then, the An Giang special project has been under full sail little more than six months. During this time, additional US staff has come aboard and plans laid out in previous months have been put into operation. Some, like the Rural Electric Cooperative (not financed by MORD), have been simmering for almost two years and are just now about to come to fruition. The same can be said for the quarry project, another directly funded and slow moving effort. Others, like the Public Safety and Education programs appear to be on dead center and obviously require special attention. Still others, like the Animal Husbandry, Fisheries and Agricultural Services programs are moving ahead nicely. The same may be said for the unfunded self help program. These portend well for the future.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, in fact all through the developing period, the

1. This account would not be complete without reference to the directly AID funded, 15 member Australian Surgical Team assigned to the province hospital. Extremely effective as technicians, one might hope for much greater emphasis on training of local medical staff.

Revolutionary Development Cadres have continued in An Giang, as in other provinces of the country, theoretically fulfilling their roles as pacifiers, as well as developers. The fact that An Giang was already a pacified area, requiring a different kind of "development" had little effect on the nature and character of the RD teams until July 1967, when the prototype 59 man teams were reorganized and reduced in size to 20 man teams. The security elements were disbanded and reassigned as technical cadres. While a step in the right direction, it was too hurried and almost immediately countered by the transfer of provincial technicians to RD cadres, thus transferring supervision and responsibility from the technical ministries, where it belongs, to the WORD, weakening the former severely. The smaller, wanned and strictly "developmental" teams are a welcome reality, but are sadly lacking in technical skills, supervision and the kind of morale required to get the job done.

It is at this point that the single manager direction of all US civil/military activities takes over in An Giang. It is fitting therefore that an assessment be made at this time, a benchmark as it were, from which to chart the course for the future. The following pages are an attempt to review current status of already approved development programs in An Giang province and evaluate progress to date. In so doing, we automatically place the mark against an August 1, 1967 date, from which future progress can be measured and from which we can begin any future surveys to determine direction and emphasis.

#### CURRENT STATUS:

As might be expected, some of the An Giang development projects have prospered, while others have faltered. Those which we regard as successful,<sup>1</sup> or at least satisfactory, have been blessed with both US and US support and the technical staff skill to make them go. Those less successful or virtually non-productive have lacked one or more of these ingredients.

For purposes of quick evaluation but unfortunately based on a too brief observation, Fig 1 may serve to classify existing programs on a 1-5 scale, with (5) rated as "excellent". The gradings are to be interpreted as indicative only of attainment of goals and therefore they face the obvious risks of over simplification. The evaluation attempts to take this into account but cannot be considered anything other than a subjective assessment by an American outsider whose only criteria for measurement are the equally subjective opinions of his staff and his own professional experience.

1. Note the "we" and bear in mind that this is "our", not "their" evaluation of their program.

FIG. 1 PROJECT PERFORMANCE RATING (1 AUGUST 1967)

|                             | (5) | (4) | (3) | (2) | (1) |
|-----------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Primary Educ.               |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Secondary Educ.             |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Technical Educ.             |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Public Adm. <sup>1</sup>    |     | X   |     |     |     |
| Public Health               |     |     |     |     |     |
| Self-Help (Funded)          |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Self-Help (Unfunded)        | X   |     |     |     |     |
| Public works                |     |     | X   |     |     |
| Refugee Relief              |     |     | X   |     |     |
| Youth & Sports <sup>2</sup> |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Labor <sup>2</sup>          |     |     | X   |     |     |
| Logistics                   | X   |     |     |     |     |
| Social Welfare              |     |     | X   |     |     |
| PF Dep Housing              | X   |     |     |     |     |
| Commerce & Industry         |     |     | X   |     |     |
| Land Tenure                 |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Agriculture Ser.            |     |     | X   |     |     |
| Rural Credit                |     |     | X   |     |     |
| Fisheries                   |     | X   |     |     |     |
| Ag. Machinery               |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Animal Husbandry            |     | X   |     |     |     |
| Ag. Economics               |     |     | X   |     |     |
| Sericulture                 |     |     |     |     | X   |
| Chieu Hoi                   |     | X   |     |     |     |
| RD Workers                  |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Rural Elec. Coop            |     |     | X   |     |     |
| Public Safety               |     |     |     | X   |     |
| Mil. Affairs <sup>3</sup>   |     |     |     |     |     |

1. MILPMAP Team only arrived in April 1967. Not rated.
2. Currently receiving limited attention.
3. Security situation such that usual criteria of measurement not applicable. Not rated.

Of 28 ratable project units, two (Public Health and Military Affairs) were unrated as indicated in Fig. 1. The remaining 26, had they been rated at the highest level, would have produced a point score of 130(5x26). At the lowest level, the score would have been 26(1x26). Actually our best estimate of program accomplishment comes to 77 points, one point less than average (2x26). On a standard performance rating scale ranging from "excellent" to "unacceptable", we scored on the midrange or "satisfactory" group.

Nine of the 26 rated program units, or roughly one third, fell in the mid or satisfactory group, a normal distribution expectation. However, 10 fall below and only 7 above the midgroup, thus pulling the raw average statistically below the "satisfactory" level. Granted that the sample is small and that statistics may mean little in such instances, it does indicate that the overall program is in need of bolstering and that it is far from accomplishing its professed goals.

The Performance Rating Chart when accompanied by a narrative description, is more useful. Annex "A" to this report is for that purpose.<sup>1</sup>

In it, each current project is evaluated by the project manager. Sizeable blocks of time went into the study and review of each of the major projects, less to lower priority efforts. With both the Province Senior Advisor and his Deputy just arrived in An Giang province, these took on the character of briefing in depth and lasted over a two week period. The performance ratings were made on the basis of evaluations of the program drawn from the briefings and subsequent interview and observations made during the first 30 days in Long Xuyen.

With only a few exceptions staff members were impressive and program shortcomings cannot be laid at the door of the technicians who serve here. A multiplicity of factors, too numerous to list, are undoubtedly involved. But one stands out. As of Aug 1 1967, the Province Chief and his staff have greeted the fourth US senior civilian official to be assigned here in 18 months. The lack of continuity in US leadership here is responsible in large measure for failure to reach a higher level of attainment. One can only hope that circumstances will permit a reversal of this trend and the An Giang US Mission may enjoy a greater degree of stability and staff continuity.

Both the performance chart and narrative are to be repeated in six months, and again in twelve. Prepared as an overlay, future editions may throw some light on the degree of progress achieved at six month intervals.

The GVN piaster input for FY 67 amounts to \$123,000,000V, or a little over \$1 million US. The US input is roughly \$7.6 million, including commodities, plus another sizable piece in counterpart. The total is probably in the neighborhood of \$10 million US, the GVN portion around 10%. Of this huge amount, a few big money projects account for a large portion of it. For example, the land tenure program will absorb \$1 million for both FY 67 and 68. The rock quarry project at Lui Sap will require

1. A report submitted on Aug 17, to CORDES in fulfillment of a requirement for a six months review of the Revolutionary Development Program.

\$2.3 million and the rural electrification project, \$1.2 million, thus accounting for \$4.5 of the \$7.6 million. Agricultural requirements are budgeted for roughly another \$.75 million with equal or lesser amounts spread across the program spectrum.

All in all, the US investment is heavy, both in terms of money and manpower. The 470,000 people of the province, if allotted equal shares of the approximately \$10,000,000 FY 67 assistance input, exclusive of military assistance, would receive about \$20 US. While an admittedly high proportion of their estimated average annual income, matters need to be put in proper perspective. We should be concerned now with the question, "Are we at last prepared to accomplish the goals we set for ourselves some months ago? Have we put in position all the resources, technical, economic, physical and moral that will make it possible for the people of An Giang to do for themselves what they want and need to do, but can't do without our help?" If in the next year or two, the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, the size of the investment will be secondary to the rewards which will accrue to the people of An Giang and indirectly to us who had a part in it.

H. AUBREY ELLIOTT, Province Senior Advisor  
Long Xuyen, August 18, 1967

## REVIEW OF RD PROGRAMS (Jan 67-Aug 67)

Primary Education: Progress to date has been less than satisfactory. Experience of 1966 set the stage for 1967. Many classrooms built in 1966 were without furniture and some were of such poor quality as to present the opposite image of the GVN than the one desired. Construction of classrooms this year has been limited to four three-room schools (one in each district). These schools are being built to determine "actual" construction costs in An Giang, since province officials and MORD do not agree on cost estimates. MORD has tacitly agreed that construction costs in An Giang are somewhat higher than elsewhere by increasing the cost estimate of one classroom from 85,000\$ to 89,000\$. Detailed cost records have been maintained for these "experimental" schools. These records appear to be accurate with the possible exception of labor charges which vary from 20 to 30 thousand VN per classroom. These records indicate costs ranging from 115-130000\$ per classroom (includes labor).

Last year's construction was largely controlled and contracted by the District Chiefs. The GVN solution to this year's problems has been to tighten controls involving the District Chiefs in every detail of the projects and to look to Saigon for more money. To date our efforts to influence the provincial officials to turn to the people and their newly elected local officials, using the true self-help concept envisioned in the program, have been unsuccessful. The growth of the unfunded self-help program in the past months indicates the willingness of the people to contribute time and money to projects which are close to them.

The Primary Education Chief is tired, conservative, awaiting retirement, and sees the Hamlet School funds as a way to expand his existing Ministry of Education schools. It was only by the use of extreme measures that hamlets lacking schools were included in this year's proposed list of schools. There still remains a grey area in the "inter-hamlet" schools constructed in cy 66 with some schools being "inter-hamlet" in name only. This problem will be studied in conjunction with the construction of the 108 classrooms projected for cy 68.

The usual problems in replacing lost Ministry of Education funded teachers exist here. However, they do not appear to be a serious. (Beginning 11 September, 195 teachers will be recruited and trained).

Secondary Education: This year six high school classrooms were funded for three district capitals. Two classrooms in Huo Duc were built by the Seabees. In Cho Moi, two classrooms and a dispensary are being built to add to the present high school. And in Thot Not, the high school P.T.A. in an unprecedented move raised 150,000 piasters and is building two unfunded self-help classrooms to go along with the two funded ones presently under construction.

Annex A to the An Giang Priority Development Program.

It is in Long Xuyen that problems have been encountered. The site of the present high school has just about run out of space. CORDS attempted to induce the province to perform this year's funded construction (5 classrooms, a library, and a dispensary) at a new site, one which would permit future expansion and hopefully lead to the establishment of a new comprehensive high school. The lateness of the season and the lack of a prepared site thwarted this idea, and this year's construction will now be at the existing site.

Given the emphasis on the development of An Giang, it strikes me as particularly incongruous that the province ranks as one of the lowest in the Delta in percentage of children who are able to go to high school. This problem is rapidly assuming crisis proportions because the high primary school construction program in An Giang is and will be turning out even more students. The Ministry of Education, for some reason has failed to recognize this and does not even classify An Giang's secondary education needs under Priority C. The province badly needs a new, comprehensive high school. I recommend that CORDS and USAID Education do everything in their power to bring this about in the coming year.

#### Technical Education:

The only fy 67 funding in the RD budget for the Technical School was for tools and supplies. The former school principal was caught with his hands in this fund and dismissed. The school itself has been a disappointment to date, but its failings have been due to shortcomings on the part of USAID and the Ministry of Education, not the province (which is hardly kept apprised of its affairs by Saigon). USAID is guilty of failing to produce programmed equipment for the school, which has almost nothing to work with save some rather elaborate but empty buildings. The Ministry of Education has been derelict in sending teachers to staff the school.

*Why?*  
A considerable expansion of the school is programmed for later this year through direct dollar funding to a foreign contractor. This is all being handled through Saigon. We hope that the Ministry will supply the teachers necessary to permit the school to realize its potential value to this province -- and the heavy US investment in the school.

It would also be helpful if GVN/Saigon would keep the province chief informed. His lack of knowledge of the expansion of the school has resulted in over commitment of the site. This problem has been corrected but not without considerable waste of time, money, materials and loss of face on both sides.

#### Public Administration:

There have been no notable problems in this field. Both the Deputy

Annex A to the An Giang Priority Development Program.

Province Chief for Administration and the Administrative Service Chief are capable men, although the Provincial Training Officer is less so.

Village and hamlet official training courses have gone well, as did the elections for these officials. Through dollar funding, fourteen of the newly elected village chiefs are currently on a six-week observation tour of Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

A slight problem has arisen in connection with An Giang's section of the CAP. We had agreed with the GVN to include six outboard motors in our CAP and that the GVN would include funds for construction of six speedboats for provincial use. The boats were included, but our motors were delayed in the final review. We are endeavoring to obtain the motors on a loan basis and will include them in our FY 1968 CAP request. In connection with the FY 1968 CAP exercise, we plan to include 38 Tri-Lambréttas, one for each village. We have found it money well-spent to support these new village administrations, which should become the Government's most important link to the people.

Construction on 1.5 million piaster training center addition is expected to start soon.

#### Public Health:

The 556 Med Serv Flt was moved into An Giang Province during Apr. 66. Its primary mission at that time was patient care and renovation of the Ministry of Health facilities at the district level.

Renovation of the district MED's was completed at a cost of 1,907,393\$ VN by June 67.

On June 67, the mission of the 556th was changed. It is now primarily involved with the training and support of Vietnamese Ministry of Health personnel and secondarily with patient care. The MILPHAP personnel now see patients only on a referral basis. The unit is in the process of making visits to all medical facilities within An Giang Province. A Village/Hamlet survey form has been prepared and distributed and will also be used to make recommendations concerning facilities improvements projects.

The supply system at each district MED has been turned over to Vietnamese personnel. Our personnel are working on a six month supply level at each district MED which will be able to provide for all medical facilities within the district concerned.

In cooperation with the MOH personnel in the Provincial hospital, the team is inspecting government facilities for sanitation, living conditions, latrine facilities, etc. This activity will later be expanded to include RF/PF housing, schools, restaurants, etc.

Annex A to the An Giang Priority Development Program.

Self-help: The funded self-help program is lagging because of a lack of command emphasis and support of the population. These projects are normally contracted, which results in the lack of popular support. Only 24 of the 30 projects programmed for this year have been approved and underway. These 24 are approximately 30% complete. Because of this slow progress and further, because of the coming flood period, I suggest that no further projects be programmed this year. As next year's program, I propose a slightly increase level, with an all out effort to see to it that better methods are put to work in carrying out the projects. At the same time, we will encourage continued expansion of unfunded self-help projects, which are meeting with more than expected success.

Public Works: Progress to date on public works projects has been good. Work is underway or commencing on three interprovincial roads, three village roads, an extensive street repair project in Long Xuyen city, and over 30 bridges. The principal problem in this area is the difficulty encountered in moving sufficient quantities of crushed rock up from the Hui Sap quarry for use in the above mentioned projects. I strongly recommend expediting the delivery of the five new rock barges included in the quarry expansion program.

The rock quarry expansion project has gotten underway. Initial surveys are in progress at this time. A number of potential problems have been raised by the survey team, most of which can be solved at the provincial level.

The areas of inland waterways improvement and civil air base maintenance are experiencing difficulty due to apparent lack of support from Saigon. Specific proposals for action in these areas will be forthcoming soon.

Refugees: In 1965, refugees in An Giang Province (since the beginning of the Refugee Program) numbered 5,422. During 1966, 1887 new refugees arrived. While the CAP has predicted that during 1967, an additional 13,700 will arrive, to be followed by 15,000 more in 1968, it appears unlikely that this influx will be seen in CY 1967 due to slippages in military plans for the Delta. Unforeseen natural disasters could, however, produce large numbers of refugees. We are fortunate in that the relative prosperity of this province will enable us to sustain these people without too much difficulty.

I strongly recommend efforts to locate land for these people, reclaiming presently unusable land if necessary, before they arrive. Further recommendations will be made following a survey to be conducted the 20th of August.

Youth & Sports: This program is progressing according to plan and no major problems are seen at this time. It has not has real emphasis, however and we will determine its proper place on the priority spectrum as soon as possible.

Labor: Approximately 250 students are presently learning masonry (2 classes), carpentry (2 classes), sewing (1 class) and mechanics (1 class) under sponsorship of the Labor Service. No problems exist at the moment.

Annex A to the An Giang Priority Development Program.

Logistics: Logistics support is adequate and supplies are arriving in a timely fashion. Construction of the Province maintenance shop has been delayed by the loss of the approved site. The province chief's unawareness of the plans for the expansion of the technical school caused him to start the maintenance shop on ground which is to be used by the technical school. Construction of the shop was halted 9 August. Efforts to secure a new site continue, but have been unproductive to date.

Social Welfare: This program sustains widows, orphans, the disabled and other indigents as well as those who have suffered losses in natural disasters. It also provides funding for an old men's home, an eating hall for poor people, a community center, and several other construction projects. There has been a history of almost, but not quite, completed projects in An Giang and efforts should be made to complete these projects prior to initiating new ones.

We are presently building 850 houses for last year's flood victims.

Popular Forces Dependent Housing: This has been one of our most successful programs. We have several hundred housing units already completed or under construction. A program of this sort should be started for other units, particularly police.

Commerce and Industry: Several projects are currently under study in Saigon, designed to bring various light industries into the less prosperous areas of An Giang (soapmaking, textiles, etc.), together with training program to create the skilled manpower necessary to operate these light industries. These will be pursued. I consider this a definite priority activity area.

Land Tenure Project: Identification of rural land parcels by ownership and occupancy has been completed in four villages. Training has progressed to the stage that the activity is currently being expanded to ten additional villages.

Approximately 250 soil samples have been collected for analysis and study. This represents about 25 per cent of the field work necessary for completion of the soil inventory.

A three-man FARI team arrived mid-July on TDY assignment for the collection of information on existing infra-structures, related resources and the current economy for the Thanh Quoi pilot area and the province as a whole. Before its departure the team will submit recommendations to FARI/W. on optimum farm size for the development of the Thanh Quoi pilot area.

The Engineering support studies for land development and water control demonstrations are about 75 per cent completed. A final report, covering the findings and recommendations, will be submitted in December 1967.

There was no MORD Budget in 1967, but the 1968 budget should include pay for field personnel (GVN).

Annex A to the An Giang Priority Development Program.

Agriculture Service: The Agriculture service program is progressing satisfactorily. Approximately 7,000,000 of the 10.8 million R.D. budget is either spent or obligated. The 4.0 million scheduled for a soybean loan program is 75% spent. The secondary Crop program is moving very well. The ha. has risen from 3150 in 1965 to 7900 + at the present.

Internally agriculture services stands as follows on - money spent:

Extension - 70% or 156,480\$

Home EC. - 55% or 86,800\$

Plant protection - 100% - 100,000\$

Rice seed - 100% or 1,199,245\$

LT - 70% or 138,000\$

The major slowdown is in the area of soybean seed and seed warehouse construction. Recommendations:

(1) Transfer at least 2 million from the soybean seed fund to a secondary Crop seed fund. Also emphasis should be removed from soybean production and centered on 2 Crop Rice and secondary crops. This is based on the many failure soybean farmers have had and a more realistic market price now prevailing.

(2) Site acquisition should be made soon for an early start on construction of the seed warehouse.

Rural Credit: Problems of rural credit exist, but MORD budget is not involved. There was no 1967 MORD budget and none is needed for 1968 except in the area of very low income groups such as refugees from war zones and very poor tenant farmers. Budget needed: Unknown.

Fisheries: A very small part of the MORD budget. For all practical purposes it is all spent or obligated. Production of fish in the provinces is up about 30% over last year. The budget for 1968 should be approximately the same as that for 1967.

Agriculture Machinery: No MORD budget for 1967 except 300,000\$ for POL. The only budget is ministry or USAID provided. 1968 should see a larger MORD input. MORD money should have been budgeted for replacement of some A.M.D. equipment.

Recommend that MORD input include 1 more barge and 16 replacement tractors. MORD budget should also buy at least 5 sets of complete attachments for tractors.

A school for tractor operators and mechanics should be conducted in 1968 with MORD funds.

Animal Husbandry: Progress to date is very satisfactory in this field. Approximately 90% of the NORD budget has been spent or is being spent. The full budget will have been used by the end of the year. Unspent funds are budgeted for a slaughter house, feed mill, pigs, and pay for village cadres. The pigs have been contracted, the slaughter house and the feed mill are planned to start in November and cadres are working. The loss of cadre from service control may severely affect this program next year.

Agriculture Economics: There was no NORD budget in 1967. It should be included for 1968 and should be aimed toward assistance in marketing and agriculture related industries. Implementing the development of transportation facilities for fish and farm produced commodities ranks high on the priority list.

Sericulture: To date two buildings, salaries for technical equipment and mulberry plantings have been made. In 1967 no progress has been made. It should be assessed as a total failure. This program seems to have had poor technical planning put into it. Buildings were located in low areas where flooding is a problem. The mulberry cuttings were planted in low marshy acid sulphate soils causing 90% loss of stand. Based on present findings, I suggest this program be discontinued and remaining funds be transferred to Chau Doc Province.

Chieu Hoi: The Chieu Hoi program in An Giang has not progressed to its fullest potential due largely to the lack of a full-time advisor to the service. An advisor was assigned 5 July 1967 and the program already shows improvement. However, the housing area has definitely been upgraded in recent months and outside observers regard the program as among the better ones in the Delta.

Lack of motivation and leadership qualities on the part of the Chieu Hoi Service Chief are a deterrent to more rapid progress. The assignment of a permanent advisor will improve matters and emphasis will continue to be placed in this field. Lack of interest in the program on the part of GVN officials is chronic, unfortunately.

Vocational training and job placement of Hoi Chanh are planned for the near future. We plan to continue to improve the Chieu Hoi Hamlet. However, expansion will be geared to the rate of returnees. The quality of instruction will be upgraded by having key personnel, civilian and military, participate in the political re-orientation of the Hoi Chanh.

RD Workers: An Giang Province started CY 1967 with seven 59-man RD Cadre teams. Three additional teams were added at the end of January. All teams were under-strength, and were not as effective as they could have been. Immediate problem involved an inefficient cadre chief and staff, poor operating procedures, and cadres who lacked motivation, initiative, and discipline. Immediate remedial action was taken in the form of personnel and procedural changes which, over a period of time, resulted in a much more disciplined and effective organization.

*Best  
missed  
on 1/1/68*

Rural Electrification: During the first half of 1967, final grading and placement of wood ties on the site has been completed, two 1500KW generators have been received and membership has increased from 7200 to 8000. Progress has been slow but engineers are beginning to stake lines and 1400 poles have been promised from military sources on a loan basis. Their arrival is imminent and work here should step up awy soon. This is a high priority program.

Public Safety: Program for 1967 include strengthening the physical facilities and equipment of the police. Items such as ammunition, boats and motors, vehicles, scooters, office supplies, office equipment, photographic equipment, and various other items have been received or are still programmed. Two district stations programmed for 1967 have not been built nor does it appear that they will be this year, USAID input for 1967 is \$117,990. US - \$69,400. US input is programmed for 1968 and commodity levels are to be reduced.

Personnel strength has increased from 980 to 1130 men but is still short of the 1289 authorized strength. Authorized strength is based on 3 policemen per 1000 population (1963 census). Today's population indicates authorized strength should be 1500 men. While the 3/1000 formula is accepted as adequate under normal circumstances, it is recommended that the formula be increased to 6/1000 until total pacification is realized. The police rendered surplus in this province by total pacification could then be used in other provinces as trained cadres.

Only 179 of the required 283 men are assigned at district level. Facilities at district level will be not support a greater number of police at this time.

*See comment on page 4*  
The number of assigned police vehicles has increased from 22 to 28. Authorized vehicle strength is 28. Four of these vehicles are assigned to districts. If the 6/1000 formula is approved, 8 additional vehicles will be required.

At the present time there is no highway patrol program. Such a program is badly needed and will become a necessity in the foreseeable future, with the rural electric power system almost a reality. With the institution of a patrol program, the authorized allowance for gasoline must be doubled from 144,000 liters per year to 288,000 liters per year (128 gallons per year per vehicle to 256 gallons per year per vehicle).

This program is less than a credit to either the U.S. or VN Governments. I intend to make the public Safety Program in An Giang a priority project for 1968. In so doing, the proposed budget for 1968 is woefully inadequate. For example, the following construction is needed: two headquarters buildings, records buildings; district and village stations; dependent housing at province, district and village level; dock facilities; and training facilities to include a firing range.

Long range problem centered on the fact that the criteria for cadre operations throughout the country did not apply here because of the extent of pacification in this province. We undertook the reorganization of the program to bring it in line with our needs. Our plans called for the breakdown of the 59-man groups into smaller, technically trained units which would be stationed in the village to serve as a task force servicing all the hamlet within the village. In May we received verbal approval to move ahead with our plan, the first phase of which called for the technical training of the cadres.

We had hoped to send 38 cadres (there are 38 village in An Giang) to the Philippines for community development training. They would serve as team leaders upon their return. In-province training was to have been arranged for the remainder of the cadres under the supervision of the Technical Services Center except for the medical cadres whom we intended to send to Vung Tau Training Center. The target date we set for the cadres to begin operations was 1 October 1967.

In June, NORD instructed the province officials to implement the reorganization by 1 August, and to integrate the Technical Services into the RD Cadre program. We took issue with this, but the NORD decision was implemented over our protests and new 20-man teams were sent to the villages on 28 July. Since there were not sufficient cadres to staff the new program, the NORD authorized the province to recruit 100 additional cadres who are currently at the National Training Center in Vung Tau where they will receive regular RD training. There are also 18 Hoi Chanh at the training Center who were recruited under a special program which has since been disbanded. These latter, therefore, will be integrated into the new cadre program.

As was expected, the TSC have become disaffected and some are threatening to resign rather than be integrated into the program. By the end of 1967 the cadres will have reached an estimated strength of over 700 which we think should be its maximum expansion until such time as it proves to be a highly effective program. In the meantime our emphasis will be on arranging technical training for the cadres, which we deem so necessary to attain any degree of success in the program.

Military Affairs: The Revolutionary Development program with respect to Military Affairs, has progressed well. The province continues to enjoy a high degree of security and a low VC initiated incident rate.

There are no Military programs in the RD plan. However several programs are worthy of mention at this time. The PF dependent housing program has completed 500 units in 1967. The lack of wood and commodities other than cement and tin roofing continue to hamper this activity. No information has been received concerning this province's share of the \$8.8 million allocated nationally for PF housing. Civic action by RF/PP units increases each month and RF/PP units and are now making a significant contribution in the province.

The force structure increase proposed for 1968 has been submitted and is adequate to provide security for economic development of the province.