

Mr. John Arthur, AAA/VN/ND

March 1, 1968

Earl J. Young, VN/ND/POD

Mr. Grant's Discussion with Ambassador Komer

The single most important question is: "Where do we go from here?"

It should be worthwhile to find out if Ambassador Komer has carte blanc to return to the previous RD/pacification program as soon as he is able, or if he has instructions to wait for a new appraisal from Washington.

In either case, Mr. Grant should get Komer's opinion as to the state of RD, present and future.

While it goes without saying that the American side is both willing and able to continue the march; what about the GVN officials from RD Team leaders to Province Chiefs? Are they willing and able to return to the previous program?

If the answer to the foregoing is "no", then what action does Ambassador Komer propose to take?

If RD is out, what are the contingency plans for the AID programs, funds and personnel now in place?

What is the impact of the assignment of the two new VN Corps Commanders?

On the premise that there will be a joint command, what impact does Komer think this will have on RD, if it is allowed to continue?

How does Komer evaluate the security situation now, especially in the Delta?

If we return to RD, can it exist in light of the more overt opposition by VC military units?

Does Komer see the U.S. military playing a more unilateral role in RD or RD-related programs?

Mr. John Arthur, AAA/VN/ND

March 1, 1968

Earl J. Young, VN/ND/POD

Mr. Grant's Input to Congressional Hearings

Based on AID-financed programs, it would seem that Mr. Grant should and could make the presentation and answer congressional inquiries on the following:

1. Chieu Hoi Program except
 - a. Employment, training, etc. of Armed Propaganda Teams (DOD)
 - b. Psychological warfare inducement-to-rally effort (DOD/USIA)
 - c. Kit Carson Scout Program (DOD)
 - d. Intelligence aspects of returnee debriefings (DOD)
2. International Voluntary Services.
3. Youth Program.
4. Transportation and Warehousing.
5. Relation of U.S. Military Civic Action to AID programs.
6. Asia Training Center.
7. Relationship of CORDS VN Training Center to AID Training.

TEXT of Saigon 20984

1. Herewith report week ending March 1 Mission Press Center activities non-military aspects U.S. operations, Vietnam, including USAID and CORDS Press Officers' efforts in support press center.

II. Emphases: In contacts with correspondents, all officers continued to stress four main points growing out of Tet Offensive:

- (1) No general uprising as VC sought
- (2) ARVN showed courage and effectiveness in many battles
- (3) GVN not only did not disintegrate but took hold to keep many services going
- (4) VC suffered large losses.

To buttress above themes, following additional factual points offered as evidence

1. GVN ability to maintain large refugee camps with food, shelter, health services shows organizations and will to meet this crucial human problem:
2. No city outside of Hue suffering from food or medical shortages: water shortages such as Phan Thiet being met by emergency offshore shipments
3. GVN efforts are well underway to help refugees, evacuees begin rebuilding through indemnification grants.
4. GVN has maintained High level of curfew-bolstered security in cities, especially Saigon, and re-opened many main routes thus helping prices some foodstuffs to drop to pre-Tet levels:
5. Actual construction of new housing in burned-out areas beginning
6. GVN moves to draft eligible youth, and former veterans, stopping luxury construction, closing of bars, night clubs are evidence newer hard-nosed approach.
7. Similarly, replacement of commanders for II and IV Corps noted as moves to strengthen security posture.
8. On enemy efforts, failure of VC to mount second-wave attacks evidence of serious losses they suffered although we continue concede second-cycle a possibility.

9. While vacuum may exist in many parts of countryside, strong evidence at hand that VC unable not fill in this vacuum.
 10. RD program, despite serious setbacks, far from finished and beginning to return to former positions.
 11. No instances of any serious or large-scale defections of ARVN, Hoi Chanh or other forces to VC.
- III. Problems: Despite this correspondents still cynical about GVN ability to meet challenge. They point
1. To apparent widening split between Thieu-Ky
 2. Stress evident repression, lack of unity and self-confidence stemming from arrests of leaders
 3. Argue no real effort being made to halt corruption, digging out incidents of incompetence
 4. Ineffectiveness province chiefs
 5. Note apparent failure of allies to mount military offensive
 6. Repeating and embellishing stories of ARVN looting
 7. Pointing to allied bombing as major cause destruction of homes, industries
 8. Criticizing "disappearance" of RD program.

Washington obviously aware these problems from its knowledge of U.S. press which we attempting to counter but we are limited as to factual evidence we can adduce against these broad, interpretive criticisms which often are based on sufficient facts to provide an element of validity.

IV. Solutions:

1. Apart from stressing positive aspects mentioned paragraph 2, press center actively seeking out upbeat stories countryside giving continuing support aforementioned themes.
2. Also digging out VC atrocity stories wherever available.
3. Better communications with field reps being explored not only to elicit stories but to give guidance on candid, factual lines to use with visiting correspondents who now are beginning to fan out to provinces.
4. Preparing list of RD situations showing both good and bad and pointing correspondents toward both

5. Briefing returning field reps and province senior advisors on continuing press contact efforts that will reflect factual situation.

6. Also urging military, both US and ARVN, to present genuine heroes in uniform in effort to build up emotional response and show that our forces are neither dispirited nor apathetic but a courageously affective (see last item paragraph 6)

7. We are frank to admit obvious dilemma of need to balance our forces between cities and countryside but our confidence in ability to defend cities seems justified in apparent inability of VC to take advantage of post-offensive uncertainty and dislocation. While correspondents have reported rife rumor of US-VC collusion, few if any have accepted it and it appears to have gone the way of similar earlier canards.

8. Some stories of alleged Chieu Hoi re-defections beginning to surface but efforts already underway to provide solid documentation putting in perspective.

V. Actions: Daily MPC auditorium briefings stress GVN and USG response in areas of food, health, reconstruction, security. Press releases underscored U.S. faith in recovery and future of SVN agriculture by signing new \$33,000,000 fertilizer agreement. Also described food distribution programs which steadily bringing down prices.

LEVERAGE

DRAFT

I. DEFINITION

Leverage is a controlled form of political intervention with specific objectives understood by both sides. The function of leverage systems is to reduce instances where frustration causes extreme choices, i.e. inaction versus unilateral U.S. action.

II. LEVERAGE ESSENTIAL IN 5 AREAS

1. Promote effective government performance primarily rural performance.
2. Promote integrity (diversion and corruption problem) within government
3. Raise quality of government leadership - reward and removal system
4. Adoption of sensible government policies
 - Resources allocations
 - Anti-corruption
5. Protection of specific U.S. interests
 - Mobilization

III. INSTRUMENTS FOR INFLUENCE - "LEVERS"

1. Withholding U.S. support - i.e. denial helicopters/funds/stop CIP
2. Retention of Resources in U.S. Channels - with distribution to government at utilization point.

3. Joint Command - integration of US/GVN/FWF forces - civil/military
4. Control over counterpart funds - national and province level - project agreements/provincial sign off
5. Joint Planning - U.S. input to government planning - civil/military
6. Contingency funds and special resources - U.S. control for performance incentives
7. Joint Inspection Audit - accounting for resource expenditures - punishment
8. High level insertion of special Americans in key positions of authority
9. Rapport - personal relationships - least reliable/transferable form
10. Joint Personnel Management - for career incentive/selection/removal

IV. PRINCIPLES OF LEVERAGE

1. Must apply at every level - central/regional/provincial/district
2. Cannot apply to programs/actions of little interest to GVN
3. Must be done skillfully, consistently with willful determination
4. Must be flexible and evolving new techniques/approaches to GVN counteractions
5. Must have specific objectives understood by both sides.

EXAMPLE

/ Lao Cluster Program installed without knowledge or approval of RLG. Entire program, projects, material, personnel under US field managers. At first,

Lao complained but after year, joined in.

2. *Commercial Budgets of 1963-1964-1965 (US includes P's Kennedy)*

V. PROBLEMS WITH NON-LEVERAGE

1. MAP and AID resources turned over at port unrelated to specific performance due to fear of infringement of sovereignty.
2. Different U.S. agencies control different programs and resources each with different concept on how to win war and each having different accountability requirements.
3. Multiplicity of programs with no priorities has overloaded Vietnamese circuit
4. U.S. failure to delegate sufficient authority to field province level
5. U.S. Advisors judged on rapport rather than results. Objectives not spelled out for performance.
6. Unilateral actions by various U.S. tactical forces overshadow advisory effort.
7. Too much top management time spent on minor problems due to lack of GVN-US middle management decision points.