

22 November 1965

On Cadre Working Group

From: KANAROWSKI, MAC-V J 33

1. CADRE DECREE: The present wording of the draft rural construction decree is not offensive to MACV, though it is distant from the type of detailed instructions that should go to the field for 1966 pacification planning and programming. The statement in Article 4 that a detailed Rural Construction Ministry instruction will be published provides a loophole for General Thang's cadre planners to create impractical or unworkable cadre sub-teams. It appears that U.S. Agency experience in cadre organization and operating techniques substantially exceeds that of the GVN; this experience should be made available to General Thang on a continuous basis until a detailed, jointly acceptable cadre decree or instruction is obtained. MACV's position in this regard is as follows:

- a. In view of past difficulties in obtaining GVN action on the reorganization of cadre operations, the present efforts should result in a decree which adequately meets all aspects of the cadre problem.
- b. The CAS PAT program should become an integral part of the cadre program, and PAT's should be integrated into the rural construction cadre organization.
- c. Vietnamese from the areas to be pacified should be recruited for the cadre organization. Priority should be given, in training, to personnel for the jointly agreed upon "priority areas".
- d. The GVN cadre organization instructions should provide for the tailoring of teams to meet local situations.

2. FUTURE GVN ACTIONS: In view of General Thang's earnest approach to the 1966 Rural Construction Program, his stated intention to have 1966 funds to the provinces by 1 January, and his comment at the joint Mission Council/CRCC meeting two weeks ago that a rural construction cadre decree would be published in December, we should expect Major Ngoc and Mr. Nghi to continue to work on cadre organizations and functions. Lt. Col. Chau's plan for village pacification may provide a basis for their work. MACV has a copy of this plan.

3. U.S. FUTURE ACTION: U.S. actions should focus on the RC Ministry cadre instructions referred to in Article 4 of the draft; the following points are of interest and concern to MACV:

- a. How the cadre teams will function in the context of FWMAP units, ARVN, RF, PF and National Police operations?

No foreign

Inclosure 2.

- b. How are the cadre teams to be organized?
- c. What type of administrative, logistical, and training support will be required?
- d. How should the U.S. support this program -- funds, equipment, advisors, instructions to the field etc.?

4. WORKING GROUP: Until such time as a single agency takes over the cadre program, the MLG/CWG or some equivalent joint committee should continue to seek solutions in the areas outlined above. SLO chairmanship is desired and full agency participation is absolutely essential. The following specific group objectives could be set:

- a. An acceptable and detailed RC Ministry cadre letter of instruction.
- b. An examination of proposals for U.S. support of the program to include funding, training, equipment, and advisors.
- c. A joint mission directive on cadre operations as a guide for U.S. agency field advisors.

Signed: STANLEY M. KAMAROWSKI JR
Captain, Armor
J33, MACV

CADRE IMPROVEMENT PLANNING AS OF 11/22/65
Status Report for USOM and Cadre Work Group

This draft is intended for USOM review preparatory to being submitted later today as a contribution to the Cadre Work Group's report to the Mission Liaison Group and as a working paper for further collaboration with Rural Construction Ministry staff.

A. CURRENT SITUATION

An overall decree on cadre personnel has now been issued. It establishes standard base pay, benefits etc., and provides a framework for special cadre decrees.

The draft special decree on rural construction cadres, after general agreement by Work Group representatives in conference with RC Ministry staff members (Maj. Ngoc, Mr. Nghi etc.), has gone to Gen. Thang for approval and, hopefully, forwarding to the Prime Minister for issuance.

Cadre

In order to move ahead promptly on organization and operating procedures the RC staff has invited the Work Group to meet with it again on 11/29. In preparation for this, the CWG Chairman is to submit a progress report for consideration by the Mission Liaison Group on 11/24/65.

B. IMPROVEMENTS ATTAINED OR ANTICIPATED

1. In the past several months, the cadre problem has received higher priority attention from GVN and the US Mission. The old Rural Construction Directorate was raised to the status of a Ministry and now there is a Deputy Prime Min. as coordinator. On the US side there has been more interagency collaboration including attention by the Mission Liaison Group and establishment of a Cadre Work Group with members from CAS, Embassy, JUSPAO, MACV Sr. Liaison Group and USOM. AID/W also shows growing interest.

2. The General Decree on Cadre, with its more adequate and equitable remuneration, promises to minimize one of the real handicaps of the past. Also it provides better recruitment standards, including de-emphasis on formal education and emphasis on ability as demonstrated during training.

Improvements in the Offing

3. The draft RC decree will achieve a long sought goal -- integration into one Rural Construction Cadre category of the three separate government administration groups -- NLH, Mobile Admin. & Rural Political cadres. It may also provide special incentives for RC cadre such as draft deferment, risk allowances and extra leadership allowances.

4. We can expect transfer into Rural Construction of the CAS - supported cadre (PAT, APA & Census of Grievance) which have been outside

of the regular structure of government. This should facilitate coordination with other cadre and better utilization of the training center and staff at Vung Tau and the CAS administrative and logistics support capabilities.

5. Relevant training for key jobs is receiving increased recognition. For example, at the Prime Minister's behest, NIA graduates are being mobilized and given special indoctrination in RC leadership. Fourteen have been transferred to RCM to strengthen its staff. Some 30 or 40 will be promoted to district chief positions. Military district chiefs will be given special orientation in political and administrative affairs. Also JUSPAO's brand of on-the-job training is becoming more appreciated and on-the-job coaching and motivation are expected to be part of the pre-selection training of many cadres.

6. Inter-agency collaboration among US agencies concerned with cadre should continue to become closer and more systematic. Working relationships with counterparts should also become closer and better balanced.

C. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT

Between GVN and US

1. The main problem is a basic one -- the concept of how best to organize and use cadres in a typical locality. The following tendencies appear:

<u>GVN Side</u>	<u>vaguely conceived</u>	<u>US Side</u>
a. A more or less fixed sequence of steps is held to be the pacification process eg., (1) Armed political action (2) Survey, (3) Civil Affairs Action (4) Mass Organization.		A flexible approach tailored to local situations and available resources, but based on valid principles and practical methods.
b. Development phase might be postponed although RC staff agreed to insert it in draft #7.		Development would always be included; in fact, would be the main target.
c. Large groups of 50-70 consisting of standard elements for each of the above. Presumably sub groups would be deployed in various ways.		Small teams of about 12 accustomed to working together and supplemented by other elements as necessary and feasible.
d. Considerable specialization within the elements, eg., (1) Mass Organization or "Motivation of the People" would be handled by a separate organization.		Greater versatility within elements. Involvement of the people would be part and parcel of civil affairs and development functions.

e. Self-defense capabilities would be an integral part of each group (ie. 40-man PATs)

Self-defense might often^{be} by auxiliaries placed under RC command temporarily. They might come from Popular Forces etc. in addition to PATs.

f. Information cadre would remain under Psy War Ministry.

Transfer of these cadre to RCM is recommended by MLG.

Comments on what to do about these differences are included in D below.

Differences Among Elements of the US Mission

2. The main intra-US difference so far has pertained to strategy and timing -- Whether to make a strong stand in favor of the US approach and, if so, whether to make it prior to issuance of the RC cadre decree, which states the cadre missions in such a way as to imply the organization and sequence of pacification operations. Those who feel most strongly that the GVN approach is fundamentally mistaken have been most prone to favor an early and strong stand. They acceded to the majority (including USOM), however, who felt the draft leaves room for maneuvering during later stages and that the issue can be better resolved in the course of planning for actual operations. Only the fact that the development function was inserted by the RC staff made this compromise possible.

3. Among the US agencies there appear to be a few differences of emphasis on substantive questions. For example:

- a. Should PAT forces be preserved as relatively separate and self-contained elements?

USOM believes PATs' present assets and essential techniques should be preserved. If, while assuring this, the PAT elements can be operationally blended in with the local government construction teams that will be advantageous to both types. Also individual cadre should be subject to selection and transfer back and forth. These are matters for experimentation and there should be flexible allowance for such.

- b. Should we press for the recommended action to transfer information cadre into MRC? (C-1-f above).

USOM still favors such a transfer but does not regard a delay as serious. If there is strong objection within GVN to a mass transfer we recommend facilitating individual transfers by recruitment.

D. COURSES OF ACTION TO RESOLVE GVN - US DIFFERENCES

1. Some move might conceivably still be attempted, ^{to} get the RC cadre decree postponed until the problem in C-1 can be resolved. No CWG members, however, appears to favor this now.
2. As to the future, one course would be to take no joint action on the C-1 problem. In that event, normal contacts by separate US agencies might have some effect during implementation stages. Such separate contacts, if not guided by an agreed position, may also prove confusing to counterparts.
3. The remaining course would be for the agencies, presumably through the CWG and MIG, to adopt a mission position. The question would still remain how firm and vigorous a stand to take and by what means.

USOM is inclined, first, to find out more about why General Thang favors his approach and how it would be likely to work out in practice; then we probably would recommend joint pursuit of the agreed US position by a variety of strategies short of getting tough. One strategy would be to urge experimentation on the part of GVN. Later on, if it became quite obvious that a decree or regulation has to be changed, we would work toward that end.

E. PROBLEMS AHEAD AND METHODS OF ATTACKING THEM.

Questions Oriented to the American Side

1. How can the US Mission be most helpful to HCM in its cadre improvement effort?

Rather than attempting to answer this now, USOM will say that a more complete answer is important and suggest that CWG should propose guide-lines in both immediate and long range terms.

2. What will be the operational and policy roles of USOM in the reformed cadre effort?

This can be answered more soundly in light of the answer to No. 1. The role will undoubtedly be very substantial, however, and we must give it high priority in planning and in mobilizing resources, especially

- economic support for the increased cost of cadre manpower
- technician support for manpower planning, training and guidance toward the long range strengthening of local government.

3. How should the special contributions and available resources of the five participating US agencies be mobilized and coordinated toward improvement of Cadre?

USOM believes in utilizing them all; even the combined resources will not be sufficient. As to the method of organizing this joint effort we shall merely list at this time the alternatives that come to mind:

- a. Bilateral US-GVN operations by individual agencies acting independently (eg., CAS with PATs, USOM with other RC cadres; JUSPAO with Psy War type Cadres)
- b. No. a except with normal US Mission coordination.
- c. No. b with the continuation or increase of special coordinating mechanisms such as the present Work Group or a permanent task force.
- d. Establishment of an interagency cadre project -- essentially a manpower commission-- headed by a joint command, and transfer of agency responsibilities to it.
- e. Consolidation in one operating agency -- USOM no doubt -- of virtually all responsibility for the cadre effort, with other US agencies transferring resources to it (eg., technical advisers and equipment for training), detailing personnel and lending facilities to it, and/or participating in a committee which is advisory to it.

4. How should Prov. Ops. bring other USOM divisions into more meaningful participation in cadre planning and management?

Certainly they have a stake and a contribution. The work of technical cadre will loom larger and larger as the development stage is reached.

Questions Oriented to the GVN side.

5. How can the US side deal more meaningfully with GVN individuals who are really the policy makers?

We have tended to spend our time getting a meeting of mind with people down the line who ideas do not then prevail up the line. Probably this cannot be resolved until a prestigious GVN officer is definitely put in charge of cadre.

6. How does pacification or rural construction actually occur -- what main lines of action take place -- in representative situations?

We have not spelled out a concept that can be understood by US agencies, let alone shared as a common goal to be pursued with counterparts. Perhaps, like a religious concept, this is something to be pursued rather than ever attained, but the pursuit should be more systematic.

USCOM urges that a small US/GVN working team try to prepare a joint description of the pacification process for reference at least as a point of departure.

7. What are the main stages of development and sequences of action confronting MRC during the transition?

A practical, down-to-earth formulation of these, should be initiated by GVN and reviewed by the US side, (starting 11/29) It may then be evaluated and broken down into manageable projects. We should try to ensure that reasonable provision is made for:

- Mission and program definitions.
- Requirements estimates and resources mobilization
- Functional definitions and organization orders -- local, provincial, regional (?) central.
- Manpower management: recruitment, selection, training, assignment, utilization, recognition, promotion, records, benefits, separation.
- Logistical support.
- Staffing the bureaucracy to handle all these.
- Operational methods, procedures, communication.
- Internal coordination and management development in MRC.
- Relationships with others GVN agencies at all levels; orienting others so as to further coordination.
- Evaluation of results and continuous improvement of programming and operations.

8. What multiplier steps can be gotten under way soon, e.g.:

a. Identifying leadership and instructor talent and getting selected individuals into training even while other plans are still amorphous. (eg (1) The 14 transferees from the NIA seminar are to start orientation training on November 30 to become inspectors or headquarters staff members. (2) Last August a group of potential leader-instructors

were selected and brought together for a time. Should they now be re-assembled? (3) The first of a series of seminars for military district chiefs will start in mid-December. How can it be made most useful toward NC improvement? (4) Interior's provincial training directors have been doing some cadre training as well as village and hamlet officials training. How can their experience, materials and abilities be tapped?

b. Setting up immediately a training assistance team (eg., under JUSPAO leadership with contributions from CAS, Public Administration, MACV and others) and getting a two-year training program launched. Promoting GVN organization for training on an inter-agency basis.

c. Initiating steps to bring in additional technical advisers and perhaps to arrange for 3rd country participant training.

d. Getting a small management analysis and procedures staff for MRC into training if NIA can arrange such training.

e. Asking the Public Administration Division for additional input such as (1) development of a special program for training administrative specialist cadre to serve as counterparts of village chiefs, and (2) guiding Interior toward close collaboration with MRC at all levels including the sharing of training facilities.

9. What is the actual cadre manpower situation, province by province; what are the assets to be preserved, the priority needs, and the resources to be mobilized?

This seems to call for a survey at least on a sample basis.

10. How can we re-direct MRC's tendency (characteristic of VN agencies) to plan on building new training facilities etc., and doing everything from scratch rather than to mobilize and use available resources? Also how can we prevent a head-long, blanket approach to training in favor of an approach occasionally expressed which is more pragmatic and better calculated to preserve present values and gain province chiefs' support?
11. In the most immediate terms, how shall GVN/US fill the serious gaps in cadre for the widening areas now being cleared by successful military action? Must we have an emergency stop-gap program in addition to a longer range one?
12. Looking to the future, can the Mission, USOM and the Public Administration Division in particular, develop fairly soon:
- a. A GVN/US series of goals pertaining to citizen participation, local government structure, and national-local relations so that cadres, MRC

officials, Interior and other officials can have something definite to work toward in these subject areas?

b. A GVN/US design for evolution from the present patchwork of cadre and other personnel schemes and the present multiplicity of national-local organization schemes to more rational systems of personnel and organization?

Ivan Asay USOM/OP&PAD 11/23/65

November 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM ON CADRE WORKING GROUP

FROM: Undeland, JUSPAO

This memo is in response to your memo of November 18, 1965.

1. The draft statute on Rural Construction cadres, as it emerged from the joint meeting of November 18, marks a potentially significant step forward. It contains the basic elements, combined with flexibility, for an effective RC cadre program. A few improvements could be made, but these should not become points of issue between the U.S. and CVM, as they are not of central importance, can be better dealt with later in more specific planning and by being raised could jeopardize acceptance of the draft statute. It should be wholly accepted without change by the U.S. Mission.

2. MRC planners who attended the joint November 18 meeting stated that once the cadre statute is approved, they will work on operational and organizational plans to implement the provisions of the statute. The subsequent step is to assure that training and retraining will adequately prepare RC cadres to perform the required tasks. They indicated the desire to work closely with the U.S. advisory effort in this planning. It is difficult to say how long this planning will take, but probably at least a month. The Vietnamese approach seems logical and valid.

3. It is important that decisions be now made on the nature of the U.S. advisory effort henceforth. The CWG has been useful in airing ideas and positions of U.S. agencies, in arriving at considerable agreement and in communicating and dealing with the Ministry. However, there are some important differences of opinion within the CWG, and as planning becomes more detailed, it is essential that the U.S. speaks to the MRC on cadre matters with one voice.

A solution is to assign complete advisory responsibility on cadres to one operating agency of the U.S. Mission, with the mandate to draw on personnel and resources of other agencies as needed. Another solution lies in strengthening the CWG and having it the focal point for coordinating inputs of the different U.S. agencies. At the present time, the latter appears to pose problems which the single agency solution would avoid, and perhaps in the long run, the committee formula might prove less manageable.

4. JUSPAO will support the fullest possible extent improving the RC cadre program, as regards planning, training and execution. Two aspects upon which success of these cadres will largely depend is their motivation and the psychological impact they make on the rural population. In both of these areas, JUSPAO has had experience that should prove useful.

MEMORANDUM

November 22, 1965.

On Cadre Working Group

From: Dick Holbrooke

1. During the joint meetings between the cadre sub-committee and the staff of the Ministry of Rural Construction, in a free give-and-take atmosphere, the Vietnamese adopted many specific changes in their draft according to our suggestions, and in turn explained much of their own thinking. The final product, as agreed upon at the conclusion of the second session, may not have been perfect; it did constitute a version which we find basically acceptable. On some points of importance, the draft is sufficiently vague so as to allow flexibility of future action; this is preferable to a specific formula which would be premature.

The implications of the GVN draft are primarily dependent on factors not exposed in the draft itself. Is GVN thinking too rigid and authoritarian? Is the GVN headed in the direction of substituting coercion and regimentation for the more difficult but also more enduring attempt to gain the support of the population? There are warning signals that the answer to both questions may turn out to be yes, but if this is true, the solution does not depend on the rewording of the draft decree, but rather on direct discussions with the Minister of Rural Construction and other high-ranking officials.

2. & 3. The GVN has indicated that they wish to continue their discussions with us on the detailed operational documents concerning the use of cadre in pacification. Mr. Nghi asked us for a draft containing our preliminary ideas. Our next task is to respond to this request. I think that this will take on added significance when Col. Chau arrives from Ben Tre to take up his duties and should be taken up by the combined team mentioned in para 4 below.

4. The ultimate objective of our efforts should be to produce a combined US advisory effort in the field of cadre training and operations. OSA, JUSPAO, USOM, and MACV all have resources which would be of greater value in such a combined approach than they are in their present fragmented form. Given the experience and the resources that can be brought to bear we believe that USOM and OSA with the assistance of all other mission elements should be given the responsibility.

POL:RHolbrooke:ajjo