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BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS

SPECIAL ISSUE:
Vietnam Center
at SIU



Eqbal Ahmad

Gabriel Kolko
Douglas Dowd
Arthur Waskow

David G. Marr
Nina Adams
Huynh Kim Khanh

Ngo Vinh Long
Stanley K. Sheinbaum

and others

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

C. Harvey Gardiner is Distinguished Research Professor of History at Southern Illinois University. Robert G. Layer, an economist, was recently appointed Chancellor of the Carbondale campus of SIU. Douglas Allen teaches Asian philosophy at SIU. David Marr is Assistant Professor of Vietnamese Studies at Cornell and is the author of a forthcoming book on Vietnamese anti-colonialism, 1885-1925, to be published by the University of California Press. Nina Adams is a doctoral candidate in Vietnamese history at Yale and co-editor of *Laos: War and Revolution* (Harper and Row, December 1970). Ngo Vinh Long is a doctoral candidate in Vietnamese history at Harvard, and the editor of *Thoi Bao Ga*, newsletter of anti-war Vietnamese students in the United States. Huynh Kim Khanh is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Western Ontario University; his principal writings are on the history of colonialism and neo-colonialism in Vietnam. Gabriel Kolko, Professor of History at York University, leading historian of American foreign policy, is the author of *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (Random House, 1968) and several other books; he is currently at work on a history of postwar American foreign policy to be published by Harper and Row in late 1971. Earl Martin is in Vietnamese studies at Stanford and has lived in Vietnam for three years. Al McCoy, a national co-ordinator of the CCAS, is in Japanese and Southeast Asian studies at Yale and is co-editor of *Laos: War and Revolution*. Stanley K. Sheinbaum, an economist at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, was formerly campus director of the Michigan State University Project in Vietnam. Arthur Waskow is a Resident Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies and the author of *The Limits of Defense* (Doubleday, 1962), *The Worried Man's Guide to World Peace* (Doubleday, 1963) and other works. Douglas Dowd is Professor of Economics at Cornell University. Eqbal Ahmad is a Fellow at the Adlai Stevenson Institute, University of Chicago.

February 1970	Center. Cops club students, arrest 19.	Illinois Central trains. 1200 National Guardsmen occupy campus, hundreds of injuries and arrests. Campus votes in administration-sponsored referendum to eliminate Center.
	Over 3000 students march chanting "Off AID." Downtown Carbondale is trashed. National Guard is called in.	
	History Department dissociates itself from Center: "Fiscal and administrative involvement with the Center poses a threat to academic freedom."	August 1970
April 1970	More student protests against Center.	
May 4, 1970	Four students shot dead at Kent State.	October 16, 1970
Mid-May, 1970	<i>SIU is shut down by a storm of student protest.</i> Viet Center and Fishel's home are firebombed. 6000 students march on SIU president's office, others stop	October 23-24, 1970
		November 1970
		Cambodian lobbyists spend week at SIU, auspices Milton Sacks.

communications

Tong-Hoi Sinh-Vien
 Saigon Students Union
 207 - Hong Bang, Saigon

Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars
 Harvard Chapter, U.S.A.

Dear Friends,

It is for us—students from the Saigon Students' Union—a great pleasure to make the acquaintance of the CCAS, through one of your colleagues, Miss Cynthia Fredrick.

The South Vietnamese students, who for seven months have committed themselves to a bitter struggle for peace and self-determination in their country, wish to express their great admiration and their profound acknowledgement of all that your committee has done on behalf of the Vietnamese people.

We are sending you some documents which we have recently published in the hope that they might be of some use to you.

We also hope to get to know you better and establish more solid ties with your committee in order to promote common efforts in the struggle for peace and justice to all peoples.

Fraternally,
 Huynh Tan Man
 President, Saigon Student Union

United States Senate
 Committee on Foreign Relations
 Washington, D.C.
 September 29, 1970

Mr. James Morrell
 Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars
 1737 Cambridge Street
 Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Morrell:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of September 14 concerning Section 211(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act. As you know, the language of this section is quite broad and general and the legislative history does not shed much light on what types of activities are contemplated for financing under the provision. I question, however, whether there was any intent to authorize assistance to universities for purely academic studies which are not directly related to, or intended to have application to, foreign development programs.

Sincerely yours,
 J. W. Fulbright,
 Chairman

preliminary note

On October 17, 1970 a group of aging businessmen--successful bankers, merchandisers and jobbers in the small towns of southern Illinois--summoned Instructor Douglas Allen of SIU to one of their meetings. They told him that as of June 30, 1971, he would no longer teaching philosophy to the students of SIU. "Mr. Allen has criticized the university and the public knows it," explained the octogenarian chairman of the SIU Board of Trustees. "The Board felt it was to the best interest of the university not to have people of that caliber on the faculty. If Mr. Allen is unhappy at the university, we see no reason why he should want to stay and teach there."

Does anyone have a job for Mr. Allen?

During the same meeting the Board voted without comment to rescind a scheduled salary increase for Distinguished Research Professor of History C. Harvey Gardiner. All of the other members of the History Department received their scheduled increases.

What had Messrs. Allen and Gardiner done to merit such an impressive display of academic statesmanship by the SIU council of elders? The answer is essentially contained within the papers submitted by them to this special issue of the *Bulletin*. They had dared to criticize--publicly, insistently, and emphatically--the presence of the AID-funded Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs on the SIU campus and had called for its elimination.

Obviously, they had done the wrong thing. They had exercised their right of free speech and in so doing had displeased the small-time businessmen to whom are entrusted the destinies of a major American university. But on October 23, they were joined by some 20 noted scholars of Vietnamese and Asian affairs--including Eqbal Ahmad, who has since become the victim of a much more severe and bizarre form of repression--who gathered at SIU to dissect the Center for Vietnamese Studies and the motivations of AID for funding it. Their findings are presented in the following pages.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE VIET CENTER: From Vietnam Lobby to Cambodian Lobbyists

July 1950.....Wesley Fishel meets Ngo Dinh Diem in a Tokyo tearoom, brings him to United States. Vietnam Lobby is underway.

July 1954.....Diem becomes Premier of South Vietnam.

August 1954.....	Fishel goes to Saigon to advise Diem.
May 1955-1962	Michigan State Advisory Group buys guns for Diem, fronts for CIA. Project is sponsored by ICA (AID's predecessor agency) and headed by Fishel (1956-58).
May 1961	SIU gets \$2 million in AID contracts for education programs in Vietnam. Over 4000 Vietnamese are trained in American ways of education, including 200 province chiefs (high government officials sent out by Saigon).
June 1962	SIU undertakes to train South Vietnamese prison officials for AID.
April 1966	<i>Ramparts</i> exposes Michigan State scandal.
November 1968	Richard M. Nixon goes to Washington as President of the United States.
February 1969	John Hannah, President of Michigan State, goes to Washington as Nixon's new AID Administrator.
May 1969	Fishel goes to Carbondale.
July 1, 1969	Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs at SIU becomes operational.
July 11, 1969	AID announces \$1 million grant to Center "for economic and social development of Vietnam and its post-war reconstruction."
August 1969	Milton Sacks, Brandeis, ex-State Department, goes to Carbondale to advise Center.
October 1969	H. B. Jacobini, ex-AID Grant Officer but lacking academic background in Vietnamese studies, becomes Director of Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs.
November 1969	David Marr dissociates himself from Center.
January 1970	SIU Philosophy Department votes not to hire faculty through Center.
	<i>First student protests against</i>

Stonybrook, New York
October 23, 1970

Doug Allen
Dept. of Philosophy
SIU
Carbondale, Ill. 62901

I oppose all obstacles to the free pursuit of Vietnam-

ese studies. The SIU Vietnam Center is born of AID the spirit of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The Center is therefore detrimental to free Vietnamese studies. I urge all students of Vietnam to work for immediate total U.S. disengagement from Vietnam. Effort should not be cynically spent devising "reconstruction"--a task exclusively Vietnamese.

Truong Buu Lam

Letters of Resignation

and Statements of Dissociation from the Center

October 31, 1970

H. B. Jacobini
Director, Center for Vietnamese Studies
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, Illinois

Dear Sir:

It has been almost four years since I went to Vietnam. In 1967 I already knew enough about the war to refuse to fight in it, but I wanted to go there, to see what it was all about with my own eyes. So I joined the International Voluntary Services and travelled, lived, and worked for a year with many different Americans and Vietnamese.

For a good part of that year I lived in a village of peasant farmers on a large island in the Mekong River. Although fighting sometimes broke out on both sides of the river, the island itself was a peaceful sanctuary from the war. The Vietnamese helped me build a small thatch house, and I spent my days working in their fields, fishing the canals with them, and struggling to relate to them through a language I could barely understand.

At times I felt more accepted among those people than I did among my own. It was ironic, because at the same time I was beginning to feel a great sense of guilt for what my country and my people were doing to them. The wanton destruction of towns and villages, the racism and brutality of the GI's, the corrupting power of our wealth, the cynicism, opportunism, and repressed despair--these things filled me with a kind of sick outrage. But whenever I cursed the Americans for what they had done, I heard the Vietnamese cursing me. I began to see that the soldier who pulls the trigger is not the only one who kills; I was implicated, too, for in merely doing "my thing" I had unwittingly become a minor but useful cog in the machinery of a war fought on many different levels. Many of us in IVS were fiercely idealistic, and all of us were, I think, supremely well-intentioned. But our effective purpose was to make the Vietnamese and the folks back home complacent about

the American presence in Vietnam. A fellow volunteer, who died because he spoke his mind, put it best of all: regardless of what each of us hoped to accomplish by coming to Vietnam, he said, we were all together little more than a "sugar-coating on American genocide."

I left Vietnam because I could not in good conscience stay. When I returned home, I found many people who could understand why I left, but very few who could appreciate the intense longing I had to return. For six months I travelled around describing what I had seen and come to believe about Vietnam. I met lots of people distressed, resentful, and passionately opposed to the killing. But few of them took more than passing interest in the life of the Vietnamese.

This was natural, I told myself, since Americans' exposure to things Vietnamese is limited mainly to the 6 o'clock news. Whether hawk or dove, Americans tend to reduce the Vietnamese to two stereotypes: the corrupt, cynical politician epitomized by Nguyen Cao Ky, and the terrified refugee scrambling from the ruins of his burned-out home.

But I knew individuals in Vietnam. The old carpenter who helped me build a house and taught me Chinese characters; the priest who had fought with the Vietminh; the farmer who refused to talk to me; the men who cried when I left; the old woman singing a nonsense lullaby to her granddaughter in the hammock next door--these were the Vietnamese in my mind. Preoccupied with their world, I could not tune in to what was happening here. And I realized that, once one has lived in Vietnam, there is no satisfactory way of relating to it except by going back to live again.

Going back, however, would have to wait until after the war. I knew I would not return as long as Americans were there in force. But in 1968 there was still hope (now abandoned) that some Americans would be allowed back in, even if the NLF were to gain complete control. In the meantime, then, I decided to go back to school to study agriculture and community development.

About a year after I came to SIU, the Vietnam Center appeared on campus. I was invited to sit in on some of the initial "task force" committee meetings. Although a couple of people seemed to share my concerns, it was clear that the Center's main inspiration was coming from men more interested in what Vietnam could do for SIU than what SIU could do for Vietnam. Ostensibly they were looking for ways to help the Vietnamese. In fact they were looking for ways to capitalize on eight years of technical assistance programs in Vietnam--no small edge when it comes to competing with other universities for lucrative government contracts.

With this as their starting point, Center promoters were not about to raise any serious moral or political issues. No one thought it necessary to ask whether or not Americans had a right, or even a capacity, to do anything *for* the Vietnamese, considering what we had already done *to* them. No one bothered to ask how the university could develop a respectable or independent relationship with a country embroiled in civil war, where no authority had a clear claim to act in behalf of the country as a whole. No one seemed to think any additional problems were raised by the fact that our government has intervened massively in support of one of the warring factions. Did the Vietnamese even accept the idea of such a relationship? No one even knew how to begin asking such a question, and no one had any idea of what would constitute a meaningful answer. What about North Vietnam? The NLF? Because these questions were thought irrelevant, it was reasonable to conclude, as I did, that the Center's functioning presupposed and depended upon preservation of American influence in Vietnam.

It was not until the AID grant was announced that I realized the reverse of this was also true: the preservation and strengthening of American influence in Vietnam depended in part upon setting up Centers like the one at SIU. My own experience with AID was enough to assure me that the funding reeked of ulterior motive. And it was clear from the task force meeting I attended that the Center originally planned to involve itself in "technical assistance," and that only when the Center's critics complained did it retreat back into a "strictly academic" role. But the dispute over the Center's exact function obscured the real significance of the AID grant. The Center may stick to academics as its spokesmen insist, but the AID grant continues to symbolize a willingness on the part of the University as a whole to cooperate with the Government in the manipulation and exploitation of the Vietnamese people. While the Center tends to its studies, other parts of the University will carry out programs and fulfill contracts that might not have come their way if the Center were not here.

As for the Center itself, I can have little confidence in its scholarly or academic "integrity." Language and

culture courses may be taught fairly and critically, but the value of the knowledge they impart depends in part upon the uses to which the knowledge is put. If, as I believe, the Vietnam Center is part of a University-wide plan to cash in on the American presence in Vietnam, then the uses are both reprehensible and pre-determined.

This is why I am not impressed by the Center's alleged efforts to recruit scholars with varying points of view. It is interesting to recall that Center promoters were not overly concerned about "balance" until *after* critics began complaining about the lack of "anti-war" scholars. But in my opinion such attempts were motivated by a desire to appease critics, rather than a genuine concern for political or intellectual balance.

Under these circumstances I am not surprised that anti-war scholars are boycotting the Vietnam Center. The Center's promoters claim that this is due to "sabotage." But that is not the problem. The problem is that the Center is so lacking in credibility that it cannot escape the stigma of complacency and expediency that marks its earliest days on campus. The Center has sabotaged itself. And how could it be otherwise? From the very beginning its main support has come from Government bureaucrats, educational entrepreneurs, professional anti-communists, and self-seeking attentists who cultivate their careers while America tears their homeland to pieces. No wonder the Center can generate so little enthusiasm among the rest of us.

I have wanted to say these things for a long time, but once again I find myself pointing an accusing finger in the mirror. Nine months ago the Center offered me a fellowship with a monthly stipend of \$300. At the time I was broke, and it was too late to seek funds elsewhere in the University. Because I knew which side I was on, I felt that I could use the Center more than it would be able to use me. As for "technical assistance," I told myself that the Vietcong would take care of any more of efforts to "help" the Vietnamese. So I accepted the fellowship and went back to my studies.

In the months that followed, I regretted that decision more and more. As the protests increased, people I admired joined the struggle, and a lot of students went to jail. I found it harder and harder to reconcile taking money from the Center with the sympathy I felt for their cause. But my financial problems had increased, and I had come to rely on the fellowship even more. Since I was unwilling to give it up, I simply withdrew from the conflict and tried to avoid thinking about the implications it had for me.

That has not worked very well. The recent Conference on Scholarly Integrity and University Complicity told me very little I did not already know about the Center and

the system of which it is a part. But it reminded me that once again I have implicated myself in the perpetuation of something I abhor. I am not willing to ignore that fact any longer. I have contemplated merely renouncing the fellowship, but that is not enough; there were many times when I could have helped the struggle but kept silent; but I have not merely abstained from the solution, I have been part of the problem, to use Eldridge Cleaver's words. To compensate for this, therefore, I intend to keep the fellowship and, until it is either terminated or expires, contribute all proceeds from it to the Southern Illinois Peace Committee--with the sole stipulation that the money be used exclusively to help get the Center removed from this campus. If the SIPC chooses not to accept, I will look for a suitable substitute. In the event that none can be found, I will notify you, and you may consider this as my letter of resignation.

Many times in the past year Doug Allen has served as an example of courage and dedication for a great many students. The decision of the Board of Trustees to remove him from the University merely underlines the corruption that infests our educational system at its core. Until now, my own actions have not been consistent with my beliefs, but only with the conflicts I have felt inside. I have used the fellowship to pursue my own interests. Now I am putting it to the only use that justifies retaining it. I only wish that I had had the strength to do this before.

Sincerely yours,
Jeffrey R. Long
Graduate Student
Community Development

10 November 1969

Mr. Ralph W. Ruffner
Vice-President for Area and International Services
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, Ill. 62025

Dear Mr. Ruffner:

Thank you for your letter of 21 October, which I received only two days ago via Berkeley.

Your offer to serve as an external consultant is certainly a generous one, but unfortunately I feel it my duty to turn it down. Since meeting with you last spring regarding your projected Center for Vietnamese Studies, I have seen little indication that the criticisms I raised then were in any way incorporated into your planning or exe-

cution. It is also not unfair to say that, at present, your Center lacks the respect of Southeast Asia specialists in general and most Vietnam specialists in particular. If I thought I could really change things by joining your Panel of External Consultants, that would be one thing, but all indications so far are that the tone set in the beginning has persisted, and will continue to persist, unless there is a complete conceptual and structural overhaul.

I'll be interested in receiving your second newsletter, nevertheless, and any further general publication. Is there there not always the possibility of redemption?

Please extend my regards to Professor Kuo, Dr. King and the others.

Sincerely,
David G. Marr
Visiting Assistant Professor
of Vietnamese Studies

"GUIDELINES ON THE RECRUITMENT OF A SOUTHEAST ASIAN HISTORIAN"—A STATEMENT SIGNED BY 20 OF 22 MEMBERS OF THE SIU DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, FEBRUARY 16, 1970.

The Department of History should not hire a Southeast Asian Historian from funds provided by the Agency for International Development, U.S. State Department, for the operations of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs.

We believe that the Center is not primarily an organization devoted to the scholarly acquisition and dissemination of knowledge concerning Vietnam but has essentially political objectives, specifically the training of individuals to participate in the social and economic development of that country. As one of its chief purposes the Center will train individuals, both Vietnamese and American, to work in Vietnam and will also undoubtedly train personnel who will not actually go to Vietnam but will instruct others who plan on working there. Consequently, the Center over a period of years will have contact with large numbers involved directly or indirectly with Vietnam. Given the present conditions in Vietnam and the current thrust of American policy, the Center, through its connections with a governmental agency, tends to become involved in upholding American policy and the present regime in South Vietnam. Although officials of the Center have stated that its sins are only to promote research and diffusion of information about Vietnam and that it has no connection with the present military and political situation in Southeast Asia, the documentation does not bear

out this allegation. In fact, the documents stress that a major function of the Center is support of an involvement and presence in Vietnam.

We conclude that the heavy emphasis on non-academic programs within the operation of the Center is evident in the very title of its Grant, namely, "A Grant to Strengthen within Southern Illinois University Competency in Vietnam Studies and Programs Related to the Economic and Social Development of Vietnam and its Post-War Reconstruction." The summary of the agreement between Southern Illinois University and the Agency for International Development, dated June 6, 1969, emphasizes that the purpose of the Center is to provide "economic and social programming" for Vietnam, which takes place within the current framework of American policy and the present regime in South Vietnam. The first sentence of the summary states that "This Grant will strengthen the existing competency of the Southern Illinois University Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs for its programs of technical assistance and consultation, research, and training related to the economic and social needs of Vietnam and its post-war reconstruction." (p. 1) [See "Documents" section—ed.] The section of the contract titled "Objectives and Scope" offers further evidence that the Center will train individuals in problems of Vietnam under the auspices of A.I.D. The Center has contractual responsibility to

respond..... to requests for assistance on economic and social development problems in Vietnam from the Agency for International Development and other U.S. federal agencies, other U.S. universities, Vietnamese government agencies and universities, international and regional agencies, various private businesses and interested private citizens.

Certainly this statement implies that the Center is heavily involved with the present regime of South Vietnam and American policy in that country.

Nothing in the Grant specifically states that the activities of the Center are limited to South Vietnam and that they could not include North Vietnam; however, a clause in the Special Provisions (p. 2) of the contract says that "a product commodity purchased in any transaction will not be eligible for U.S. dollar funding if it contains any component from countries other than Free World countries." This provision not only contradicts a previous pledge in the Grant that "The University will expand its library and public information service on all aspects of Vietnam," (p. 4) but it constitutes a built-in an insurmountable bar to contact with North Vietnam and its documents, publications, and other materials pertinent to historical research.

Other parts of the contract reveal the non-academic character of the Center. One sentence provides that

The University will expand its permanent, full-time professional core staff, of Vietnamese and U.S. scholars, which under the Director of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs, will be responsible for the activities of the University in programs of assistance to the economic and social development of post-war Vietnam. These activities will include organizing interdisciplinary courses of study about Vietnam....development of new courses and the restructuring of some existing courses. (p. 4)

This provision raises the question of interference with the prerogative of the History Department to formulate and institute its own courses. A statement in the terms for the "Administration of A.I.D. Grants" (p. 14) asserts that "in no event shall copies of any documents relating to the grant project, if marked, 'Top Secret,' 'Secret,' or 'Confidential,' be furnished....to any person not entitled to receive the same." This imposes a form of secrecy which precludes the free exchange of ideas basic to a university community.

Although the contract constitutes the most important evidence, more recent documents further illuminate the true purpose of the Center. A letter to Senator Fulbright from John Hannah, the Administrator of AID, dated September 9, 1969, states that the purpose of the Center is

(a) to develop a major resource center of academic study and competence on Vietnam and the broader geographic area in which it is located, and (b) to produce technical and professional personnel for assistance *as requested* (underlining added) in the post-war economic and social reconstruction of Vietnam--with particular attention being paid to Vietnamese and American veterans of the Vietnam conflict, for such service.

In this communication to Senator Fulbright, one of the most persistent critics of American policy towards Vietnam, AID understandably tries to interpret the Center in the best possible light. To be sure, the first purpose sounds scholarly and objective. However, when the second purpose is introduced, the overwhelming impression emerges that the fundamental aim of the Center (and the reason for the AID Grant of \$1,000,000, with quite possibly more in the future) is involvement in the present political and military situation in Southeast Asia.

The "Newsletter" published by the Center on September 15, 1969, reiterates the service function of that organization. It will engage in

the preparation of both technicians and professionals for specific goal-related project undertakings in the economic and social development of Vietnam.... and will furnish special consultation--short and long-term--and training services to private and government organizations working in Vietnam, making available the expert advice and services of the personnel of the Center and the University at large.

The "Operational Guidelines" for the Center for the present fiscal year were provided on January 19, 1970 by the Chancellor of the Carbondale Campus and the Vice-President for Area and International Services and were addressed to the Director of the Center. They presumably constitute the most recent policy of the University. The "Guidelines" indicate that a faculty member paid from Center funds is expected to be significantly involved in the work of that organization and would in some degree be subject to its control; the pertinent passage reads:

Each professor should have a portion of his time (for example, one-third to one-half) released from instructional duties for the purpose of carrying out research and special projects directly related to Center objectives--as worked out jointly by the academic department head concerned and the Center Director.

Even if the local guidelines were changed to eliminate the provision for released time, the contract and the payment of the salary by the Center would subject the History Department and the Southeast Asian historian to control by the Center.

It should be pointed out that unsupported oral and written interpretations which attempt to alter the terms of the contract are not acceptable. One clause concerning the "Administration of the AID Center" (p. 8) holds the Center responsible for adherence to the contract and sets out the procedure which must be used to change any part of the agreement: "If a deviation from the Grant is contemplated, written approval must be obtained from the Grant Officer, Office of Procurement, Contract Services Division, A.I.D."

Although any faculty member is free to make his own contracts and have his own associations, it is undesirable for the History Department to hire a Southeast Asian historian with the funds of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs.

The committee concludes the following:

a) That our concept of academic ideals precludes identification with this Center;

- b) That fiscal and administrative involvement with the Center could impinge upon the Department's prerogative to organize and institute its own course of offerings;
- c) That the Center's personnel guidelines impinge upon the Department's present practices concerning the teaching load, salary, released time, and freedom of choice of research subjects;
- d) That the outlook and limited vision prescribed by the terms of the Grant make historical objectivity impossible;
- e) That, finally, fiscal and administrative involvement with the Center poses a threat to academic freedom.

Howard W. Allen
 Harry Ammon
 Michael C. Batinski
 Charles W. Berberich
 Donald L. Brehm
 M. Browning Carrott
 David E. Conrad
 Donald S. Detwiler
 Betty L. Fladeland
 C. Harvey Gardiner
 Robert L. Gold
 Thadd E. Hall
 Harold A. McFarlin
 Reinhold C. Mueller
 James D. Murphy
 Len R. Shelby
 John Y. Simon
 Henry S. Vyverberg
 David P. Werlich
 Stanley Zucker

April 28, 1970

Dr. W. R. Fishel
Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly
 Southern Illinois University
 Carbondale, Illinois 62901

Sir:

On returning from my trip, I found your letter as well as one from Prof. H. B. Jacobini, neither of which had been forwarded to me in the Far East.

You know my reaction since you have received my telegram requesting you to remove my name from your International Advisory Board.

Indeed, at the time of your visit you told me that you

were at the stage of contacts which you hoped would be as broad as possible, and that you already had approval from a rather wide spectrum of Americans. Among these you mentioned colleagues whose position regarding the war in Vietnam is ethically irreproachable.

Now, however, instead of a typed list for my preliminary approval, I have received a printed prospectus with my name on it and moreover with the names of several colleagues who to my knowledge must have experienced the same unpleasant surprise, and which, you additionally informed me, was distributed at the annual convention of the Association of Asian Studies in San Francisco on April 3-5.

In the present circumstances, your undertaking does not offer sufficient guarantees of academic freedom for me to associate myself with it. I ask you to publish and distribute a retraction.

Sincerely yours,
G. Condominas

P.S. Of course I shall send copies of this letter to each one of our colleagues.

St. Louis Airport,
Missouri, U.S.A.
26th September 1970

Professor W. Fishel and Dr. Jacobini
Center for Vietnamese Studies
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, Illinois, U.S.A.

Dear Dr. Jacobini and Professor Fishel,

I should like to thank you for your courtesy and hospitality whilst I was in Carbondale. In the course of the five days I spent at your Center and University it has been possible for me to meet a considerable number of university teachers, librarians, and administrative officials who are concerned in one way or another with Vietnamese or other South-East Asian Studies. However, mindful that I was a guest of your Center, I deliberately avoided making contact with any of the detractors of your Center on the staff of SIU as this would, in my view, have been improper. I should like you to know, furthermore, that the conclusions I have reached have in no way been determined by the opinions or views of members of other universities, either in the USA or in Europe. In other words, my assessment of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and the academic auspices of the projected journal *Southeast Asia* has been made on the basis of my observations and discussions at Carbondale.

My firm conclusion, I much regret, is that I wish to

terminate any links I have had with both the Center for Vietnamese Studies at SIU, and with its Journal. I do not however bear any personal grudge or disaffection for any individual member or associate of the Center. On the contrary, I have considered it a privilege to be introduced to such excellent and dedicated Vietnamese scholars as Professors Nguyen-Dinh-Hoa and Nguyen-Khac-Hoach. My decision makes necessary my resignation---which I wish to take effect immediately---from membership of the Editorial Advisory Board of the journal *Southeast Asia*. For the same reason I shall not now submit to Dr. Hildred Geertz, the Book Reviews Editor of *Southeast Asia*, the review article on recent sociological and anthropological writing on Indonesia that she had requested for the first issue of the Journal, and that I had previously agreed to write.

As you know, the purpose of my visit to your University and Center was misrepresented in a number of places on the campus, especially in the campus newspaper *The Egyptian*. I have already taken steps to correct these misrepresentations, and I would ask you to correct any other similar errors or distortions if they come to your notice. I have also made it clear, both in my public lecture on Thursday night, under your auspices, and in discussion with members of your Center and other teachers in the University, that I have not profited personally from funds whose source is, for me personally, morally contaminated.

My decision is based solely on academic considerations, and in no way affects my relationship with or regard for individuals at SIU, many of whom have shewn me much courtesy and consideration.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jaspan
cc. Dr. H. Geertz

April 16, 1970

Professor Wesley Fishel
Editor, *Southeast Asia*
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, Ill. 62901

Dear Wes:

Apparently because of the mail strike backlog, I received your letter of April 1st just a few days ago.

It is with deep regret that I must write this letter. Despite our fundamental disagreement on the Vietnam War and my disapproval of some of your activities, which may well be mutual, you have always dealt with me fairly. The incident which I describe below thus comes as a rude shock.

You are well aware of the fact that I agreed to serve on the International Editorial Advisory Board of your new Journal only after being assured of the wide political spectrum represented. I asked in particular about the presence of David Marr on the Board of Editors during our telephone conversation of about March 20th and you reassured me that he had accepted your invitation, repeating what you had said in February. Now I discover that, in fact, David Marr is not a member of the Board, had never agreed to become one, and had made very clear to you again more than a month ago that he would not so agree.

Since my agreement to serve on the International Editorial Advisory Board was made on the basis of this misinformation, I must withdraw. I will communicate my decision to other members of the Board so that there will be no further confusion on this matter.

Sincerely,
David Wurfel
Associate Professor

November 2, 1970

Professor Wesley Fishel
Editor, *Southeast Asia*
Department of Political Science
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

Dear Wes:

It has been some time since we last spoke. Since April I have been to Singapore and, of course, have received the letter distributed by Condominas. While in Singapore I had a chance to chat with K. J. Ratnam about his attitude toward membership on the International Advisory Board of *Southeast Asia*.

More recently I have become better informed about the situation at SIU through the panel on the subject at the Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs in Bloomington. Included in the discussions were lengthy informal presentations by Joel Maring and Nguyen Dinh Hoa.

As a result of these experiences, I must reiterate my decision to withdraw from the International Advisory Board of your quarterly. At the same time I send this letter to you I will be informing other members of the Board of my decision, as well as other interested persons.

It appears to me that the procedures by which persons were recruited for the Advisory Board were not as careful as would be necessary to establish the reputation of a new journal launched, in any case, under certain disadvantages. Though I am not charging deliberate misrepresentation, statements were certainly made in my case, and others, which easily led to misunderstanding as to the probable make-up of the Board. This creates a certain

uneasiness about the procedures under which the Quarterly might operate in the future.

Whatever the virtues of the new journal, however--and I must admit there are several--its relationship with SIU under the present circumstances is such that I would have to sever my connections in any case. Any dissenter on the War whose name has in any way been linked with SIU recently is being used to justify a SE Asia program financed by a contract which I believe now to be unjustifiable.

Given the reasons I have stated for withdrawing from the Board, I should hasten to add that I would be glad to rejoin if conditions change. If SIU should cancel its contract with AID for the Vietnam Center, or if *Southeast Asia* should relocate at another university, and if the International Advisory Board were reconstituted so as to accomplish the diversity of views originally desired, then I think the new journal would be a significant contribution to SE Asian studies. I certainly hope that these changes can come about.

Sincerely,
David Wurfel
Associate Professor
University of Windsor

October 18, 1970

Dear Doug:

...I knew Milton Sacks in Saigon...but hadn't seen him since 1967. Got a call on March 14 from him in Newton; could we meet and talk about what I'd been doing? Saw him that evening; the conversation quickly turned to the Center--what did I think about it, etc. I expressed strong doubts, but waited to see what he was up to (didn't know at that point exactly where he stood there). His proposal was briefly that I consider working as a researcher/instructor there--also a possibility that the Center publish my thesis (concerned with "nationalist" politics during the 1966-1967 period). What would I be interested in doing? I replied that my choice would be researching a project which I called "how the NLF won in 1965"--and that I'd like to go and spend some time in the liberated territories, etc. The latter he had no objections to, but the topic he thought was "unreasonable"--indeed, idiotic. (I might note that *Asian Survey* in its May and August issues published a two-part piece by Jeff Race entitled exactly that--"How they won"--before the U.S. build-up! Indeed, I knew about Race's piece at that time, and thus my suggestion was not wholly a "come-on" or provocation or whatever). Sacks told me, quite frankly, that such a topic would never pass the "board's O.K."--I didn't pursue the problem of who constituted "the board" --knowing pretty well what the answer would be. At one point in the conversation he mentioned that "although AID might ask me to do such-and-such a project, I would

be able to refuse." Later, when I tried to get him to elaborate on these "AID prerogatives", he refused to concede that the government would have any such control over the program; the contract, however, confirmed my suspicions. Anyway, to make a long story short, I didn't give him a flat no at that time, as I was thinking seriously of taking him up on his offer (i.e., of submitting a proposal to the Center and applying for a position there) in order to establish an "inside link" with the Center---and ultimately, expose their outfit, etc. (Subsequent conversations with CCAS people led me to change my mind as to what benefit this would be to anyone, I might add.) I spoke with Sacks the following Monday, but at this point, the possibilities of my doing business with him started deteriorating rapidly.

The upshot of this rather morbid encounter demonstrated clearly enough as far as I was concerned the duplicity and underhanded attitude of the Center in their drive to legitimize their presence at SIU. If I had only been aware of the extent to which they were willing to go to "recruit" the Vietnamese studies people---as is so clearly evident from the documents you all have collected---I could have perhaps done more to find out how the Center works. As it was, I was simply willing to cross off the experience as a bad scene and feel relieved that I had not become involved in their thing.

The utter disregard for what we call "academic freedom" and "academic integrity", the outright contempt for American scholars, and the complete and shocking disrespect for the Vietnamese people shown by the Center clearly demonstrate not only the incompetence but also the real danger of the Center as an institution of "higher learning". The future of Vietnamese studies has always been dark, but never darker than it is today... For nearly a quarter of a century the Vietnamese have been the victims of American "advisors" and "scholars" seeking to bring "self-determination" and the "fruits of western democracy" to their land. Over a million Vietnamese have died as a result; indeed well over that number, if one takes into account American complicity in the first Indochina war. It is time we began to listen to the Vietnamese and to learn from *them* about their civilization instead of regarding their homeland as a testing ground for U.S. military innovations and a means of acquiring AID grants, prestige and power within the university. That the existence of the Center should even be regarded as a subject for *debate* is not only ludicrous but sinister. The fate of Vietnamese studies in the U.S. may be sealed---if so, then we who call ourselves "Vietnamese scholars" must take the blame. But the future of the Vietnamese people cannot be written off so glibly. We must take steps to insure that it will not...

Peace,
Cynthia Fredrick

23 October 1970

STATEMENT ON CENTER FOR VIETNAMESE STUDIES AND PROGRAMS AT SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

The Vietnam Studies Coordinating Group (VSCG), a subcommittee of the Southeast Asia Regional Council of the Association of Asian Studies, has had the opportunity to review pertinent documents regarding the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs at Southern Illinois University (SIU). It has also had the occasion to discuss the formation and development of the Center with Center representatives and with faculty and student opponents of the Center. On the basis of this investigation the undersigned members of the VSCG, speaking as individuals, wish to make the following statement:

There seems little doubt that the prime *raison d'être* of the SIU Center is ultimately to provide United States Government agencies and interested private organizations and businesses with the intellectual and technical means for continued involvement in the economic, social, and political future of Vietnam. While we do not necessarily deny the probity of such involvement---given substantially altered future conditions in Vietnam---we believe that at this point in time such a position seriously jeopardizes, perhaps precludes the development of a truly respectable teaching and research program on the people, history and culture of that country.

Briefly stated, our arguments are as follows:

At the moment the academic study of Vietnam in North America is in its infancy. By contrast official American involvement in Vietnam has been gigantic and remains etched in everyone's minds. We simply cannot permit the latter experience to swamp the former. This will certainly happen if we rely for our development of serious teaching and research programs on the same financial sources, institutional channels, and personalities that have initiated and sustained our official involvement in Vietnam.

Any long-term academic program for the study of Vietnam will need to rely on resource materials and scholarly contacts at the three other locations where such efforts are underway: Hanoi, Saigon, and Paris. It is our impression that the SIU Center has developed in such a way as to make extremely difficult cooperation with all scholars in Hanoi and with most scholars of Vietnam located in Paris. Obviously it is impossible at this point in time to satisfy everyone; but this is all the more reason for exercising careful thought, widespread consultation, and manifest patience.

There is a large body of printed and xeroxed materials available on the SIU Center. We strongly urge colleagues to explore carefully all the implications of the SIU Center before in any way involving themselves in its activities or advising their students to do so.

(signed) Huynh Kim Khanh, David Marr, Truong Buu Lam, John K. Whitmore

C. Harvey Gardiner:

Academic Incompetence

The theme of this conference, "Scholarly Integrity and University Complicity", promises, by the very nature of words and ideas, a verbal confrontation. Behind that word "complicity" is a sense of guilt related to wrong-doing which, in turn, is a basic contradiction of honesty. We are here, I trust, in a spirit of honest inquiry, because honest inquiry is what the university--any university--is all about. One concern of this conference must be facts. But, at best, facts can only establish a historical record, because facts by the very nature of their relation to events concern matters that are behind us.

However, the honest inquiry of a university community--or, for that matter, of the concerned citizen on campus or off campus--cannot settle for a re-creation or restatement of the past. The honest inquiry that leads one beyond the facts of the past to relevant principles for the present and the future can convert a university into a frontier of the intellect.

This conference must be an exercise in intelligence, utilizing specific facts in search of underlying principles. This will require critical outlook, a critical outlook that cannot, will not, settle for maintenance of the *status quo*. Change is the essence of living experience and any man who equates intelligent criticism with disloyalty stamps himself an idiot. The banker who tells you that saving some money today guarantees a better tomorrow is reminded that saving a little of America today --the right of free speech that includes dissent--is the best guarantee America will have a better tomorrow. So I

hail and challenge the exercise of your intelligence, your freedom of speech, your dissent in the opportunity this conference affords you in constructive citizenship.

* * *

Now to scholarly integrity in relation to the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs at Southern Illinois University. On February 7, 1969, one staff member of the International Services Division of SIU, with an eye on Nixon appointments in Washington, wrote a memorandum to his superior. Among other things he said, "The appointment of John Hanna [sic] as the Director of AID is not only an exceedingly good appointment but it is a clear indication in my opinion of the policies which will be followed..." The memo writer continued, "it looks like SIU will have an excellent possibility to develop new and stronger contact relationships with AID..." To that he added, "I believe that priority will be given to awarding contracts to institutions which have a strong academic foundation on which the new contract may be built." This prompts the question, my question, "What academic competence did SIU have in the area of Vietnamese studies?"

My question is all the more relevant because the title of the AID grant of June, 1969, supporting SIU's Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs indicates that the support is "to strengthen within Southern Illinois University competency..." The presumption, accordingly, was that SIU had a competence in reference to Vietnam.

X-ray

Since 1961 SIU had sent 41 staff members to Vietnam in connection with two technical assistance programs. None of those staff members went to Vietnam with a command of the Vietnamese language. Urged publicly to step forward and disprove the statement that they lacked fluency in Vietnamese, not one of the forty-one challenged the conclusion that after two or more years in Vietnam they had returned illiterate in reference to Vietnamese. I have not been on campus every minute since SIU first sent staff members to Vietnam in 1961 but I will say that I have no recollection of any general public lectures about Vietnam ever having been given by the returned educators.

In all the eight years prior to the mid-1969 grant for the Center no department introduced a course specifically related to Vietnam. In those years between 1961 and 1969 no department in the entire university announced a priority related to Vietnam as it projected personnel needs. No one, returned veteran of the two Vietnamese contract programs or anyone else, ever insisted that the Vietnamese language be taught at the university.

When the forty-one veterans of Saigon were urged to list the courses they had taught concerning Vietnam, the theses they had directed concerning Vietnam, and the scholarly items they had written about Vietnam, not a single response was made. My questions to the forty-one were termed rude and in bad taste. Let me tell you that just as the honest student is not offended when his books are checked as he leaves the library, so the able educator is not offended when asked to exhibit his credentials. Yet the competence-shy forty-one were considered to represent a reservoir of competence upon which SIU could build. Honesty and soundness --and Webster tells us that honesty and soundness are synonyms of integrity--should have kept this institution from entering upon a program

punctuated by educational pretense and academic bravado.

All the challenge to integrity at SIU by the AID grant is not borne by faculty; some administrators share it. Alongside the forty-one who had seen Saigon, the president, chancellor and dean of liberal arts and sciences approximated a trio of blind mice. More than one aide in a presidential office dedicated to bigness nodded administrative approval of the efforts to wangle federal funds for the Center. Some of the job of implementing the project fell to the chancellor. From his performance I cite one item in terms of our concern about integrity.

On April 9, 1969, at a formative moment when it was thought desirable to replace an acting director who had no professional ties with Asia, the then chancellor urged that the director of the Center be "a distinguished scholar on Vietnamese affairs." However, inasmuch as there was no such person on campus, the post went to an authority in international law whose scholarly relationship to Asia pivoted on the Philippines. Nothing in more than twenty years of publication identified the new director of the Center with Vietnam. The designation of the director was by a chancellor whose own field is chemistry. I suspect that were a student of his, in a given laboratory exercise, inclined to substitute hydrochloric acid for sulfuric acid, the dunderhead would be written off as hopeless. Yet the chemist-chancellor did not hesitate to thrust that same kind of substitution upon the humanities and social sciences. We live, you and I, in a world that laments the gap between scientific achievement and man's capacity to solve his social problems yet administrative arrogance that so mismanages matters in the area of the humanities and social studies helps to guarantee the continuance of that gap.

When a dean was needed for our infant School of Medicine, a chiropractor did not get the job. If a chiropractor had been appointed Dean of Medicine, the laughter and ridicule--not to mention a dermatologist trustee--would have forced an immediate rectification of the mistake.

However, when a director was needed for the infant Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs, no such concern about professional competence was exhibited. I submit that "honesty" and "soundness", twin facets of integrity, took a beating in SIU's administrative circles.

Nor did the lack of professional concern and professional competence stop at that. Much of the inception of the Center deviated from norms customarily pursued in university circles. During the initial planning of the Center at SIU there was an exceedingly limited participation by the faculty at large. Essentially, until the program attained the *fait accompli* stage synonymous with the winning of the AID grant, the project was controlled by men better described as promoters than academicians. After the grant was obtained, the irregularities continued. At no time, although new courses were instituted, did a course proposal go through the established channel that included consideration by the Committee on New Courses and Programs. At no time, although the Vietnam studies that were non-existent in 1968-69 were now projected to include advanced graduate students in 1969-70--at no time was the Graduate School invited to consider the program. In

other words, the winning of the \$1,000,000 grant became an "open sesame" that overrode established procedures. The money apparently stifled the chancellor's announced desire that the director be "a distinguished scholar on Vietnamese affairs." The dean of liberal arts and sciences, whose faculty would be most directly concerned with the proposed operation, apparently indulged an automatic acceptance of his superior's proposal. The government grant seemingly encouraged the short-circuiting of established procedures. The money from the federal government became a corrupting influence as one office and area of university administration after another gave the grant for the Center special handling. One definition of integrity, let me add, reads "freedom from corrupting influence or practice."

On April 1, 1970, the then chancellor of SIU, speaking to three professional educational fraternities, addressed himself to the issue of the public's lack of confidence in higher education. He said, "I think part of the difficulty is that higher education has slipped its moorings and its integrity is not what it should be." I agree with the man who took to the Oregon Trail, and I add that at SIU, in reference to the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs, he helped it slip its moorings; he contributed to its damaged integrity.

Yet another challenge to integrity, to scholarly integrity at SIU, is involved in the contractual relationship between government and university as set down in the terms of

the AID grant. To cite but one area of the problem, let me indicate that, according to the terms of the AID grant, the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs has a responsibility to "respond...to requests for assistance on economic and social development problems in Vietnam from...Vietnamese governmental agencies..."¹ In February, 1970, I noted that the Thieu-Ky regime had announced its intention to raise revenue by opening a series of "entertainment centers" containing brothels, gaming dens, and dance halls. This official program is to be directed by the South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare. This tasteless venture by the South Vietnamese government prompted a letter from me in which I asked what the SIU Center would do if it were faced with a request to assist this program. Some people were enraged at the idea of my raising such an odious issue. Other people, however, saw the fundamental issue in perspective. More important than determining which was the more despicable, the South Vietnamese program or Gardiner's disturbing question, more important than either of these matters was the realization that the university is tied to an open-end and indefinitely vague commitment.

To avoid this dismal prospect, as well as to achieve the "strictly academic" operation long hoped for, the Center is now busy altering its image, dropping "and Programs" from its name and trying to wiggle out of potential obligations, which the Director has preferred to term ambiguities and garbage. The Center wants to renegotiate the terms of the present grant and it would like a change in the funding of the grant, removing it from AID.

A grant, in the final analysis is a contractual relationship, in which there is some "give" as well as "get". It is one thing for the Center to say it is dropping "and

Programs" but the question follows: how far can the Center go in unilateral revision of the terms? Not very far, one suspects. While some may hope that the heat of criticism will lessen with announcement of revision and good intention, there are many who consider unobtainable the Center's desire to get something for nothing as it aspires to a strictly academic operation without ties to policies and programs of the government.

Considering the fact that the Director is reported to have addressed himself to this problem in July, is it not time for him to share with the public the answers he has received from Washington? After all, the grant specifically says, "If a deviation from the Grant is contemplated, written approval must be obtained from the Grant Officer, Office of Procurement, Contract Services Division, A.I.D."

No one, in his right mind, in this world that technology seems to shrink by the minute would deny the validity of Vietnamese studies in a university program. Collaterally, no one, in his right mind, wants his university to engage in Vietnamese studies or any other studies at the expense of the integrity of faculty and administration. The crux of the issue, then, is not the matter of program but the relationship of integrity to program.

Finally, in all fairness to a new man at the helm of the university, Chancellor Robert G. Layer, I must add that a ray of hope appears on the administrative horizon. I shall hazard the guess that he is here with us today not simply to welcome and inaugurate a conference but also out of a realization that the integrity of the university requires vigilance. Layer brings to the chancellorship of SIU a refreshing dimension of intellectual and moral concern--call it integrity. Let

us all, in this conference, bring our own dimensions of intellectual and moral concern--our own integrity. And if we do, who knows, even in reference to the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs a miracle

may be wrought, one that will no longer require the forces of light and darkness, of integrity and complicity, to do battle.

1. See "Documents" section. --ed.

Robert G. Layer:

Reforming the Center

Thank you, Professor Gardiner. I would like first of all to express my appreciation to Mr. Allen for inviting me to address the conference. I'm aware that the very fact that I'm on this podium is controversial to some persons' minds.¹ But nevertheless I feel it is important for me to state to you my position with respect to the Center for Vietnamese Studies at this university and also to put in focus what I consider to be the place of the university in the general order of things and how the two relate to each other. I also must state that I am speaking in an official capacity in that my personal feelings in the matter, while they may be revealed in what I say, are not intended to be conveyed. But I wish to offer more of an explanation of what is and, I think, should be the university's position with respect to certain matters.

To begin with, a promise was made last spring--pretty much on the spur of the moment, in the heat of a rather violent or at least semiviolent situation--that there be a so-called "Blue Ribbon Committee" or Panel to investigate the Center. I'm sure that Dr. MacVicar [former chancellor at SIU] didn't have an opportunity to measure very closely and accurately the nice phraseology he may have wanted to use. Well, this means that when the first attempt to set up a committee was made, there was a lack of realization on the part of that committee's original organizers that certain things were demanded by MacVicar's statement, or at least were inferred from it by a large number of individuals. And I can state, because it's a matter

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of public record, that I was party to some of those concerns. In fact, I will also say that of the two members of the committee who objected to the initial charge given to the committee I was one. In so doing I hope at least to give you some notion of the kind of track record I've had with respect to the importance of setting up an objective committee to review this very controversial unit of the university.

* * *

Next I will address myself to what I believe to be the most important improvements in the organization of the Center's administration as well as the imposition of significant limitations on the activities of the Center. The chief administrative change is that of placing it under me, the chancellor of this campus, with no restrictions upon me with respect to how it shall be administered. Now of course one has to have a certain confidence in the chancellor, because if I'm corrupt then all is lost too. Also, if everybody I ask to help me in the administration of the Center or the scrutinizing of it is corrupt, again all is lost. At some point confidence has to be placed somewhere in somebody. And all I can say to you is what I said when I accepted the administration of the Center on this campus I insisted upon the Board of Trustees' approval of the following conditions: "The Center shall not engage in or financially support through the employment of persons, the distribution of fellowships and other moneys or in any other way support any programs of social or economic assistance or development." I take full respons-

sibility for that statement. I included in it everything I thought was relevant to assuring a proper academic programming of this particular unit's activities.

To implement this, I have addressed myself to the group that I thought was the most proper one to carry out academic scrutiny and supervision, i.e., the Graduate Council. Again one could say it's possible that the Graduate Council is corrupt and again all could be lost. But again one has to place confidence in somebody, and if I'm ever going to get the proper scrutiny and programming of this unit, the Graduate Council is the place to seek it. And so I have sought it there. I asked this group to consider the following:

In order to implement the intent of the memorandum and after conferring with the Dean of the Graduate School, Professor Olmsted, the chairman of the Graduate Council, Professor Webb, and others, I requested the Graduate Council to specify what the Council considers to be adequate and proper procedures for the academic approval of persons and funds to be spent for the Center, in order that the Center's total functioning will be in accord with the procedures followed by all other units of research operating on the campus.

Now this is absolutely open-ended; I did not attempt to direct or limit the Graduate Council. The appropriate committee of the Council will proceed also to make very detailed specifications and there will be a continuous scrutiny of the propositions of the nominations for fellowships, as well as the usual surveillance or proper scrutinizing of academic vitas, etc., of the professors who might be hired by departments in this university in association with the Center. My guess is that they might even be given closer attention than usual,

but at least they will be processed in the same manner as that of any faculty member who is hired--the normal gamut of questioning and so on by his department, by his chairman, by his dean and, if he's going to be a member of the Graduate Faculty, also by the Graduate Dean's Office. Thus I have turned over the assessment of the intellectual and academic integrity of individuals who would be paid by the Center to the group which I consider to be properly set up in the university for this purpose. I believe there is nothing else I can do. And I believe that is the proper route and this I not only must do, but this I want to do.

the very fact that I'm on this podium is controversial to some persons' minds

We are concerned as well that the officials in Washington--AID specifically--recognize what is the intent of the operation of this Center. We have taken steps through the annual report, through a reiteration of the Board of Trustees' position, and through the actual operation of the Center during the immediate past to show Washington what we think the Center is and what it should be. And we have already received favorable responses from AID that this will become the basic understanding of the mission of the Center in an amended grant document.

Now I also want to speak in terms of the larger problems. Undoubtedly, the Center is an arm of the university. Undoubtedly the university has many aspects to it. Undoubtedly the university has support from the federal government in other areas. Undoubtedly the university will be interested in having the support

of Federal Government money in years to come. I certainly cannot make any promises about the nature of what those particular financial arrangements or contracts may be in the future. I can only say that I can look at them as they pass by and as I have an opportunity to see and determine what I think is proper. But nobody can certainly say that the university will never, or that it shouldn't ever, use federal funds, or even particularly AID funds, although those are the ones which are obviously most important in your minds. There has been questioning of AID projects elsewhere and persons engaged in AID projects elsewhere, and this may very well be a legitimate questioning. But I must address myself to what I think is true at home. I cannot and certainly do not have the opportunity or the time to determine whether every AID project is legitimate in terms of the scrutiny that I suggest we are offering here. I think each unit of the university has to answer for itself. And I happen to have the Center under my jurisdiction and I fully intend that it be clean. Now I'm also aware of the larger problem that all of us are very much concerned with: the role that the government plays through its foreign policy. Here is where AID may very well be a principle agent. Here lies the whole question of whether money is tainted and ought not be accepted at all because it's federal government money, whether it be AID or any other kind of money. I cannot subscribe to the view that because money happens to be tainted at one point that this makes the same dollars tainted at all points. I personally accepted a Fulbright professorship a number of years ago, and I have in the recent past accepted a Rockefeller Foundation grant, and being an economic historian, I know how John D. Rockefeller got his money. But I thought that somebody ought to use it legitimately, and I thought there was no reason why I shouldn't be the one. [Applause] And I think there

is more than a passing interest to that particular notion. One could even argue that if one is using it for a legitimate purpose, it can't be used by someone else for purposes which may not be so legitimate. Well, I don't wish to belabor the point, but I do not subscribe to the notion that simply because money comes from a particular source that automatically determines the use to which it will be put. It is important to be sure that everybody knows the purpose to which money is put, and this is exactly my intention in doing what I have done to the Center, or rather, for the Center, because I want certainly as much as you do to have it academically clean.

I thank you very much for the opportunity to address you this afternoon on the position of the Center, the intentions I have, and the intentions that the university administration has in general.

1. A day before the Conference on Scholarly Integrity and University Complicity, the Center issued a statement denouncing the meeting as an "academic travesty."

--ed.

Center
not being
out doing broccos

Douglas Allen: Is Academic Freedom Still a Viable Principle?

Last fall, when suspicions regarding the academic integrity of the Vietnam Center were first voiced on this campus, spokesmen for the Center lost no time in denouncing the critics as "irresponsible", "unscholarly", or worse. Since that time the irresponsible ones have been joined by many Asian scholars in this country and abroad who likewise feel that the Center lacks sufficient guarantees of academic freedom and independence from such a politically committed agency as AID. One widely circulated statement reads as follows;

We, members of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, along with other members of the university community professionally engaged in the study of Asia, condemn the threat to academic freedom presented by the establishment of an AID-funded Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs on the Southern Illinois University campus.

Despite claims to the contrary, the terms of the AID-SIU contract clearly show that the Center is open to direct political control and utilization by the United States government, that the terms of the grant will inevitably exert a chilling effect upon free inquiry and that such an arrangement is entirely out of place in a university setting.

We therefore support the initiative of the History Department, individual professors and students who have raised this issue of academic freedom on the SIU campus and dissociate ourselves

from the Center.

Pétitions protesting the existence of the Center as a threat to academic freedom have been signed by Asian scholars at such universities as the University of Chicago, Harvard, Yale, Cornell, Michigan, Washington University, the University of Washington, Berkeley, and Stanford--in short, at nearly all the universities that have flourishing Asian studies programs.

Why should these scholars see the Vietnam Center as a threat to academic freedom? I propose to focus on several salient features of the Center which show that the condemnation and boycott of the Center by anti-war Asian scholars is fully warranted.

SIU received the one million dollars from AID in July, 1969. By then the university had already had two AID contracts in Vietnam. Although this grant for the Center is the largest single amount ever given in this field to an American university, yet as Professor Gardiner has made clear SIU had little if any academic competence in the field of Vietnamese studies.

Given this lack of competence, one might have expected that the university first bring in as consultants a group of specialists representing a broad spectrum of views--not just those friendly to U.S. involvement in Vietnam--then apply for a modest initial grant and determine whether this university could indeed develop an academic competence in Vietnamese studies. Then, having developed the basis for

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competence, the university might have applied for larger grants; certainly not from AID, but perhaps from other, less compromising sources.

But this was not the procedure followed. Despite the lack of competence, SIU received the one million dollars. Why?

The AID press release of July 11, 1969 entitled "AID to Help Southern Illinois University Program for Vietnam Reconstruction" throws light on the original intentions of the Center initiators. Consisting mostly of statements by the late Sen. Everett Dirksen, former university president Delyte Morris, and AID administrator John Hannah, the press release discusses plans for bringing Vietnamese and American veterans to this campus, retraining them, and sending them back to Vietnam for AID programs there. This, clearly, was good public relations copy. Hannah remarked that "this training of former fighting men to assist in development programs in Vietnam is one of the gratifying aspects of this grant." He added, "The University's increased competence will provide a valuable resource of specialists and services for AID and other agencies involved in Vietnam's development."

Wesley Fishel remains the key figure in the Center

The Senate testimony of Sen. Dirksen on June 23, 1969, offers more information on the Center's original purposes. Dirksen speaks of providing "special consultant and training services", retraining veterans, reconstruction, even setting up a "Vietnamese village" somewhere on campus.

Further suspicion regarding the

academic integrity of the Center was aroused by the nature of its early appointments. The first number of the Center's newsletter is issued on September 15, 1969 lists three new appointments to the university: Wesley Fishel, former head of the Michigan State University Advisory Group in Vietnam; Nguyen Dinh Hoa, "Counselor for Cultural Affairs and Education, Embassy of Vietnam", and John Laybourn, former Associate Director of the AID-funded Asia Training Center in Hawaii and now an Associate Dean of International Studies at SIU. The most important appointment, of course, was that of Wesley Fishel, whose utilization of the MSU group for arming Diem's police and providing cover for the CIA are fully documented in *Ramparts* and in Scigliano and Fox, *Technical Assistance in Vietnam: The Michigan State University Experience*. While Milton Sacks has replaced Wesley Fishel as visiting professor in government this year, Fishel still heads the Center's journal, serves as a consultant, and is conspicuously present on campus. He remains the key figure in the Center.

In the memorandum of February 7, 1969 already cited by Professor Gardiner and in a second memorandum dated March 27, 1969, Oliver J. Caldwell of International Services informs Ralph W. Ruffner, Vice-president of Area and International Services that Hannah believes there should be "a renewed and increased emphasis on technical assistance in our foreign aid programs and that qualified universities be invited to become the principal operating agencies for such programs around the world." Caldwell suggests also that this is an excellent opportunity for SIU. He discusses the amount of money other universities are receiving and how SIU can get into the act. An apt expression of this pecuniary motivation was

given by Bruce MacLachlan, an assistant to the Chancellor and a supporter of the Center: "MacLachlan, asked why a Vietnam study center was sought by SIU, said the reason was opportunism...First, there were gobs of money available for such a center..." (*Daily Egyptian*, August 15, 1970).

In a letter to Sen. Fulbright dated September 9, 1969, Hannah reveals that Professors Hoa and Fishel were on this campus months before the university applied for the AID grant, and, more significantly, that they were hired by SIU before the actual grant was made. This led us to believe that the Center had to assume a certain orientation acceptable to AID and Washington as a necessary precondition for getting the grant. (Cf. David Horowitz, "Sinews of Empire", *Ramparts*, October 1969). One of the key men in setting up the Center has revealed that SIU's initial grant proposal was rejected by AID and that only after the Center resubmitted the proposal with a list of "scholars" friendly to U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam did the Center get the money.

While these intensive negotiations with AID were taking place in conditions of semi-secrecy, there was little effort to consult the larger community of Asian scholars. This has had a chilling effect on academic freedom, because the crucial decisions were being made and the priorities being set not by the community of scholars but by an outside government agency. With one exception, no scholar who has the respect of anti-war academics was even consulted in the establishment of the Center. And it must be said that David Marr's "consultation" with the Center was contracted for the sake of appearances only, for his advice was utterly ignored. Sensing that the basic decisions had already been made,

Marr asked, "Why does the Center abdicate responsibility for discussion and decision on postwar goals to the U.S. government?"

David Marr's case is a typical illustration of the Center's lack of integrity. During last year's discussions and debates, I always conceded that one anti-war scholar was indeed an external consultant to the Center, although his lone presence hardly affected the overwhelming imbalance within the Center. I assumed that Marr was a consultant because the Center listed

Intensive negotiations with AID in conditions of semi-secrecy

him as such. Actually, he never agreed to join the Center's Board of External Consultants; he was offered the position by Vice-president Ruffner and promptly turned it down. [See above, "Letters of Resignation."] But the Center, so desperate for one token anti-war figure, was not honest.

A similar case illustrating the Center's lack of integrity is the Center's relationship with George Condominas, the French scholar. In the *Daily Egyptian* of August 29, 1970, Wesley Fishel attempted to discredit our claim that a large number of scholars opposed the Center. He had found almost total support, he said. He did admit that "we had one member of our International Editorial Advisory Board... --a Frenchman--who decided to quit the board after the invasion of Cambodia. He wanted nothing more

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to do with anything American. No reflection on us, no reflection on SIU."

The Frenchman, George Condominas, had actually written to Fishel on April 28, 1970--two days before the U.S. invasion of Cambodia-- to rebuke him for using Condominas's name without authorization and to dissociate himself from the Center, because of its lack of academic freedom ["Letters of Resignation"].

When confronted with these instances of unethical conduct, lack of integrity and academic freedom, and complicity with the prosecution of the war, the Center's main defense is that it has nothing to do with technical assistance, reconstruction, or other service functions. They protest that their "special" 211(d) grant is "merely academic", that it does not concern technical assistance but is only intended for disinterested scholarly research.

Checking section 211(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in 1966, we find that these funds are authorized for universities specifically "for the purpose of strengthening their capacity to develop and carry out programs concerned with the economic and social development of less developed countries." In fact, in a recent letter Senator Fulbright states: "I seriously question, however, whether there was any intent [in section 211(d)] to authorize assistance to universities for purely academic studies which are not directly related to, or intended to have application to, foreign development programs."

The Center is therefore caught on the horns of a dilemma: if they don't make it properly academic, it will come under increasing attack; if they make it "purely" academic (not a real possibility unless there is a thorough conceptual and struc-

tural overhaul) it can be brought up in Congress for misuse of AID funds.

With this dilemma in mind, let us assess the most important terms of the AID-SIU grant itself. What has this university been committed to do?

(1) The title sets the tone for the entire document: "A Grant to Strengthen within Southern Illinois University Competency in Vietnamese Studies and Programs Related to the Economic and Social Development of Vietnam and its Post-war Reconstruction."

(2) Under "University Capacity and Commitment", the grant states, "The ability of the University to offer counsel and advice--and under separate agreements or contracts have specialists available for technical assistance--and in general service the needs of AID will be accelerated by the Grant."

(3) Under "Administration" we read, "At the initiative of AID and following submission of an annual technical report, there will be an annual substantive review of activities under this grant. This review will include evaluation of progress, administrative and financial considerations, plans for the following year, and discussion of possible AID utilization--under technical assistance, research and training contracts--of the evolving University competency."

(4) Under "Objectives and Scope", "The expanded full-time Vietnamese-American professional core staff, courses of study, library and information program will enable the University to respond more adequately to requests for assistance on economic and social development problems in Vietnam from the Agency for International Development and other U.S. federal agencies, other U.S. universities, Vietnamese governmental agencies and universities, international

and regional agencies, various private businesses and interested private citizens."

(5) One of the Institutional Development Grant Special Provisions stipulates that at AID's request SIU "will terminate the assignment of any individual to any work under the grant, and, as requested, will cause the return to the United States of the individual..."

(6) Likewise, the grant may be "revoked or terminated by the AID Grant Officer upon six months notice, whenever it is deemed that the Grantee institution has failed in a material respect to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant or for the convenience of the Government."

What the Vietnam Center seems to be saying to us is the following: "Trust us. We are going to outsmart the government. True, we have received the million dollars and signed a contract committing us to carry out technical assistance. But now we will outsmart the government, take the money, and not do what we have committed ourselves to do." We respond: "We don't trust you. The government is not so stupid, and your key personnel have never exhibited much aversion to para-military projects in Vietnam for the U.S. government."

One distinction ought to be made: the Center itself will no longer carry out service functions. Originally the emphasis was upon services, especially the retraining of veterans. But sometime during the fall of 1969--probably as a reaction to the increasing attacks by critics--this emphasis was changed. A letter from AID dated December 18, 1969, denies that the Center will carry out "service functions" under this grant. Rather the university will strengthen its competency in relation to economic and social development and postwar reconstruc-

tion. "The university has a responsibility, as it has in the past, to assist A.I.D. in specific related tasks. The university carries out such services by specifically funded contracts as appropriate." The letter concludes by stating that "AID fully expects to continue to use the present and resulting increased competency created by this grant at Southern Illinois University at the 'Vietnamese Center.'"

In other words the Center will not directly carry out technical assistance but will use its connections, contacts, and increased competence to bring in separately funded service contracts, whether with the School of Agriculture, the School of Technology, the Vocational Training Institute, or some other area of the university. Without the Center SIU would be at a disadvantage in the competition for such contracts, as the Caldwell-Ruffner memoranda make clear.

Contrast the lavish support for our local center with the present precarious position of Asian studies programs throughout the United States. A major threat to academic freedom and university integrity exists in the funding of such centers as the one at Carbondale. In a speech delivered to an anti-Center rally in February, 1970, Jonathan Mirsky of Dartmouth noted:

Within the last few weeks the directors of those centers [at Yale and Cornell]--and of more than 150 other Foreign Language and Area Centers funded by HEW--were notified that "the program would be phased out in its entirety by 1972" as "outdated and less productive." As of now for the entire country the appropriation for these centers is \$6 million, or only six times the appropriation for Carbondale alone. Apparently Asian scholarship without a government service

obligation will no longer find support in Washington.

In my presentation to a panel at the midwest regional conference of the Association of Asian Studies at Indiana University last week, I suggested that SIU return the grant to AID because AID was an improper source of funding. Although a majority of the audience was critical of the Center, several of the professors from other universities replied, "But there is no other money." When I suggested that they somehow get funds elsewhere from a less compromising source, they replied that no other money is available--other centers are closing down. And that response epitomizes the sad state we are in today. Either you play ball with the government or corporate interests or else you're not going to get funded. Well, you can give in, as some scholars have done, or you can resist, as we are doing today in an effort to change the priorities and structures of these programs.

Turning briefly to the local impact of the Center, we must first note that this grant is hardly "free." According to the grant and other documents, SIU will probably spend more than \$1 million of its own money in order to use AID's \$1 million. Thus we disregard the needs

of students and others in the university and direct our attention to the "postwar reconstruction" of Vietnam. There is much "reconstruction" that needs to be done right here in Carbondale. Several blocks from the university people still live in rat-infested buildings and use outhouses. Yet there seems to be no funding in sight for a Center for Southern Illinois Studies and Programs.

But ultimately, I believe, these other significant issues--the role of the university, its inversion of priorities, etc.--stem from a more fundamental decision of the university to become not only a silent partner but an active participant in U.S. imperialism. The problem, then, is not merely the Vietnam Center. We need a total restructuring, not only of the university, but of society as a whole, for we will not be successful here until we totally remake society. And we will succeed, because we must. We will not solve the problems of war, racism, poverty, overpopulation, pollution, famine and other threats to the survival of mankind unless we begin to change our basic human values. So we have no choice but to struggle. We reach out to each other and try to create a new society, a more humane society in which such politically motivated Vietnam Centers will have become obsolete.

There is much 'reconstruction' that needs to be done right here in Carbondale

David Marr: Intellectual Functionaries

I would like to speak on the future of Vietnamese studies in North America from a perspective that I think we all can share--that is, the fact that these studies must exist in a university environment of some kind. Every one of us here, as part of the university community, has some real dilemmas to face, particularly those of us who specialize on Vietnam. I think most of us, to a degree, feel that there is something systematically wrong with our society at this point in time. We know that the university is an important cog in the social wheel. The question we must now face is whether we as participants in this process are abetting the wrongdoing and the injustice by our very participation in the university system. And if you think you have problems answering that question as majors in anthropology and philosophy, just imagine how much more acute the problem is for foreign area specialists in general and those dealing with Indochina in particular. One benefit that I think is bound to emerge from this conference is some serious questioning of educational goals in foreign study programs in general.

When I first came to SIU in May, 1969, I was dismayed and discouraged to discover that the local participants in planning the Center had left all the goals and the ends in the hands of bureaucrats in Washington. After assuming a continuing U.S. government commitment to Vietnam after the ending of hostilities--and this is quite an assumption in itself--the planners of this Center proceeded to avoid any discussion of the objectives

of this presumed commitment in Vietnam or the form that it should take if they were to be involved as respectable academicians. In short, leaving responsibility for the goals to Washington, they just wanted a piece of the action, a cut of the pie, no matter what.

Such abdication of responsibility produces a host of foreign area specialists who are little more than intellectual functionaries. Once the goals are set, you are locked in a pattern; you may not be researching or teaching a subject of immediate relevance to policy-makers, but you are part of the whole. It is, I think, an immoral and corrupting position for scholars. And the first step in getting out of the pattern is to challenge and scrutinize our educational premises as we are doing here.

But as Indochina specialists we are forced to go further. Given the bloody and bitter history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, I think it is wrong and inexcusable to rely on U.S. government funding to establish what is called a respectable "teaching and research program" on the people, history and culture of that country. The U.S. government, after all, is at war with the majority of the Vietnamese people. Can anybody really believe that a government devoting all its energies to defeating a Vietnamese enemy will on the other hand pass out money for a strictly neutral study of Vietnam, without any relationship to war objectives? I think that's a ridiculous assumption.

As an example beyond Vietnam, didn't we do this with regard to Japanese studies when we were fighting Japan from 1941 to 1945? Were Ruth Benedict's studies of the Japanese mentality simply an academic exercise? Did the government train young men in the Japanese language simply so they could understand another people for understanding's sake?

Again, given the specific Vietnam experience, the history of what America has been in Vietnam, I would argue that AID specifically can be considered perhaps the most reprehensible source of government funding. Whatever the record of AID in other countries, it has blood on its hands in Vietnam. It has totally ignored development ideals in subordination to the false god of pacification. For every AID member helping to train a nurse for

bombs and artillery. Lest anyone think that AID educational missions are separate from such grim efforts, I would argue that the result of our educational efforts in Vietnam has largely been the nurturing of a small middle-class clientele, of the slavish pursuance of American norms, of Vietnamese scampering after U.S. scholarships, and the distribution of textbooks that either ignore or undermine the Vietnamese revolution.

Just as significantly, in terms of today's topic, I think it is AID more than any other government bureau that has attempted an open and blatant assault on the university environment in the United States. The most ambitious and comprehensive effort of this type was the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG). This was an affair --it remains an affair--through which AID provided the initiative and money for organizing over a hundred Southeast Asia specialists into study committees. I think it can be summarized as an expensive and largely successful cooptation of academicians.

The Center here at SIU is another technique that AID has decided upon. Presumably AID tried it out first in Carbondale--a place which many of us feel lacks the specialists, the libraries, and the background for any serious effort in Vietnam studies--because there was a willing, eager clientele, and also perhaps because they hoped to slip it past the anti-war movement in the southern part of Illinois.

Now it should of course be pointed out that the CIA, the Defense Department, the State Department, etc. have also successfully infiltrated American universities. But the point is that theirs has been a less blatant, less obtuse, less

Whatever the record of AID in other coun- tries, it has blood on its hands in Vietnam

a village, there are five engaged in the training of counter-revolutionary policemen, assassination squads, intelligence operatives, and tax collectors. For every hour spent in improving rice or sweet potato plants, there are ten hours spent bringing in American rice to make up the deficit caused by defoliation, building roads to let the tanks move quicker, treating those injured and homeless due to U.S.

arrogant--of course, no less dangerous--an operation.

Any respectable long-term academic program for the study of Vietnam will need to enjoy the trust of the Vietnamese people. They know the history of the U.S. government's involvement in Vietnam, they know the history of AID in Vietnam, they know the history of particular U.S. universities long associated with AID in Vietnam--SIU, Ohio University, Wisconsin State in particular. They know the names and activities of particular academic entrepreneurs who have more or less made their careers off such contracts. It's simple folly to believe that the same personalities, the same institutions, the same financial sources that initiated and sustained American involvement will now be trusted by the Vietnamese to undertake what is called a serious, sincere academic effort.

In short there must be a clean break from the sordid past. I think it begins by not accepting AID, CIA, Defense Department or other compromising sources of funds in this field.

How, then, are we to proceed

to study Vietnam? Here I suggest we take seriously the points made by Professor Dowd regarding the university as an integral and functioning part of the present American socio-political and military system. As long as this relationship persists, we as participants in that system will have to face, every day of our professional existence, potential contradictions in our thoughts and actions. And I must say from personal experience that students and colleagues are a crucial factor here, since they must keep us honest, must rekindle our own moral awareness when it begins to flag.

Finally, we must always ask who is using whom in this relationship between university and society. If the present status quo leadership in America is succeeding in using us more than we are using them, then we had better find some more viable strategies fast or else leave the university. If we can use them more than they use us, then we can help in the process of forcing change in the university, the nation and in the world as a whole. Only then can we be considered part of the solution, not part of the problem.

Nina Adams:

Self-Censorship

Whenever one tries to discuss academic freedom, one encounters ambiguities which make it difficult to make distinctions. However, in the issue of academic freedom at SIU, the distinctions are clear. If there is control of specific research projects, if only faculty of a certain point of view are hired, then there are clear-cut issues. But the case of academic freedom is also a far more subtle one. It is one example of the problem which pervades Asian studies in this country, and which cannot be solved simply by the removal of the SIU Center.

I refer to a type of self-censorship which pervades academics, particularly Southeast Asian studies. Self-censorship is much more effective in terms of government policy than direct control of scholarship. If one controls the sources of funds, if one controls the status and the status mobility of people in the profession, and if one is able to manipulate publication of contracts and teaching loads, a great deal of pressure can be exerted.

Often the academic himself is unaware of this process: he may fall into a pattern of self-censorship in assuming that certain kinds of questions and topics are not those which should be discussed.

Perhaps the most obvious tendency in Southeast Asian studies is to de-personalize issues. When we discuss the war in Vietnam, for example, we talk about "removing effectives," rather than killing people. We talk about "control and interdiction" when we mean bombing. We talk about "harassment" when we mean random artillery fire over populated areas. Although this case is an obvious one, there are others in which the influence of self-censorship is less overt.

An instance is the case of Indonesia, or for that matter, any of the Third World countries. One will note the large amount of literature on modernization and political development carrying titles like "The Decline of Democracy," "The Failure of Parliamentary Procedure," or "The Destruction of Liberalism." These imply that Third World countries have failed to meet an unspecified set of standards, standards which measure them against the United States. There are many books written on Sukarno's leadership which seem to claim that he deviated from the best form of government for Indonesia, parliamentary democracy. There is no attempt, however, to find out what types of political forms are proper to Indonesia, or to discuss the fact that parliamentary democracy was a Western importation which rather rapidly died when cut off from direct Western contact. Also absent is any consideration that the Indonesians may have returned to a system of government, however much we may have disapproved of it, which has reflected their traditions, their political biases, and their level of their political development.

The process of rationalization is a similar sort of self-censorship. One may begin a study assuming that the Vietnamese should move towards a specific Western model. It is not difficult, thereafter, to look at the results of American bombings in Vietnam, describing the situation in very academic terms, and construct a whole framework of nonsense about it. Perhaps it could be called "enforced urbanization," to use Huntington's phrase, and a most blatant example. One can end up, as one noted scholar in Southeast Asian studies did, describing the massacre of 500,000 after the 1965 coup as a somewhat

chaotic but efficacious transfer of power.

This is not considered direct censorship of thought. But when all of the materials in the field, with one or two notable exceptions, consistently follow an implicit set of assumptions, one begins to note the pervasive atmosphere which is increasingly influencing thinking. What is involved here is a conscious or unconscious decision to look at topics only in certain ways, to use only certain types of terminology which pretend to be value-free because all questions of moral judgment have been removed. But simultaneously, discussions which involve other sides of an issue have disappeared. This kind of pressure is very much heightened when one begins to set up a center for study in one or another area, and selects faculty of only one point of view.

The impact of this on the students is a continual one, the effects of which become apparent over time. Students come into a field like Asian studies with a certain trepidation along with their curiosity. Sooner or later they are pulled into a status quo position by the terminology used, by the points of view of their professors, and the nature of the courses offered. They learn by observing how their professors interact with the Government and with their colleagues. This type of conditioning becomes a very significant problem.

This system of self-censorship also promotes a particular brand of elitism, now characteristic of contemporary Vietnamese studies. The notion is that unless one is expert in one particular form or another of Asian studies, one cannot even comment on public issues, much less arrive at a明智的 judgment. This kind of elitism is fostered by something like the Center for Vietnamese Studies at SIU. A constant stream of experts who are geared to the technical phase of problems of counter-insurgency, counter-revolution, and terrorism will come marching through.

Each in turn will give his data on the specific areas he has seen, and claim to understand the total problem. I would only point out that the so-called hard-headed realists in this parade have been consistently wrong in their prognostications since 1962. This may give us pause to wonder as to whether we should accept the effectiveness of future centers which operate on the same principles.

Lastly, I wish to return to the notion of academic freedom. You do not have academic freedom if an entire center, built with Government money, is composed of people of similar points of view, even if they allow one or two dissidents to come in. If certain basic assumptions are accepted -- that it is in the American national interest to stay in Asia, to wage and win a war in Vietnam, and to direct the lot of the Vietnamese, Indonesian, Thai, and other peoples, then the Center for Vietnamese Studies can also afford one or two dissidents. This is not academic freedom: there has been no opportunity to say that not only is this war a mistake from the beginning, but that neither can it be corrected by superficial technical reforms or a few measured admissions of shortcomings.

When we look at this particular problem of academic freedom, it is not confined to SIU. It is not confined to areas where the problem is clearly

self-censorship also promotes a particular brand of elitism

posed. Perhaps an unpopular person is fired, or a graduate student is denied a fellowship, or a particular type of term paper or thesis is turned down. This is a problem that pervades the profession. It is not a problem that can be solved by constant striving for more Government funding to increase our so-called expertise. Such expertise created the problem.

Ngo Vinh Long: Vietnamese Students and the Center

I would like to say a few words about the problem of academic freedom faced by the Vietnamese students studying in the United States and how this problem is connected with the Center here.

There are two different types of Vietnamese students working in this country. First, there are those who come here on private scholarships or on money from their families. Those on private scholarships are subjected to up to a year of investigations by the secret police in Vietnam and by the national police before they are cleared to come to this country. Those who come on their own money are usually rich people and therefore people who are working for the government, so the period of secret police investigation is much shorter.

Second are those who come here on government scholarships, mostly AID scholarships. These people are either sons or daughters of people who work for the government or people who have been in the army or for some other reason are trusted by the Saigon government. Right now, for example, you cannot get out unless you have completed your military duties, and a law passed on October 25, 1969 prohibits any male beyond the age of 18 from leaving the country. So Vietnamese students who come to this country are either from very conservative families or from governmental circles in which they cannot truly express their opinions about what's happening in Vietnam--about the war.

While the students are in this

country they are subjected to considerable harassment from the South Vietnamese embassy in Washington. Most of the students who come here on private scholarships or from private financial sources have student visas and student passports. These passports are subjected to renewal every six months or every year, depending on the whims of the officials at the South Vietnamese embassy in Washington. If you say anything that the government thinks is not right or is against the national interest as they see it, then you can be deported and taken back to Vietnam at any time. Two years ago, right after the Tet offensive, some 60 of us Vietnamese students who felt we could no longer stand the destruction caused in our country, especially the cities by barbarous random bombings of American planes, signed a statement against the war in Vietnam. Immediately afterwards, our passports and visas were taken away and we were on the point of being deported. We would have been deported had it not been for the efforts of many people, both pro-war and anti-war, who thought it would be very embarrassing for the American government to deport 60 of us because we happened to be against the war, exercising a right that Americans are guaranteed.

Vietnamese students now at the Center are mostly people who have been in the army and who are selected by the South Vietnamese government. They have no academic freedom here whatever and they don't have anything to offer you because they

cannot speak up. In fact, the Vietnamese student groups in this country are far, far different from the Vietnamese students at home. Since March of this year, the students in Vietnam have been demonstrating all over the country demanding unconditional and immediate peace in Vietnam. And because of this they have been tortured and imprisoned and subjected to all kinds of terrors. The latest incident of repression against the students took place on August 30, 1970 while Agnew was in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese government employed American helicopters, rockets of all sizes and various other armaments against the students.

Let me quote a letter from Saigon University's Student Union, which has an active membership of 25,000 people:

The August 30, 1970 repression is merely the execution of Mr. Thieu's orders of July 15, 1970 when he vowed to "beat to death" those calling for "immediate peace." He said on that day, "I am ready to smash all movements calling for peace at any price because I am still very much a soldier. We will beat to death the people who are demanding immediate peace." On the same day, the national police chief, Brigadier General Tran Van Hai, told the police chiefs to use "strong measures including bayonets and bullets" to smash all demonstrations at any price.

And you can read more about this in the *New York Times* of July 16, 1970.

And so, you can see the big difference between the Vietnamese student groups in this country and the Vietnamese students and Vietnamese people in general at home. By bringing all these Vietnamese

to the Center and not giving them the freedom to tell you what's happening in Vietnam, you have denied academic freedom at this university.

David Marr: I'd like to endorse what Mr. Long has said because I think it is very important to one of the main questions regarding the Center. A lot of verbiage has been spilling out of the Center this past year or year and a half along the lines that they have a need to relate to the Vietnamese people--in both the North and the South. I'd like to ask Mr. Long whether from a Vietnamese point of view he can possibly conceive of a strictly academic enterprise in the United States funded by AID, the same AID which has been involved in assassination and all forms of repression in his own country. Do you think the people of Vietnam could possibly relate to a Center in the United States funded by this same agency?

Ngo Vinh Long: No, for one reason. If the students who are sponsored by AID could come here and study, then return home and do anything they would like, then many Vietnamese could freely take the opportunity to accept AID scholarships. However, in signing to come here to study on an AID scholarship they must agree to obligations when they come back, and the obligations can be for five to ten years. They then have to fill positions sponsored by the South Vietnamese government and also by the American government. And I think this is not acceptable at all.

John Whitmore: I would like to add my own comment to this and certainly very much accept Mr. Long's comments on the status and position of the Vietnamese scholar in this country. It is a position in which, as he noted, we have

been overwhelmed by the study of Vietnam in the last few years. It is a position from which we are trying to move to counteract to some extent from our bases but, as he has indicated, is very slow.

...In regards to the Center, we are all for the development of Vietnamese studies within its proper context. We do not believe that either the proper context or foundation exists at this university.

Nina Adams: ...[The Center] makes the assumption that the government, as a benevolent force, almost as a neutral force in the cultural sphere in this world, has a disinterested view of culture and of the mingling of ideas of different people from different lands. This is all well and good in a third-grade textbook. It's fed to our children every day. It doesn't happen to be the case.

Most of international education in this country consists of Americanizing as many people from as many countries as possible, making English the universal language, paving the way for American expansion--financial, military and otherwise--around the world. Most of international education is geared to know-your-enemy, or know your inferiors. Let us study these quaint people whom we will be very polite to in these poor, underdeveloped areas, whom we have the divine mission to assist forward. Where do we get the gall after destroying Vietnam to announce that we will oversee its reconstruction? The least we can do for the dignity of the Vietnamese, having inflicted what we have on them, is to announce that we understand finally after six years of war their right to determine their own future, culturally and otherwise. If they wish to study techniques and technology in which the United States is sup-

posedly superior, they can do it. They can get books, they can train their own people. In their training of their own people in their own country they are building their own country, because it is theirs and we don't belong there.

It is exactly this self-deceiving notion that the Center is based on. The notion is that international education is quite open and free. The same notion comes up in statements by Center spokesmen about the creation of a free, academic center. Time and time again they point to a single individual who may or may not have anti-war views, and since he is included with 30 others, all of whom have pro-war views of one sort or another, they announce this is an objective, open and free type of center. If you have one man in a group who feels that the techniques of warfare in Vietnam were wrong and five more that feel that some of the tactics were wrong, while all of them continue to accept the basis for the war--that what we were trying to do is in fact correct--this is not a representation of various points of view; this is not an open forum.

The fact that any establishment is secure enough to tolerate one or two dissenters in their midst--tamed dissenters who only dissent on techniques and tactics--does not mean that a center is open or free or that a discussion is really occurring. These same people who now dissent from the tactics that are being used in Vietnam--it's just become too bloody, there have been too many deaths, and worst, it's not working--these same people now support counter-insurgency in Thailand. The idea that we determine the affairs of the rest of the world is still accepted. And so now we have our new group of Thai specialists, working in the field, helping out the government here and there, rationalizing our efforts on the same basis over and over again.

Huynh Kim Khanh: You Have Planned Enough!

I would like to talk about the significance of the Center for Vietnamese Studies for the future of Vietnam not as a Vietnamese expert, the kind of elite expert that Nina Adams spoke of, but from my standpoint as a Vietnamese.

I have been quoted as saying that we would be coming here as a group of anti-U.S. personnel. At a time when millions of American people are against this odious war in Vietnam, this war which kills both of our people, Vietnamese and American, I do not consider my involvement against the war in Vietnam as anti-American. I am helping the Americans out, if you regard the recorded majority of the people in the United States as American. I am not anti-American, I am pro-American. In fact, to borrow a phrase, some of my best friends happen to be Americans. This is a phrase not often used about Americans; it is said about Negroes and Jews, and anybody else. But as a Vietnamese I am still proud to say it.

Since coming to this campus I've seen posters and signs saying "off so-and-so", "off so-and-so." I think you give too much importance to some of these personalities. They may have had some importance in the past and they may not. But they do not deserve the amount of attention you are giving them now. And with regard to the size of the grant and its importance, I've read that the cost of killing one "Viet Cong" is something like \$350,000--a real Viet Cong, that is, not just a gook or any Vietnamese. In these terms, the \$1 million given to the Vietnam Center is very cheap.

More significant than particular personalities or amounts of money, I think, is the purpose for which this Center was established. If a Center for Vietnamese Studies were established in order to study Vietnamese society, to explain Vietnamese society to the American people in the hope of promoting understanding between the two societies, then that would be just great. But as the Center here is set up, it is part of a scheme to continue the American presence in Vietnam. This is simply no good; and it is very dangerous. It is dangerous because it is part of the pattern of the Vietnam war itself. Much has been said about this war's being a "mistake", as though it were correctable or whatever. It is not; it is part of a larger pattern. And I think that in the future after the Center is abolished, then people will say that the Center was a mistake, too.

This leads me to my main point--that the Center for Vietnamese Studies is an instrument of American neo-colonialism in South Vietnam. The very presence of the U.S. in Vietnam has to be understood as part of the postwar emergence of superpowers and of neo-colonialism. After 1945 one type of colonialism, that of small European countries with limited resources, was replaced by a new form of domination maintained by large countries with extensive resources, territories and populations, operating through foreign military and economic aid programs. The term "aid" itself reflects the fiction at the heart of these new arrangements--that the subject state has all the superficial symbols of national sovereignty, such as international

recognition and representation, treaty-signing powers, and so on. But through economic and military aid, the subject state is in fact controlled by a foreign power. It is only when the control exercised by military and economic means fails that the neo-colonialist powers bring troops into their own subject states. I am talking not only about American neocolonialism but about Russian as well. I am looking at Czechoslovakia and at Vietnam. And I am doing so not as a Vietnamese specialist but as a Vietnamese. We have to watch these super-powers, because with them it is not a matter of ideology; it is a question of power politics.

The Center for Vietnamese Studies here constitutes an extremely dangerous attempt to continue the American presence in South Vietnam. Political or military domination is dangerous in and of itself. It destroys our society, kills our people, renders barren hundreds of thousands of acres of Vietnamese land through the modern technological means of chemical warfare. But, as much as I am concerned about the rate of Vietnamese civilian as well as military casualties, even this I can consider dangerous only to a certain extent. For this involves mainly physical destruction.

When you kill our young men, when you kill our people, massacre our children, the old men, that is one thing. All right, our women will bear children again. Vietnamese women are not exactly bad in terms of fertility. When you destroy our crops and spray poisonous chemicals over the land, hopefully the land will eventually regain its fertility through natural processes. But when you destroy our culture--and this I see as the function of the Center for Vietnamese Studies here--when you train our young men here in the so-called American way of life, American way of thinking, and then send them back

some of my best friends happen to be Americans

to Vietnam, this becomes a cancerous growth on our society, it destroys the Vietnamese way of life and the Vietnamese culture. And while you Americans can teach us much in the field of technology, beyond this I don't know what you have to teach us. We have our own culture. When you destroy the consciousness of a people, then you have destroyed everything.

I am saddened by what I see in the American press time and time again--that the Vietnamese are the enemy. And I am amazed by this too, because around 1955 or 1956 I found few Americans who even knew where Vietnam was or how to pronounce it. Then suddenly, first there was a stream of love for the Vietnamese people, to help them out, to preserve their freedom and self-determination. After that, when you could not make them part of your scheme, you called them the enemy. I think that this is in essence the story of why the Center for Vietnamese Studies is not being set up to help us. And it is for this reason that it may be best not to be a part of this scheme that we see here before us.

Q & A

Q. [Paraphrase of a question asked by a member of the audience, a Vietnamese student at SIU] The Vietnamese survived 1000 years of Chinese cultural domination and 80 years of the French; why should we be so fearful of 15 or 20 years of the Americans? How is the Center involved in this? Why should we not be proud to see foreigners learning to speak our tongue and studying our country?

A. Indeed, we learned very much from the Chinese, we learned very much from the French and hopefully we have learned something from the Americans, although I'm not sure what it is other than striptease shows in the bars and certain other aspects of the "American way of life" in Vietnam.

You said you don't know how the Center contributes to all this. I think if you will read the grant document written by the Center itself, it will become very clear to you. Attempting to prove their qualifications for aiding the post-war reconstruction of Vietnam, they claim that the university has already trained 200 provincial chiefs as part of AID's educational programs there. The Center itself could provide the best answer to this question.

As regards Americans learning to speak Vietnamese, I would also be very pleased to be able to converse with Americans in another language than English, so I am happy to see Americans speaking Vietnamese, too. I could even have some nationalistic pride in it as well--but for what purpose are they trying to speak Vietnamese? To continue American domination of Vietnam, or what? Is it in order to understand Vietnamese better so as to promote better understanding between our peoples, to learn something from Vietnam? Well, if they would start doing that too--learning something from Vietnam--then I would be very happy. I haven't seen that yet. As far as Americans are concerned, they are still gooks and have nothing to teach you.

Let me mention the situation of those Vietnamese who are involved in these AID projects. Actually, I think this is one of the main reasons I am against this war. It is very sad that the Vietnamese

have been corrupted by the war. I feel very sorry that our Vietnamese soldiers have been made to fight their own brothers. They didn't want to. Many Vietnamese who work for the Saigon government today have to do so in order to make a living. What else can they do? I'm not calling all of them corrupt--they have to live somehow. You have to understand them as human beings. I make an exception in the case of certain personnel of the South Vietnamese government such as Thieu, Ky, Khiem and some others who clearly work for the Americans, and who, if the Americans would leave, would be among the first to leave with them. But the majority of the people who work for the government--civil servants, the students sent over here by AID--they understandably had to find some way out of the war. I respect their human quality of fearing death like anybody else. I fear death, too.

Then I am left with the question: Why am I not in Vietnam myself? Why am I sitting here? And I say yes, I'm a coward. I fear death, because I'm human. If I were not a coward I would be on the other side, fighting the Americans. Yet while admitting I'm a coward I still think I'm doing the best thing I can--staying abroad, telling the Americans what the war is about. Probably in this way I can do something to justify my being a coward.

Finally, what ought we to study here in order to do some good for our country? The question is to define what is good, what is good for Vietnam, and the answer is to stop the war, get the Americans out completely and unconditionally, and immediately, so that we the Vietnamese can reconstruct our own country. If we need American help, we shall ask for it. But let us ask you, not have you plan the development for us. You have planned enough--you have planned enough

killings in our country!

I am a very proud Vietnamese. The Americans are trying very hard; they have not lost the war yet, but this is one time I can say I feel the Americans have been defeated, not yet physically but mor-

ally. They are out there to save Vietnamese self-determination, freedom and all of the usual moral causes, but in so doing they are committing more crimes than they expected. Morally they have been defeated, militarily they have not.

Gabriel Kolko: The political significance of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs

The long and agonizing history of barbarism, destruction, and war in the twentieth century is in large part the result of the institutional deficiencies and aggressive needs of nations and their social structures, but it is also to some critical measure the outcome of the individual's abdication of his personal and moral responsibility for the institutions and societies immediately surrounding him and within his capacity to affect in one way or another. The great chain of evasion and denial which is expressed in refusal to acknowledge facts or to accept a common moral responsibility to act to change evil conditions and institutions has repeatedly led to the individual and collective abdication of the ideal of a rational civilization as we think it should be, and ultimately to personal insensitivity and, in some instances, inhumanity. This phenomenon of denial is personally comforting, and during World War II it led the German people--essentially good, ordinary men and women--to refuse to believe that their Nazi government was committing genocide in Europe. It made our own country immune to racism as the dominating quality in the life of the black people, and until 1962 it led to a total obliviousness toward the phenomenon of poverty among tens of millions of whites

and blacks. Until My Lai, the fact that the Vietnam war was an attack against an entire population of a nation, which could only ultimately lead to its total genocidal destruction, was denied by many good men and women--genuinely kind to their children and pets--save for a quite small proportion who could not deny the massive and growing documentation that was offered up by the two greatest living philosophers, Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre, by press accounts, and by the Vietnamese themselves.

Ultimately, and usually too late, the facts have a way of surfacing and helping us to define realistically the world we live in--and overcoming our personal abdication of our responsibilities to root out those evils and wrongs that define the quality of our universities and social institutions. In 1965, when the first university --the University of Pennsylvania-- turned inward to discover what was later revealed to be a far more extensive national university complicity with the Pentagon, the CIA, and agencies of American warfare and domination throughout the world, it was essential to learn and patiently explain the facts of the university-government relationship to many sincerely uninformed as well as morally irresponsible university

faculty and students. By 1968 these facts were no longer in doubt, and nearly every academically outstanding school was in the process of discontinuing or phasing out existing military-oriented contracts, and refusing new ones. Without exception, every university that had significantly compromised its deepest obligations to the majority of its students and faculty, as well as the traditional aims of the university in Western history, learned that they could not have tranquillity at the same time they were making profound compromises and moral evasions. Many learned this lesson in the very hardest manner and too late. Very few, and perhaps none, would in 1969--much less today--take your Center for Vietnamese Studies, mainly because it would be administratively disastrous to the other, much more essential functions which are any university's sole rationale for existence.

* * *

Let me explain how and why the U.S. government funds projects such as those you have here at SIU. With the exception of the National Institute of Health and the National Institute of Mental Health, all major U.S. agencies funding behavioral and social science research are members of the "Foreign Affairs Research Coordination Group" (FAR), which the State Department administers. The largest component of FAR is the Pentagon, but the CIA is also a part, as is AID, the Labor Department, etc. FAR's guidelines indicate explicitly that even at the level of research, which your Center states is one of its key functions, its goals are inherently non-academic. "Few agencies have as their central mission the advancement of knowledge for its own sake or for its general utility," FAR's collective guideline states. "Most agencies that contract for research look to research--and rightfully so--for assistance in carrying out specific missions or tasks

in policy or action..." I shall in a moment indicate what "policy and action" today means in Vietnam.

All agencies of FAR review each other's projects and proposals and they "welcome comments and suggestions" from each other "in perfecting plans, projects, and contracts." The real sponsor of a project may be another FAR agency, such as the Pentagon or CIA, and FAR is explicit in stating that "no assurance can be given that it [research] will in fact be used or that other uses will not be made of it, by either the supporting agency or others." If one agency has a special expertise in one area, such as Vietnam, the others will channel their needs through it to avoid duplication and utilize its experience. In the case of the CIA and Pentagon, whose research has been the main focus of campus protests, they have also moved to camouflage their activities somewhat by utilizing the auspices of AID and NSF. Essentially, however, there is no conflict between the work of such agencies, which regard themselves as fully interrelated information and operations pools. When you work for one FAR agency, such as AID, you work for them all.

The best proof of this is that the prime contractors in such research must pass the usual security clearances, that legacy of the McCarthy era which functions as a discriminatory mechanism against faculty who refuse to subject themselves and their acquaintances and relatives to its inquisitorial procedures. In the case of your Center at SIU, key individuals such as Fishel must have undergone security clearances. And as a matter of routine and national policy, to quote the Assistant Secretary of Defense, John Foster, "results of [contracted] research in the behavioral and social sciences related to foreign policy must be reviewed prior to publication... This is general governmental policy; it is

When you work for one FAR agency, such as AID, you work for them all.

not confined to DoD programs." As your Center's contract with AID specifies,

At the initiative of AID and following submission of an annual technical report, there will be an annual substantive review of activities under this Grant. This review will include evaluation of progress, administrative and financial considerations, plans for the following year, and discussion of possible AID utilization--under technical assistance, research and training contracts--of the evolving University competency.

The government always retains the right to tell you, therefore, what you are allowed to do. Such power to control activities and classify research is an infraction of the academic freedom process so basic that it alone makes sponsored foreign area research anti-academic. Again quoting from your Center's contract, "The grant may be revoked or terminated by the A.I.D. Grant Officer upon six months notice, whenever it is deemed that the Grantee institution has failed in a material respect to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant or for the convenience of the Government."

If in the name of gaining funds for a university, administrators violate the principles of open research, freely publishable, and if they consciously allow research which in intent, not merely consequence, causes and perpetuates man's social and physical ill-

--if for any reason they compromise the historic humanist commitments of a university, they cannot later complain when students and faculty seek to reaffirm the integrity of the university at embarrassing moments or in whatever manner their limited resources impose on them. The fault always rests with administrators and those who are more concerned with the dictates and material rewards of power rather than intellectual sensibilities and the autonomy of the university.

Having said what hard experience has taught many universities already, let me now turn to the nature of the war and how your Center's work is vital to Washington's desire to prolong that war despite the wishes of the vast majority of Americans for peace.

* * *

After World War II the United States pursued its diplomacy on the traditional postulate of military power ultimately being based on physical plant, economic capacity, and the ability to destroy it. This assumption was also a definition of the nature of the world conflict, which after 1945 designated the Soviet Union as the primary threat to American security and interests.

The Korean War raised a critical dilemma. It immediately proved the limits of existing military strategy and technology against decentralized, non-industrial nations, for there were no decisive targets against which to employ atomic military technology. Ultimately the United States waged the Korean War with "conventional" arms also intended for combat between industrial nations, and the Korean precedent reveals the principles and tactics to emerge in Vietnam in a more intensive form. The Korean War, in brief, became a war against an entire nation, civilians and soldiers, Communists and anti-Communists alike, with everything regarded as a legitimate target for attack.

For the Koreans, the war's magnitude led to vast human suffering, but the

United States learned that it was unable to translate its immense firepower into military or political victory for itself or its allies. There was, in brief, no conceivable relationship between the expenditure of arms and the political or military results obtained. This dilemma of relating American technology to agrarian and decentralized societies was not resolved by the time President Kennedy came to office.

One of the most significant realities of the war in Vietnam, a fact which makes "legal" combat impossible, is the absence of conventional military fronts and areas of uncontested American control. American forces, in reality, form enclaves in a sea of hostility and instability, able temporarily to contest N.L.F. physical control over large regions but incapable of imposing Saigon's flimsy political infrastructure to establish durable control. Perhaps most ironically, the N.L.F. has been able to transform this American presence, which it has not been able to remove physically, into a symbiotic relationship from which they extract maximum possible assets.

There now exists more than sufficient documentation proving that the U.S. claims to "control" 67 per cent or more of the South Vietnamese population, as before Tet 1968, bear no relationship to reality. Suffice it to say, the Pentagon also maintains private figures revealing that a very substantial majority of the South Vietnamese are not under the physical "control" of either the Saigon regime or U.S. forces. Apart from political loyalty, which claims on hamlet control ignore, the supreme irony of the war in Vietnam is that hamlets labeled "secure" for public purposes, such as Song My, are often the hardest hit. The reason is fundamental: areas, villages, and large population concentrations the N.L.F. operationally controls frequently cooperate in Saigon-sponsored surveys and projects to spare themselves unnecessary conflict with U.S. and Saigon forces. What the Pentagon describes as the "secure"

area in Vietnam is often a staging and economic base as secure and vital to the N.L.F. as its explicitly identified liberated zones.

To some critical measure, "secure" areas are both a part of, and essential to, the N.L.F. And to be "secure" is not to be a continuous free-fire zone. The question is not who claims "control" but who really possesses it. For the most part, such control as the U.S. may have is temporary and ultimately is based only on its ability and willingness to apply firepower. The integration of the institutional structure of so-called "secure" areas with that which the N.L.F. dominates, the profound lack of clear lines and commitments among the Vietnamese, attains its ultimate danger for the Americans when it is revealed that the Vietnamese support for the N.L.F. extends to all levels of the Saigon regime. Such an army of unwilling conscripts, corrupt officers, and politically unreliable elements in their midst is a dubious asset to the U.S. and alone scarcely an unmanageable threat to the N.L.F.

Hence the illusion of "Vietnamization." The various administrations have known all this, and much more. Neither on a political nor a military level can Washington transfer to the Saigon regime a real power it has never enjoyed: that of defining the political future of South Vietnam.

The basic dilemma that the U.S. today confronts in Vietnam is the same that the French encountered in their effort to win their colonial war over 20 years ago. There is no military means of winning that war, and no relationship between the expenditure of money and firepower and the political results attained. Between 1965 and the first half of 1970 the U.S. dropped 5.2 million tons of air ordnance on all of Southeast Asia, and an equal amount of ground ordnance from 1966 through May of this year—a tonnage that far exceeds that of World War II and Korea combined.

and equals the explosive power of 770 Hiroshima-size bombs. The U.S. has been unable to win military victory because the vast majority of South Vietnamese oppose its presence, and the largest group supports the N.L.F. In effect, there are not many Vietnamese who sustain America's cause in Vietnam, just as there were precious few for the French--and those who do have enriched themselves handsomely at the expense of American taxpayers and their fellow countrymen. The war, in brief, is not a civil war; it is an international intervention.

There are many ways of measuring this. The N.L.F.'s remarkable political and military durability is the best test. The Saigon army's unwillingness to fight, despite its immense numerical superiority, is another. The refusal of not more than one-fifth of the South Vietnamese electorate to vote for Thieu in the rigged election of 1967 is yet another. The total self-serving corruption of the Thieu-Ky regime, and the consequent rampant inflation, black market, and economic chaos is still another. Such a regime, with its Swiss bank accounts, decadence, and luxuries in the midst of war cannot defeat the N.L.F. but only the larger goals of the U.S. in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

South Vietnam's inevitable fate can only be compared to China's between 1945 and 1948, where Chiang's forces probably won more military engagements than Saigon's, but died from its own intense economic, political, and ideological morbidity--not in one dramatic debacle but rather by the disintegration in its basic society via thousands of small wounds. Fighting such a counter-revolutionary war is possible militarily *only* with American men. The Johnson and Nixon administrations have numerically trimmed manpower somewhat on the ground only to sustain virtually the same level of firepower via air and artillery. It is for this rea-

son that all public and private administration statements have alluded constantly to "residual" American forces that are to remain at 150,000 to 250,000 men in Southeast Asia, according to present administration plans.

Politically, the problem that has confronted both Johnson and Nixon is, how to make such protracted conflict politically feasible at home and militarily successful in Vietnam. The political constraints operating to inhibit the President are extremely powerful. Not only does a large majority of the American people support total withdrawal by a fixed date or immediately, but important business elements have rightfully concluded that the war is responsible for the inflation, stock market decline, recession, and rising internal social disintegration--and that pragmatism, if not principle, warrants leaving Vietnam. Both Johnson and Nixon failed to give up essentially a military response to the war, and the only way they could gain respites from inter-

Anything that holds out the promise of 'success' postpones the day when real success and peace can be obtained.

nal political opposition was to hold out illusions of imminent "progress" that would presumably satisfy mounting complaints--and give the government more time in the field. Alleged progress in Paris talks, where the U.S. has not yet offered a negotiable package for a diplomatic settle-

ment, was often promised or hinted at, perhaps via so-called secret talks which later proved non-existent. These promises relaxed domestic opponents, but only temporarily, and the inevitable military escalation and protraction of combat fanned them up again. These escalations produced no permanent military results for Washington, led to a wider war, and weakened the U.S.'s position in Cambodia and Laos, creating pandemonium within the U.S. In last spring's escalation, "Vietnamization" of the war was exploited as its justification, and it is likely to be trotted out again to justify yet more escalations and prolonged U.S. involvement in the future. Anything that holds out the promise of "success" postpones the day when real success and peace can be attained for the Vietnamese and American people alike, and the terrible 25-year war brought to an end by the total withdrawal of all American and foreign troops and intervention.

There is no illusion at all in Washington regarding the possibility of the Saigon regime becoming a viable alternative to the government that the N.L.F. and all neutralist forces, including the Buddhists and Catholics, are inevitably going to form. I have closely followed all the Congressional hearings, read the government's reports on Saigon's disintegrating economy, the CIA's account of the total corruption or N.L.F. infiltration of the Saigon political and military infrastructure, and I am certain in the light of the massive documentation of these facts that is circulating about Washington that no responsible politician, including Mr. Nixon and the Pentagon, believes that Saigon can attain the victory that eluded U.S. manpower for over five years, much less do it with a fraction of the money and a fraction of the firepower which the U.S. has employed. This is an illusion--it's a conscious deception. What Nixon needs and desires is more illusions at home to gain him more

time from internal political pressures. To produce illusions, he needs a facade and the usual optimistic, if entirely false, data intended to disarm his opposition with the repeatedly discredited promises and claims that have succeeded in winning him time in the past.

* * *

Apart from the total inappropriateness of your Vietnam Center to any university, there can be no doubt that it is intended to play an especially critical role in the continuation and revival of the myth of "Vietnamization." As such, and because by the terms of the contract it is premised *entirely* on Saigon's ultimate victory, it can only help

Your Vietnam Center is intended to play an especially critical role in the continuation and revival of the myth of 'Vietnamization'.

the prolongation of the war and postpone the day when the American people attain their own victory by having all their young men on their own shores. I repeat, the existence of centers which produce public relations data of this kind for the Saigon regime and the "Vietnamization" program can only contribute to prolonging the war. Not until Nixon draws the inevitable conclusions from the prevailing economic, political and military facts, both in Vietnam and at home, and accepts the principle of total and immediate American withdrawal from Vietnam, will the likelihood of even more

military escalations be eliminated. Until then, it is less consequential that the Center is a total waste of public funds in its effort to do the impossible, but it is significant that it is a discredit to all the remainder of the university, which is to say the much greater part of it, that will be tarnished by its presence here and the national notoriety it has gained--a fact that would make it virtually impossible for AID, or whoever else might be involved, to move it to another university of any standing. It is not important, either, that some of the Vietnamese who will come here will eventually be found to be bitterly opposed to U.S. troops in their homeland--perhaps even be pro-N.L.F.--but rather it is more significant that a much larger proportion will share the Thieu regime's standards of fiscal integrity and its ruthlessness towards the rights of all internal opposition, whatever its religious or political complexion. And speaking of the fiscal integrity of the Vietnamese who have been here, it would repay the university community to research well the congressional hearings which were held at the end of 1969 regarding black market operations

order.

Most critically, however, we must see your Center's unique national role in the context of the protraction of the war and Washington's desperate effort to keep alive an intervention that should never have occurred. The Center will not help the development of Vietnam but sustain the attempt to destroy it. It will not do research but will create myths vital to the larger Vietnam strategy of a discredited administration. It cannot aid the Vietnamese people, and it can only continue to hurt the welfare of our own. In intent and consequence, it can only prove harmful, and its efforts to dress up its facade with a few anti-war academics--an effort that has failed until now--should not detract from the essential fact that it ought to be dissolved forthwith.

We Americans have repeatedly stated to Washington our opposition to the war, an opposition that has been expressed both at the ballot box--when Goldwater's 1964 threats to escalate were repudiated and Johnson's record of escalation rejected--and in the largest street demonstrations in this nation's history. Both courses have failed to alter the government's policy, and it has ceased to represent any majority constituency that can be identified as more than a useful myth. Given the futility of the conventional as well as the unconventional means of change by expressing one's clear desires, the question is now less what we would like to see the government do than what we can do to make it unable to continue its unresponsive, undemocratic course. At this university it means the abolition and removal of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and a denial of its legitimacy to illegitimate policies. It is only by your resistance today to policies that are both immoral and illegal that politics based on

The Center will not help the development of Vietnam but sustain the attempt to destroy it.

in Saigon and the connections which the various Saigonese operators have with Americans and Vietnamese in the U.S.--because in there I noticed prominent among the photostats Carbondale checks which certainly indicated that the Carbondale banks had become international in very short

the consent of the people will become possible tomorrow.

Q & A

Q. Our Center's standard defense is that it will not provide any service or do any research for the government, that it can in fact be completely academic and scholarly. Can this Center which is being funded by 211(d) AID funds be completely scholarly?

A. Absolutely not. There are laws of the United States which make that impossible. Your Center has a contract with the U.S. government. When it accepts a contract with the government it must conform to the government's norms. We've gone through this on dozens if not hundreds of other universities. And that's the usual defense--"We are free to do as we please." But invariably, it's discovered that there is a contract, and the contract explicitly delineates the nature of the undertaking, the nature of the research and the direction of the research. That research is not pure in any sense of the term. It's applied, it's mission-oriented, as the FAR job description indicates. It is intended to perform a function essential to the purposes of the government in Vietnam. And the United States government's purposes in Vietnam have no relationship whatever to the normal acceptable functions of any university.

Q. Do we as a university, as a community, have a chance to stop the Center?

A. Well, let's put it this way. I must be perfectly candid. Many schools have gone through it. We went through it at Penn where we were very successful and got rid of the most important laboratories

working on chemical warfare in Vietnam, and we did it the reasonable way. We had discussions, we released facts, and the students and faculty voted to get rid of it. It didn't move the administration. Ultimately --and I must say this is unfortunate, but it's the price that administrators inflict upon themselves--ultimately only pandemonium convinced them that this project was dysfunctional. And quite frankly, if the normal votes don't work, and the faculty senate votes don't work--and they have not in many places --then whatever else is functional to the objective makes sense. I should say that at Penn where I used to teach and was involved in this campaign--I say "used to teach", Mr. Allen, because your experience is not untypical--we had the first student sit-in in the president's office. We had the first student picketing en masse and we were very unmovable. We prevailed and persisted and we ultimately won. And I think you will too. I'm sure of it. No one has failed after the amount of effort that you're apparently ready to invest in this undertaking.

Q. Do you think anything like that is possible now with Agnew's and Nixon's efforts to divide the country and strengthen the police forces and add to their technology so they can get armaments here in five seconds flat?

A. He is asking in effect whether the determination of the government and its willingness to use violence will not defeat the students. We had to face that kind of determination at Buffalo last year. We had some 400 policemen patrolling our place for six weeks, and we had three days in a row where the CS gas was so thick you couldn't breathe--you had to leave. We had 80 people sent to the hospital and we had 47 faculty members indicted with maximum possible sentences--it's still

pending in the courts--of up to 15 months. And nevertheless, despite this overwhelming show of violence, it became perfectly clear that you can't run a university and maintain this kind of immoral research at the same time and we got rid of that research project. As a matter of fact the government found that no research was being conducted there because the center, which specialized in techniques of advanced underwater warfare, wasn't producing any results and it was dysfunctional. I think that the government can use violence but nevertheless it can't rule the country without the consent of the governed, and the consent of the numbers who are involved in politics is much more critical. If you persevere you'll win--don't worry about that. Again, there's no guarantee--you take your chances.

Q. I hope that what I'm about to say is not true, but I've heard from people who are still at the school that you just recently left [SUNY Buffalo] that the present administration is *more* repressive and the situation is even worse than when you had 400 police on campus. What do you think?

A. Well, the local power structure has made the decision to destroy the university, and the faculty is leaving, the students are leaving, and presumably the police will fill the rooms. But police can't teach history and police can't earn degrees and they can't contribute to the betterment of society. That is a choice that every university administration has the right to make. It is more repressive, but it's not a university anymore. And that's the decision that the administration and the faculty of this place will have to make, too.

Q...

A. I haven't seen you by the way,

Mr. Sacks, since you were taking tickets at a socialist meeting some years ago... [Laughter] But I don't think you're a socialist anymore.

Q. May I point out, Mr. Kolko, that's a very unusual way to...

A. But I think we used to know each other in that context, is that not correct?

Q. I'm under the impression that that's not the only place you saw me. You've also been over at my home, in my living room, with your wife if you remember.

A. No, I don't remember that. [Laughter] But I think we used to know Frank Trager in common as well. Tell me, why hasn't Frank Trager denied the press reports that he was taking CIA money for his Vietnam research all these years... Since we were living room associates--and I must apologize for not remembering that--I do remember we had Frank Trager as a common friend and I recall that Frank and I used to spend much time together when Frank was hunting up research grants. But I find it abysmal, and I would like to get your comment on this, on why Frank who was our mutual friend has not publicly denied the reports which appeared in *Le Monde*, which is the greatest newspaper in the world, that his work on Vietnam was paid for by the CIA. Do you know much about it?

Q. You should ask Frank Trager. I know nothing about it.

A. But you know Frank as well as I do. Perhaps he confided in you in a way that he wouldn't confide in me. But please, let's have your question--I don't want to seem brash.

Q. Would you put the microphone down?

A. Well, I...

Q. You're interrupting me each time, number one.

A. Please.

Q. Number two, you took the occasion without even hearing the question from me to raise an utterly irrelevant thing from the course of your speech.

A. Well, it's not often that I meet old friends in southern Illinois. [Laughter]

Q. I understand that kind of behavior. You learned it in a good school. Let me just suggest something to the audience. I listened very carefully to Mr. Kolko's speech, and he has suggested to you that you ought to trash the school if you want to stop the Center. [Mingled shouts of "Right on!" and "He did not say it."]

A. He didn't say it.

Q. He said you are to take such measures...as to stop the institution from functioning. And that's exactly what I heard him say. Now I may be deaf, but I think I heard him say that. [From the audience: "Are you asking for a succession of democratic processes?"] --The democratic processes... [More questions from the audience] Look, one of the things I would like to do is just get through my little bit and do my thing...

A. Would you ask me a question? That's what I'm here for.

Q. I'm trying to make a point, not a question. And I have a right to do that--that's part of the democratic process.

A. Right.

Q. You shouldn't interrupt me.

A. I think that we went to the same meetings for many years. But I'd like to ask you about the earlier meetings.

Q. Will you let me have an opportunity to talk and let me make my point. You spoke for about thirty minutes. Let me make my point. Number one, you have the problem of how you want to conduct yourself at a university. And I do not, because I am not somebody who knows this university well, dispute for a moment, in view of what I've read from afar about last May, that you are capable of stopping this university from functioning. I don't know. You may be very well capable of stopping the university from functioning. But I would caution you that you weigh the benefits of that particular course of action in terms of the existence of the forces of repression which will be displayed--I raise this quite seriously--[in the face of a threat] to the continued existence of this university. And I particularly do so because of the remarks of the speaker in which he said that contracts, plans, projects--all of these--he equated to the 211(d) grant which is here, and said, therefore all the research in this institution--I'm quoting him--all research in this institution done by the Center for Vietnamese Studies is subject to the review of AID and, by its membership in FAR, all of these other agencies. Now I have a simple fact, a simple fact. There are at present, at least as far as the funds in the grant are concerned, a number of allocations for research made to senior research scholars and to some people for their Ph.D. work. These have gone through the regular committees of the university and received approval. None of these things have been approved or disapproved of by any other agency than the duly constituted faculty of this university.

And, moreover, there is no provision in any of the funds given for research purposes--because we discussed them yesterday, the \$7500 grants--none of them escaped the control of the faculty of this university through its regularly constituted committees and they are not subject to review. Now I raise the question to Mr. Kolko: if in fact there are no limitations on either the professors appointed, on either the money expended for research fellowships, on either the travel done by students or faculty, or on library acquisitions--if that's what the grant is, so that it covers the entire spectrum of academic activity, and if those and those only are the things done by the Center, under what circumstances and under what conditions should the university not accept such money to do such activities?

A. Look. Everyone who is trying to save his institutional prerogatives says that I am free to do what I want in the sense that I have agreed to do something voluntarily that the government is willing to pay for. In brief, I am willing to accept his contractual specification. The quote I gave you was taken from a long policy statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense with regard to the publication of foreign area research under the auspices of every agency. If you think that the Assistant Secretary

of Defense does not know what he's talking about--he happens to be a very competent man--then I think you misjudge his ability. And I think as well that if you can assure us that AID is what it declares it not to be--if you're going to assure us that AID is not oriented toward mission-oriented specific functions in Vietnam--then we can take your statement at its face value. AID states explicitly that it is interested in performing certain missions for certain ends. It makes no bones about it and it funds only those kinds of activities. As a matter of fact there are congressional amendments which make it impossible now for the government to give absolutely pure research grants without them having some ultimate functional objective. I will say this: I'm sorry I twitted you so mercilessly, but you are a professional and for twenty years you have been involved in the Vietnam business; and I'm sure that when you write your autobiography it will make very interesting reading. You have been living off government research grants directly or indirectly for a long, long time. And I don't blame you for wanting to earn a livelihood. But you can hardly blame these young people for wanting to live in a decent society, and that's precisely what the professionals have not been able to create. [Applause]