

# Ngo Vinh Long: Land Reform?

Because time is short I cannot discuss all the dirty programs sponsored by AID in Vietnam. I would like to spend a few minutes, however, describing the best program they have and show you how good this is. The program they are really proud of is what they call the Rural Development Program. And again, because of the problem of time, I'm not going to talk much about the Rural Development Program. Many parts of it are very dirty. But let me talk about the best of this best program, namely the land reform program recently carried out.

On March 26, 1970, the Saigon government finally passed a land reform law called "Land to the Tiller", after much pressure from the United States and after three years of study by a group of "specialists" from the Stanford Research Institute sponsored by AID. On that date President Thieu declared that it was the happiest day of his life. After that Ambassador Bunker in Saigon followed suit by praising the bill as perfect and the only one of its kind in the world. Back in the United States the news media were also caught up in a storm of over-enthusiasm. For two days NBC had a program about the land reform whose message was that the Vietnamese peasants are really overjoyed because now they have land.

South Vietnamese observers, however, do not share this enthusiasm. In a recent article entitled "March 26 Is the Happiest Day For President Thieu, For the Peasants, Or For Whom?" published in *Doi*, a Saigon weekly, the editors concluded that March 26 might have been the

happiest day in the lives of the American leaders and Thieu and the landlords, but in reality it meant little for the peasants of South Vietnam. The editors of *Doi* are former members and leaders of the Rural Development cadre teams sponsored as a joint operation by the CIA and the U.S. Operations Mission to Vietnam. The real reason for passing the land reform law, the article said, was to "make it easier for the American government to persuade the people to support the government of the Republic of Vietnam." In another article entitled "Is the Land to the Tiller Bill as Perfect as His Excellency Ambassador Bunker Claims?", which was published in the August issue of *Tu Quyet* (a Saigon magazine), the author, Duong Son Quan, shows in some detail how the land reform program represents "an extreme degree of demagoguery." This and many other articles by South Vietnamese writers on the land reform agree that the land reform law will not work for several reasons:

--The law sanctions the distribution of only those lands which have for a long time been left uncultivated because they happen to lie in insecure areas. This land is of no use to the peasants since they cannot cultivate it, and even if they could cultivate it American air and artillery strikes would visit it constantly. Moreover, rice-culture requires intensive irrigation and labor, which means a lot of capital would be required to put the abandoned land back into production again. Insecurity makes the peasants' effort, as well as the outlay of capital, which is often borrowed at high interest from usurers, seem worthless. Thus, in spite

of the fact that the peasants don't want such land, they are nevertheless forced to go out to clear land in some areas, getting blown up by land mines in the process. While the peasants are forced to put into cultivation lands that they don't want, landlords receive about \$1000 for each hectare of the worthless land which they abandoned long ago. All in all, they will receive 161 billion piasters, or over \$1 billion for such worthless lands.

--In addition to the fact that most of the land is worthless as it is because of the war, Article 13 of the land reform bill clearly shows that the land reform is not primarily for the benefit of the neediest peasants, since landless agricultural laborers, who make up the majority in the countryside, are put at the bottom of the list of priorities for land distribution. Military men, civil service personnel, and city dwellers precede them on the list.

--Since the start of the program some \$40 million have been embezzled from the Rural Development Bank, which is supposed to lend money to the peasants to help them put the land back under cultivation. Last year this fact was disclosed by representatives in both the Lower House and the Senate in South Vietnam; as a result the head of the Rural Development Bank was sent by AID to Harvard University to study postwar reconstruction--in other words to get into a university to regain his credibility and respectability, then go home and do the same thing again.

Having mentioned this one AID program in Vietnam, let me now relate it to the AID programs here at this university. They bring in a group of Vietnamese who cannot object, who have to support the Saigon government. Once here, they are given technical and specialized training which will prepare them for manning AID programs on their return to Vietnam. This is one major function of the Center and

the other AID programs here.

Second, by setting up this Center and collecting all these people in one place, you have a perfect means of advertising the American AID programs in Vietnam and justifying them, or, in the words of the Saigon newspaper I mentioned earlier, making it easier to persuade the American people to support the present American policy of maintaining the Saigon government.

A third reason for creating a Center such as you have here--and I must go on to include this--is to provide a means of legitimacy to certain Vietnamese "scholars" who have been sent to America to try to justify the American and South Vietnamese policy. For example, last year they sent Nguyen Dinh Thuan, the Minister of Defense under Diem. Nguyen Dinh Thuan is a very devious individual. He was introduced to Diem by a friend of his, the friend at that time being the Defense Minister; then Thuan maneuvered his "friend" out of the Defense Minister post and assumed the position himself. While he was in this position he killed a lot of people. He ran some Buddhist monks out of Vietnam into Cambodia, then sent spies after them to have them killed. Just before the coup that toppled Diem, he had become Minister of the Presidential Palace, thus holding two key posts at the same time. He knew everything about the plot against Diem, and when the first coup attempt failed, he packed up and left the palace, having sent his wife, children and all his money ahead to Paris. Now the Saigon government sent this same man to Harvard University to study that well-known artifact of the Soviet Union, the revolutionary movement in North Vietnam under the French. But Harvard soon learned of this man's background from a group of Vietnamese students and accordingly

arranged for his departure. With an "acceptable" and more pliable university program such as this Center, however, any kind of scoundrel can be invited to offer a defense of American or South Vietnamese policy and with no fear of being forced to leave.

To sum up the functions of your Center, it was created, according to its own spokesmen, to study and prepare for the "postwar reconstruction" of Vietnam. This assumes that if the war ends at all, the United States will have won it. For if the United States does not win it, it will not be involved in postwar reconstruction at all. So the Center is based on the premise that the United States is going to carry out the war until it ends the war. In this light we should consider Nixon's recent cease-fire proposal; what does it reveal about future American policy towards Vietnam?

While Nixon proposes a stand-still cease-fire, Vietnamese students back home in Vietnam have been continually demonstrating against the war. Their most important and explicit demand is immediate and unconditional peace in Vietnam, and by that they mean that the United States should withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Vietnam. This position, while it is completely different from Nixon's, has the support of a sizable portion of the Catholic Church, the Buddhist Church, the war veterans and the workers.

Now, by proposing a stand-still cease-fire, which means that the United States forces can still stay in Vietnam where they occupy large areas and divide Vietnam into different areas of control, the United States is saying that it has a right to decide the future of Vietnam. As I just indicated, this is far, far, far from the desire of the great

majority of Vietnamese. Nixon knows very well that the NLF cannot accept a stand-still cease-fire, and when the NLF denounces the cease-fire Nixon will ring his alarm bell saying "Look, we are for peace, we want a cease-fire and the enemy doesn't want it." Indeed, by announcing such a program Nixon has shut up, perhaps temporarily, the war critics in this country; McGovern and the rest haven't said anything about it. Only Senator Fulbright said anything adverse, and he only said that the stand-still cease-fire offer was better than nothing. Some time in the future, I think, when pressure here in the United States is greater, Nixon may announce an unconditional cease-fire. By this he will mean that he will pull all his troops back to their enclaves, giving all the super-weapons to the South Vietnamese troops and letting Vietnamese fight Vietnamese. In a word, let the slant-eyed Asians kill themselves, while the United States hangs in there to make sure they keep on fighting. This to most Vietnamese is just like the case of the thief who breaks into your house, beats you, robs you, kills your wife, kills your brothers, and then when he gets tired of killing gives his knives to one of your brothers whom he has bought out and says, "Okay, now you fight it out and make sure that you settle your familial mess." Of course, the Vietnamese are not going to accept this, and will attack the American troops in their enclaves, and Nixon will say, "There now, we are for peace, we have withdrawn to our bases and they are attacking us and taking the lives of American boys. Let's let them have it." And the war will go on. And your Center's work will go on.

...As I mentioned last night, there is no question of academic freedom as far as the Vietnamese students studying here are concerned. They have nothing to offer you academically. But let me comment on the

state of Vietnamese studies in this country and the role of American scholars in the Vietnam war... Samuel Popkin, for example, wrote his thesis on Vietnam basing himself on questionnaires put together by Ithiel Pool who is a contractor for the State Department in Vietnam. I have read the questionnaires and they are ridiculous. First of all, the questionnaires are written in English and translated into Vietnamese in a manner often completely different from the original English. One question read, "Do you believe in democracy?" This presents a considerable problem of translation into Vietnamese, and comes out something like "Do you think the people should be the master?" To the Vietnamese, this is the language not of the Saigon government but of the NLF. So when these interviewers ask the people whether they believe in democracy, and get their answer, which is "yes", they then turn around and say, "Look, the peasants support the Saigon government."

The interviewers go into the villages and ask the peasants questions like, "Do you have security in the village?" or "Have the Americans dug wells and given you radios and TV sets?" The Vietnamese peasant or village chief usually answers the question in a long and involved form which is very different from the simple formulations of the questionnaire. The interviewing teams bring their results back to Saigon, hire completely incompetent Vietnamese to translate it into English, and then send it back to the United States where

it is fed into computers and used as evidence about what the Vietnamese think about the war.

It is for such "scholars" and such forms of "scholarship"--in reality, propaganda--that your Center has been created, and this is for me the main objection to the Center.

# Earl Martin: A Child of Son My

I spent the last three years in Vietnam and so all this is very close to me, too. I'm glad that we have the participation of our Vietnamese brothers and sisters here in this conference because I think that many times, with our gargantuan AID programs and efforts to change the society of Vietnam, we have not listened to the lessons the Vietnamese people themselves have for us. I often witnessed such attitudes among Americans in Vietnam. This is one reason why I think it is so important that anyone who is serious about Vietnam learn the Vietnamese language. Many AID people could live in Vietnam perhaps 18 months and yet know nothing of the Vietnamese language or the people; soon they were overtaken by an overwhelming sense of cynicism and superiority. They utterly lacked any understanding of the beauty of the Vietnamese people, the richness of the Vietnamese heritage, and of the contributions which the Vietnamese people could make to our own society.

When I went to Vietnam in 1966 with a private organization to work with refugees, the chief AID advisor to social welfare in Vietnam told me that he did not spend time studying Vietnamese for three reasons. First of all, it was an impossible language to learn. Second, he said, they don't really understand themselves when they speak to each other. And third, he said, the Vietnamese actually want to learn English. This attitude prevails in much of the AID work in Vietnam.

Many times it is actually much more sinister and devastating to the Vietnamese people, as in one

case that my wife and I worked with very closely. In Quang Ngai province there was a major operation of the urbanization program—that is, bringing refugees in from the countryside. The senior province advisor, that is, the chief AID man in the province, had an idea for social engineering which he thought he would try out in Quang Ngai province. And that was to attempt to integrate the ethnic Vietnamese with the tribal hill people, who in Quang Ngai province are the Hre people. So in June of 1967, after repeatedly insisting on his idea to the Vietnamese province chief, the Montagnards were brought down from the mountains to be integrated into the refugee camp, in which were concentrated the ethnic Vietnamese. As it turned out the Montagnard people were not familiar with the conditions in the valley. They had no friends or social ties. They couldn't fend for themselves. They drank the water as it came out of the well, because they were used to drinking water out of the mountain streams. Forced into this unfamiliar situation with no one to help them, one after another the children became sick and then the older people became sick.

This is my comment, then, on those Americans who feel we should have something to say about the reconstruction of Vietnam after the war. I think it's time we listened to the Vietnamese people. I think we have stifled the voice of our Vietnamese brothers and sisters and perhaps the most important cry that is coming from them now is simply the cry to end the war. The one voice of a lone Vietnamese young person comes to us.

He calls himself the child of Son My, that is My Lai, which we all know is in Quang Ngai province--

about eight miles from where my wife and I lived for about three years:

### CHILD OF SON MY

Dear Son My, my heart aches with the cry of my young brother dying beside his mother's corpse  
And his grandmother's corpse  
Among the sound of guns  
And barbarous laughter  
Ricefields raise our children  
Why kill them, our people in so many places, so many times? Why add hatred and violence? Is it to achieve your rule upon this country of red blood and yellow skin? Look at the heap of flesh and bones raised by the traditions of Vietnam from thousands of years of struggle each priceless person belongs to Vietnam.

My young brother is like a bud just growing on the tree of our nation. The root, his father, he has never met. The sap, his mother, he has never known.  
And with the millions of brothers and sisters they kill him, the bud of our trees. They kill his mother, kill his source of milk.  
Yet can they kill four thousand years of tradition? Can they kill his father who carries the gun against the invaders? And can they kill the hatred within him as he dies?

His farewell is not his last word for his brothers will be born and grow up like the warrior Phu Dong to repay the nation which has raised them, the nation standing like a centennial tree and on its branches like the green buds they will grow up, millions of hands to end this war and drive from our country these killers who cannot hide themselves.

Humanity will judge them  
Son My, I ache every second, I cannot wait for an hour  
Or for the evening hour to pass  
I must act now  
To save old mothers and young children.

by Le Duan

# Al McCoy: Subcontracting Counterinsurgency

Although two days of discussion devoted mainly to the problems of S.I.U.'s Vietnam Studies Center does allow a thorough evaluation of the problems here, there are pitfalls as well. There is a danger that we will lose our perspective and focus so much attention on S.I.U. that its relationship to the war and A.I.D. will seem unique. It is not. We are just now beginning to realize that many academic departments and foreign studies centers specializing in South East Asia are consciously supporting the war and related counter-insurgency efforts.

The depth of academic involvement was revealed in a dramatic fashion at the Association of Asian Studies convention in April of 1970 when the Student Mobilization Committee and Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars released documents showing the extensive involvement of many of the most distinguished names in Thai studies in an overt, conscious counterinsurgency program focused mainly on North and Northeast Thailand. In my discussion of the U.S. counterinsurgency program in Thailand I will pose and answer four basic questions which hopefully will place this academic involvement in a clearer perspective. These questions are:

- 1.) Why is there a counterinsurgency program in NE Thailand?
- 2.) What is the nature of this program?
- 3.) How does the counterinsurgency research of U.S. academics relate to this program?
- 4.) What are the consequences for the people of Thailand?

## *The Need for a Counterinsurgency Program*

The Northeast section of Thailand remained a rather poor region with a long history of local dissidence until 1954 when the U.S. became directly involved in SE Asia in its campaign to "prevent the Southward expansion of Chinese Communism." With the Viet Minh-Pathet Lao offensive in Laos in 1953-1954 and the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, U.S. strategic planners began to look to Thailand as a secure base for military operations in SE Asia. The U.S. defensive strategy for the region was defined by John Foster Dulles in January 1954 in his "massive retaliation" speech. According to Dulles, the U.S. would provide aid for the expansion and modernization of native armies which would be able to hold the southward surge of China's armies long enough for the U.S. to launch a massive airstrike at China's industry and communications.<sup>1</sup>

To facilitate these projected air-strikes into Southern and Western China the U.S. began construction and expansion of a network of airbases centered on Northeast Thailand. From 1954-1962 the U.S. spent a modest \$97.5 million on seven Royal Thai airbases, and two major highways linking the base at Udorn in the Northeast with Bangkok and Northcentral Thailand. Following the Laotian crisis of May 1962 when 4,500 U.S. Marines were flown into Udorn, interest in the Northeast increased somewhat, and this limited complex of bases and connecting highways was improved.<sup>2</sup>

However, as the Johnson administration began to move towards a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam in 1964, marginal concern for Northeast Thailand

was transformed into an intense pre-occupation. On November 3, 1964, the NLF destroyed six B-57s on the runway at Bien Hoa with mortar fire and 'crystallized' the determination of the administration to launch a bombing campaign against North Vietnam.<sup>3</sup> Regular U.S. bombing of North Vietnam was finally begun on February 7, 1965, after NLF mortarmen destroyed more U.S. aircraft on the ground at Pleiku.<sup>4</sup> Since these incidents had played a significant role in the decision to bomb the North it was obvious to U.S. strategists that a more secure sanctuary was necessary for American airbases if the bombing were to remain feasible. If the heavy losses from anti-aircraft fire over the North were compounded with heavy losses from guerillas on the ground the bombing would become much too costly.

Thus, in 1964 the U.S. began a hasty expansion of its air force facilities in Thailand, particularly in the Northeast which provided the shortest bombing run to the Tonkin Delta. By the end of 1964 3,000 air force personnel and 75 aircraft (F-100s, F-105s, rescue helicopters) had been transferred to Thailand. In 1965 an additional 6,000 USAF personnel and 125 aircraft were transferred, and by December 1966 this had increased sharply to a total of 25,000 men and 400 aircraft as the bombing over North Vietnam was escalated to an unprecedented level. As the B-52s were shifted to the recently completed base at U-Tapao in 1967 and F-4 Phantoms replaced older aircraft in 1968-1969, the Thailand airbase network gained still greater military significance.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, from 1965-1968 almost 75% of the total tonnage dropped on North Vietnam was carried by aircraft flying out of bases in Thailand. Although the bombing of North Vietnam was stopped on October 31, 1968, on the following day the Thailand base complex simply shifted its target area to the Northeastern and Panhandle regions of Laos. The total bombing tonnage generated by these bases continued to increase steadily.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, soon after the initial decision was made to establish Thailand as the base for air operations against North Vietnam, Laos, and certain sectors of South Vietnam (and now Cambodia) the security of Thailand's Northeast became very important to the United States government. The U.S. Air Force had allocated only \$8.1 million dollars for base construction in 1963, but in 1966 this increased more than tenfold to \$110.8 million as the USAF transformed Thailand's small airbases into some of the busiest and most modern in the world.<sup>7</sup> From 1965-1969 the U.S. government spent over \$600 million on such programs as the construction of an aircraft munitions port at Sattahip, expansion of roads from Sattahip to the Northeast's airbases for the shipment of bombs, air communications, and expanded base facilities.<sup>8</sup> The combination of this enormous air logistic complex and its costly aircraft gave these bases a strategic significance second only to Saigon and the major U.S. bases in Vietnam.

However, the huge investment of American resources and the enormous strategic importance of this complex did have its Achilles heel -- a local revolutionary movement. Since even the smallest guerilla movement could destroy millions of dollars of equipment and damage the effectiveness of the airwar with a few well-placed mortar rounds or rockets, even the smallest local incident became a matter of vital concern to the U.S. military. Moreover, liberal social scientists and conservative military men agreed that the bases themselves would foster insurgency. The military men argued that Hanoi and Peking would create local revolutionary movements to attack the bases, while the social scientists felt that the rapid socio-economic changes in the Northeast's economy caused by the bases would create social dislocation and spawn revolution.<sup>9</sup> Thus, in 1964-1965 it became imperative to launch a massive pre-emptive counter-insurgency program in Northeast Thailand to protect the complex of U.S. airbases from possible local insurgency.

### *The U.S. Counterinsurgency Program in Thailand*

After 1964, the pressing demand for an effective counterinsurgency program resulted in the subordination of almost all non-military government funding for Thailand to the goals of the counterinsurgency program. Beginning in 1964, U.S.A.I.D. began to concentrate over 75% of its total aid funds for counterinsurgency work in North and Northeast Thailand. As A.I.D. administrator Robert H. Nooter explained in 1969,

The primary threat to Thailand's security and consequently to U.S. interests in Thailand is the insurgency described briefly above. Our aid, therefore, is concentrated largely on assisting Thai counterinsurgency programs of various sorts and is supplied on grant basis to cover foreign exchange costs of U.S. technicians, training, and commodities.<sup>10</sup>

The U.S. counterinsurgency program has been divided into three major efforts: rural security; rural development; and improving Thai governmental administration.

The largest single component of the counterinsurgency effort is the rural security program. In essence, this program is an attempt to train, equip, and finance the Thai National Police Force so that they will be able to locate and crush any local insurgency before it gets out of hand. Under this program the number of personnel in the Border Patrol Police (BPP) has increased 40% since 1965, and the Provincial police have grown 36% in the same period.<sup>11</sup> A.I.D. has enabled the police to expand its control to the village level, by financing the construction of over 900 local police stations (mainly in the Northeast), while it has increased the mobility of the BPP and Provincial police by providing helicopters and aircraft for their Air Support Division in the North and Northeast.<sup>12</sup> Each of the appointed village headmen has been given a two way radio which he can use to call in police and troops, and his

authority has been further augmented by the creation of a village police force responsible to him. Under the direction of 368 Green Beret officers and men, A.I.D. had established 5 police counterinsurgency schools in the North and Northeast.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the United States Information Service (USIS) has established 12 provincial propaganda centers to train and assist the Thai government in improving the level of its anti-communist publications and broadcasts. This program has involved the establishment of a 100-kw Hill Tribe radio station at Chiang Mai for "psychological" broadcasts to the various tribes.<sup>14</sup>

The second feature of the U.S. counterinsurgency program is the rural development effort which was also begun in 1964. Despite its rather neutral title, the program's major effort has been the construction of 1,500 kilometers of all-weather roads and 700 kilometers of dirt tracks in 20 northern and northeastern provinces. Much of these regions consist of vast expanses of forest and mountain terrain which could easily become the base area for a guerilla movement if it remained closed to the swift penetration of well armed government troops. The construction of these roads under the Accelerated Rural Development program (ARD) is designed to give the Thai army's cumbersome U.S. style armored and infantry units easy access to these areas in time of insurgency.<sup>15</sup>

And, finally, the program to expand governmental efficiency is designed largely to reinforce the rural security and development programs by seeing that they are administered as efficiently and honestly as possible.<sup>16</sup> All three of these programs are of considerable size and scope, and they account for over \$24 million of U.S. aid in fiscal year 1970.

The office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency in the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok is nominally responsible for the overall direction and coordination of the various counterinsurgency programs. However, in the Northeast where even the smallest insurgency can have serious consequences for U.S. military

operations, actual authority rests with the military and intelligence commanders at Udorn AFB. In recognition of this situation, the embassy has created a special consul for Northeast Thailand responsible for co-ordinating counter-insurgency operations between the airforce, the C.I.A., A.I.D., and the Thai government in that region.<sup>17</sup>

#### *The Need for Academic Expertise in Counterinsurgency Programs*

The military and civilian planners who began to plan this counterinsurgency effort in Thailand in 1964 could no longer work with the same false confidence which had pervaded similar programs in Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The United States had spent several hundred million dollars financing a modernization and expansion of the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam and had tried to use it to break the growing NLF movement -- and had failed miserably. In fact, the largest single U.S. counterinsurgency program, the strategic hamlets, had severely oppressed the rural population and strengthened the NLF's popular base. There was a general feeling among all but the most conservative military officials that "next time" a counterinsurgency program must be much more carefully planned, executed, and supervised if it were to succeed.

General Maxwell Taylor (former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam and architect of early counterinsurgency theories) articulated these sentiments at a Defense Department Jason Conference on Thailand in 1967.

Looking back at my Vietnam experience the most serious problem was getting basic data soon enough. Their data and our graphs in Washington were not worth a damn. Our people were staying in Saigon. To correct this situation in Thailand would be a major contribution. You need people who are students of Thailand, ethnology, etc. We don't get enough people in our government who have that kind of background....We would like method-

ical surveys, frequently repeated to get trend data.<sup>18</sup>

The more sophisticated members of the various U.S. agencies operating in Southeast Asia had realized that a successful counterinsurgency program was an extremely complex process which required a sophisticated knowledge of the whole social system in which the insurgency was operating. Since insurgency "exploited" social problems and could be eliminated by eradicating such problems, a counterinsurgency program required vast amounts of the most minute basic data on all aspects of the client society. George Tanham, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency in Thailand, saw this essential unity of academic research and military intelligence.

Well, I think in my field, at least, counterinsurgency area, it is difficult to make a distinction of which subjects are of value to the military and which are of value to the civilians, because there is such an overlap and intermingling of things, so I think some of the subjects they [ARPA] have done, for example, the Meo handbook is sort of anthropology and sociology, if you like, but it is of equal value to the military advisor and the Thai military to bring out a Thai version, and it is of much value to the civilians.

There are a number of research projects I think will be put into that class.<sup>19</sup>

Responsibility for the research and design of the U.S. counterinsurgency program in Thailand was assigned to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense. ARPA's responsibilities were described in 1969 by U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense has underway a program of applied military Research and Development conducted jointly with the Ministry of Defense in Thailand, with the following objectives:

- (1) Working with the pertinent

Thai researchers to describe and design the most effective R.T.G. measures to counter the insurgent threat;

(2) Research counterinsurgency topics in response to ad hoc requests generated by the U.S. Mission; and

(3) Help develop a Thai Ministry of Defense capability to define, manage and perform military research.

Some illustrative programs...are: the design and establishment, as a pilot project, of Thailand's first continuously up-dated storage and retrieval system for counterinsurgency intelligence data keyed to the country's 39,000 villages; a manual concerning the Meo, a non-Thai ethnic minority presently being infiltrated by the Communists; and development within the Royal Thai Air Force of a capability to perform [deleted] reconnaissance.

The Royal Thai Government has increasingly applied ARPA's and Ministry of Defense's research results through joint participation in these and other counterinsurgency research activities.<sup>20</sup>

When ARPA began to design a comprehensive counterinsurgency program for North and Northeast Thailand after 1964, it divided the various intellectual components (research, consultation, information gathering, etc.) among various academic centers, committees, and private corporations. Although these academic groups were contracted by different government agencies, in each case ARPA directed their work, providing overall coordination in an attempt to avoid duplication of effort (just as the various implementing agencies in the Northeast such as U.S.I.S. and A.I.D. were co-ordinated at Udorn). And while each academic group was given a functionally specific task (such as research, consultation), each signed a contract which made it perfectly clear that its limited function was an integral part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency research program.

*each academic group...was an integral part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency research program*

The major group responsible for initiating, channeling, and directing basic anthropological field research for ARPA in the critical mountain areas is the Tribal Research Center (TRC) at Chiang Mai. It was opened in 1965 under the supervision of Australian anthropologist W. R. Geddes with substantial SEATO financial support<sup>21</sup> and much of its scholarship funds have subsequently been supplied by SEATO.<sup>22</sup> Although the TRC's SEATO funding leaves little doubt as to essential counterinsurgency orientation, the 1969 report of its retiring director, Australian anthropologist Peter Hinton, to the Thai Department of Public Welfare makes this quite clear:

It is no exaggeration to say that whoever control the hills control the north of Thailand...the hills provide a sanctuary from which guerillas could launch attacks on the centers of population in the lowlands. Rail, road, and air communications with Bangkok could be cut with ease. Extensions of the northern hills reach as far south as Pitsanulok in Central Thailand, and Kanchanaburi in the West. These extensions could easily be used as bases for operations against the central plains region, and districts within one hundred kilometers of Bangkok.

Operations by security forces are at present hampered by their lack of mobility in the difficult upland terrain, their lack of training in counter-guerilla tactics, and the fact that the government has little administrative control over the region.<sup>23</sup>

The TRC's research functions involved a variety of tasks which included channeling all anthropological research on hill areas

so that it would complement ARPA's data for the Border Patrol Police<sup>24</sup> and hosting a series of academic discussions on a variety of tribal problems for the Thai and U.S. operational counterinsurgency groups.<sup>25</sup>

The Border Patrol Police is the major mechanism for translating the TRC's data and theories into operating policy and Hinton advised the Department of Public Welfare that

I see the primary functions of the Border Police Patrol, a para-military body, as in the fields of intelligence and defense. After a gradual takeover of the present civic action functions of the BPP has been completed, their role should have the following features:

i. To provide a defensive umbrella for the operations of civilian agencies in troubled areas;

ii. To forestall plans of guerilla activists, and to quell violence if it occurs. The success of the BPP in this respect will depend on:

iii. Competence in collecting intelligence. By a circular process, the accuracy of the information received will depend upon the success of the civilian operatives in winning the confidence of the people in the hills.<sup>26</sup>

And Hinton recommended that the TRC's future work be closely integrated with this kind of administration.<sup>27</sup>

As a part of ARPA's responsibility for the "design and establishment... of Thailand's first continuously updated storage and retrieval system for counterinsurgency data keyed to the country's 39,000 villages" (see above) the TRC's "Tribal Data Center Project" has requested all anthropologists to fill in the following data card.

*Proposal for a Village Data Card Code*

1. Province, District, Subdistrict
2. Village name
3. Map coordinates, map sheet
4. Number of houses
5. Population (total)--
 

Adults:	Males
	Females
Children:	Males
	Females
6. Village Headman
7. Influential persons
8. Years of residence
9. Place of former residence
10. School (BPP or other)--
 

Teacher	
Students:	Boys
	Girls
11. Number of BPP residing
12. Other ethnic groups permanently residing in village:
 

Number of houses
Population
13. Occasional residents: name  
race  
occupation
14. Current welfare or aid projects
15. Horticultural products
16. Livestock
17. Weapons
18. General information
19. Sources of information and date obtained<sup>28</sup>

The TRC's research among the hill tribes has taken on increased significance with the advent of the Meo revolts in 1967-69 throughout the mountain areas of northern and north-eastern Thailand. These revolts are the largest local insurgencies in a number of years, and ARPA has responded with the "Meo handbook" mentioned earlier, which was probably contracted to the Tribal Research Center.

Since the demands for detailed knowledge of Thailand's rural areas came so quickly in 1964-65, it was impossible for ARPA to rely solely on original research such as that

conducted by the TRC and cooperating anthropologists. It was necessary to set up a specialized committee to gather all past research and personal experience of various academic field workers and present it in a clear, usable form. Thus, in 1966 some of the most prominent academic specialists in Thai studies formed the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand (AACT). Using the University of California as a cover, the AACT signed a contract with A.I.D. in 1966 to fulfill certain functions which are described in its 1968 contract amendment:

#### *A. General Objectives*

The overall objective of this contract is to make available the resources of the Contractor, including personnel, to support and strengthen the operations of the U.S. aid program in Thailand, particularly with respect to the research activities undertaken by the Research Division of USOM Thailand [subordinate to ARPA]. In so doing, the Contractor will provide support to facilitate the effective functioning of the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand (AACT) to insure its maximum contribution to accomplishment of the goals of the A.I.D. program in Thailand.

#### *B. Scope of Work and Operational Plan*

The Contractor, in conjunction with AACT, will provide the following services:

1. Identify research that is being, has been, or will be conducted in universities, foundations and other institutions which may relate to developmental and counter-insurgency activities in Thailand; evaluate, index and make such research available to A.I.D.; suggest and solicit research proposals relevant to A.I.D. activity in Thailand for consideration by A.I.D./W and U.S.O.M. Thailand.

2. Identify, prepare and maintain a current inventory of Ameri-

can scholars with specialized knowledge of or background in Thailand, which can be drawn upon by A.I.D. for its specialized needs...

3. Meet requests of A.I.D./W and the USOM Research Division for assistance and suggestions in addressing issues affecting A.I.D. operations in Thailand.

4. Analyze, evaluate, and make recommendations concerning reports, studies, and proposals for study, including those prepared by USOM Research Division, which are referred for review by USOM and for A.I.D. Washington; such reviews would utilize the knowledge of scholars with backgrounds in Thailand.

5. Review and make recommendations concerning research plans, opportunities, problems, priorities and techniques of the USOM Research Division.

6. Organize, coordinate and conduct meetings, seminars, or conferences under AACT auspices, dealing with development and counterinsurgency problems, issues and activities including research relating to A.I.D. operations in Thailand.<sup>29</sup>

Just as it was the responsibility of the TRC to channel all research done in Thailand by field workers of various nations in such a way that it would complement ARPA's data gathering, so AACT was to perform a similar function among academics in the United States. AACT began a conscious effort to subvert almost every major academic body in the United States concerned with Thailand in an attempt to channel their priorities towards the imperatives of ARPA's research. AACT's executive secretary, David Wilson, is chairman of the Association of Asian Studies' Research Committee on Southeast Asia. AACT's members agreed that they would seek the appointment of AACT president Lauriston Sharp to the executive committee of A.I.D.'s Southeast Asia

Development Advisory Group (ironically enough, the group which originally created AACT).<sup>30</sup> At the July 1969 meeting AACT members discussed the recruitment of capable academic personnel for USOM's Research and Evaluation Division,<sup>31</sup> while in March 1970 AACT members agreed that they

will further undertake to specify research projects that are necessary or desirable; and seek people who would be prepared to undertake such research. In the search for such people, we will make an effort to draw Thai research people into this sort of work, as well as U.S. and perhaps third country persons.<sup>32</sup>

The Stanford Research Institute, which has always drawn heavily on the resources of Stanford's academic departments, has contracted directly with ARPA for at least five major research projects in Thailand since 1962. Increasing its output sharply after 1964, SRI has issued over 100 reports of which 30 deal directly with counterinsurgency problems. These reports have fulfilled two major functions for ARPA: conception of a macro-model for counterinsurgency operations in various regions of the country; and design and testing of advanced techniques for specific counterinsurgency problems.<sup>33</sup> This latter function has involved the cooperative testing and development (with Cornell's Aeronautics Lab and Michigan's Willow Run Laboratories) of infrared photographic techniques for pinpointing guerilla encampments, analysis of "patterns of Communist terrorist crop cultivation," and discussion of the varieties of physical torture likely to make a guerilla suspect give up information.<sup>34</sup>

As General Maxwell Taylor has noted, one of the critical failings of earlier U.S. counterinsurgency programs in South Vietnam was the inability to monitor effectively the ongoing impact of the program on the local population. ARPA sought to prevent a repeti-

tion of this failure by contracting a private firm, American Institutes for Research, which was staffed on a full and part-time basis by PhDs and faculty members of various universities. In December 1967, AIR presented a detailed proposal to ARPA in which AIR defined its functions:

1. To devise reliable and valid techniques for determining the specific effects of counterinsurgency programs in Thailand;
2. apply these techniques to ongoing action programs to generate data useful both in the formulation of broad programming strategies and in the design of the specific mechanics of program implementation;
3. assist the Royal Thai Government in establishing an indigenous capability for the continuing application and refinement of these techniques; and
4. pave the way for the generalization of the methodology to other programs in other countries.<sup>35</sup>

This proposal recommends that John D. Montgomery, of the Harvard University Government Department, and M. Ladd Thomas, Coordinator of Southeast Asian Studies at Northern Illinois University, be hired by the program.<sup>36</sup> AIR's general approach for evaluating the efficiency of the counterinsurgency program fused behavioral science with military operations in a most "exciting" fashion:

The offer of food in exchange for certain services affords a convenient example. If this has in the past been a strong stimulus,

## ***'burning the crops'***

it can probably be weakened by increasing local agricultural production. If it has been a weak or neutral stimulus, it can probably be strengthened by burning

the crops.<sup>37</sup>

AIR was awarded a two-year, \$1 million contract by ARPA, and, like AACT, it has cooperated extensively with USOM's Research and Evaluation Division.<sup>38</sup>

AIR's sophisticated techniques have generated considerable enthusiasm among counterinsurgency researchers. In a February 1970 evaluation report to AIR/ARPA, Prof. Michael Moerman of UCLA's Anthropology Department said

Now, here is really my last point. It's also a practical one, and I finish up all positive. One of the most striking claims made in the Semi-Annual Report...is AIR's ability to show where the impact of one agency's programs might work against the impact of some others...and in short provides guides to mixing projects. I think AIR is further along on being able to deliver the goods here than anyone else is. If the project succeeds at all, it should certainly succeed in this regard. This is a contribution of unique and immense value which you should not neglect to emphasize in selling the program and attempting to renew its support.<sup>39</sup>



While this rigorous division of labor among the various academic groups has no doubt increased the efficiency of ARPA's program, it has also had significant consequences for the domestic debates in the United States and Australia over academic involvement in counterinsurgency work. Although all the known contracts of these academic groups state quite clearly that their specific function is an integral part of a larger effort, when criticized, each has used its functional specificity to deny or minimize its involvement in counterinsurgency research. Defenders of AACT claim "We did no research, we only advised," while Australian anthropologists who have directed the TRC

have excused their involvement in the TRC by arguing, "We did not advise in counterinsurgency policy, we only did basic research."

*Consequences of the U.S. Counter-insurgency Program for the People of Thailand*

While the U.S. counterinsurgency program has had little impact on the relatively stable society of lowland central Thailand, it has had disastrous consequences for the historically more volatile Northeast and North. The North is inhabited by hill tribes who have resisted almost all forms of central government authority for hundreds of years, while in the Northeast there are hill tribes as well as a large Lao population which was forcibly abducted into Thailand during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and never really integrated into the Thai polity. While the continuous low-level dissidence in these regions went unnoticed before 1955 and was paid only minor attention until 1964, the construction of the vulnerable U.S. airbase complex and its bomb transport highways in the Northeast made it absolutely imperative to crush even the most minor disturbance quickly. Since the consequences of insurgency could be so disastrous for the U.S., it was necessary to wipe out the rebels first and ask questions later, if at all.

Typical of this changing response to local problems and dissidence was the counterinsurgency work against the Lom Sak Meo from 1967 to 1969. Until 1967 the Lom Sak Meo lived in a mountain area straddling Route 12 and bounded on the west by Routes 203 and 21 which linked Sayaboury province in Laos with U.S.-Thai military bases in the central plain. Route 12 had been built by U.S. aid funds in the 1950's to link the North and Northeast and serve as a firebreak and access route against advancing armies, while Routes 203 and 21 had been improved under the Accelerated Rural



Development program to deal with military contingencies arising out of U.S. military activity in Laos.<sup>40</sup> The eight Meo villages to the south of Route 12 were a relatively recent development. Previously, all of the Meo in the Lom Sak vicinity had lived in a triangular area bounded by Nakhon Thai, Dan Sai, and Lom Sak to the north of the road. However, population had increased and half of the 6000 Meo moved into the uninhabited hills to the south of Route 12 to survive.

Although this move went unnoticed for a number of years, growing concern about the consequences of insurgency throughout the North and Northeast finally brought a survey team from the Hill Tribe Division (the same agency which supervises the TRC) into the area south of Route 12 in July and August of 1967. Using an early model of the TRC's present Village Data Card, the Division's team collected data on the names, population, ages, numbers of rifles, sex, and number of livestock in the eight Meo villages south of the road. Basing its decision on these data, the Border Patrol Police told the Meo that their shifting slash-and-burn agriculture was damaging forest reserves, and in late August 1967 ordered them to move to the north of the road. The Meo explained that since the soil in the present area was deeper and richer than to the north, they would be able to establish permanent fields and no longer have to burn forests to open new fields; whereas, if they were crowded into the poor soil of the northern triangle they would destroy a good deal of the forest with repeated slash-and-burn cultivation. The BPP ignored this logic and repeated the order to move. The reason for this decision was simple; since Route 12 was a "firebreak" road intended to contain the southward spread of insurgents it was poor strategy to have potential insurgents on both sides of such a crucial highway.

Financed by the Accelerated Rural Development Agency, the BPP constructed a dirt track into the southern area from September to November. In January, 1968 the BPP trucked the Meos out of their old villages, across Route 12, and into new village sites in the northern triangle which it had selected from the air. Although the Meo did manage to get in a crop in early 1968, the disruption of the forced move resulted in a poor harvest in early November. The BPP had promised the Meo relief supplies, but they had "disappeared" somewhere in the police hierarchy. Thus, in November the Meo were faced with a critical situation; they would either have to steal food from the valley towns or starve.

In mid-November the Meo began to steal food from urban storage areas, and when the BPP interfered the Meo responded predictably by attacking nearby camps at which the BPP were training Meo for counterinsurgency work. All the Meo in those camps deserted to the insurgents, and soon the local BPP were outnumbered, surrounded, and without water.<sup>41</sup> The initial government response was to send in some army troops from Pitsanuloke,<sup>42</sup> reinforcements for the BPP, and helicopters and fighters from the Police Mobile Air Reserve.<sup>43</sup> However, the Meo compensated for their inferior weapons (mainly shotguns)<sup>44</sup> by using the terrain to their advantage and outmaneuvering the cumbersome government troops. By December 7, a fifty-man police squad sent in to reinforce the BPP was completely wiped out, and combined ground and air attacks had failed to break through the Meo siege of the major towns in the region.<sup>45</sup> As poorly armed Meo guerrillas bested government troops at every turn, the full-scale revolt became a source of embarrassment to Bangkok's military leadership. The response of the Director-General of the Public Welfare Department was typically bitter: "Local Meos have been behaving well and those who

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have come to live in the camps have become truly civilized. They produce crops for the town markets now." However, the Meo Communists "have come in from Laos."<sup>46</sup> On December 7 it was announced that the Third Army had joined the battle and it was expected that its armored personnel carriers, heavy tactical air strikes, and large-scale burnings of forest would "clear the triangle" within a few days.<sup>47</sup>

Despite these encouraging words and several premature announcements of the revolt's collapse, the Meo continued to ambush the army and police units at will. On December 19 Meo guerillas shot down at least one helicopter which was trying to break their siege at Pu Kitao near Lom Sak.<sup>48</sup> The government began to excuse its failure by explaining that Meos had acquired a number of helicopters for logistical support, were trained in Hanoi, Laos and China, and were armed and supplied by China.<sup>49</sup>

Since the government could not defeat Meos in combat, it moved to more extreme measures. On December 20 the government set up a strategic hamlet at each of the triangle's corners (Nakhon Thai, Dan Sai, and Lom Sak) and began dropping leaflets to the Meo warning them to surrender. The Deputy Director-General of the Police Department explained, "We are now trying to separate the good, loyal Meos from the Communist terrorists,"<sup>50</sup> while Air Marshal Dawee Chulasap warned of serious consequences for the wrong kind of Meo. "Heavy weapons may have to be deployed to get the most effective result within the shortest possible time."<sup>51</sup> When the Meos proved themselves to be of the Communist variety by failing to surrender, the government withdrew its troops to the triangle's perimeter and jet aircraft flying out of Udorn began the systematic bombing and napalming of the region. "They must be got rid of once and for all," declared Air Marshal Dawee

Chulasap.<sup>52</sup>

The bombing continued throughout January, but by early February, only 200 to 300 Meos had been "flushed out" into the refugee camps. The great majority of the Meos had been killed in the saturation bombing and only the fortunate few are still holding out in the deepest recesses of Lom Sak's mountain triangle.<sup>53</sup>

Thus, a situation which would have been avoided completely or remained a petty scrap between local officials and tribesmen was transformed into a costly life-and-death struggle by the demands of the U.S. military. The U.S. had launched a massive bombing campaign from Thailand which gave Thai leaders reason to fear retaliation, cultivated the government's concern over counter-insurgency in order to protect the U.S. military apparatus, and finally built up Thai armaments to the point where it was much simpler to obliterate dissenting communities than to deal with them. And when a small network of communities in an insignificant mountain recess resisted the government in a rational, traditional fashion, they were thought to be building the fateful "sanctuary from which guerillas could launch attacks in the centers of population in the lowlands" described in the TRC report. Once this happened the research and information gathering on the tribes by AACT and the TRC, the training of the Border Patrol Police by A.I.D., TRC, and the Special Forces, highway communications constructed by Accelerated Rural Development, the counter-insurgency contingencies developed by Stanford Research Institute and American Institutes for Research, and the training and equipping of the Thai Air Force by the USAF--all swung into action like the precision mechanism it had become. And it smoothly, efficiently "eliminated" this bothersome little problem in the mountain recesses of northeastern Thailand.

# *academic associations continue to harbor... para-military personnel*

In light of the contracts these academics have knowingly signed, the advice and research they have given to counterinsurgency agencies and the consequences for the people whom they have studied, the failure of the American Association of Anthropologists and the Association of Asian Studies to withdraw their academic cover from intelligence operations is a clearcut case of ethical failure and collective complicity. If the academic associations continue to harbor such para-military personnel, it will become necessary for the ethical members of the university community to deny the para-militarists academic cover by driving them off the campus and into the intelligence agencies where they belong.

6. Fred Branfman, "Presidential War in Laos, 1964-1970" in Nina Adams and Alfred McCoy, *Laos: War and Revolution* (New York, 1970), pp. 239-240.
7. United States Senate, *op. cit.*, pp. 620-621.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 651.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 892-893.
10. United States House of Representatives. Committee on Government Operations, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, *Hearings on Thailand and the Philippines* (Washington, June 16, 1969), pp. 102-103.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
13. United States Senate, *op. cit.*, pp. 631, 775.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 632.
15. United States House of Representatives, *op. cit.*, 107-108.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
17. United States Senate, *op. cit.*, p. 637.
18. Jason Summer Study, Institute for Defense Analysis, "The Thailand Study Group" (Falmouth, Mass., July 6, 1967), p. 2.
19. United States Senate, *op. cit.*, p. 790.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 632.
21. *Bulletin No. 1 of the Tribal Research Center*, cited in Jayawardena, Chandra, *The Michigan State University Project for Research, Technical Assistance and Guidance in Vietnam*, mimeo.,

1970, p. 6.

22. Clark E.-Cunningham, "Urgent Research in Northern Thailand" in *Bulletin of the International Committee on Urgent Anthropological and Ethnological Research*, No. 8, 1966, p. 62.

23. Peter A. Hinton, *Report A: Defense, Development and Administration of the Uplands of North Thailand* (Chiang Mai, Thailand, September 7, 1962), p. 2. Australia is a SEATO member. Prof. W. R. Geddes, Department of Anthropology, University of Sydney, supervised the planning and establishment of the TRC, and turned it over to his student, Peter Hinton. Geddes himself published the TRC's Meo report in 1966, which probably was the basis of ARPA's later report. Their Thai field assistants have received graduate training in Australia to be fed back into the TRC.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 9-12.

25. Tribal Research Center, *Agenda: Tribal Data Center Project: Consultants' Meeting* (Chiang Mai, January 14, 1970).

26. Hinton, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Amendment No. 3 to the Contract Between the United States of America and the Regents of the University of California*, September 1, 1968, pp. 2-3.

30. *Meeting of the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand*, June 10-11, 1969, p. 8.

31. *Op. cit.*, July 23-24, 1969, pp. 3-4.

32. *AACT Work in the Next Year*, March 18, 1970, pp. 2-3.

33. Eric Wolf, "Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand" in *New York Review of Books*, November 19, 1970, p. 31.

34. Banning Garrett, "The Domino-ization of Thailand" in *Ramparts*, November 1970, p. 10.

35. American Institutes for Research, *Counterinsurgency in Thailand: The Impact of Economic, Social and Political Action Programs* (Pittsburgh, December 1967), p. ii.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

38. S. Bhakdi, R.E. Krug and C.A. Murray, *For A.I.R. Use Only*, p. 2.

39. Letter of Michael Moerman to Dr. Paul Schwarz, AIRSOD/ARPA. RDC-T, February 13, 1970.

40. United States Senate, *op. cit.*, p. 614.

41. *Bangkok World*, December 22, 1968.

42. *Bangkok Post*, November 28, 1968, p. 1.

43. *Bangkok Post*, December 4, 1968, p. 1.

44. *Bangkok Post*, December 27, 1968, p. 1.

45. *Bangkok World*, December 7, 1968, p. 1.

46. *Bangkok Post*, December 8, 1968, p. 1.

47. *Bangkok World*, December 7, 1968, p. 1; *Bangkok Post*, December 10, 1968, p. 1.

48. *Bangkok World*, December 19, 1968,  
p. 1.
49. *Bangkok Post*, December 17, 1968,  
p. 1; November 26, 1968, p. 1.
50. *Bangkok Post*, December 20, 1968,  
p. 1.
51. *Bangkok World*, December 20, 1968,  
p. 13.
52. *Bangkok Post*, January 5, 1969,  
p. 1; January 31, 1969, p. 1.
53. *Bangkok Post*, February 7, 1969;  
United States Senate, *op. cit.*,  
p. 629.

# Stanley K. Sheinbaum: The Michigan State-CIA Experience

Perhaps the best description of the American dilemma as we move into the seventies is that we are faced with a crisis of legitimacy. Legal authority is challenged because those with the authority violate principle after principle on the grounds of expedience. Legitimate, as distinct from legal authority exists not necessarily when legal words so authorize, but only when legally delegated men and the institutions through which they function have gained the respect of the community at large. When that respect does not exist or is lost, people are not responsive. Without that voluntary responsiveness authority is hollow, and societies become unstable. Legal authorities begin to sense legitimacy does not automatically derive from legal power, and to enforce their power they must, because of expedience again, resort to illégitimate--that is, unprincipled--devices. And so the circle grows, and such is the dynamic of the rightist trend we are witnessing. In fact, one very adequate description of fascism is the use of legal authority, be it by a police department, a bureaucracy, or a university, for an illegitimate purpose.

The Michigan State University link with the CIA is fraught with deviation from principle, and therefore makes a good case study of the deterioration. Wise men would have known better than to accept the assignment. Good men, once cognizant of the association, should have recognized the implications. Call it what you will, false patriotism, the bureaucratic dynamic, even greed, everyone went along--unquestioningly. We had become cold warriors, and whether a university should be so involved never was the question.

For two years prior to January 1957, I held a joint appointment at Michigan State University in the Department of Economics and on the staff of the so-called Vietnam Project, when the then Coordinator, Ralph Smuckler, told me that he was becoming Assistant Dean of International Programs, and that if I was agreeable I would be promoted to Coordinator. I was pleased to accept.

He then told me of the CIA involvement, that several of the staff in Saigon were operating not under Michigan State direction, but rather for the CIA. Several more such persons would be joining the staff. The term "CIA" was always used, as it was in this first discussion with Dr. Smuckler, when referring to their affiliation. In our more formal organizational schemes they were called the Internal Security Division. The matter was classified as Secret, and I had received the necessary clearance up through Secret to receive such information.

Dr. Smuckler went on to inform me that the work of this group was not part of the University's work, and that I should not expect to be made aware of their activities. There was never any question but that the inclusion of the CIA group was an acknowledged part of the MSUG.

The contract between MSU and ICA/W (now AID) was up for renewal in the spring of 1957, just after I became Coordinator. One of my new duties was to negotiate the contract with Washington. There was not at that time any consideration by the University administration of requesting the removal of the CIA unit. This was months after I had been officially told of their involvement. In fact, the number of men in that unit was increased to five. The claim that

the University made attempts to remove the CIA unit as soon as they learned about it is not true. During the spring, 1957 contract negotiations it was regularly discussed with ICA/W and no protest was ever raised by the University. It was understood to be part of the contract. I can further say with considerable confidence, although I cannot establish it as absolute fact, that it was such from the very beginning of the association with ICA/W. As for President John Hannah's awareness of the involvement, I discussed it with him myself on several occasions. His subsequent attempts at denial testify to his integrity.

Inasmuch as I was involved in the hiring of the staff for Saigon, I was also instructed at the onset by Dr. Smuckler that in the cases of new staff joining the CIA group it would not be necessary to undertake the usual review of their backgrounds and recommendations. They would be assigned to us by the CIA; the procedures for their employment by MSU then would be identical to any other staff member except for the checking of references.

These men, I think all of them, listed their previous employment as Department of Army. Under the circumstances it was not surprising that the CIA would not be explicitly mentioned.

Their appointments to the MSU staff were processed in the same way as any other MSU faculty. This was in keeping with the terms of the MSU-ICA/W contract. For some of them I signed the papers myself, and I am sure they are still in the University's files.

Two men were already with MSU during the 1955-1957 contract period, and three were "recruited" and processed subsequent to my becoming Coordinator in the spring of 1957.

MSU is now claiming that this Internal Security Division of the MSUG was merely engaged in counter-insurgency training. If only training,

why the extreme secrecy? No one was permitted in their offices on the second floor of the MSUG building at 137, Rue Pasteur in Saigon (later to become the US Military Command Headquarters in Vietnam). No one was permitted to know what their activities were. I do not believe that Ralph Smuckler, for example, even when he was Chief Advisor in Saigon, ever himself knew of their activities. They reported to the Embassy, not to us.

The specific point, therefore, is that I was brought into knowledge of the CIA involvement in early 1957. The nature of the instructions to me were that this involvement had existed from the onset of the contract, with full knowledge by the University administration. At the time of contract renewal in 1957 there was no attempt to end the association. It was not until 1959 that the association was terminated.

However, the fact of the CIA relationship receives too much of the attention. The Michigan State professors had their own roles--and at all levels. They helped with fingerprinting techniques, bureaucratic procedures, economic policy, the drafting of South Vietnam's Constitution, and even in the choice of Ngo Dinh Diem as President.

On the public side, the unquestioning role of MSU in support of a mistaken and bankrupt policy was such that one, in retrospect, must question the nature of higher learning in this country. Nobody on the Project raised an objection when the time for the 1956 elections under the Geneva Accords came and went.

On the university side, a university must provide an atmosphere in which teaching and scholarship and service to the society must be permitted to take place freely. The presence of clandestine operations seriously impedes that freedom. In a university in which secret operations are undertaken, suspicion of the motives of one faculty member spreads among the others. The line between scholarship for

academic purposes and research for ulterior intent becomes blurred.

Michigan State University (like Southern Illinois University) has a long-standing record as a land-grant institution. Its reputation for its philosophy of service to the people of Michigan and beyond is well known and justified. Indeed, a considerable source of this country's strength comes from the implementation of that philosophy. However, it is a far cry from providing service to the people and the community to being extensions of the State. One argument for the struggle against communism is that under a totalitarian system the State is given first priority, and that the people are the secondary consideration. In this instance a major university allowed itself to become an instrument of the State. It is further aggravated by the fact that the particular arm of the State is one which is notoriously unaccountable, being beyond the control of the representatives of the people.

Meanwhile on campus, only an embarrassingly small handful of faculty, usually the chronic mavericks, raised any objection. And those being the 1950's, nothing was heard from the students.

Do such contracts benefit the campus? The Michigan State-Vietnam contract can be said to have had a deleterious effect on the campus. It resulted in no significant academic work or programs on Vietnam for the students or knowledge in general; in fact, because of the dislocations caused by faculty members leaving for extended periods, the teaching function of the university suffered and the faculty members themselves were distracted from the research function. To this day Michigan State is not looked to as a source of expertise on Vietnam or Southeast Asia. Further, the smooth functioning of departments was disrupted. How can the department members on campus vote pay increases and promotions, ostensibly academic work, when their colleagues (technically, at least)

in the field are performing for the government? It is not coincidental that Michigan State, which in 1954, at the beginning of the Project, had one of the finest young political science departments in the country, witnessed by 1966 the departure of all but two of that group.

When the *Ramparts* revelations about the CIA-MSU link in Vietnam broke in April 1966, the attempts at denial in the face of other admissions would have been comic if the import had not been so tragic. At State of Michigan Legislative hearings in May, John Hannah's testimony is revealing on several accounts. He began with a tiresome and dumb recitation of the Cold War and the need to protect America for our children and grandchildren against the threat of communism. It was the blind acceptance of anything anti-Communist (e.g. "free China in Taiwan") that was worthy of a bad politician, and that has resulted in the tearing apart of this country--not from communism, but exactly from John Hannah's kind of inability to think for himself, to think past the slogans and clichés.

Just as bad for the head of an academic and intellectual enterprise were these revealing quotes:

I don't know whether the decision was right or wrong, but the decision, as you well know, was that the old domino theory might prevail out there.

I know nothing about the motives. I know that I was asked by the representatives of our government whether or not Michigan State University would be interested. It was more than interested.

Now I am not defending the American position in Vietnam; I don't understand it exactly.

I don't know whether [the American position] is right or wrong.

I am...not posing to be an expert.

I think these remarks speak for themselves, but they are not remarks of a man who perceives a university as an institution of scholarship and critical analysis independent from the pressures and pulls of society and

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*...everyone went along  
—unquestioningly*

---

governmental policies. He was neither willing nor even able (judging from his remarks) to examine what the government's policy was. Worse, he showed no interest in questioning the loss of the critical independence of the University itself. I submit that a man like this, now a governmental administrator, is not likely to expend any energy or thought toward protecting the academic role of a university.

As to the consistency of Mr. Hannah's stated principles, compare his remarks above with the following quotation from Michigan State University's 1965-1966 Annual Report: "...a university should reflect the spirit of the times without yielding to it." (italics mine.)

For those whose taste runs to an economic interpretation of U.S. foreign policy, John Hannah also had some choice remarks. Asking what materials were needed to satisfy American consumer and industrial appetites, he listed the needs in detail: bauxite, coal, cobalt, coffee, copper, fiber, lead, manganese, mica, About a third of the ingredients required for a satisfactory level of industrial activity in the U.S. have to come from abroad, he said. Therefore Asia was more important to us than Western Europe. In other words, in order to maintain our standard of living, we can kill hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese at a cost of forty thousand American lives and a few irrelevant dollars. Dr. Hannah gave that testimony in 1966. As his reward, President Nixon made him the AID Administrator.

And now we have the AID contract with Southern Illinois University for a Vietnam center. If the officials of the university, as reported in the February 23, 1970, *New York Times*, reject the criticisms of the Center's link with AID on the ground of academic freedom, they had best be certain that that very involvement is itself not an encroachment on academic freedom. From his remarks Dr. Hannah does not understand that principle, and unless Professor Fishel be more open with his colleagues about what went on -- or, at a minimum -- stop denying it, the University cannot make even a weak case against the objections on the ground of academic freedom. If academic freedom really is important to them and if the project is a serious and worthwhile one, I suggest they turn to the foundations for funds. The federal government has done too much already with its contracts to feed the general disrespect from which the universities are now suffering.

Too much, to repeat, has been made of the C.I.A. business at Michigan State; that is not the real issue. In the first place -- and at a very low level of consideration -- if such a relationship existed with SIU it would not be in the contract or in any other documentation, given the nature of the activity. John Hannah based his denial on the fact that there was nothing in contractual form. More important, to repeat and to emphasize, is the question of what the university is all about. Eric Sevareid in commenting on the MSU-CIA connection on CBS catches what is at stake:

Pretty surely the real point is what such arrangements do to our institutions of higher learning; their spirit, their management, their historic independence in the search for truth without fear of anybody, even government, without favor to anyone. More and more their best teachers work in these projects and less and less do they directly teach the students. One recent study shows that the overwhelming

emphasis in the publicity put out by university public relations offices deals with grants, governmental or industrial projects and research achievements with less and less attention to student achievements. It is a little hard to see how university faculties can speak their minds freely about the policies of their country's government if they themselves, in great numbers, become part of the government apparatus and instruments for its policies.

Legitimacy is at stake. John Hannah was legally the President of MSU. If he could not understand a university's role, his presidency was illegitimate. The problem pertains to the individual, certainly the leader, the institution,

and the government. What is happening is that the American people have begun to sense that we have receded from our principles. With the crisis of legitimacy goes the cement that binds a society horizontally and vertically in both directions.

What is at stake is whether the American people have the inner confidence to adhere to their original principles and to appreciate and rely on our country's enormous potential, and not to conduct themselves negatively out of fear. If the fear of communism grows as the overriding principle of American life, not only in foreign policy but also domestically, in corporations, in the foundations, in the news media, and in the universities, then we shall have lost the battle to keep this country free.

Final Proposal for AID Institutional Grant Support

Name of Applicant: Southern Illinois University

Date of Application: June 6, 1969

Title: A Grant to Strengthen within Southern Illinois University Competency in Vietnamese Studies and Programs Related to the Economic and Social Development of Vietnam and its Post-war Reconstruction

Duration: Five years from date established by the Grant.

Amount of Grant: \$1,000,000

Summary

This Grant will strengthen the existing competency of the Southern Illinois University Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs for its programs of technical assistance and consultation, research and training related to the economic and social needs of Vietnam and its post-war reconstruction. The Grant will help to provide secure, long term support for an expanded core program including salaries of key staff members engaged in original research, integration of findings of previous research, teaching, and developing new curricula. It will also provide support for domestic and foreign graduate and special students and for library acquisitions. It will make possible the hiring of new Vietnamese and U.S. faculty and the creation of additional professional strength and competence in economic and social programming for Vietnam; it will help finance visiting U. S. and Vietnamese scholars for seminars, courses and symposia. It will provide for expansion of the University's present focus on Vietnamese educational problems to include broader economic and social development needs and requests for assistance to which the relevant disciplines of the University will respond. The work of the Center will be coordinated and integrated with, and supported by, the existing and expanding University activities in the relevant disciplines.

University Capacity and Commitment

The capacity of Southern Illinois University for research, training and services on Vietnamese educational, economic and social problems has developed over the past eight years, with support from AID financed technical assistance projects in elementary teacher training and vocational-technical teacher training. The University has helped to provide specialized and

advanced training to more than 4,000 Vietnamese professionals -- including over 200 Provincial Chiefs. About 30 senior regular staff members of the University have actively participated in the University's Vietnamese programs of whom 21 are still with the University and working with the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs.

The University's Vietnamese programs have stimulated the participation and cooperation of faculty in several other U. S. universities.

As evidenced by the number of requests from U. S. and Vietnamese universities and U. S. and Vietnamese government agencies requesting information, assistance and special training, the University has become well-known and respected as a primary source of professional expertise on Vietnamese educational, economic and social problems. Within the limits of its resources the University has made every effort to respond to all requests for technical assistance, counsel, research, and training relative to Vietnam. With the larger core staff -- which it is expected will, in addition to Vietnamese scholars, include a significant number of this country's recognized and expert Vietnamologists -- expanded curricula, and increased library and informational facilities in this area of specialization made possible by this Grant, the University can respond more adequately to these requests and provide substantially more trained personnel specialized in Vietnamese economic and social development problems.

Southern Illinois University has a clear and firm commitment -- unanimous endorsed by its Board of Trustees and the State of Illinois Board of Higher Education -- to the program of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs. The Area and International Services budget request of the University includes \$225,000 for the Center for Fiscal Year 1970. It is anticipated that the needed dimensions of support for the Center can be phased up to over the next five years as the Grant support phases down. The ability of the University to offer counsel and advice -- and under separate agreements or contracts have specialists available for technical assistance -- and in general service the needs of AID will be accelerated by the Grant.

#### Administration

The Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs is administered by a Director responsible to the Dean of the International Services Division who in turn is responsible to the Chancellor of the Carbondale Campus of the University and the Vice President for Area and International Services. The Director is guided by an Advisory Committee appointed by the Chancellor and the Vice President and including one of this country's most expert Vietnamologists as Visiting Professor in Government. The Assistant Director for Services will be responsible for the administration of this Grant.

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Chancellor  
Carbondale Campus

Vice President for Area  
and International Services

Dean, International Services Division

Director, Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs

Advisory Committee - - - - -

Assistant Director for Services

Funds requested in this proposal will not replace existing funding for any programs. Activities provided for in this proposal will be additive to existing and planned programs of the Center.

At the initiative of AID and following submission of an annual technical report, there will be an annual substantive review of activities under this Grant. This review will include evaluation of progress, administrative and financial considerations, plans for the following year, and discussion of possible AID utilization -- under technical assistance, research and training contracts -- of the evolving University competency.

Southern Illinois University plans to continue at least its present commitment of resources, and probably to increase that commitment as a result of receiving this Grant, and will provide:

1. Office, classroom, conference and meeting rooms, and auditorium space for faculty and students, and special groups related to the purposes of this Grant.
2. Use of library, equipment, supplies and other necessary facilities. Appropriate access to University computer facilities and other special research aids.
3. Normal administrative and technical supervision by department heads, deans, and the Dean of the International Services Division.
4. Advice and consultation with all faculty members -- including those not directly associated with the Center -- who can contribute to the objectives for which this Grant is made.

The University is committed to the continued growth and development of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs. It regards the next five years as a basic development period during which time it will seek to enhance the financial backing both from within the University and from other outside sources. At the time of submission of this proposal the University has firm assurances of financial assistance from the Office of East Asian and Pacific Programs of the Department of State for assistance in the development of sister-university relationships with one or more Vietnamese universities and from the Southeast Asian Section of the Library of Congress for materials and services in kind in support of the University library acquisition program. More tentative discussions of support are in progress with the Ford Foundation, the Defense Languages Institute and the U. S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

#### Objectives and Scope

1. The University will expand its permanent, full-time professional core staff, of Vietnamese and U. S. scholars, which, under the Director of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs, will be responsible for the activities of the University in programs of assistance to the economic and social development of post-war Vietnam. These activities will include organizing interdisciplinary courses of study about Vietnam in the related disciplines at the graduate, undergraduate, and special short-course levels for both U. S. and foreign graduate and special students. This will involve the development of new courses and the restructuring of some existing courses.
2. The University will expand its library and public information services on all aspects of Vietnam.
3. The University will expand its research into economic and social development technology as related to the purposes of this Grant.

The expanded full-time Vietnamese-American professional core staff, courses of study, library and information program will enable the University to respond more adequately to requests for assistance on economic and social development problems in Vietnam from the Agency for International Development and other U. S. federal agencies, other U. S. universities, Vietnamese governmental agencies and universities, international and regional agencies, various private businesses and interested private citizens.

The multidisciplinary teaching, research and service competency of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs will include but not be limited to:

95

the use of the University's knowledge, contacts and experience in Vietnam as well as its scholarship to identify and analyze economic and social development problems in Vietnam to which the relevant disciplines and competencies, strengthened by this Grant, will respond;

identification and maintenance of an inventory of, and contacts with, the relevant disciplines and in-depth competencies of other U. S. universities -- such as the Marine Resources of Rhode Island University and the Land Tenure Center of the University of Wisconsin -- which will be required in the post-war reconstruction of Vietnam;

providing specialized consultation, orientation, research and training for the administrators, staff, students and participants of other U. S. universities, AID, other U. S. federal agencies, and international and regional agencies to help maximize the efforts of other centers of competence and resources in contributing to the social and economic development of Vietnam and its post-war recovery.

### Implementation

A major aspect of the first year's activity will be that of consolidating into the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs the knowledge, data and staff experience obtained in the eight years of work in Vietnam supported by the AID contract which terminates on June 30, 1971. This will include the preparation of a study of the experience of SIU, other U. S. universities, AID, other U. S. federal agencies and private organizations and individuals working in Vietnamese educational development. It may also include the preparation of teaching and general educational materials, country situation descriptions and analyses by the relevant disciplines strengthened by this Grant, and other materials needed to enhance the University's capability to train both Vietnamese and Americans to meet requests for technical advice and assistance, and to conduct problem-oriented research.

Changes not presently predictable in such strategic elements as sources of funds other than the Grant, shifts in relative costs of component items, and modifications in services desired by AID and other users of the University's competencies will require flexibility within the operating plan during the period of the Grant. In general terms, however, the operational plan as presently estimated would be approximately as follows:

1. About 70 percent would be for salaries, including full or partial funding of:
  - a. the Assistant Director for Services
  - b. senior and junior faculty
  - c. librarian
  - d. Research Associate

This part of the plan would begin at about 70 percent operation the first year and be staffed up to 100 percent by the second year. It is planned that the University will assume -- year by year -- greater financial underwriting of the new faculty as the underwriting provided by this Grant diminishes with the objective that by the end of the fifth year the University will assume complete financial responsibility for all programmed faculty positions in this program.

2. About 14 percent would be for stipends and allowances including graduate and special student stipends. This part of the plan would begin at about 66 percent operation the first year and at full operation by the second year.

It is planned that the University will assume -- year by year -- greater financial underwriting of the fellowships as the underwriting provided by this Grant diminishes with the objective that by the end of the fifth year the University will assume complete financial responsibility for all programmed fellowships in this program.

3. About 8 percent would be for travel:

- a. for Vietnamese and U. S. graduate and special student travel between the U. S. and Vietnam
- b. for Vietnamese and U. S. faculty travel between Vietnam and the U. S., and in the U. S.

The rate of implementation would be approximately the same as that for staffing with Grant support diminishing as University support increases with the objective that by the end of the fifth year the University will assume complete financial responsibility for all programmed travel in this program.

4. About 6 percent would be for library acquisition. The rate of implementation would be highest in the two years following full staffing.

Personnel Costs	\$ 718,000
Graduate Fellowships	142,000
Travel	80,000
Library Acquisitions	60,000
	<u>\$1,000,000</u>

\* \* \*

### Institutional Development Grant Special Provisions (excerpts)

#### A. Allowable Costs

In accordance with Grantee normal accounting practices, the Grantee shall be reimbursed for direct costs incurred in carrying out the aims of this Grant. It is mutually understood and agreed, unless otherwise provided herein, that the Grantee will not allocate any costs to this Grant, which are normally charged as indirect costs in accordance with the Grantee's normal accounting practices. The following costs are unallowable for reimbursement under this Grant: Advertising, bad debts, contributions, donations, entertainment and interest.

#### B. Foreign Country Nationals

When authorized in writing by the Grant Officer, the Grantee shall be reimbursed for the costs of bringing Foreign Country Nationals to the Grantee institution for purposes consonant with the objectives of this Grant.

...a product commodity purchased in any transaction will not be eligible for U.S. dollar funding if: (1) It contains any component from countries other than Free World countries, as listed in A.I.D Geographic Code 899...

#### E. Regulations Governing Employees Performing Work Overseas

(1) Approval. No individual shall be sent outside of the United States by the Grantee to perform work under the grant without the prior written approval of the Grant Officer; nor shall any individual be engaged outside the United States or assigned when outside the United States to perform work outside the United States without such approval unless otherwise provided in the Schedule or unless the Grant Officer otherwise agrees in writing...

(5) Right to Recall. On the written request of the Grant Officer or of a cognizant Mission Director, the Grantee will terminate the assignment of any individual to any work under the grant, and, as requested, will cause the return to the United States of the individual from overseas or his departure from a foreign country or a particular foreign locale.

#### F. Grant Officer

All correspondence dealing with the terms and conditions of any part of this Grant shall be directed to the Grant Officer, Office of Procurement, Contract Services Division, A.I.D. All other correspondence pertaining to the grant shall be directed to the Director, Research and Institutional Grants Staff, Office of the War on Hunger, (WOH/RIG), A.I.D.

#### G. Federal Reserve Letter of Credit

Subject to the determination of the Assistant Administrator for Administration that the opening of a Federal Reserve Letter of Credit is in the public interest, and subject to the conditions hereinafter set forth, the Agency for International Development shall open a Federal Reserve Letter of credit in the amount of this Grant against which the Grantee may present sight drafts according to the "FRLC Procedures for Grantee" set forth below...

...3. The Grant Officer may terminate this Federal Reserve letter of Credit at any time he determines that such action is in the best interest of the Government...

#### IV. Termination

This grant may be terminated or canceled by the Grantee institution not less than six months after written notification to A.I.D. The grant may be revoked or terminated by the A.I.D. Grant Officer upon six months notice, whenever it is deemed that the Grantee institution has failed in a material respect to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant or for the convenience of the Government.

\* \* \*

#### FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1966, SECTION 211 (d)

Public Law 89-583--Sept. 19, 1966

Title II--Technical Cooperation and Development Grants

(3) At the end of section 211, add the following new subsections:

"(d) Not to exceed \$10,000,000 of funds made available under section 212, or under section 252 (other than loan funds), may be used for assistance, on such terms and conditions as the President may specify, to research and educational institutions in the United States for the purpose of strengthening their capacity to develop and carry out programs concerned with the economic and social development of less developed countries."