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TERRORISM AS A MILITARY WEAPON

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TERRORISM is a disease of modern society. It is a virus growing in an ill body. The effects of the virus can sometimes be ameliorated, but there is no certain cure.

The causes of terrorism are diverse; often one cause overlaps another or several causes. There is the social cause: Uruguayan young people denied their rightful place in a society that was stagnating. There is the racial cause: black and Indian militant groups in the United States. And, of course, there is the political cause: Israelis seeking independence from Great Britain; Cubans seeking freedom from Dictator Batista and then from



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Dictator Castro; Algerians seeking independence from France; northern Irish Catholics seeking to destroy British rule, and, conversely, Irish Protestants seeking to neutralize the Catholics.

Each instance was or is one of armed conflict—in a word, of war. Whether the cause be social discontent or national aspirations, a larger or smaller segment of a population wars on another segment or on a foreign adversary. The feasible weapon is terrorism. A military observer, Colonel William D. Neale, noted, "Terror, it is obvious, is a legitimate instrument of national policy."²

The complexity of causes of terrorism, the diverse ideologies that have employed terrorism, the multitudinous arms and tactics available to terrorists—all these factors have made terrorism one of the most complicated problems of the times. Certainly the scope of the problem defies understanding by any single discipline. Terrorism is a tangled skein of varied human motivations, actions, hopes, emotions, and goals.

A conference on terrorism and political crimes held in 1973 made the following conclusion, among others:

The problem of the prevention and suppression of "terrorism" arises in part because there is no clear understanding of the causes leading to conduct constituting "terrorism." The International Community has been unable to arrive at a universally accepted definition of "terrorism" and has so far failed to control such activity.³

Terrorism cannot be explained by psychologists who construct facile theories. It cannot be countered by police who view terrorism as simply one more type of criminal activity: identify the criminals, arrest them, throw them in prison or perhaps shoot them, and the problem

is solved. Terrorism cannot be handled by conventional military men who scoff at it as being beneath their notice.

The academician who wishes to study terrorism with academic dispassionateness finds theories, explanations, and chronological statistics but little else. Penetrating interviews with genuine terrorists, for example, are of minimal availability.

Terrorism *is* a tangled skein, and any observer attempting to unravel and separate one thread leaves himself open to criticism, justified criticism. "You say terrorism is a military weapon. What about the kidnappings solely for financial gain in Italy and the brigandage in Argentina motivated by monetary profit?"

Precisely. The skein is a mess of threads; it may not be possible to separate any one of them cleanly. Nevertheless, the effort is worth attempting if it contributes a pinpoint of light in what is certainly a long, dark tunnel. This article will attempt to focus on one thread: terrorism as a military weapon.

In September 1972 the world was stunned to learn that the Twentieth Olympic Games, a symbol of international harmony, had been attacked by political terrorists. A group of urban guerrillas belonging to the Palestinian Black September movement had forced their way into the Israeli quarters at the Olympic Village and seized nine hostages. The guerrillas issued a number of demands, including one for the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners in Israel. Day-long negotiations took place between the guerrillas and the West German government, and eventually the government appeared to accede to the Palestinian demands. An accord was reached whereby the terrorists, together with their hostages, were to be taken to an airport and there provided with air transportation to Egypt. At Fürstfeldbruck Airport, however, German snipers opened fire on the terrorists, and in the resulting battle all Israeli hostages died, as did four guerrillas, a police officer, and a helicopter pilot.

Thanks to the sophistication of modern communication systems, people in many lands were kept abreast of developments minute by minute. Americans watched television in fascination as events unfolded before their eyes. When the final holocaust occurred at the German airport, shock, horror, and revulsion swept the civilized world.

The question was repeatedly asked, what did the Palestinians hope to gain by

their action? Did not the kidnappings—and the resulting killings—do their cause far more harm than good? The actions of terrorists, however, cannot be measured in the way other acts of war or revolution are appraised. Urban guerrillas do not march to the same drum that regular soldiers or even rural guerrillas march to. Colonel Neale stated:

Terroristic violence must be totally ruthless, for moral scruples and terror do not mix and one or the other must be rejected. There can be no such thing as a weak dose of terror. The hand that controls the whip must be firm and implacable.⁴

Although not generally viewed as such, the Olympic action was nevertheless fundamentally a military move. Having failed in three conventional wars to defeat the Israelis, the Arabs and Palestinians resorted to unconventional tactics: specifically, terrorism in the border zones and against Israeli installations in foreign lands. If the Arab leaders had not themselves been conventional, they might have utilized unconventional tactics much earlier—perhaps more successfully than were their efforts to defeat the Israelis in "regular" warfare.

Basically, terrorism is a form of psychological warfare (frighten your enemy; publicize your cause). Seen within this context, the Olympic attack achieved its purpose. Kidnapping the Israeli athletes did no military harm to Israel. As a psychological blow, however, it probably boosted Palestinian morale, and it certainly spotlighted worldwide the Palestinian cause. It encouraged future moves by Palestinian terrorists—the historical record attests to this. As a psychological blow the Olympic attack demonstrated that wherever Israeli figures of prominence went abroad, whether they be diplomats or athletes or whatever, they were susceptible to terrorist attack.

War is armed conflict, and armed conflict is the province of the military. Terrorism is a form of armed conflict; it is therefore within the military sphere. When diplomats fail, soldiers take over. When soldiers fail, terrorists take over. The political terrorist, however, is a soldier, too. He wears no uniform, he may have received little or no training, he may accept minimal discipline, his organization may be ephemeral—but he is a soldier. He engages in armed conflict in pursuit of a cause. His weapons are the gun and the explosive. His battlefield is the city street, and his targets are the vulnerable points of modern society.

Certainly not all terrorists are soldiers.

Not all terrorism is military. For purposes of this article, it is postulated that terrorism is military when:

- It is utilized as a substitute for "regular" warfare, as in the case of the Palestinians against the Israelis.

- It is used in conjunction with other military activities, as in the cases of Cuba (against Batista) and Vietnam (against the Saigon administrations).

- It is used as the chosen weapon of conflict by a population segment against another segment and/or a foreign power, as in Northern Ireland.

Terrorism is sometimes believed to be synonymous with urban guerrilla warfare. Urban guerrilla warfare, however, is a broader term: it encompasses urban terrorism but other actions as well, i.e., ambushes, street skirmishes, assaults on official installations, and other types of hit-and-run urban combat. Also, it may be noted that terrorism is not confined to urban zones: it can be conducted in rural areas as well, as was notably the case in South Vietnam.

Thus, terrorism in certain circumstances is conducted as a military tactic. The purpose of military action is often to achieve political goals. "For political aims are the end and war is the means . . ." stated Clausewitz.⁵ In some instances terrorism is a part of the means, or is *the* means.

Terrorism as a tactic can be traced back to ancient times. Today's terrorists take human hostages; Incas of old seized the idols of the people they had conquered and held these as hostages to ensure that the defeated would not rebel. Terrorism as a tactic of urban guerrilla warfare dates back to the struggles in the past century and in this century to Russian revolutionaries against the czars. The concept of terrorism as a military instrument, however, is comparatively new. One of the papers developed at the first National Security Affairs Conference, held at the National War College in 1974, noted:

Despite Mao's emphasis on the relationship between guerrilla warfare and the rural peasant, despite the doctrinaire vision of armed, revolutionary conflict culminating on the open battlefield, and despite the role of rural warfare in the most important revolutions of the past half-century, the rapid urbanization of much of the world now suggests new opportunities, and hence new strategies for revolutionary warfare, and, in particular, a new attitude toward the role of the city as the ultimate revolutionary battlefield.⁶

For the political militant, urban guer-

rilla warfare offers clear advantages over rural guerrilla warfare. If he is a city youth, he can remain in the cities and need not meet the rugged demands of rural and hill fighting. In the cities there is an abundance of potential targets. The countryside offers few targets. In the cities there are opportunities for militant actions (such as the placing of bombs) that do not necessarily entail direct personal conflict with the police. In the countryside guerrillas must eventually prove themselves by combat with units of the regular army. Rural guerrilla warfare requires a great deal of physical exertion with few gratifying results over a long period. In urban areas guerrillas can commit spectacular acts that garner great publicity and, then, if they have not been identified by the authorities, can return to "normal" lives until the time comes for their next violent action.

The growing technological complexity of our times increases the vulnerability of modern life. Not only does technology engender vulnerability, it also develops more sophisticated weapons that can kill or endanger more people and do more damage. Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski aptly referred to "the global nervous system";⁷ Swedish Premier Olof Palme, at the United Nations, discussed "technology's multiplication of the power to destroy."⁸

One has but to look about a modern city and he will see a plethora of targets. Aqueduct pumping stations and conduits, power stations and lines, telephone exchanges, post offices, airport control towers, radio and television stations—all these form part of a city's nervous system. Terrorists can shoot at policemen, rob banks, sabotage industrial machinery, kill government officials, incapacitate vehicles, and set bombs in theaters and other public localities. Destruction of an enemy's cities is an accepted strategy of modern warfare; whether it be accomplished by aerial bombers or by land-bound terrorists is merely a matter of means. The National War College paper previously noted also pointed out:

The destruction of a hydroelectric system, the crippling of a central computer bank, the acceleration of a social disorder by racist and counterracist assassination, the undermining of an economy by the pollution of an entire wheat crop . . . all these are but mere samples of the kind of violence which would lend itself to strategic manipulation. Although disguised in the name of revolution or rebellion, such violence could be decisive in terms of dis-

tracting a nation, or isolating it, or even paralyzing it. It would be, in effect, a new form of war.⁹

As postulated, terrorism could be used in conjunction with "regular" military activities. Or it could be used as a substitute. Colonel Seale R. Doss sets forth in the aforementioned paper that, "with the rapidly shifting alliances and animosities of the modern world, no nation could be quite sure in any case just which foreign power had (or even if some foreign power had) sponsored its disasters, for such violence would lend itself, like underworld money, to political laundering."¹⁰

Because terrorism as an instrument of war is a relatively new concept, there has been little doctrinal categorization or interpretation of, or doctrinal direction for, this type of warfare specifically. The three foremost warrior-theoreticians of guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, virtually ignored this method of combat. Giap has said only that "to the counter-revolutionary violence of the enemy, our people must definitely oppose [place in opposition] revolutionary violence," and that "the most correct path to be followed by the peoples to liberate themselves is revolutionary violence and revolutionary war."¹¹ (Emphasis is Giap's.) By "revolutionary violence" Giap probably meant all available means of warfare, including terrorism.

Guevara alone approached the subject of urban guerrilla warfare as a specific type of combat, and then he did so only in brief. In his book *La Guerra de Guerrillas* he provided limited recognition to what he called "sub-urban warfare." The sub-urban guerrilla group, he stated, should not carry out "independent actions" but rather should "second the action of the larger groups in another area." As for terrorism itself, Guevara said, "We sincerely believe that that is a negative weapon, that it does not produce in any way the effects desired, that it can turn a people against a determinate revolutionary movement and that it brings with it a loss of life among those who carry it out far greater than the benefits it renders." Guevara separated terrorism from assassination, which he felt was "licit" although only in "very selective circumstances," namely, against "a leader of the oppression."¹²

La Guerra de Guerrillas has served as a basic instructional book for Latin American guerrillas. It has, however, no instructions for urban guerrilla warfare. This is especially interesting in view of

the fact that the urban guerrilla movement played as important a role, perhaps a more decisive role, than did the rural guerrillas in the 1956-1958 Cuban civil war. Fidel Castro and Guevara preferred, however, to promote the mystique of the rural guerrilla. They had been rural guerrilla captains, and it did not suit the historic position they envisioned for themselves to grant recognition to the urban clandestine movement that participated so significantly in the conflict.¹³

There was a practical consideration as well in the Castro-Guevara effort to develop the mystique of the rural guerrilla. Almost as soon as Castro came to power in Cuba, that small country launched an extensive program of subversion, with most of the effort concentrated on creating *fidelistas* guerrilla movements in rural areas of Latin America. Castro and Guevara sought to duplicate their own guerrilla operation: launched from abroad, it had functioned in isolated rural areas. Guerrilla warfare, declared Guevara, is "the central axis of the struggle" in Latin America.¹⁴ So deeply did Guevara believe in the guerrilla mystique that eventually it led him to his death in Bolivia. It was only after repeated failures, including Guevara's death, that Castro turned his attention to urban movements.

A perusal of other military instructional literature reveals a similar dearth of attention to urban guerrilla warfare. North Vietnamese Lieutenant General Hoang Van Thai's *Some Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare in Vietnam*¹⁵ deals entirely with rural combat. The *Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army*¹⁶ is a fine basic book on rural guerrilla warfare, and much that it says is applicable to urban guerrilla combat, but it does not touch on this specifically despite the long utilization of urban terrorist tactics by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Bert "Yank" Levy's *Guerrilla Warfare*¹⁷ has a brief chapter on "the city guerrilla," but the book is primarily about rural guerrilla warfare. Spanish General Alberto Bayo's *One Hundred and Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla*¹⁸ and Swiss Major H. von Dach Bern's *Total Resistance*¹⁹ also have material useful to an urban guerrilla, particularly in regard to sabotage activities, but again the books are concerned mainly with rural guerrillas.

The only document specifically dealing with urban guerrilla warfare that has received international recognition was written by a Brazilian politician-turned-terrorist, Carlos Marighella. Marighella

wrote the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* for use by Brazilian terrorists, but its instructional contents are valid for guerrillas in any city in the world. Marighella stated:

The urban guerrilla is an implacable enemy of the government and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the men who dominate the country and exercise power. The principal task of the urban guerrilla is to distract, to wear out, to demoralize the militarists, the military dictatorship and its repressive forces, and also to attack and destroy the wealth and property of the North Americans, the foreign managers, and the Brazilian upper-class.²⁰

Marighella declared: "The urban guerrilla is a man who fights the military dictatorship with arms, using unconventional methods. . . . The urban guerrilla follows a political goal . . ." ²¹

It is interesting to note that just as Mao, prophet of rural guerrilla warfare, believed that type of combat was secondary to "regular" warfare,²² Marighella, prophet of urban guerrilla warfare, envisioned urban combat as supplementary to rural guerrilla combat. He stated that the function of urban guerrilla warfare was "to wear out, demoralize, and distract the enemy forces, permitting the emergence and survival of rural guerrilla warfare which is destined to play the decisive role in the revolutionary war."²³

As for terrorism specifically, Marighella said, "Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish."²⁴ It is also a weapon the military cannot ignore.

ANYONE writing about terrorism labors under the difficulty that it has not been possible for anyone to develop an entirely satisfactory definition of terrorism. Mainly this is due to the fact that there is no precise understanding of what the term "terrorism" encompasses. There are too many grey areas of violence and of intimidation that may or may not be labeled as terroristic. Whether any particular area of activity or specific act is indeed terroristic largely depends on the circumstances within which this is undertaken. Example: Is sabotage a form of terrorism? Seeking an answer, we go full circle, for whether sabotage is terroristic depends on the definition of terrorism.

Therefore, in this article the following working definition is offered:

Political terrorism is the threat of violence or an act or series of acts of violence effected through surreptitious means by an individual, an organization, or a people to further his or their political goals.

Under this definition sabotage committed for political purposes is indeed a form of terrorism.

Perhaps there is no such thing as "military terrorism." Or perhaps this is merely a semantic lack. At any rate, terrorism is one form of military activity that can be utilized by an organization or a people in pursuit of their political goals. Terrorism is a military weapon.

(Most often, terrorism consists of a series of acts of violence. All terrorism is criminal in the eyes of the government that is assailed. But there may be "criminal terrorism" in which the violence is committed purely for monetary, not political gain. Frequently this type of terrorism will disguise itself as political terrorism, especially in situations wherein genuine political terrorism is rampant, e.g., the Argentine situation.)

Terrorism as a military arm is a weapon of psychological warfare. The purpose, as the very word indicates, is to engender terror in the foe. The terror thrust encompasses the following ingredients:

- Terrorism publicizes the terrorists' political cause.
 - Terrorism demonstrates the capability of the terrorists to strike blows.
 - Terrorism heartens sympathizers of the terrorists' cause.
 - Terrorism disconcerts the enemy.
 - Terrorism eventually—the ultimate goal—demoralizes the enemy and paralyzes him.
 - Conceivably, in certain circumstances, terrorism could deter potential allies of the terrorists' target country from assisting that country. ("If you provide aid to our enemy, we will unleash our terror tactics against you, too.")
 - Sabotage causes material damage to an enemy's vital installations; the damage, in turn, has a psychological effect on the foe and on the populace. It frightens the foe and emboldens the ally.
- Terrorists function within an area controlled by the enemy whether it be a metropolis or an airliner in flight. The terrorists either:
- Represent a significant portion of the population (as in the case of a struggle against an unpopular dictator), and their actions are applauded, even when they cause discomfort to the population (as when rebels knocked out a substantial portion of Havana's electric and water systems during the Cuban civil war).²⁵
 - Do not receive any significant

amount of popular support and are generally condemned as outlaws (the minuscule ethnic militant groups in the United States are an example).

- Or, are foreign or foreign-supported and are seeking to destroy the enemy's control structure or to achieve some other political result (as in the case of the IRA bombs in restaurants and other public places in London).

Whereas in Case One the terrorist may try to minimize civilian casualties in order not to turn the population against him, in Case Three the more casualties there are the better the terrorist feels his goals are served: he is applying ruthless pressure against his enemy, and the number of casualties is a measure of his success. In Case Two, whether the terrorist concerns himself over civilian casualties is largely determined by whether his fanaticism is tempered by mercy.

AT WHAT point does terrorism become the concern of the "regular" military? For a military establishment that is *attacking*, terrorism can be used as a substitute for conventional warfare or in conjunction with conventional warfare and/or rural guerrilla warfare. For a military establishment that is responsible for *defending* an area or a country, the military role in the handling of a terrorist problem is determined by local circumstances: Is the government of the country under attack run by civilians or by the military? What constitutional and other legal responsibilities and restrictions are placed on the military? What useful capabilities do the military have that the police do not have?

The level of intensity of terrorist activity appears to be a determinant of military response more than any other factor. In most national cases military activity has been largely limited to guard and military intelligence duties in support of the police authorities. In other cases, however—notably in pre-Israel Palestine, Cyprus, Algeria, Uruguay, Argentina, and Northern Ireland—the military took over primary responsibility for combating terrorists because the police were overwhelmed.²⁶ In those cases cited where the military sought to maintain foreign control over populations, it is significant that the independence struggles were nevertheless successful (except in Ireland, where the conflict continues). In the two countries where indigenous military have sought to suppress major terrorist movements, the military were

successful in one instance (Uruguay), and the outcome is as yet inconclusive in the other (Argentina). One may reasonably gather from this that terrorism is an effective weapon when used by a substantial portion of a population against foreign occupation troops. As a weapon against indigenous authorities supported by a military establishment, its efficacy is open to question. Terrorism appears to have succeeded only in such cases wherein it was used in conjunction with other military tactics (Cuba, South Vietnam).

There appear to be three fundamental functions of terrorism as a military weapon:

- Psychological warfare—Demoralize the enemy (his government, armed forces, police, even the civilian population) through assassinations, bomb explosions, agitation, and so on. The Viet Cong utilized the entire arsenal of violence in their campaign in South Vietnam.

- Material destruction—Destroy or damage the enemy's utilities, communications, and industries. Destruction by sabotage, particularly against specific targets limited in size, can be as effective as destruction by air raid.

- Economic damage—Engender a state of psychological unease and uncertainty in a city or a country and commerce dries up, investment funds vanish. The deterioration of the Cuban economy during the 1956-58 revolution was a major factor in the downfall of the Batista regime.

Terrorism utilized as a military weapon, whether by a foreign power or by domestic insurgents, is somewhat akin to air raids: it is warfare conducted in the enemy's rear. In both cases the tactic aims at destroying the foe's installations, killing his officials, and battering his morale. Lamentably, in both cases the deaths of civilians are an additional result, unacknowledged as a goal but nevertheless often deliberately sought.

IF, THEN, terrorism is a military weapon—a weapon to be used for a military goal: the defeat of an enemy—how much recognition of this weapon has been extended by "regular" military establishments? Traditionally the regular military have looked askance at any type of unconventional warfare. This remains true today even though the line of differentiation between conventional and unconventional warfare grows increasingly blurred. In the cases of the

British, Israeli, Argentine, and Uruguayan armies, the military have been forced by circumstances to recognize their responsibility in dealing with terrorism. Reality has legitimized the bastard, military terrorism, in fact if not in name. The daring Israeli commando rescue of 102 airline-hijack hostages at Entebbe, Uganda, in July 1976 was a dramatic example of the utilization of military power in a counterterror endeavor.

In South Vietnam terrorism was a major problem facing the American and South Vietnamese forces. Nevertheless the main responsibility for combating it was turned over to civilian intelligence organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency. In general, of the military branches only the U.S. Marines recognized the military importance of Viet Cong terrorism and sought not only to conquer territory but to hold it and to provide security for its inhabitants.²⁷ It is interesting to note that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff's *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* finds no place for the words "terror" or "terrorism."²⁸

U.S. military interest in terrorism appears to be minimal. The fact that one of the panels at the National War College's National Security Affairs Conference dealt with "'New' Forms of Violence in the International Milieu" was encouraging. There have been lectures and panels at the Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and a protection-against-terrorism manual for U.S. military personnel being sent overseas has been written there. The *Air University Review* has published a number of relevant articles. This attention, however, must be considered inadequate in view of the enormity of the problem. Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret) has warned:

We live in a revolutionary era. My hunch is that history is waiting to play a deadly joke on us. It did so on recent graduates of the Imperial Defence College in London, who now find themselves facing the savagery of revolutionary warfare in Northern Ireland. It did so on Pakistani officers under General Niazi, who undoubtedly wish now that they had learned better ways of coping with the Mukti Bahini guerrillas. It is starting to do so on Argentine graduates of the Escuela Nacional de Guerra in Buenos Aires, who are waking up to the fact that Marxist ERP guerrillas intend to win themselves a country with the methods of the Tupamaros next door.²⁹

There are existing situations and pos-

sible situations which counsel greater understanding of terrorism by the U.S. military. American military personnel have already been subjected to terrorist attacks in countries as diverse and far apart as Iran and Guatemala. It is not inconceivable that an international terrorist organization might decide, for tactical and ideological reasons, to strike at U.S. military personnel and even installations in a number of countries. (NATO, concerned over the spread of terrorism, conducted through the intelligence agencies of its member states a study of an international terrorist organization that is believed to operate globally.)³⁰

The United States provides military equipment and guidance to a substantial number of friendly countries. Of what use is tank warfare doctrine to an army confronted with a major terrorist problem? Are U.S. Military Advisory Groups prepared to provide the assistance needed? Another scenario: U.S. forces are stationed in a foreign country, perhaps as part of an international peace-keeping force, and the local rebels resort to terror tactics. Are the U.S. military prepared to cope with such a situation?

There are additional scenarios that might require military involvement in terror situations within the United States itself, much as troops were required at critical moments during the civil rights struggle of the sixties. Recognizing the constitutional and historical limitations on the military and recognizing that a terror level akin to those in Argentina and Northern Ireland is not likely to develop in the United States within the foreseeable future, one can, nevertheless, postulate situations in which the military would have to exercise counterterror capabilities. Two possibilities:

- Terrorists seize the Capitol in Washington while Congress is in session. Or they take another major edifice in an American city. Handling the crisis is beyond the means of the police.

- Terrorists have a nuclear weapon or a major bacterial weapon. They hold the weapon in a heavily guarded building in the center of a city, and they threaten to devastate the city if their demands are not met. Again the situation is beyond the capability of the police.

Hypothetical situations, yes. But terrorists have seized buildings in other countries, and the U.S. government is concerned over the possibility of terrorists obtaining a nuclear bomb. These situations could occur within the United

States. The U.S. military would do well to prepare to assist if they are called upon to do so.

BEYOND THAT is the necessity of recognizing that in today's world terrorism is often a military weapon. General Robert E. Lee said of the Confederacy's own guerrillas, "I regard the whole system as an unmixed evil."³¹ Evil or not, guerrilla warfare has been employed by innumerable combatants down through the ages, always bedeviling the regulars. Disdaining it will not make it go away. Disdaining terrorism will not make it go away, either. Unhappy though it may make the graduate of the Imperial Defence College, or of the Escuela Nacional de Guerra, or of the U.S. Military Academy, it is a tactic that must be dealt with. Far better that the U.S. military be prepared than that they, too, be caught by surprise. Tactics must be studied, doctrines must be developed, defenses must be constructed. For, as one writer stated, "Step by step, almost imperceptibly, without anyone being aware that a fatal watershed has been crossed, mankind has descended into the age of terror."³²

Coral Gables, Florida

Notes

1. Richard M. Ketchum, *The Winter Soldiers* (New York, 1973). Washington prescribed the "rifle dress" for his troops because it was associated in the minds of the British with the apparel worn by skilled riflemen.
2. Colonel William D. Neale, USA (Ret), "Terror—Oldest Weapon in the Arsenal," *Army*, August 1973.
3. M. Cherif Bassiouni, editor, *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, Illinois, 1975).
4. Neale, op. cit.
5. H. Rothfels in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Edward Mead Earle, editor (New York, 1970).
6. Colonel Seale R. Doss in *Defense Planning for the 1980's & the Changing International Environment* (Washington, D.C., 1975).
7. "The U.S. and the Skyjackers: Where Power Is Vulnerable," *Time*, 21 September 1971.
8. "The City as Battlefield: A Global Concern," *Time*, 2 November 1970.
9. Doss, op. cit.
10. Ibid.
11. Vo Nguyen Giap, *The South Vietnam People Will Win* (Hanoi, 1965).
12. Ernesto Guevara, *La Guerra de Guerrillas* (Havana, 1960).
13. See Jaime Suchlicki's *University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920-1968* (Coral Gables, Florida, 1969); Ruby Hart Phillips's *Cuba, Island of Paradox* (New York, 1959); Jay Mallin's *Fortress Cuba* (Chicago, 1965).
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15. Foreign Languages Publishing House (Hanoi, 1965).
16. Issued by General Headquarters, 1965.

17. Panther Publications (Boulder, Colorado, 1964).
18. Twenty-eighth edition (Havana, 1961).
19. Panther Publications (Boulder, 1965).
20. Carlos Marighella, "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," *Tricontinental* (Havana, November 1970).
21. Ibid.
22. "When we say that in the entire war [against Japan] mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility in deciding the outcome." From "On Protracted War" in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking, 1963).
23. Marighella, op. cit.
24. Ibid.
25. Mallin, op. cit.
26. Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea* (New York, 1965); *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict* (three volumes, Washington, D.C., 1967, 1968).
27. William R. Corson, *The Betrayal* (New York, 1968).
28. Washington, D.C., 1972.
29. Major General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF (Ret), "The Opposite Number," *Air University Review*, July-August 1972.
30. "Radical Nations Aid, Finance Global Terror, NATO Thinks," *Miami Herald*, 6 February 1976.
31. Bruce Catton, *A Stillness at Appomattox* (New York, 1953).
32. Paul Johnson, quoted in David Fromkin's "The Strategy of Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1975.