

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

OF

INTERVIEW

WITH

SERGEANT PHILIP R. WISE

9TH AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION GROUP

CLARK AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

17 APRIL 1975

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF COLLATERAL INVESTIGATING

OFFICER'S INTERVIEW

WITH

PHILIP R. WISE

SERGEANT USAF

USAF HOSPITAL CLARK AB, R. P.

17 APRIL 1975

I0: Okay, you just start out by telling me your name, rank and your social security number.

W: Philip Romon Wise. My rank is Buck Sergeant.

I0: Buck Sergeant?

W: Social Security Number is

I0: Okay, and your organization.

W: I fly with the Ninth Aeromedical Evacuation Group here at Clark Air Base in the Philippines.

I0: How long have you been flying as a medical technician?

W: It's two years this month. Two years this month, right here at Clark.

I0: What's your home of record in the States? Address?

W: Flint, Michigan

I0: Flint, Michigan. Do you have a street address there?

W:

I0: Michigan. Okay. Now, Sgt Wise, can you tell me, I'm here as you well know, investigating the C-5 crash and I would just like you to start out going back to the 4th of April, starting out with when you were alerted to be on duty. Can you start out and just tell me what happened?

WISE

W: I was alerted about, I'm not really sure of the time, it was about 8:30 in the morning or something. They were trying to get all, who's all going on the C-5 crew list. They finally got me. They said I would be the medical technician in charge. And then it was myself, Sgt Gmerek and Sgt Hadley.

I0: Sgt Hadley was the reservist from Travis, right?

W: He's the reservist from Travis.

I0: Who were the two flight nurses?

W: Flight nurses were Capt, Lt Goffinnet and Wirtz, right.

I0: Are you sure it wasn't Lt Aune?

W: Right, Lt Aune.

I0: Lt Aune and Lt Wirtz. Okay. Now what were you told about this mission? What do you remember being told about this particular mission?

W: I was told that we were the first to go in to pick up the babies.

I0: And you were told you were going to go on a C-5?

W: Right. I was selected to go on the C-5, and they said, maybe there might be a 141 right behind us to pick up some more babies.

I0: You had never flown a irevac on a C-5.

W: No, sir. I had never flown on a C-5.

I0: You've said you've flown a irevac on a 141?

W: Right, I flew a couple of times on a 141.

I0: Then, of course, you are C-9 qualified?

W: Right.

I0: Okay, so you all got aboard the C-5 then, is that right?

W: We got aboard the C-5.

I0: Took off for Saigon.

W: Right, Once we got there we had to wait for the off load of the equipment they took over and then we started on loading the babies.

I0: Okay. Sgt Wise, can you tell me this? Let's talk about the airplane a little bit. Did you ever get up to the flight deck? You know where the flight crew is?

W: During the flight?

I0: The flight crew where the pilot sits, and so forth. Did you get up there?

W: During the flight? I didn't go up during the flight.

I0: No, I mean did you ever get a look at that?

W: Oh, I got a look at it right after we got to Saigon. We were waiting, we waited there until they off loaded the equipment up on the flight deck.

I0: Okay. And you know what the cargo compartment looks like?

W: Right.

I0: And then the troop compartment, upstairs.

W: Right.

I0: Okay, when you flew over, I guess you all flew over in the troop compartment?

W: In the troop compartment.

I0: Right. Okay, now when you got over there, what were you told about how many passengers you were going to pick up?

W: I wasn't told anything about the passengers. I was just told we were going to get the babies.

I0: Okay. How were you going to carry the babies? How were you going to put them on the airplane and get them seated?

W: They told us to sit them up in the troop compartment, three or four to a seat. We took out all of the arm rests off the seats and we just put about four babies to a seat.

I0: Four, maybe two babies to a seat, two in each seat?

W: We just put as many as we could, just as long as there was enough room to cover the space.

10: So that after the equipment was unloaded, then the babies and the escorts came on board.

W: Right, the escorts. Well, while they unloaded equipment, they told us to stay upstairs in the cockpit.

10: In the flight deck in the troop compartment?

W: In the flight deck, the flight deck. They told us to stay upstairs, so that's where I stayed. Sgt Hadley got off. He took a couple of pictures, I guess.

10: Where were you, Sgt Wise, when they started to bring the orphans on? and the escorts? What were you doing then? You were helping with the babies or?

W: We had a chain like and I think I was up top. While they were passing the babies up.

10: Up the troop compartment ladder?

W: We were just sort of. Had a chain like type going.

10: And you were up on top?

W: Right.

10: Were you helping Lt Wirtz position the babies?

W: I was helping the nurses position the babies.

10: Okay. You got all the babies in then, is that right?

W: Yes, sir.

10: Upstairs?

W: We laid out blankets on the cargo part for adults. We laid out I don't know how many blankets, just laid them out so they could sit down. So we could secure them to the airplane.

10: Did you have any mattresses?

W: No mattresses.

10: Just blankets. How did you plan to secure the escorts and the babies that were in the cargo compartment?

W: We had all the babies upstairs and the adults were downstairs.

10: Were there any babies downstairs or children? ]

W: No sir.

10: No children at all downstairs?

W: Not that I remember. I don't remember no children being downstairs. We put all the babies upstairs.

10: What was downstairs in the cargo compartment?

W: All the adults. The civilians.

10: There weren't any children sitting along the side maybe? Not babies necessarily, but you know, children who could walk.

W: I can't say. I don't remember.

10: Now, where were you when the airplane took off? Do you remember where you were?

W: I was right there by the adults on the left hand side.

10: Okay, you were downstairs in the cargo compartment? ]

W: Yes, sir.

10: And you were on the left hand side of the airplane looking forward, looking toward the front of the airplane? ]

W: Right. I was facing the front. All of the adults, everybody else sitting right in the middle of them, facing left.

10: Were you standing up on take off or buckled in somewhere or were you seated on the side or what? Do you remember where you were?

W: I was seated on the side. I was seated on the side, seat belt and a litter strap on me.

10: With a what?

W: A litter strap.

10: Litter strap.

W: Yes, sir.

I0: That's the strap that

W: A litter strap.

I0: Oh, okay, a litter strap. Okay, Okay, I see. I understand that take off was fine. No problems with the take off.

W: Yes, sir.

I0: Sgt Wise, do you remember how many people were down in the cargo compartment with you?

W: It was well over a hundred.

I0: Well over a hundred you feel?

W: Did I feel?

I0: Do you believe it was well over a hundred?

W: Yes, sir. It was well over a hundred.

I0: They were - were they seated toward the back or were they seated toward the front? Where did you start to put the blankets down?

W: It was closer to the front, closer to the front of the flight deck. That's where we started laying our blankets down.

I0: Okay, after the airplane took off, what did you do then?

W: After we got airborne I started doing my duties, seeing that everybody was fine, you know, nobody throwing up. Making sure everybody was secure.

I0: Were there people who were apprehensive, maybe and a little scared?

W: Yes, there were quite a few people who were a little scared. They asked, "How long would it take and stuff?" I answered to the best of my knowledge.

I0: Were you talking to the civilian women, is that who you were talking to mostly?

W: Yes, sir.

I0: And they were somewhat apprehensive?

W: Yes, sir, they were very frightened.

10: And you were trying to calm them down?

W: Yes, sir. I was calming them down.

10: How about the children down there? Or there wasn't any children?

W: There wasn't any children. No babies.

10: No babies.

W: There could have been small little kids. I don't remember seeing any.

10: Okay, so after you took off then you were going around, were there any women that were sick?

W: There were some people throwing up. I was giving out burp bags.

10: Trying to cheer them up?

W: Yes, sir. I was just trying to cheer them up, tell them it would be all right. We're on our way back now.

10: Okay. What happened after that, Sgt Wise, as best you can remember it?

W: I guess we was up about 30 minutes or so an hour, I heard this big old blast. The doors flew open.

10: Okay, Sgt Wise, this is important. Where were you when you heard the blast?

W: I was right where I was seated at. Standing up. Just going around to people. Going around to people. I was, then I, once I heard the blast I hit the deck. I grabbed the cargo tie down strap. The door flew open. I was seeing stuff flying out.

10: When you heard the blast, did you feel any kind of a concussion in your ears, or not?

W: I didn't feel nothing in my ears.

10: What did it sound like? How can you describe it? Like you were telling me about it. How would you, what did it sound like?

W: Pfsss, Pfsss, Pfsss, like that.

10: It didn't go boom?

W: No, it wasn't no hard blast. It was just a pfsss.

I0: Okay, and then, did you hit the deck first or did you look out?

W: I looked out.

I0: What did you see?

W: I seen a little stuff flying out of there but I didn't see no bodies fly out..

I0: Okay, then it looked like the whole back was out, or what did it look like to you?

W: The part where the tail closes? That part just flew open.

I0: Okay, and all you could see was sky?

W: That's all I could see was sky.

I0: Did you see anything hanging there, anything hanging there, or just pieces of stuff inside?

W: The only thing I saw hanging was the ladder, the troop ladder from the deck going upstairs.

I0: Okay, tell me about the troop ladder. What did that look like? The troop ladder.

W: It was just hanging there swinging, you know, tilted back.

I0: Was it broken, do you know?

W: It looked like it could have been bent some.

I0: Did you see Sgt Perkins hanging on the ladder then?

W: I didn't see him.

I0: You hit the deck.

W: Yes, sir.

I0: Then what happened?

W: Then I grabbed onto the cargo tie down straps. And then I guess that's when I passed out. I had no oxygen to breath on. I didn't see any immediately.

10: Did you see any people moving about after that happened, you know, after that happened? After you hit the deck? Did you notice panic? Was anybody panicked? Frightened?

W: I didn't see nobody get up.

10: Okay.

W: There was some panicking because all the people around me were just hollering and screaming. I just grabbed onto the cargo tie down strap and just held on.

10: Held on tight. Okay, what do you remember after that?

W: I don't even remember the impact. I don't remember the impact.

10: What do you think happened? Do you think you suffered from, what do you call it - anoxia?

W: Hypoxia.

10: Hypoxia?

W: Yes, sir. That's what I think I suffered from.

10: When you went to flight school, Sgt Wise, when you were in training, did they simulate rapid decompression?

W: Rapid decompression. In our class we used to practice, the last I couldn't write my name in about 20 seconds. I wasn't able to write my name.

10: From the best you can tell, did this appear to you this what happened there, was that like the rapid decompression that you had seen or felt, experienced in flight school?

W: Yes sir. The time used to practice is exactly. I wasn't able to stay awake. I just passed out.

10: What's the next thing you remember, Sgt Wise, after passing out? What's the next thing that comes back?

W: When I was in ICU. When I came to in ICU.

10: When you came to in ICU. Don't remember anything from

W: I don't remember nothing.

I0: So I guess other people have told you what happened, but

W: I just been - - - by what happened, what happened. After the doors flew open, that's all I remember.

I0: That's all you remember.

W: There was no oxygen down there. All that left as soon as the doors flew open. I guess we were about 27,000 feet up.

I0: Yes. What you remember is, you remember the doors blowing, the noise you remember hitting the deck, grabbing the cargo strap.

W: That's the last.

I0: And that's the last thing?

W: Just everybody screaming.

I0: What kind of injuries did you suffer, Sgt Wise?

W: I got a laceration on my right arm, and about two or three lacerations on my left arm, broken baby finger, and some torn ligaments in my knee and that's all. My head's busted, but

I0: Well, I guess they can fix you all up they say.

W: They said my eye was out but it's okay now.

I0: Your eye's okay now?

W: Yes

I0: Did anybody tell you who found you or what?

W: SMSgt Smedley and the commander of the aircraft found me.

I0: They found you?

W: Yes sir.

I0: MSgt Smedley, SMSgt. Snedegar - Snedegar, the loadmaster?

W: Yes sir. SMSgt

I0: He and the aircraft commander, Captain Traynor?

W: Yes, sir.

10: They found you?

W: When they found me they thought I was dead. My eyeballs hanging out, my head was busted and I was hanging upside down. The plane was on fire and they just pulled me out. They found out I was still breathing.

10: Okay. Is there anything else you think you might add, or you think you could say, or you want to say?

W: No sir.

10: Okay. Sure?

W: That's all I can think of.

10: Okay.

The above is certified as a true and accurate transcript of the foregoing interview.



BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
Collateral Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

OF

THELMA L. THOMPSON

PASSENGER

CLARK AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

10 APRIL 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

USAF Hospital Clark  
Clark AB, Republic of the Philippines

10 April 1975  
(*Printed*)

(Date)

I, Thelma L. Thompson, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr., [REDACTED] has identified himself to me  
as C5A Collateral Investigation Officer USAF.  
(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement. My name is Thelma L. Thompson and my stateside address is [REDACTED], California. I work for the Air Force Division of the Defense Attaché. I lived in Saigon, but my duty station was Bien Hoa and I commuted every day. I am not married and have just one daughter. I have been employed as an Inventory Management Specialist two years this month. I worked for the Air Force in Sacramento, at McClellan AFB.

*Davelson*

I was home on sick leave and Becky Martin and Twila Dunnison, friends and U.S. Convent employees, lived in my Villa and knew that I was home. Twila called me about 8:00 and said, "Thelma, get a taxi and get over here right away. We are having a meeting and it is important." This was on Friday, April 4, 1975. I got over there a little late but I got filled in and we were told that we would be on a 30 day TDY. We were going to help take the orphans back to the states, and were to go to our homes, not to our duty stations and remain at our homes until further instructions. We all had assembly points like the gym, then we went to lunch and then to the bank, those who had to go to the bank, and then back to the conference room. We were given orders and from there to the terminal at Tan Son Nhut. We went through the preliminaries, checked out through customs, etc., with our passport and everything, then boarded the bus to be taken to the aircraft. We got our bags; I had two large bags and one carry on and I had been on a C-5 once, just looking and making an observation. I knew there was an upstairs but I had never been there, so we were all in the cargo area. They had blankets and they had some benches on the side for sitting and some seat belts but they weren't individual, they were long ... crew belts. Then the babies were lying on the blankets and they had belts going across them. The babies were already out there and I think they were on the plane. It appears the persons carrying the babies were on the plane and then they came off and there was a hugh crowd around, cameramen taking pictures, and we were trying to find our luggage after they had taken it off the buses. The people who had left their babies were coming out in tears, and we were to start taking care of the babies. The people who were there were Vietnamese and some Americans too. I remember seeing both, more Vietnamese than Americans. I don't know which orphanage and I heard that was not all that was at the orphanage. It was just part of them. It looked like the children were all from one orphanage because someone was asking if that was a complete orphanage and they said, "No, that was just part of one." My bags did get on the plane, my two bags and my carry on bag. I carried my bag on, because I was told that I could have two bags plus a carry on. Our bags were left sitting on the ground and we were instructed by Colonel Tobin "Don't worry, our bags would be put on the plane by Americans." He said not to worry about it because we would sometimes have problems with pilferage. Colonel Tobin said, "Just leave our bags out there and they would be put on the plane. Just find our carry on bags and get aboard." At this time I didn't know where we were going, whether we were going to Clark, Seattle or Travis, but we were told in advance in a briefing that we were going to assist the babies going and we had 30 day TDY orders. It was after we had gotten on board that we sat our things

down and the babies were all lying out on the blankets. Those who were large enough to sit were sitting on the benches and the Americans didn't have any place to sit, they didn't have anything to hold on to except that belt that went over the babies and we were to lie there, maybe on our stomach and try to support the babies as they ascended. They were short upstairs, short of help and a flight nurse came over and asked me if I would go up and assist up there where they had mostly small babies, about six to a seat, or a section. We were briefed to lie on the floor if we had an emergency landing and we didn't have any place to sit so we would have to stand and brace ourselves on takeoff but I sat on the floor between rows and seats and braced my back against the cabin wall and after we had taken off and I felt that we were up high enough - to tell you the truth - I was a little apprehensive about missiles and I got up to check the babies to be sure that none of them had been pulled out of the seat, and so in a few minutes ~~there~~ was that terrible blast and it seemed like I was standing upstairs where ~~there~~ <sup>HERE IS</sup> had just one huge door, but it sort of reminds me of a double door where they have the life rafts upstairs and I was standing about there and it seemed like everything was just going to come right up through the floor there. I was in the rear of the aircraft, where the grates are. There was a big long grate and then there was a stair well. I wasn't in the seats before the stair well, I was in the right, to the next group. After the blast, I immediately got on the floor behind the first row of seats and was holding on to where the seats were anchored to the floor. We were descending very rapidly and I guess the best description of what was happening was that it sort of reminded me of when my father used to drive and would try to conserve fuel by switching off the ignition and coasting and then turn it on again. This is the sensation that we were getting and we were going down rapidly but when he would like turn it on again we would not ascend but would level off, but we were traveling too fast, and then first impact.

There seemed to be order in the aircraft. Someone was saying something but I don't remember what they were saying and I sort of looked down under the seats and I saw many people lying on the floor. They were women like myself who were going along to escort the babies and to help take care of them. There were under 10 people up there, some of them men, but they were civilians, but there were under ten. I think there were at least two aircrew people up there. There was one flight nurse who was to and fro and I don't know if she was up there at the time or not, but she was up there and then she would leave, and then she would come back and I don't remember if she was back or not, but after we had the first impact, everything started rushing forward like those containers for the life rafts and it seemed like everything in the world. It pulled me out of that section and I managed to pull back into the next row. It was where I pulled back in that there was a second exit door, a small one and when we finally - when I got back in there for the last impact, which was a tremendous one, I realized we were at a standstill and opened the emergency door, and I guess it was so sudden that I couldn't feel that I was hurt, except I remember feeling all of the bangs and when I got out I couldn't make it very far; I realized that I must get away from the plane, with some of the children, the ones that could walk, because it was burning. I directed them to come with me so we could get as far away as possible, so I walked as far as I could make it in the marsh and then I sat.

*TRUNK  
Transposed*  
*See  
Next Page*

The distance from the exit to the ground was like jumping from the bed to the floor, and the ground was marshy. There were not many that came out, there were some guys who were passing babies out and the helicopters were then within ten minutes and I saw some military men with guns and I became apprehensive because I didn't know whose side they were on, but then the helicopters and Air America came down and picked

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

up. I kept telling them that someone should go back for the babies because there should have been quite a few who survived since they were cushioned with full pillows around them and had the seat belts on and by them facing that way, their backs to the front. They took me direct to the VNAF hospital first, then to the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital. I got x-rays there but I didn't get stitched until I got to Clark and that was about 12:00 at night.

After the explosion when we were descending I realized that it seemed we didn't have any pressure and my ears were awfully painful just like it was stripping everything out descending so rapidly. I didn't notice the lack of oxygen. I felt two impacts, one, mildly, the one terrific impact, and after that we skidded and stopped. The plane was sitting flat. It had lost the bottom lower portion, the lower portion was gone. There was nothing there but the top, the floor of the top, in the top section, and the door was just right there at the ground. I guess I was thinking on the way down that the possibility that there were some survivors up there where we were and that it was going to be awfully hard to get them from that distance. But when I opened the door there was the ground, and I just jumped out. When I heard the explosion I was standing back by the galley.

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

(Signature)

(Address)

(Signature)

(Address)

*Shelma L. Thompson 10 Apr 75.*  
(Signature)

LAWTON  
2814 Lake Drive, Davis, California 95616  
(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized  
by law to administer oaths, this

*10<sup>b</sup> April 1975*  
USAF Hospital Clark  
at Clark Air Base, Philippines

*Bernard A. Waxstein*  
Signature of Person Administering Oath.  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, Jr., Colonel, USAF  
C5A Collateral Investigation Officer  
(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

## ENCLOSURE FOR HOPITALITY (JTR)

## REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAVEL OF FEDERAL PERSONNEL

DRAFT REQUEST

(Reference: Joint Travel Regs (JTR))  
Travel Authorized as of March 31, 1975 through 21.

4 Apr 75

## REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL TRAVEL

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initials)		2. POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE OR RATING	
THOMPSON, THELMA L. 66N		INVENTORY MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST, GS-2010-1	
3. OFFICIAL STATION		4. ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	
Defense Attaché Office FPO San Francisco 96620		AOSAF-LCMS	
5. TYPE OF ORIGIN		6. SECURITY CLEARANCE	
Single		SECURITY CLEARANCE	
10a. APPROX. RD. OF DAYS OF TDY (including travel time)		7. PROCELOD OF A (Date)	
30 Days		4 Apr 75	
11. ITINERARY		8. PURPOSE OF TDY	
FROM: RVN		To direct employee to escort Vietnamese orphans out of Vietnam on humanitarian flight to the United States.	
TO: APOD in CONUS and onward to HOR at SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA		VARIATION AUTHORIZED	

12. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION							
COMMERCIAL				GOVERNMENT			
RAIL	AIR	BUS	SHIP	AIR	VEHICLE	SHIP	N/A
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	PRIVATELY OWNED CONVEYANCE (PICK-UP)
13. AS DETERMINED BY APPROPRIATE TRANSPORTATION OFFICER (Unless Travel Only)							
RATE PER MILE: <input type="checkbox"/> MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOVERNMENT MILEAGE REIMBURSEMENT AND PER DIEM ALLOWED TO COMPENSATE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COST OF COMMERCIAL CARRIER TRANSPORTATION RELATED PER DIEM AS DETERMINED IN JTR. TRAVEL TIME LIMITED AS INDICATED IN JTR.							

14. ESTIMATED COST							
PER DIEM	TRAVEL	OTHER	TOTAL	15. APPROXIMATE DATES	16. APPROXIMATE DATES		
\$	\$	\$	\$	15 APR 75	16 APR 75		

16. REMARKS (Use this space for special requirements, leave, superior or first-class accommodations, excess luggage, registration fees, etc.)							
1. Employee limited to 44 pounds of luggage. 2. Employee authorized 30 days advance pay. IAW 550.84A3e(3) 3. Home address: _____ Return rights: McClellan AFB, CA 95652							

17. REQUESTING OFFICIAL (This is signed)

JOE H. BROWN, XO, PERS DIV

MOVING OFFICE, DOD, FOR JTR

HENRY P. HILLS, JR., CHIEF, PERS DIV

## 18. ACCOUNTING STATEMENT

1751804.3520 212 68205 C 058205 2D509107 EFCO E, 30 days advance per diem auth,  
CIC 3509107 168205RS.

19. APPROVAL AUTHORITY (Signature and Title) (Signature)	20. APPROVAL AUTHORITY (Signature and Title)
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SWORN STATEMENT

OF

SUSAN ELIZABETH DERGE

PASSENGER

CLARK AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

10 APRIL 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

USAF Hospital Clark  
Clark Air Base, Philippines

(Place)

10 April 1975

(Date)

I, Susan Elizabeth Derge, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr. has identified himself to me  
as CIA Collateral Investigation Officer USAF.

(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement. [redacted]  
My name is Susan Elizabeth Derge. My address as of yesterday was [redacted] Saigon, however, my family just left Saigon and I don't know if they will return so I don't know if that's one you can rely on. I don't have a stateside address. My father works for Esso Eastern. I am not married. I am 19 years old. I have a younger sister who is 18; and older sister who is 24; and an older brother who is 25.

Two years ago when I came to Saigon I fostered a Vietnamese boy who is two years old and that was to go to a family in Indiana; and I had asked that if when he went to Indiana, I could take him. So, about two hours before the flight left the head of the orphanage called me and she said, "The flight will leave in two hours. You and Bien Hoa (who is the baby) would you please be at the orphanage at that time." The first orphanage we went to was New Haven, it's called Friends for All Children. It's referred to in Saigon as New Haven Orphanage and we met there and picked up the infants. I think we picked up about half of the infants (about 20) at the orphanage. These are the children maybe under a year and a half, under two years. We went to a different orphanage on Votan and this was the orphanage that had older children. What they do is when the children are able to walk they take them to the orphanage at Votan so all the children there can walk. This flight was supposedly to take all the children that had been placed for adoption already. They have assigned parents in the United States. So, the 20 which were the half we picked up were from the Fondon Fon Orphanage. I understood that there were another 20 or 30 from another orphanage but there were more than that on the plane. I don't know where all the rest of the others came from. There were several large buses and a few cars. We went out to the airport, with police escort, and straight to the plane. There were quite a few photographers around. I only noticed one Vietnamese newsman. I had one large bag, one small carry on bag and one shoulder thing. There was pretty short notice to take the baby and get everything packed.

Things were very orderly, when I got to Tan Son Nhut. Everything was well prepared. We waited in the car for a while, while they unloaded what looked to be two or three tanks off the plane. On the plane were, I couldn't say exactly how many, Vietnamese soldiers and some American soldiers. There were also Vietnamese and American soldiers on the ground around the plane. After about 15 or 20 minutes, they motioned for us to pull up to the loading ramp. They started loading on the infants that couldn't walk and they started out doing it by carrying two kids upstairs and then they would proceed up the stairway in the plane to the top. Then they decided that was kind of dumb because there were people going both ways on the ladder on the outside of the plane so they formed an assembly line and handed the babies up one at a time all the way up, and put the babies in the seats --- two in each seat. There were a few children, I can't guess the ages of some of these kids, but there were a few that were not infants but were on the top. I was also on the top. I was asked to go on top. And I wanted

to anyway since my child was on the top. It was sort of a tense situation because the children were all crying. Other than that everything was going quite smoothly. They put the babies about 8 or 9 to a row upstairs, two in each seat. The only time I went downstairs was to take one child down who would not sit in a seat and at that time I saw on one side of the plane on the benches a row of American women that I guess were there to take care of the children and on the other side were the row of Vietnamese children. They had blankets spread out on the floor and some mattresses spread on the floor to put children and infants that would not fit upstairs. They just laid them out on the floor. Some of the women were on the floor with the children. Then I went back upstairs and from then on I have no idea what went on downstairs. Since the children were really jam packed into the seats we sat on the floor during take off. One Air Force man said, "if you hear a horn lay down on the floor." I heard him say it to a couple of other people. When the plane was getting ready to take off all the children were screaming and we were giving them bottles and milk and that type of thing. We took off. In the beginning we were all going around trying to take care of all the children. Just everybody walking up and down the rows, but eventually we decided there were enough of us after sending a few people upstairs for each person to have one row of children. So each of us would take care of 8 or 9 kids. It seemed like a very short time afterwards, I would guess 20 minutes after, I have no idea really of the time, there was a vibration and a very muffled sound. It was simultaneous with the oxygen masks dropping. Everybody dropped to the floor, the Air Force guy in front of me pointed to the masks to all of us. We pulled the masks down and started them going, pulled them all down and we were sort of alarmed because there were six masks for 9 or 10 along the row. I tried to pass the masks back and forth. I had three older children in my row and the rest were infants; and the infants in my row, I don't want to say passed out, because it isn't as if they were going to faint, but they just became very drowsy and then they were all quiet and their eyes were closed. The older children had masks and were passing it to the little children next to them once in a while. In the beginning when I had the mask on I would take it off once in a while and give it to another child, I wouldn't really notice any difference. I sort of felt like maybe I didn't need the mask at all but once in a while I'd bring it back to me anyway just in case. Because if the children were all zonking out I didn't want to do the same thing. Then a gentlemen came upstairs and one of the flight nurses. They both had some kind of insulation material in their hair in very small pieces. At first I thought it was baby diaper cotton that had somehow blown apart. He said we are going to go back to Saigon and I don't think by this time we were using the oxygen masks anymore. He stayed upstairs and so did the flight nurse. The flight nurse on the other side of me was very upset because she said the emergency wheels were coming down. And we all just sat down on the ground and just were talking to each other and trying to make the kids not panic. There were some blind kids that were upset about flying let alone everything else that was going on. We were just going down. There were no windows. We had no idea if we were over water or land. A few of us asked if we were over water and everyone said, "no." We went down and hit very hard. The first time we hit I let go and then the second time we hit I was thrown somewhere. We were all sitting on the floor, squatting. We tried to figure the best way if you land hard without injuring yourself. Most of the children were still strapped in when we landed. That was the first impact.

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The second time when everything was really jolted it blacked out. I'm sure all the lights went out. Someone who was behind me jumped up and ran forward and so I ran forward and grabbed my own child, and the child in the seat next to him. The emergency doors had both collapsed. From the outside the compartment we were in looked like a bunker. It was covered with mud. There was a wing over here, cockpit over there literally turned over. You could see the tracks where we came in. You couldn't see the bottom half of the plane anywhere. Everybody was very calm. They got out and just at first they started bringing babies out very quickly. Then people began to realize that that part of the plane was in no danger so they decided it would be better if they just let the children in until some kind of help came. We didn't know where we were at all. We landed in a marsh which was very uneven. Some people said we were up to our waist. I didn't see any parts of the swamp which went past the knees that I went through. The only form of panic, and you couldn't even call it panic, was someone saying very loudly that we didn't have any radio. They didn't know where we were. Otherwise everyone else was very orderly, in fact, my ear had come off and I went up to a gentlemen and said, "I'm not panicking so please don't panic when you see this." I think I was in shock otherwise I would have had a fit. And I said, "I think my ear has come off would you please put it back on because I didn't want to lose it." And so he placed it back on and put his hankerchief around there and then I carried two children out and gave them to another girl and laid down on the grass because I couldn't stand anymore. Then the helicopters came and picked us up, and took us to a South Vietnamese Army Hospital and then later took us by ambulance to the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital in Saigon.

I was about one-third of the way back from the front, so there were still two-thirds of rows of seats behind. I was closer to the latrine than to the galley or the ladder stairway.

I couldn't even call the noise an explosion because when I heard it I had no idea what it was. I wouldn't describe it as an explosion. Someone said right after it happened it sounds like the door has come out and air has been sucked out. And then I thought that was possible but at the time it never occurred to me that it was an explosion for some reason. It was too muffled. It wasn't loud enough, except that at the same time the oxygen masks came down or almost right after and I was more involved with that. I was paying more attention to that than the noise. I did not notice that we were descending. I thought the plane was a lot smaller than it was when I saw it. I didn't realize the size of it. I've been in small planes, where I'm used to moving very shakily and going down very quickly and in misjudging the size of the plane I considered it to be normal. The thought of crashing never occurred to me until impact. It never occurred to me at all. Everybody was talking about whether the plane was going to impact and what we should do.

I was looking for the body of the plane after we finally came to a stop and couldn't see it anywhere. All that was under us was just the floor of the upper deck. It just looked like a little bunker. It was amazing and the marsh was like well I didn't really stand there and scale the whole area but it seemed to me very small area. That pilot did an amazing job of getting that plane down, because there were trees, there were ... it was just amazing the way he landed it and saved as many people as he did.

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

I remember seeing the fire though from inside the part of the plane I was in, because when we landed the lights went out. You could hear the crackling, you could feel the heat. I looked out and saw the fire and black smoke. And right away I thought this is going to explode. I just ran and grabbed the babies and ran out.

Our passports were taken when we boarded the plane by a woman who I do not think was on the flight. She's black; took my passport, took it to a military police. She never gave it back to me. Maybe my passport is saved, I don't know, she never gave my passport back to me. I never gave my name to anyone until I was in the hospital. I didn't notice any head counting or anybody coming up and actually counting the children. There could have been though.

I will probably be here at Clark in the hospital, if my ear takes, about a week, a little over a week. If my ear turns black then he's going to take it off again and do a skin graft off my hip and make a whole new ear. That will probably be about three weeks or more. But other than that, there's probably no reason for me to be in here even. I feel great but starving to death.

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

Susan Elizabeth Derge  
(Signature)

(Signature)

(Address)

(Signature)

(Address)

91 Fondon Fon, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam  
(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

10<sup>th</sup> day of April 19<sup>75</sup>  
at USAF Hospital Clark  
Clark AB, Philippines

Bernard A. Waxstein  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath.)

BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C5A Collateral Investigation Officer

(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

OF

INTERVIEW

WITH

TERESA DRYE

PASSENGER

CLARK AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

16 APRIL 1975

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF COLLATERAL INVESTIGATING  
OFFICER'S INTERVIEW WITH

TERESA DRYE

DEPENDENT DAUGHTER OF

HELEN DRYE

USDAO EMPLOYEE, SAIGON RVN

16 APRIL 1975

AT USAF HOSPITAL, CLARK AB, RP

Inves.

Officer: Let's see, Terry, do you remember, I guess on 4 April when you went out to to the airplane.

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Do you remember what it was like, when you had your bags and you went out there?

Witness: It was just a lot of people. Nobody knew exactly where they were going, but, they just went.

Inves.

Officer: Just went out there. Do you remember your birthday? What day were you born?

Witness: September 3,

Inves.

Officer: 1958?

Witness: 1957.

Inves.

Officer: 57. September 3, 1957; okay. You were in your last year of high school?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Right. Okay. You all went out to the airplane and you had your bags with you.

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Did anybody tell you what to do when you went out there?

Witness: Well, just went out to the airport, while we were there, everybody just telling us what we were supposed to do, where we were supposed to go. I never traveled on orders like that before.

Inves.

Officer: Of course, you traveled on an airplane before, I guess, haven't you?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Yes. I guess when you were coming here to school you had to fly to Manila, huh?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: From Saigon to Manila?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Did you fly up to Baguio at those times or did you take the bus?

Witness: Well, I took the bus all but once.

Inves.

Officer: Yes, okay. When you got on the airplane, Terry, where did you go? Did you go upstairs or downstairs, or

Witness: Oh, just stayed down in the bottom section.

Inves.

Officer: Stayed down in the bottom section.

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Now. Remember when you went on the airplane, on the big airplane, out of Saigon, I guess that was a different kind of airplane than any you have ever been in before, right?

Witness: Well, yes, in a way. It wasn't really fixed up with all the seats and everything.

Inves.

Officer: Yes. The bottom part didn't have any seats in it right?

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: Did you go up to the top part?

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: Did you go up to the top part where it had seats in it?

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: No. Were you down in the bottom part all the time?

Witness: Yes, the whole time.

Inves.

Officer: All the time in the bottom part.

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Were you on a blanket or what?

Witness: Well, they put blankets down on the floor if you wanted to sit on them, but, I didn't want to much, sat on the seats.

Inves.

Officer: You sat on the seats?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Like along the side?

Witness: Yes. It was like a big long bench.

Inves.

Officer: Like a bench?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: And, that's where you sat?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: And, did they put a seat belt on you, or what?

Witness: Yes, they put a long seat belt on me, with those straps in between, and about 5 or 6 people.

Inves.

Officer: And, Terry, when you got in there, were the babies already in?

Witness: Yes, most of them.

Inves.

Officer: And, were they lying on the ground, on pillows and blankets?

Witness: Well, some of them were sitting on the seats and some were lying on the ground, on the blankets on the ground.

Inves.

Officer: Were the little babies lying on the blankets.

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Okay. And, there were women there with the babies too?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: They were staying with the babies and maybe giving them milk or juice or

Witness: Yes, just, you know, talking to them or playing with them.

Inves.

Officer: Okay, and you were down there and you were sitting on a bench too?

Witness: Right.

Inves.

Officer: Right. Okay. And, I guess that was an awful big airplane for you to be in, yes?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Yes. Do you remember, Terry, you know, inside the airplane. Were you about in the middle of the inside, or closer to the front or the back?

Witness: Yes, I was pretty close to the rear of the aircraft.

Inves.

Officer: Closer to the back of the aircraft.

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: And when you got on, Terry, how did you get on? Did you get on through the back?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Up the stairs?

Witness: Yes. They had a big opening, you know.

Inves.

Officer: Yes. Right. Were there a lot of babies?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: A lot of babies.

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: And a lot of women trying to help the babies?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: American women?

Witness: Yes. I think there were about one for every five or ten babies.

Inves.

Officer: Okay. But, you say you never did go up to the top part of the airplane.

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: Did you see where the top part was? Was a big ladder

Witness: Oh yes.

Inves.

Officer: You saw people going up and down that ladder?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Yes. Did you see them carrying babies up and down the ladder?

Witness: Yes. I saw them taking babies upstairs.

Inves.

Officer: Yes. You thought you were going to go to the states, right? Or to Clark?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Yes. Okay. Now do you remember when the airplane took off?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Yes. Okay, and do you remember what happened after that?

Witness: Yes, we took off and we were up there a little while and then kind of like the whole thing got filled with carbon dioxide. The back was gone.

Inves.

Officer: The back was gone?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Popped. I guess it was pretty hot on the airplane when it was on the ground, right?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Everybody was probably sweating because it was hot, right?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: But, once the airplane took off then, did it get cool? Do you remember?

Witness: Not overly cold, no.

Inves.

Officer: But it was a little cooler than when it was on the ground?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Yes, because the air conditioning started working. Then you say the back of the airplane came off.

Witness: Yes. It seemed like it. After all the carbon dioxide or whatever, the back end looked like the whole tail was gone.

Inves.

Officer: Did you hear any noises, Terry?

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: Did you look out and see that you could see the sky out the back of the airplane?

Witness: Yes. Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Okay. Did you, were there any oxygen masks there? Did you hear somebody tell you to put it on?

Witness: There didn't seem to be any, no.

Inves.

Officer: Do you remember an oxygen mask? Did you have one on? Do you know? Or somebody give you one?

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: Do you remember what happened then afterwards, after, you know, after it looked like the back of the plane was gone?

Witness: Well, it looked like we were going to land again, turning around and landing, but I guess we didn't.

Inves.

Officer: Did they tell you you were going back to Tan Son Nhut?

Witness: Yes.

Witness: Not overly cold, no.

Inves.

Officer: But it was a little cooler than when it was on the ground?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Yes, because the air conditioning started working. Then you say the back of the airplane came off.

Witness: Yes. It seemed like it. After all the carbon dioxide or whatever, the back end looked like the whole tail was gone.

Inves.

Officer: Did you hear any noises, Terry?

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: Did you look out and see that you could see the sky out the back of the airplane?

Witness: Yes. Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Okay. Did you, were there any oxygen masks there? Did you hear somebody tell you to put it on?

Witness: There didn't seem to be any, no.

Inves.

Officer: Do you remember an oxygen mask? Did you have one on? Do you know? Or somebody give you one?

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: Do you remember what happened then afterwards, after, you know, after it looked like the back of the plane was gone?

Witness: Well, it looked like we were going to land again, turning around and landing, but I guess we didn't.

Inves.

Officer: Did they tell you you were going back to Tan Son Nhut?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: Okay, do you remember what happened then?

Witness: Not too well, no.

Inves.

Officer: Okay. When is the next time, Terry, that you remember anything that you could tell me about?

Witness: And then I, I remember going back and they said we were going to land and then I remember being here in the hospital.

Inves.

Officer: Okay. I know you don't like it here in the hospital, but, there's some nice people here, aren't there?

Witness: Oh, yes.

Inves.

Officer: Do you know Susan?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: She's a nice girl. Some of the nurses too?

Witness: Yes. I know quite a few people. I've been here a while.

Inves.

Officer: I see. So you were on the bottom of the airplane all the time and you never did get up to the top.

Witness: No.

Inves.

Officer: Okay. It's been nice talking to you. I understand you are going to go back to the states pretty soon.

Witness: Yes. I hope so.

Inves.

Officer: Do you?

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: You haven't been back to the states for awhile?

Witness: What?

Inves.

Officer: You haven't been back to the states for a while?

Witness: Not for about nine years. It will be kind of nice getting back, but not for very long visits.

Inves.


Officer: Visit your Grandma in Little Rock.

Witness: Yes.

Inves.

Officer: That's good. Well, thank you Terry.

The above is certified as a true and accurate transcript of the foregoing interview.



BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
Collateral Investigating Officer

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

OF

INTERVIEW

WITH

LINDA D. ADAMS

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

24 JUNE 1975

25 June 1975

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF THE COLLATERAL BOARD INVESTIGATING  
OFFICER'S INTERVIEW WITH MISS LINDA D. ADAMS TAKEN AT  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA ON 24 JUNE 1975.

(The interview convened at 1015 hours and closed at 1045  
hours on 24 June 1975.)

Questions by Colonel Waxstein:

Q. Just for the record, would you state your name and your address?

A. Linda Diane Adams, [REDACTED], California.

Q. All right, and would you tell us when you were born, please?

A. March 28, 1957.

Q. And you are currently staying with your father?

A. Yes.

Q. And his name?

A. David C. Adams.

Q. Do you have any brothers and sisters?

A. Two, Thomas Adams and Timothy Adams.

Q. Okay, where does Thomas live?

A. Do you mean the address?

Q. Please.

A. [REDACTED] Virginia.

Q. How old is he?

A. He's 20; he'll be 21 in August.

Q. Okay, and your other brother?

A. He lives in Warrenton, Virginia, and he's 19 - sometime in July.

Q. Now, on the 4th of April of this year you were in Saigon, Vietnam, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You were staying with your mother?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Okay, and your mother's name?

A. Barbara E. Adams.

Q. Now can you tell us -- your mother evidently was employed by the United States Defense Attache Office in Saigon?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did she do there?

A. She was secretary for Colonel Fletcher plus some other -- she changed job in the middle of her -- while she was there. She was secretary for Colonel Ewing and the other colonel that worked with him, I'm not sure of his name.

Q. And when did you arrive in Vietnam?

A. Around March 21st, or between the 21st and the 25th somewhere. I was there two and a half weeks.

Q. Can you tell us the circumstances of how you happened to be there with your mother?

A. I had been in a car accident -- two of them -- and she came home because I had my cast on my leg and stuff, and she wanted me to come back to Saigon to live with her because she had to go back there. So the judge didn't -- I was just 17 then, and he didn't want me to just stay there without my mom, so I went back to live with her.

Q. Were your father and mother separated or --

A. No, they're divorced. He's remarried.

Q. And I take it you graduated from high school when -- in June of --

A. No, I never graduated.

Q. Okay, so your mother then came back here to the States in March 74, and --

A. 75.

Q. March 75, and took you back with her?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. As her dependent?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, now could you tell me what occurred again with regard to the orphans and so forth on 4 April, the best that you can remember it?

A. What do -- I don't understand what you mean.

Q. Well, evidently what happened, you received notice -- your mother received notice and you received notice that you were going to have to leave Vietnam?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that right?

A. Yes. She went to work on Fri -- in the morning and as soon as she got there they told her to turn around and go home and get me and we had an hour to pack, and then we had to report back to room 17 something in the DAO building. So she came home and we packed and we met everyone else in the room at the building.

Q. Now, at that time, did they tell you what you were going to do?

A. They said that we would be evacuated, that we were leaving, that we had to go, and that there would be orphans on the plane. But they didn't really make it too clear that it was really -- until a little while later they didn't make it clear that that was our cover, you know, that we were just escorts. Until a certain time -- they said we weren't allowed to see anyone or talk to anyone once we got back to the States, but we were really being evacuated.

Q. Okay, so you and your mother then packed your bags and you were taken out to the Tan Son Nhut Airport?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. By bus or car or what?

A. By bus -- not for a couple of hours. It was -- we met like in the room at noon and we didn't get to the plane until like four.

Q. Okay. Could you describe what the scene was like when you arrived at the airport and you were boarding the aircraft?

A. Well, there were hundreds of people around there, all of the ladies that were carrying Vietnamese babies. They were putting them on the plane and then they would get off and get a couple more and go back on the plane, and a lot of newspaper reporters, photographers -- just a lot of Vietnamese people all around the plane. So we put our luggage in a big pile and they loaded it on.

Q. Did you and your mother board the airplane together?

A. Yeah, we did.

Q. Okay. Where did you go when you boarded the plane?

A. In the downstairs part. We took a seat there. She was sitting on the floor and I was sitting on a long metal bench.

Q. On the catwalks on the side? On the side of the airplane?

A. Yeah, uh-huh. Everyone was sitting on there except a few ladies who were on the floor with some of the little

babies that they had put on the floor, and then the ones that were old enough to sit up were placed - like - between ladies on the seats -- on the bench.

Q. Okay.

A. Then they took the long white strap and strapped us all in and the ladies on the floor too -- they put it around them, but then just before they closed down the doors some man asked me if I'd go up and help the babies upstairs because they needed some help. So I asked my mom if she wanted to go, she did, and so we went upstairs and then we took off.

Q. Okay. So you went upstairs then?

A. Yeah.

Q. And what was the scene upstairs as best you can remember?

A. Oh, God, there were a lot of babies in one row seats. There were like ten babies in each row and --

Q. Do you remember that there were two babies to a seat, isn't that what it was?

A. Just about - yeah, and there weren't that many people upstairs for one thing, cause it is pretty small, but we each had like three or four rows to take care of. And even before we took off, it was already mass panic because all the babies were wetting and crying at the same time.

Q. As I understand it, there were no seats for the adult escorts or any of the crew, is that right?

A. No -- yes, that's right.

Q. Where were you on the takeoff then -- what were you told to do?

A. We were told to kneel between the seats and -- takeoff -- while we took off and, then, if we heard a loud warning sound to lay on the floor, but we never heard the loud warning sound.

Q. So you kneeled between the seats then?

A. Yeah.

Q. And the airplane took off?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Okay. The airplane took off. Then what did you do?

A. Well, we just started looking after the babies, doing their bottles, and stuff like that. We were allowed to get up and walk around, but they said, you know, don't really go down stairs yet.

Q. Now, your mother was up there with you?

A. Yeah, uh-huh.

Q. Okay. What happened next, then?

A. The next thing I remember I was just feeding a baby, like sitting on a big bag of diapers, and the next thing I knew I was standing up, you know, and my head felt really funny. I guess that's when the explosion or whatever occurred.

Q. The rapid decompression --

A. Yeah, and --

Q. What did you see and feel and hear at that time?

A. Well, there was still a lot of smoke; I think a lot of it was from the humidity system that they have. I don't know, but --

Q. A lot of condensation in the air, like fog?

A. Yeah, and it just got a little harder to breathe and just really light-headed, I guess. I felt really strange.

Q. Did you get an oxygen mask? Did anybody tell you to use an oxygen mask?

A. Yeah, there were three of them that popped down automatically and they said to put one on and then put them on the babies and to lie down, and that was pretty hard because there were two oxygen masks left, like for the babies.

Q. Did you put an oxygen mask on?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you feel any better then?

A. Well, I couldn't really -- I didn't really feel any different. It was really strange.

Q. Where was your mother during this time?

A. She was right across the aisle from me and she was moving around getting the other oxygen masks on the other kids. And so then when I got my head back, or whatever, then I started moving around to get the other kids some masks.

Q. Okay. Did you ever have -- let's see -- in the troop compartment, do you recall that the latrines were really in the forward part of the troop compartment - the bathrooms?

A. Upstairs, where I was?

Q. Right.

A. Yeah, they were in front.

Q. Okay, in the back was the galley and the ladder that goes down to the cargo compartment?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Okay, where were you and your mother, as best you can recall? Were you about in the middle, were you toward the galley, or were you toward the latrines?

A. I'd say we were more toward the latrines. We were about two door -- about two rows in front of the emergency doors.

Q. Did you notice any flight nurses or any medical technicians around?

A. Yeah, there were a couple of them upstairs. Three or four that I remember.

Q. Did you ever have an opportunity to look downstairs in the cargo compartment or out towards the back of the airplane?

A. No, once the decompression occurred, we were told just to stay where we were.

Q. Okay, then what happened next?

A. Then a man came upstairs and said that the cargo doors had just blown off -- open, and that there was a rapid decompression, but that we would be going back to Saigon, that they got the landing gear down and everything was okay. And, we'd be going back for a landing and then -- so we went down really fast -- really, really fast. Then I walked across the aisle and kneeled on the floor across the aisle and my mom was kneeling there to.

Q. Next to you?

A. Yeah, but on the outside of me. I was nearer to the wall. And we just came down and the next thing I know --

Q. Now, you say you were kneeling?

A. Kneeling on the --

Q. Where were you facing? Were you facing the wall?

A. I was facing the aisle. I was kneeling with my side to the seat and I was holding on with my right hand to some metal thing that was just on the back of the seat.

Q. And your mom was next to you?

A. Yeah. And then she leaned over. She was leaning over because some of the -- one of the kids I noticed, I guess evidently understood that something was going on and he was scared, and some of the other kids were just wondering what was going on, and we didn't know we were going to crash, so she was helping calm them down. And then, the next thing I know there is mud flying in and everything and I saw her go down and all, but I didn't think of it at the time. And there was the fire -- I remember some fire a first, and then the black girl opened the door and someone said we were going to blow up so we had to get out of the

Linda  
Adams

plane. So we all grabbed a couple of babies and got out of the plane.

Q. Okay, now, Linda, do you remember how many impacts there were? Do you remember a first impact? Can you remember what it was like?

A. I don't -- I just -- I remember coming down really fast. It felt like we were going nose first, straight down. And, none of us knew where we were at the time either. For all we knew, we were still over the ocean. But, then after that I don't really remember the first impact. I just remember -- I guess I thought we were landing. The wheels hit the ground; that's what I thought. But then, all of a sudden, mud started flying in and I, you know, that's the last thing I remember for a minute.

Q. Now, when all this happened, where were you? Were you right in the same place?

A. Yeah, and I just held on really tight with my right arm until -- and I didn't fly around or anything.

Q. And you say your mother was outside of you to the aisle?

A. Yeah, like half in the aisle and half between the seats cause she was trying to take care of some of the other kids, cause it was pretty scary, I guess.

Q. Then, you say that the last thing you saw was that your mother had gone down the aisle?

A. Yeah, she had. It looked like she was running down the aisle, but with force cause -- I was holding so hard that I got whiplash, but she was just thrown down. I guess when I looked at her I just figured that she was just walking down the aisle for something, I don't know, that's what happened in my mind. I just thought she was walking down the aisle.

Q. Now you were kneeling all that time?

A. Yeah.

Q. And your mother was kneeling too?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. So the next thing you knew that the hatch was open and you grabbed some babies and went outside?

A. Yeah, well, I stood up for a minute and just looked around and tried to find my mom, but I couldn't find her, and some people were already out, I guess from the front -- I don't know where, but they were already out, and then I got out.

Q. Actually, there was no fire in the troop compartment, right?

A. No, I guess not. It might have been, like, outside, but

Linda Adams

we could feel the flames; we could see them cause I saw fire somewhere.

Q. Perhaps the wings --

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And then you were outside. Who -- was there anybody else outside with you at that time that came outside with you?

A. The black girl got out before me. She opened the hatch as a matter of fact, and then after I had walked a ways  
the girl with the hurt ear -- she was out there, and then I remembered seeing her with Dr. Starkey -- she knew him -- and she walked over there and there were about five or six men and women standing, the crew.

Q. Air Force crew type?

A. Yeah, and I think one -- she may have been in the Air Force, but I thought she for some reason was with an orphanage, I'm not sure of that. They were standing over by the plane and I walked over to see if I could get any more kids and they said no, they were just going to leave them in the plane until help comes cause the plane was okay.

Q. I imagine that very soon thereafter then the Air American and Vietnam helicopters came?

A. Yeah, very soon.

Q. And they told you to get on?

A. Yeah, I was kind of scared because I didn't know if they were ours or theirs.

Q. Now, did you notice -- were you feeling bad? Did you have any injuries yourself?

A. My neck.

Q. Your neck?

A. Right at the time, yeah, but I've had whiplash before so I knew what it was.

Q. You've had whiplash before in a couple of car accidents?

A. In a car accident I had it, yes. The same thing, from holding too tight with my right hand.

Q. When was that car accident?

A. A year or two ago.

Q. But you weren't -- evidently no scratches or lacerations?

A. Just a cut on my foot where I stepped on part of the plane or something, or something really sharp underneath the mud cause my shoes got stuck.

Q. Were you taken to the Seventh Day Adventists Hospital, or where?

A. Yeah, after we got out at Tan Son Nhut, we went to the hospital and then they started checking everyone. They didn't check me cause I told them I was okay.

Q. So, as far as you know, the only thing you suffered was just a little cut on your foot?

A. Oh, no, I found out later -- I had hurt my left knee in a car accident before I went to Saigon and after I came back from Saigon I completely collapsed once or twice, neither leg would work, and they found out now that from kneeling on the floor when we hit like that, that the pads between my knee ripped.

Q. Which doctor have you been seeing here? Do you go to the Presidio or a private doctor?

A. Yeah, I've been seeing, I don't know his name, he's in orthopedics at the Presidio.

Q. Your dad is retired?

A. Army colonel -- lieutenant colonel. But the knee pads were all mutilated or something, and they just have to be rebuilt; and the muscles in the right and the left leg are just really, really stretched out, you know, they just -- they don't work very well. Other than that --

Q. How's your neck?

A. My neck's okay. They gave me some muscle relaxers when I got to Clark and it went right away.

Q. You haven't been bothered -- have you been bothered by your neck?

A. No, no more than it ever bothered me after the first one.

Q. Just your knees then, that is what's bothering you now?

A. Yeah, my legs.

Q. How about the cut on your foot? Did that heal up okay?

A. Yeah, it's healed up fine. It will leave a scar cause I didn't get stitches, but it's okay.

Q. Okay, now, you left for Clark the next day, right? The next morning, as a matter of fact, right? Or the next day?

A. Afternoon.

Q. Yes, there were people who said they saw you standing in line. They knew you. I think it was Lois Bates who did.

A. Yeah, in fact, I saw her in the cafeteria that morning.

Q. Okay, then you came back here to the States, to San Francisco?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. I think that's about it. I can't think of anything else. Yes, I do have one more question that I can think of now. You were talking about the little boy. How old would you say he was? The little American boy?

A. The little boy?

Q. The little boy. You said there was a little boy that came out with you, a boy?

A. Oh, yeah, he was, I guess an American boy. He looked like around 10, 12, kind of fat, chubby.

Q. Yeah, how was he after the accident? Did he look like he was hurt at all?

A. He didn't appear to be. He was walking around, but then everyone was walking around with everything wrong, so, but he looked fine, and he wasn't in shock or anything. He was wondering what he could do to help. He was really good. But I was kind of messed up so you know he was taking it better than most everyone.

Q. Now, again, you say that at the time of the rapid decompression, you got out an oxygen mask and you were putting oxygen masks on the other babies, right?

A. The ones that woke up. Some of them didn't even wake up.

Q. And you were trying to calm them down?

A. Most of them didn't do that much. Most of them didn't understand it.

Q. Okay, and you say your mom was doing the same thing?

A. Yeah, everyone was.

Q. She was giving oxygen to the kids?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and I think you said just before the impact that your mom was trying to calm down some kids over on the other side?

A. Yeah, and like the aisle in front and the aisle on the side, because they all weren't jumping out of their seats or anything, but they were all pretty worried. But none of them said much -- none of them said anything.

Q. Would you say that you and your mom were trying to do all you could to help keep the babies in --

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you make sure that the babies that you had, did you check their seatbelts so as to make sure they were secured?

A. Yeah. I checked the row where I was sitting and everything, and she, you know, she was doing the same thing; although some of them must not have been because I saw a few babies on the floor, but they were little and they must have just slipped right out.

Q. Uh-huh. My understanding was that they put pillows and blankets in between the babies and the seatbelts?

A. Yeah, they did, but I still saw one or two on the floor, so they may have just --

Q. Did it look to you, after the impact and after everything had stopped, did it look to you like most of the babies were okay?

A. Yeah, it did. As a matter of fact, it looked like all of the babies I could see were fine. I only saw --

Q. Did you see any bleeding or anything on them?

A. On one or two, like, I saw one on the floor and I picked him up and put him back in the seat cause I didn't know quite what to do with him, and he looked like he had blood on his head maybe, but I didn't really look that close at him, or any of them.

Q. But they looked pretty good?

A. Yeah, they all looked pretty -- they all looked okay. They were all seated so --

Q. So you feel that you and your mom did the best you could do to take care of the babies while that plane was going down?

A. Yeah, I would say so. Everybody upstairs was doing more than they could, you know, because at that point there was really nothing left to do cause we couldn't explain to them. There was really nothing we could do except try and comfort them. That's about it.

Q. And, you said -- how many babies did you take out with you when you left the airplane?

A. Oh, I was carrying two and then two, maybe three at the most, I think two were sort of dragging along with me, holding on to me cause the mud was really deep.

Q. And you tried to go back in again and get some more?

A. Well, I walked back to see what was going on, and they just said they were going to leave them all in there until the helicopters came cause they didn't want them running all over the place.

Q. Is there anything else you might want to add?

A. No, I can't think of anything.

Q. Well, thank you very much. I appreciated talking with you.

This is certified as a true  
and accurate copy of the  
interview.



BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., COLONEL, USAF  
Collateral Board Investigating Officer

STATEMENT

OF

DR. MERRIT W. STARK

23 MAY 1975

Statement of Dr. Merrit W. Stark taken by Maj James P. Piper,  
HQ USAF/JACC on 23 May 1975.

Q. Would you please for the record give me your name and occupation and current address?

A. Dr. Merrit W. Stark, Public Health Position, what was the third?

Q. Uh, your address or business address for the record.

A. Department of State, USAID EA PD PH, Washington, DC 20523.

Q. Thank you, Dr. Stark. Would you please tell me how you first came to be associated with the Operation Babylift Flight, the C-5A?

A. The evacuation of orphans had been done primarily by commercial flights and then as the military situation over there deteriorated the seven agencies that were approved for inter-country adoption were seeking means to get their children out of the country.

Q. At this point, do you recall the names of the seven agencies?

A. Yes, I think I can give those to you; Friends for All Children, Friends of Children of Vietnam, Pearl Buck Foundation, Catholic Charities, ICCS (its an international Red Cross . . . not Red Cross but some international agency), lets see what was that other one. . . . Those all that come to mind at the moment, but I recall that there were seven.

Q. Fine. Now if you could just go ahead sir.

A. About 11 o'clock on 4 April I received a call from my superior officer, Dr. William O'dell who is the Director of Public Health. . . .

Q. At 11 a.m.

A. 11 a.m. telling me that he had just come from a meeting and that there was to be this orphan's airlift and that I had been nominated to accompany the orphans as medical advisor. And I was to be at one of the adoption agencies,

MR. STARK

Friends for All Children, at one of their locations, the nearest to the airport, at 2 o'clock. I also had to pick up a copy of my orders. When I called the adoption agency they were interested in getting any other escorts because at that time they just had perhaps a half a dozen for over 200 children they were taking back. So my daughter was in the country and when I got home I asked her if she would throw her things together and serve as an escort on this flight, which she did. And I threw my things in a suitcase and dropped by USAID on the way to the airport and picked up my orders and arrived at the adoption agency at 2 o'clock. There were perhaps five or six buses there and apparently some of the other agencies that were sending children on this airlift had brought their children to this FFAC location which was sort of a collecting point for the orphans. And some time around 2:30 why we all got into the buses and we had orders from Dr. Don, the Vice-President and Minister of Social Welfare, and he had coordinated this with some of the airport officials and so they let us through the gates and we drove out to the air strip right adjacent to where the C-5A was located. At the time we arrived, they were still unloading military equipment from the plane and probably about, oh they finished this about a quarter of three and then we started putting the orphans aboard. And this was accomplished in about an hour. The first ones that came aboard they had requested would be the smaller infants and these are the ones that primarily went up in the top part of the plane. But there were also some older children and children with handicaps, braces and all. So just about 4 o'clock we got the plane loaded. Everyone was very anxious to depart because some of the Vietnamese officials were reluctant to have all these Vietnamese children leave and the supporting documents for their departure was not entirely clear. I had a list of . . . apparently all of the orphans in one particular agency but these were not the children that necessarily were going aboard the plane and I was told that the exact number of children and the names of the children would be clarified at a future time. They just didn't have time in the short time that they knew that the plane was going to prepare all these papers.

Q. Could I go back just for a moment Dr. Stark to the processing area at the Friends for All Children where you said that most everyone gathered and boarded the buses. Who was apparently in charge of the operation there?

A. Well, to the best of my understanding someone from the Friends of All Children had contacted perhaps President Ford or someone in this country regarding removal of these children and had gained some sort of an approval for the use of this plane to evacuate the children.

Q. Well, I'm more interested in . . . I'm sorry I mislead you, I'm more interested in the actual physical loading of the buses and coordinating for people to get to the Friends for all Children area that particular day and putting people on buses deciding who goes on what bus, how was that handled, who acted, were there any Americans involved in that operation, official Americans?

A. I think no official Americans. I think this was primarily handled by the adoption agencies and the one agency that seemed to be sending the most children and I think that the one had coordinated everything was Friends for All Children.

Q. Were you the only U.S. Government employee as far as you know there at the orphanage.

A. At the . . .

Q. At the adoption center there, that morning and that afternoon when you arrived.

A. There were some wives of some of the USAID and embassy employees there but I . . .

Q. Were these people to serve as escorts?

A. Well, no I think they were just sort of assisting in getting the buses loaded and many of these ladies that volunteered to work at the adoption centers, they were just sort of volunteers but many of them were not scheduled to be escorts on the flight.

Q. Were the buses there when you arrived at the center?

A. Yes.

Q. And, exactly how did the operation work there at the center, when you arrived, from the time you arrived who gave what kind of instructions as to preparing to leave the center?

A. One of the ladies, Margaret Moses, I think it was, who was sort of coordinating things with our embassy and also the Vietnamese and my understanding was that we were to be at the airport shortly after two that the buses were to depart from her location at 2 o'clock. Naturally it was about 2:30 before that I think, when I first got there why I contacted Margaret Moses and went back into her office and she, I believe it was Maragaret Moses that gave me the list of all the children and also a letter from Dr. Don authorizing the children to leave and things were sort of hectic because no one had been given very much time.

Q. Did you assist in putting the children on buses?

A. No.

Q. Did you observe while this was being done at all?

A. About 2:15 my, the word came to get the buses loaded and I forget exactly who gave the order. But someone said that they were waiting for us at the airport, so all the children were loaded up. I was in a private vehicle. I got in my private vehicle and sort of led the procession of five or six buses.

Q. You did not watch then while the buses were being loaded.

A. Uh, No.

A. O.K. I was just wondering if there was any, if you knew whether as a child was being loaded on the bus whether or not he or she was checked off the list. In other words was there any control on who got on the bus.

A. I think this had been determined before I got there which told where we going but I don't. . . as far I knew there was no checking right then but the children that were going had been selected.

Q. Was your car the only private car in the procession?

A. No. There was another gentleman from the embassy who was sort of in charge of field operations. Mr. Jacobson. He apparently had coordinated this flight and was working closely with the adoption agencies and was at the airport.

Q. When you arrived at the airport did you and the other private car have any trouble getting on the airport grounds?

A. Uh, a little bit of trouble, some of the guards hadn't been completely alerted that this operation was going on. They were reluctant to let us on the post. But apparently a high ranking officer at the airport that Dr. Don had contacted finally arrived and gave the orders that it was alright for us to proceed.

Q. Did you at this time the list that you had and the letter of authorization.

A. That's correct.

Q. Did you have to do anything with that list and letter at the airport?

A. Well, not at this time. I didn't release the list until we actually got out to the airplane itself.

Q. Did anything significant happen between the time you passed through the gate and you reached the airport?

A. No, I can't think of anything.

Q. Did you drive your car on out to the ramp?

A. Right.

Q. Did someone take it away for you?

A. No, we just parked it right there. And the buses were sort of pulled in along side, too. And waited until the unloading of the military supplies had been accomplished.

Q. Was your daughter with you in your car?

A. Uh, yes.

Q. Now, you just waited then in your car or around the cars or somewhere like that, I take it until the unloading was accomplished?

A. Right.

Q. Did the children get off the bus?

A. No, the children stayed on the buses.

Q. O.K. What happened next?

A. Well, immediately after the last of the military equipment was unloaded they started loading the children. And this suggestion was made that they would like the infants in the upper section of the plane.

Q. Who supervised the loading, Air Force people?

A. Uh, Air Force people assisted and the adoption agency personnel.

Q. O.K.

A. The children went up steps as I recall to the cargo hold and then there was a very steep ladder that went up to the upper section and we just sort of handed the children to three or four military flight attendants and they passed them on up to the top and then people received them up there and put them in the seats. Two infants to a seat - and they were strapped in.

Q. Now, while the loading was going on at this time had you given your documents to anyone?

A. Yes, during the time we were waiting - before we boarded while we were, - when we first arrived there - why someone from the adoption agency came around and asked for my passport and immunization card. So I think there were seven or eight escorts that had been contacted by the adoption agencies and she collected all of these seven or eight passports from the officials escorts. And then these were returned to us just moments before the plane took off.

Q. What about your letter and list?

A. Well, when we got out to the plane why there was a another Vietnamese officer who was reluctant to let all of these children board the aircraft without going through the official customs procedures. He thought that this should be on an individual basis and was a little reluctant to accept just a blanket authorization for all the children.

Q. I take it none of these here have passports?

A. I think that's correct. And really the only thing we had was this letter from Dr. Don and finally why he sort held up the proceedings for a while and then the officer that was above him that had escorted us through the Tan Son Nhut gates up here told him that this was alright to let the children on. So everybody started boarding.

Q. Did you release that letter and list to that officer?

A. I gave to him with the letter of authorization from Dr. Don, that's correct.

Q. He kept it?

A. And I did not get it back, that's right.

Q. Fine. Is there any other contact with any officials of any sort that you can think of by either yourself or the gentleman you referred to or any of the adoption agency people?

A. No, apparently a lot of the people at the embassy and USAID and particularly anyone that had been associated with the adoption agencies they had information about this flight so that there were a lot of people that came out to help the children get boarded. But I don't recall who they were but there must have been 12 or 15 people like that. Mr. Jacobson and several other people from the embassy.

Q. I take it Mr. Jacobson did not accompany the flight?

A. No, he did not accompany the flight, but it was my understanding that he had something to do with arranging the flight.

Q. Were there any other officers in the embassy or are you the only one beside yourself on the flight

A. No, not that I know of.

Q. In other words you were probably the senior civilian American person.

A. I think that's correct, yes.

Q. Well, sir, if you could then . . .

A. The other people that were there that I neglected to mention were some photographers that had entrance to the area and they were taking pictures and I know they were met with some resistance from the Vietnamese because there are signs located all over the air base, "no picture taking" but they had gained permission apparently to do this. They were taking some pictures.

Q. Any civilian newpeople?

A. As I recall, CBS was over there.

Q. Did any one try to interview you or anyone else while you were there?

A. Uh, not at this time, no.

Q. Well, if that's all that's significant that took place before the flight, we could go on with the takeoff and what you remember after that.

A. Uh, after we all got boarded, we closed all the doors and very shortly after that we started moving toward the runway and I think within maybe 10 minutes we were headed down the runway and were airborne. I think perhaps for the next 15 minutes why we made sure that the children were strapped in. I was in the upper hatch were most of the small children were. My daughter spoke Vietnamese so I thought she would be more help downstairs with the older children.

Q. Who was in the upper area with you?

A. Well, I can't remember exactly how many, I think we had three or four flight attendants that were part of the military crew and then there was a Susan Durge whose father was employed by ESSO in Saigon. And she was serving as an escort. And then there was a Christie Lieberman who was an employee of the Friends for All Children and there may have been other people but for the first few minutes we were so busy sort of tying the children in during take off why the children had to be all strapped in but the adults were just cautioned to bend down low between two seats so none of the adult

people had any sort of seat belts or anything like that but the take off was smooth and there was no problem. And then after we were airborne why we sort of got together all the people upstairs and sort of said I'll be responsible for watching the children in this row and I think we had been airborne for perhaps 12 or 15 minutes and then all of a sudden there was this tremendous explosion, what sounded like an explosion and my first thought was that we had been hit by some sort of a surface to air missile. The plane jolted but the pilot kept control of the plane. Then a few minutes later someone climbed up the stairs and inquired if everyone was alright in the upper hatch and we all seemed to be alright and he gave the word that we were turning around and returning to Saigon. The cargo hatch had blown off. The upper part of the plane, there were no windows so we couldn't actually see what was happening, all we could do so was sort of imagine what was happening. About that time they had lowered some oxygen masks and we gave these to the children as we were descending. After we turned around the pilot seemed to have pretty good control of the plane and we made sure that the children were all well strapped in. I could tell that we were descending pretty rapidly because of the change in the pressure on my ears. And then I noticed that the pilot would speed up the plane and then slow it down and then someone came in and said hold tight and about this time we initially hit the ground. Then we started hitting the ground at regular intervals and there was a lot of mud and dirt from the rice paddies that was sailing through the upper compartment. After a couple of minutes we came to a complete halt. Prior to this the people in the upper deck had, we had talked about getting the children out and putting them into the chutes and I had said I would happy to go down the chute first and receive the children and they were lowered. But when we got the hatches opened after we came to a complete stop why our level was just even with the paddy ground so we just had to open the hatch and step right out of the door and there we were right in the paddy. One of the crew members had a broken leg so we stationed him by the door. One of the female flight attendants had a broken arm, she and I would loosen the seat belts and hand the babies out to him and he would hand them to people outside to receive the babies. In the meantime Vietnamese choppers would come in they were receiving these babies and taking them back to the 7th Day Hospital. The seats in my section

*SEATS*

*STRAK*

were pretty well in position. In the front part of the plane some of them had loosened and fallen back on the seat behind. But the children were pretty well protected and I didn't see any children that had any real serious injury. There were a few gashes and a little bleeding but I didn't see any children that were. . . One child was dead upstairs. He apparently had been loaded with his possessions in a little bag that hung around neck and I think perhaps the cord around the neck had become too tight and had perhaps strangled the child. But that was the only child upstairs that I was aware of that was not alive. Some of the children had crutches and braces and we handed those off. It took us probably the better part of an hour to get all the children off and we had to wait awhile because they could only receive only so many outside. They just sort of had to lay them in the paddie. So rather than just lay them outside we kept them inside until the choppers took a load and then we would hand a few more. After an hour we got all the babies out and I checked under all the seats to make sure that there were no infants that had gotten loose and . . . The two crewmen that were severely injured in the back part of the section where I was they had been removed on stretchers and all personnel were out of the upper half and then I got out. When I got out the first thing I noticed was this sort of blazing inferno behind our section and this is what I figured where my daughter was but I thought maybe she might have been thrown out of the airplane. I walked around the perimeter of this burning section but I could find no survivors. While I was walking around the perimeter some American personnel had arrived in a chopper and one of the fellows said there was no need for me to wander around further that they were going to search the entire area closely and recommended that I go back to Tan Son Nhut, So he hailed a Vietnamese chopper and they flew me back to Tan Son Nhut. I was the only person on that particular flight. Anything further?

*BB*

- Q. Would you tell us then how long you remained in Vietnam after the accident?
- A. As I recall the accident was on the 4th of April and I departed Vietnam on the 10th of April.
- Q. When you departed Vietnam was the Friends for All Children still operating?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any idea if there would exist in the United States or any where else where we might have reasonable access to it any sort of listing of the children who might have been on the airplane?

A. Well, this would have to be through the individual adoption agency and my understanding is that bulk of these children were from Friends for All Children which was otherwise known as Rosemary Taylor's Operation. Rosemary Taylor and Margaret Moses they were sort of the head of this operation in Saigon. But then there was also a stateside organization that received the children that they sent over. I'm quite sure that they would have knowledge of who left from their organization and I think the other adoption agencies would have knowledge of what children had left their agency. I'm not sure if I mentioned before but Holt Agency they were another agency that was licensed over there.

Q. Do you know where the Friends for All Children or Rosemary Taylor agency is headquarters in the United States.

A. Boulder, Colorado.

Q. Boulder, Colorado. This lady Margaret Moses, did she leave Vietnam?

A. You mean was she on the airplane?

Q. No, I mean afterwards.

A. Well, I think all the personnel left.

Q. Was she still there when you left?

A. She was still there when I left. I think. There was some confusion as to whose going to accompany the children out of Saigon and I know Margaret Moses was scheduled and then it seems that at the last minute why Rosemary Taylor decided that perhaps Margaret should stay. This German girl, Ilge - I can't think of her last name, but it was decided that she would go. I think she was the representative from that agency. The understanding is that she did not survive.

Q. Yes, that's right. When you left initially on this flight, did you and your daughter both intend to return to Saigon.

A. Yes, my orders were that I was to accompany the . . .

Q. Your orders, have you back to Saigon?

A. Accompany the flight to San Francisco and then either return to Saigon by commercial or military flight depending on what I could arrange.

Q. Was your daughter planning on going back too?

A. She was not planning on going back. No at this time they were trying to rid the agency of all non-essential personnel.

Q. That was a matter of time, right?

A. Right.

Q. Well, Dr. Stark can you think of anything else that you can add to shed any light on, I think you have been very complete. I can't think of any other questions to ask you right now. Oh, yes, one other thing. Do you have any idea as to whether the records (health records) of the 7th Day Adventist Hospital were airlifted out?

A. I don't have any knowledge and actually if this were done it would have been done, I think, after I left because I left on the 10th and naturally the mission didn't close, I think, it was either later on the evening of the 29th or the first thing. . .

Q. You said that the German Ilge, or something. Do you know her last name?

A. See, I just called her by her first name Ilge.

Q. Do you know the names of any other foreign nationals, other than the children, of course, who were on the plane?

A. Well, just the two that were upstairs with me, Debbie Derge who I knew personally through her family.

Q. I mean other than United States citizens? There were six.

A. Third country nationals. I don't know who those were.

Q. O.K.

A. There were so many people mingling around at the airport that actually I didn't really know. They had called me at the last minute and I didn't even know who the escorts were, except that I knew that there weren't very many. Because they had said if your daughter or wife could serve as an escort, why their help would be much appreciated.

Q. Right.

A. And I asked my wife if she would go, but she was just finishing her last day of school over there and felt that she couldn't leave her students that quickly. So she decided not to go.

Q. Have you spoken with anyone other than myself and the gentleman in California with whom you referred earlier in connection with any investigation of this accident.

A. I think the only other person would be the lady over at the State Department, the legal representative at the State Department. I did speak with her and I think she was the one who referred me to you.

Q. Miss Henshaw?

A. Ann Henshaw.

Q. Right, yes. I mean over, when you over there you didn't contact with anyone. When you came back to the United States, did you come directly or did you go through the Philippines?

A. Well, we came back by way of a commercial flight, Northwest, and their particular flight. . .

Q. I mean you didn't overlay or process through any refugee processing area?

A. No. we spent one night in Seattle and then proceeded to Denver where we stayed for about a week.

Q. You didn't process through Clark AFB or Travis or any of those places?

A. Process through we went through customs I think in Seattle.

Q. Fine.

STATEMENT

OF

CHRISTINE E. LEIVERMANN

2 JULY 1975

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE E. LEIVERMANN

APRIL 4, 1975

A. PICKUP AND TRAVEL OF CHILDREN FROM ORPHANAGE TO TAN SON NHUT AIRPORT

Most of the children departed from our nursery by bus. The smaller children were transported to the airport in cars through the courtesy of some American women. We departed for the airport in convoy fashion. We waited several minutes at the check point into Tan Son Nhut. The usual formalities were completed...looking over the papers, Vietnamese police boarding the busses to survey the occupants, looking at the baggage, etc. From the check point we traveled on to the airport. The children waited in the vehicles while the papers were being completed with the Vietnamese authorities.

B. LOADING OF PASSENGERS & BAGGAGE ON THE C5A

By the time I arrived on board the airplane, most of the passengers and baggage were already boarded. Most of the older children and many of the adults were downstairs. A few small children were with different members of our organization who were also scheduled to take the flight that day. I asked a crewman where the majority of little ones were concentrated, and he directed me to the upper deck of the airplane. I went upstairs and helped strap children into their seats. Many of the smaller children were strapped 2/seat, so I went around trying to straighten them out a bit and make them more comfortable. There were a number of other things to do, such as removing the children's travel packs and placing them out of the way, adjusting leg braces so they wouldn't block the area between the seats, and handing out baby bottles. I said goodbye to friends that had helped load the children and were now disembarking. Then I went downstairs to check on supplies. While downstairs, I noticed that most of the people were concentrated in the forward section of the plane. The luggage appeared to be strapped to a section behind the stairs. The rear loading door was still open. People were going about their business, and I didn't notice many familiar faces. I took some spare baby bottles upstairs and instructed some crew-members on what to give the children to drink. Then I returned to the section of babies near the stairwell and concentrated on making them comfortable.

There were a number of people upstairs, and many of the adults had no place to sit for takeoff. As we prepared to takeoff, I mentally reshuffled children in an arrangement that I thought would offer maximum care for the children and seats for the adults. I planned on asking one of our (FFAC) nurses to come up and help once we were airborne.

C. RECOLLECTION OF EVENTS FROM TAKEOFF THROUGH RAPID DECOMPRESSION AND SUBSEQUENT CRASH LANDING

Everyone had picked their station and had prepared for takeoff. A crewman asked me if I knew how to brace for takeoff--I said "Yes", and he went back to his station a few rows ahead of mine. My position consisted of the first 2 rows directly in front of stairwell, the short row next to the stairwell, and assisting with the row next to the emergency exit doors. My position for takeoff was between the 1st and 2nd row in front of the stairwell. After the plane had leveled off, I began to give out more baby bottles and collect the empties in my station. I took the empty bottles back to the galley and waited in line to fill them with sugar water. Someone handed me a carton of milk, and I had just finished it when there was a tremendous explosion. Someone said, "Oh my God, my Jesus God, no!". I believe that a black crewman injured his leg at this time. After a few seconds, I stepped over and around the debris that had accumulated in the galley after the explosion and went back to my station. I looked down the stairwell and saw a large body of water. I assumed the plane was going to drop into the ocean and started thinking about the fact that neither the children nor myself could swim. A crewman came up to me and put his arms around me and asked if I was all right, and if I was scared, and if I would be all right. I answered Yes to all 3 questions. He explained that the cargo door had blown off and that we would probably land all right because it's happened before and the planes usually landed okay. Some crewmen were off to my left (as I faced stairs) and appeared to be handling a radio or something similar. Someone said the wiring was gone. Then the O<sub>2</sub> masks fell from the ceiling. I only found 2 that worked in the first row. When I pulled on the tubing to start the flow of O<sub>2</sub>, the unit came out of the ceiling. When I straightened the tube and gave only a gentle tug, no O<sub>2</sub> came through to the mask. The tubes were not long enough to reach the babies in their seats. I put on one mask and had to unstrap the babies and lift them up to the O<sub>2</sub>. This proved to be extremely awkward, so I finally decided to just give it to the babies that looked like they were in greatest need. Many babies seemed to be borderline unconscious, but one was turning cyanotic, so I picked him up and held him to the O<sub>2</sub> until the crewman signaled that O<sub>2</sub> was no longer needed. The time involved seemed to be about 2 minutes, but I am in no way positive about this. I remember looking to the forward section of the plane and seeing everyone giving O<sub>2</sub> to the children. I don't know if they had the same problems with their O<sub>2</sub> masks.

After the O<sub>2</sub> was no longer needed, we began strapping and padding the children more securely in their seats. I occasionally turned to look down the stairwell. The air was much warmer, and the wind was causing scraps of paper to float around the stairs. The land was rising up

## C. Continued

quickly, and I could see rivers, rice paddies, houses, etc. The crewman came up to me again and asked if I was okay. I answered Yes. The rush of air seemed to be getting louder now as we neared the land. My babies were all very still and quiet. Most of the adults were hovering over their charges and preparing for landing. We started to brace for landing. I was still securing my children, and I could see people crouching between seats, some of them trying to shield children with their arms. I crouched between rows 1 and 2 in front of stairwell and braced. The plane touched down and seemed to bounce back up in the air and come down again. Some part of the plane broke off, and started on fire--(I don't know whether the break or the fire was first) possibly the wing. Some flames came up the stairwell and were followed by intense heat. I started to feel very panicky as I couldn't reach all the children at once. But the plane kept sliding forward and left the burning wreckage and the intense heat behind us. During this time, I was bounced around a bit, the life raft inflated, some seats near the life raft were pulled off the ground and overturned with the children still strapped in them, ceiling panels fell down on top of us, and tremendous blasts of mud, water, and weeds were shooting up the stairwell. There were many grinding, grating, and shearing noises. I glanced to the left and noticed a hole worn in the side of the plane and I saw some of the rice paddy through that hole.

## D. RESCUE EFFORTS AND SUBSEQUENT EVACUATION OF SURVIVORS TO INCLUDE EXTENT OF ANY INJURIES I HAVE SUSTAINED

  
After the plane stopped, I stood up and started to wonder how we would get out. The children in my immediate rows seemed relatively okay, and I hadn't registered yet that the overturned seats had children in them. I climbed over the rows and saw that the exit doors about mid-plane were open, so I proceeded to the center of the plane. Some children were already out of the plane on the right side, and one of the injured crewmen was there as well. Two of the children had rolled nearly face down in the mud, so I jumped to the ground (about 6-7 feet from the emergency door) to turn them face-up. After I turned them over, I noticed that the crewman was bleeding severely through a makeshift bandage on his head. I noticed the sound of helicopters landing very close by. Someone had thrown a knotted rope out the door, so with the rope and a boost from one of the crew, I went back into the plane. We found some bandages, and I handed them out to Dr. Stark who was with the crewman previously mentioned. I went back to my section and started handing children out the central door. (The exit nearest to my station was jammed.) The children from the upper end of the craft had been evacuated, so some of the crew came down to my end, and we formed a chain to hand the children out an exit on the right side of the plane. We righted the overturned seats, and found the children in apparently good health despite their ruffled appearance. The last part of my section to be evacuated was the area next to the stairwell. I could

## D. Continued

only see an arm because a number of panels from the ceiling and wherever had fallen on top of the seats. I panicked and called over to a crewman that some kids were buried under the debris and I didn't know if they were alive. He was busy sending another section of children out the left exit doors, so he asked if I could check them. I crawled over the seats and proceeded to pull the debris off the children. I found them alive and in apparently good condition. I handed them to a crewwoman, and she handed them out to one of the helicopter crew. Only after I had handed her the last child from those seats did I notice that she had injured at least one arm. I helped her out of the plane, and we proceeded to a waiting helicopter. I asked one crewman about the bottom 1/2 of the plane--he shook his head "No". All of the other children had already been evacuated, so I joined her in that helicopter. Among the passengers I noticed (besides myself and the crewwoman) the injured crewman previously mentioned, 2 or 3 children, an American man from Air America (not on the plane), and 1 or 2 other crewmen from the C5A. I looked down and saw some crewmen still at the crash site, and the piece of smoldering aircraft remains some distance behind the plane. We proceeded to the Air America landing strip, where an ambulance was waiting for us. We went directly to 7th Day Adventist Hospital. While boarding the ambulance, I asked where the other children were. Someone told me they were fine.

Once at the hospital, we proceeded to the emergency room. Just before I entered the E.R., I was stopped by one of the Vietnamese hospital coordinators for our organization. I explained what had happened, and she ran off to telephone one of our nursery supervisors. I went into the Emergency Room, and a nurse asked me what had happened. I told her the plane had crashed and she went to find someone else. An American doctor questioned me briefly and called the American Embassy, and tried to get an outside line for me to call my office. Until this time, none of the other passengers or crew had arrived at the hospital. An American lady at the hospital gave me a glass of water, and we went to sit on the bench outside to wait for the others to come. Some ambulances from other hospitals arrived at SDA and were directed to the airport. Some members of FFAC arrived at the hospital, then the ambulances started to come in with the victims. The hospital grounds started to crowd with reporters, concerned friends and staff, and on-lookers. The E.R. was filled to overflowing, so all children were routed upstairs to the pediatric ward. The flow of ambulances slowed down, and I was directed to a table where a nurse checked my blood pressure and pulse. I got up to wash my face and a doctor asked me how I was. I told him I was okay, and he went back to the injured people. The ambulances started coming in again with the dead. They were directed immediately to the morgue. I waited in the E.R. waiting room and went out to check whenever an ambulance came in. Some of the crewmen were also in the waiting room--one of them had his camera and asked me to take a picture of him in his "crash clothes". He then decided the light wasn't good enough and returned to his seat. I saw

D. Continued

the black crewman wheeled through the Emergency Room on a stretcher. I think I also saw the pilot come through, but I'm not sure of that. The crewmen continued to talk about the crash, but nothing caught my ear until another crewman walked through the E.R. I gathered from the conversation that he had been on the lower level, but he disappeared into the E.R. before I could question him. Sometime during the time I spent in the waiting room and outside with the ambulances, I think I heard mention of previous trouble with the cargo door on the C5A. I don't know who said this, as I was interested only in the ambulances. I left the hospital later that evening and went home. The following afternoon I took another flight to San Francisco. The only injuries I sustained were multiple bruises and scratches on my legs and some on my arms, some pulled muscles in my right leg and arm, and possibly some damage to my left eye. (I was wearing contact lens, and caught an eyefull of dirt when we landed.) I have seen a physician, and he finds no physical reason for a slight decrease of vision in my left eye, so he advises me to wait for a few months, then be re-examined.

NOTE: Any information concerning the identities of children and employees of FFAC must be obtained only through FFAC, as this is considered confidential material.

*Christine Leivermann*  
Christine E. Leivermann  
7/2/75

STATEMENT

OF

GEORGE J. JENKINS

WITNESS

CLARK AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

10 APRIL 1975

**STATEMENT OF WITNESS**

Clark A.F.B

10 April 1975

I, George F. Jenkins, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr., [redacted] has identified himself to me  
as C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.  
(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

On 4 April, 1975, at approximately 1630 hours, I was just leaving the "Customer Assistance" Office at DPDO, (Property Disposal) Saigon Island, when a C-5A flew over-head at a height of not more (estimated) than 300 ft. I have flown as crew-member of various aircraft when in the USAF - and, so - I felt that this aircraft was in some kind of difficulty due to the erratic manner of flight, - and harsh sounds ~~noise~~ emitting from the craft. I noticed that the cargo door was open. Most aircraft coming in for a landing would not pass immediately over DPDO - but ~~about~~ <sup>about</sup> 1000' to 1500' (estimated) - and at 2500' to 3500' (estimated).

2

after passing over my office - the aircraft flew across the river and headed toward Tan Son Nhut A.F.B.

I did not see the actual crash of this aircraft since I drove a pick-up truck almost immediately to Bldg #48, DPDC Admin. Office - which is approximately a two minute drive. I went upstairs and saw my Vietnamese employees gathered around the windows. I went to investigate and saw a large column of black smoke rising from what the Vietnamese told me was the crash area of the C-5-A (possibly a distance of three miles from DPDC). One Vietnamese employee, a man, emphatically explained that he saw "a man" jump or leave the plane just before it crashed.

This Vietnamese works for Storage Section under the supervision of Mr. Thorne & Mr. Choi.

DPDC Saigon <sup>3</sup> Island

This is the only ~~knowledge~~ ~~information~~  
I have of any thing concerning the  
crash of this air craft

George Herk 565-16-5467

DPDO Sacramento

McClellan AFB

## REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION FOR DOD CIVILIAN PERMANENT DUTY TRAVEL

(Reference: Joint Travel Regulations)

TRAVEL AUTHORIZED HEREIN AS NECESSARY IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

1. DATE REQUESTED

31 Mar 75

## REQUEST FOR OFFICIAL TRAVEL

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) <b>JENKINS, GEORGE J. SSN:</b>				3. NEW POSITION TITLE AND GRADE OR RATING <b>PRO. Marketing Spec., GS-09</b>	
4. RELEASING OFFICIAL STATION AND LOCATION, OR ACTUAL PLACE OF RESIDENCE <b>Defense Attaché Office (AOSDP) Saigon RVN</b>				5. NEW OFFICIAL STATION AND LOCATION, ACTUAL PLACE OF RESIDENCE, OR ALTERNATE DESTINATION <b>DPDU Sacramento McClellan AFB, Sacramento, CA</b>	
DUTY REPORTING DATE AT NEW STATION <b>O/A 4 May 75</b>					
6. PURPOSE OF TRAVEL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRAVEL BETWEEN OFFICIAL STATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> RENEWAL AGREEMENT TRAVEL <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN FROM OVERSEAS FOR SEPARATION					
7. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GOVERNMENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMERCIAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RAIL <input type="checkbox"/> AIR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BUS <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) <input type="checkbox"/> TO BE DETERMINED BY TRANSPORTATION OFFICER	PRIVately OWNED CONVEYANCE <input type="checkbox"/> ADVANTAGEOUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOT ADVANTAGEOUS <input type="checkbox"/> AUTOMOBILE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) RATE PER MILE \$		
8. PER DIEM FOR EMPLOYEE AND DEPENDENTS (If applicable) AUTHORIZED PER JTR.			9. ROUND TRIP TRAVEL, NOT TO EXCEED <b>CALENDAR DAYS INCLUDING TRAVEL</b> TIME <input type="checkbox"/> IS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO SEEK PERMANENT RESIDENCE		
10. TEMPORARY QUARTERS SUBSISTENCE EXPENSE <input type="checkbox"/> IS <input type="checkbox"/> IS NOT AUTHORIZED FOR <b>N/A</b> DAYS					
11. <input type="checkbox"/> MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES <input type="checkbox"/> REAL ESTATE EXPENSES <input type="checkbox"/> UNEXPIRED LEASE EXPENSES <b>N/A</b> AUTHORIZED PER JTR					
12. DEPENDENT OVERSEA TRAVEL <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENT <input type="checkbox"/> DELAYED <input type="checkbox"/> EARLY RETURN <input type="checkbox"/> NOT AUTHORIZED <b>N/A</b>					
13. TRANSPORTATION OF DEPENDENTS AUTHORIZED	FROM <b>N/A</b>		TO <b>N/A</b>	NAMES OF DEPENDENTS RELATIONSHIP DATE OF BIRTH (Children)	
				N/A	
14. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SHIPMENT OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS AUTHORIZED NOT IN EXCESS OF <b>5,000</b> (Net Weight in Pounds) <input type="checkbox"/> NON TEMPORARY STORAGE OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS AUTHORIZED					
FROM <b>Saigon, RVN</b>		TO <b>Sacramento, CA</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	
15. OVERSEA SHIPMENT OF PRIVATELY OWNED MOTOR VEHICLE AUTHORIZED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					
16. ADVANCE AUTHORIZED <b>None</b>					
17. REMARKS OR OTHER AUTHORIZATION (Use this space for special requirements, leave, excess baggage, etc. or other authorizations) Return to CONUS for new assignment. Employee will depart Saigon RVN on or about 24 Apr 75. 07 days A/L delay enroute is auth. In the event MAC flight not available, Cat Z is auth. Items 1,2,3,4ab,5,8,9,10,11 and 12 on the reverse side apply. Employee responsible for costs connected with indirect or interrupted travel for personal reasons IAW JTR. Carrying of dangerous weapons or ammunition not auth. aboard military or civilian aircraft. Gaining activity is auth. to amend orders to include Misc. expenses and TQS expenses.					
18. ESTIMATED PER DIEM COST	\$	TRAVEL	\$	OTHER	\$
	\$		\$		\$
19. TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT SIGNED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO					
20. REQUESTING OFFICIAL (Title and Signature) <b>F. GASPER, Chief Staffing Section</b>					
21. APPROVING OFFICIAL (Title and Signature) <b>JOE H. BEARD, Executive Officer, Pers. Div.</b>					
22. ACCOUNTING CITATION <b>975100 5141 01 514:02 S94629 TR5CK085 CIC: 1/L/A/S/5/P085</b>					
23. ORDER AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (Title and Signature) OR AUTHENTICATION <b>STEVE Ulichny, Administrative Officer, JAG, 3rd Legal Division</b>					
24. DATE ISSUED <b>20 MAR 75</b>					

DD FORM 1614  
13 JUL 73

Part 2, 1

PPCK

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TRAVEL: Permanent Change of Station; Renewal Agreement; Separation

a. Govt auto/bus; MAC acft between OS location and APOD in CenUS. Tvl by MAC acft is reqd between OS location and ConUS unless medically contra-indicated. Air Priority Designator.

3. If employee elects to utilize commercial air/water transp at personal expense, reimbursement will be as provided in JTR. Election must be made prior to time request is mad for MAC space reservation, or employee will not be reimbursed.

b. Common carrier, including commercial aircraft within ConUS.

c. Travel by POV within ConUS is considered advantageous to govt in connection with permanent duty travel, except for renewal agreement travel. Payment of mileage and per diem allowance will be as prescribed in JTR.

d. Travel by POV within ConUS is authorized in connection with renewal agreement travel. Reimbursement will be limited to constructive cost of common carrier transp and related per diem.

e. Circuitous route travel for personal reason is not authorized.

2. Leave-free travel time is authorized except that any travel time in excess of that authorized by the most common direct route will be charged as leave.

3. Delay enroute will be in a non-duty, non-pay status except for those individuals who have requested and who have to their credit accrued annual leave. No govt transp/quarter and/or messing facilities authorized for period of delay.

4. Weight allowances:

a. Accompanied baggage weight allowance is 66 lbs.

b. Unaccompanied baggage weight allowance is 350 lbs (gold baggage).

c. In connection with renewal agreement travel, max baggage weight allowance at govt expense will not exceed 100 lbs per person (excluding free checkable bag). Traveler will be required to pay any excess bag charges, subj to reimbursement.

5. Copy of these orders must be placed in each piece of baggage checked/handcarried, for identification purposes.

6. Upon completion of leave, employee is authorized return travel to CS duty station.

7. If return transportation to CS duty station is required, employee will request return flight at APOD Passenger Reservation Center, or will make such request by mail. Return flight reservation may be secured through any local Base Transp Office, if preferred. In any case, employee will provide copy of return travel order, date of availability for CS travel and contact address.

8. MAC flight reservation will be obtained from Tri-Service ATCO approximately two weeks in advance of desired tvl date. Employee will report to Tri-Service ATCO for confirmation of flight reservation no later than noon on day prior to scheduled date of departure. Required MTA and TRs for onward tvl from APOD to destination will be obtained from Tri-Service ATCO.

9. Required imm will be accomplished IAW AFR 161-13. Smallpox and cholera imm must be accomplished at least seven days prior to departure date or employee is subject to quarantine in ConUS. Tine Test is recommended.

10. Passport and visa rqmnt must be met prior to confirmation of flt reservation.

11. Employee will report to mail room prior to departure to provide instructions for forwarding or holding mail.

12. Employee will clear through the Civilian Personnel Office.

STATEMENT

OF

ANTONIO BUENTELLO, JR.

PHO-DAO SAIGON

CLARK AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

10 APRIL 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Clark Air Base, R. P.

(Place)

10 April 1975

(Date)

I, Antonio Buentello, Jr., hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr. has identified himself to me  
as C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.  
(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without  
having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

On or about 1600 hrs, 4 April 1975 as I was talking to Mr. Max Chesney, PDO employee, Saigon Island, Vietnam and I noticed a C5A Aircraft flying at approximately 300 ft altitude directly above us in the direction of Tan Son Nhut Air Terminal, Saigon. It appeared that the C5A Aircraft's loading rear hatchway was either open or missing and also there was an empty appearance in the aircraft's lower portion of the fuselage. I could not see if there were any passengers or luggage aboard the aircraft. The aircraft's landing gears were not affixed as if it was going to make a landing. Within four to six minutes the C5A disappeared as if it was going to land and suddenly a huge burst of black smoke went up in the air. END.

  
ANTONIO BUENTELLO, JR.  
DAC

GS-11

PDO-DAO SAIGON  
F. P. O. SF 96620

SWORN STATEMENT  
OF  
TSGT NOAH E. FIELDS  
60 FIELD MAINTENANCE SQUADRON  
TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

27 JUNE 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

27 June 1975

(Date)

I, TSgt NOAH E. FIELDS, FR, hereby state that  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF, has identified himself to me  
as C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.

(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

I am TSgt Noah E. Fields, Air Force Serial       . I am assigned to the 60 Field Maintenance Squadron at Travis AFB, California. I have been in the Air Force for 18 years. I have attended the following Air Force Schools: KC-135 FTD, C-141 FTD and C-5A FTD. I have attended several Blue Ribbon Schools on cargo doors and landing gears at Travis. I have worked on the C-5 aircraft since the aircraft has been at Travis which would be the latter part of 1970. I have been assigned as Shift Chief on graves and day during this period.

On the 29th of March 1975, I was driving Mike 3 Truck as Day Shift Supervisor of the Aircraft Repair Shop. Aircraft 218 was in Can Recovery and the A/R Shop had several work orders. Because of the number of work orders we had on this aircraft, I got out of the truck and proceeded to help my people on this aircraft.

I checked the 781A and saw that 2 aft ramp tie rods had been replaced and were due a rig check. I checked the 1C-5A-2-12 T.O. and as there were no specific instructions on this rig check, I went by the mechanical rig verification check and the section of the T.O. covering the rigging of the ramp tie rods.

In order to accomplish the mechanical rig verification check, I performed the following actions:

a. I raised the ramp and locked it. I shut off the hydraulic pressure to the system and let the ramp settle on all of the locks.

b. I disconnected the 2 tie rods that had been installed 5 days before. I checked each of the seven hooks on the right side of the ramp to make sure they had all locked. To do this, you grab the lock and see if it was tight. They were all tight. I then checked the adjustment on these two tie rods. I can't remember if I had to make any adjustment or not. To check the adjustment you make sure the bolts have a drop fit. This means the bolt slips in and out of its hole easily.

c. After I had hooked up these tie rods. I pulled on the right lock train and left lock train to make sure you could not unlock the hooks and the ramp lock actuator had mechanically locked inside the actuator.

After this was complete, I performed a complete maintenance operational check on the aft door system which included opening and closing the aft doors system. I did most of the work as Mr. Critchfield had several other work orders on this aircraft at the same time.

We found several small writeups on the door system and repaired them at this time:

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

a. Lt. ramp pad act. out of adjustment.

b. Hyd leak on Lt ramp act.

I signed off the forms at this time with the help of Mr. Critchfield.

I left the aircraft at this time and returned to the shop.

MEJ.

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initiated all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

(Signature)

(Address)

(Signature)

(Address)

Noah E Fields

NOAH E. FIELDS, TSgt, USAF, FR   
(Signature)  
60 FMS, Travis AFB CA

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

27th day of June 19 75

at Travis AFB, California

Bernard A. Waxstein  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath.)  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer  
(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

SWORN STATEMENT

OFF:

SGT LARRY G. VAN DYNE

AERO-REPAIR SHOP, 60 FIELD MAINTENANCE SQUADRON  
TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

27 JUNE 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

27 June 1975

(Date)

I, SGT LARRY G. VAN DYNE, FR, hereby state that  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF, has identified himself to me  
as C-5A Collateral Investigation Officer USAF.

(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

I am Sgt Larry G. Van Dyne, assigned to the 60 FMS Aero Repair Shop at Travis AFB, California. I entered the USAF in 1970. After basic training, I then proceeded to Technical School for "Jets Over 4 Engines" at Chanute AFB, IL. My first assignment after Tech School was Altus AFB, OK. There I worked in the C-141 Docks as an APG Mechanic, achieving my 5-level. Approximately 3 months prior to departing Altus AFB, I then moved to the C-5 Docks. In January of 1973 I departed Altus AFB to go PCS to Travis AFB. After arriving here in February of 1973, I was assigned to the Aero/Repair Shop and have been there till this date; 27 June 1975, working both C-141's and C-5's.

On 24 March 1975, Mr. Hell and I received a work order to Cann Two each Tie Rods for the Aft Ramp from Acft. 213, to be installed on Acft 218. We proceeded to Acft 213, removed the tie rods, made necessary entries in the 781A and installed AFTO Form 1492 in their proper places. We then proceeded to Acft 218 to install the tie rods. We found this acft to have many canned parts already, which would not enable us to get Hyd pressure that would allow us to rig verify and ops check the Aft Doors on 218. We then installed the tie rods to a drop fit in their respective positions on the ramp IAW 2-12 and made a Red "X" entry in the 781A for these locks to be rigged. Lack of hydraulic pressure did not allow us to do so and the rigging would have to be done at a later time. Mr. Hell and I signed off the 781A for the installation on the tie rod assemblies between #2 and #3 and #3 and #4 Rt. Aft Ramp locks IAW 1C-5A-2-12. At this time, we went work stop for hyd. pressure.

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

L.G.V.D.

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Address)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Address)

*Larry G. Van Dyne*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
LARRY G. VAN DYNE, Sgt, USAF, FR  
60 Field Maintenance Squadron

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized  
by law to administer oaths, this

27th day of June 1975

at Travis Air Force Base, California

*Bernard A. Waxstein*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer

(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

SWORN STATEMENT  
OF  
GLEN CRITCHFIELD  
AERO-REPAIR SHOP, 60 FIELD MAINTENANCE SQUADRON  
TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

27 JUNE 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

27 June 1975

(Date)

I, GLEN CRITCHFIELD, Grade WL-10, SSAN:  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF,  
as C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer.

FR, hereby state that  
has identified himself to me  
USAF.

(Special Agent APOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

I am Glen Critchfield, Grade WL-10, Social Security Number . I am assigned to the 60 Field Maintenance Squadron Aero Repair Shop. I first started working for the Department of Defense in August 1942 out of Fort Mason, San Francisco, California. I went in the Army Air Force October 16, 1942 and served as a aircraft mechanic and flight crew member at Stockton Field, California, and Lowry Field, Co. I attended aircraft maintenance schools at Stockton Field and Kessler Field, Mississippi. I was discharged at the end of World War II on February 7, 1946. I returned to Department of Defense at Oakland Army Base as an auto mechanic and in May 1946 transferred to the then Fairfield-Suisun Army AFB, CA. Here I worked as an engine mechanic, an engine assembler and disassembler, flight line mechanic, until April 1955. During the above time, I attended various on-base schools relating to aircraft on the base. I went into business for myself and returned to Travis AFB in July 1957 as an airplane frame mechanic in the C-124 docks. Was assigned to Aero Repair in July 1963 and to 604 Squadron in October 1972 and back to Aero Repair as a WL-10 in January 1974. Since my return to Travis in 1957, I have attended schools on Travis for C-124, C-130, C-133, C-141 and C-5A. Since my return to Aero Repair in January 1974 I have been assigned as a C-5A Jacking and Retracting Supervisor, performing door and lock verification checks on the landing gear.

On the 29th of March 1975 I was sent out to Aircraft 218 to check on some landing gear and flap writeups. The aircraft was in CANN Recovery and they were trying to prepare the aircraft for a local flight. TSgt Fields who was the Mike 3 Driver and our supervisor came by to check on how the work was progressing. He checked the aircraft forms and said he would check the rig check on the aft ramp. I completed my writeups and had conferred with Sgt Fields, on one of them. While he was operating the aft door system, I saw the doors close and lock. The indications that doors were operating, closing and locking. I did none of the work except to observe that the operational check was good. As I was part of the team on the aircraft from our shop. I signed the corrective action with TSgt Fields. The higher maintenance level signing off the Red Cross. The doors were reopened and several other small writeups were cleared and the doors were closed again and were stated to work good - at this time. I was outside the aircraft and saw the ramp come up. Lock, pressure door lock and side door and aft center door close and lock. We then left the aircraft and returned to our shop.

**CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.**

6mS

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

## WITNESSES;

(Signature)

(Address)

(Signature)

(Address)

Dear Mr. Frostfield

~~(Signature)~~

GLEN CRITCHFIELD, Grade WL-10,  
60 FMS/Aero Repair Shop

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

27th day of June 1975

~~Travis AFB, California~~

(Signature of Person Administering Oath.)  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer

(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

SWORN STATEMENT  
OF  
WILLIAM E. HELL  
AERO-REPAIR SHOP, 60 FIELD MAINTENANCE SQUADRON  
TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

30 JUNE 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

30 June 1975

(Date)

I, William E. Hell, Grade L-10, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr., has identified himself to me  
as C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.

(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without  
having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.  
I am William E. Hell, Grade L-10, Social Security Number . I am assigned  
to the 60 Field Maintenance Squadron, Aero-Repair Shop.

I first started working for the U. S. Air Force in April 1952 at Norton Air Force Base,  
San Bernardino, California. During the years 1952 through 1962 I worked on B-45 Jet  
bombers, C-124 Cargo aircraft, F-84, F-100, F-102, F-106 fighter aircraft and C-133  
cargo aircraft. During 1963-1964 I worked on the Atlas Missile update Project "Draw-  
Tite" - also was a lead man on 9 missiles on a "Down Range Pacific" Project.

I attended Missile Training School at Sheppard AFB, Texas.

I came to Travis in February 1965. Attended C-141 school on base. Worked on C-141  
aircraft. Went to Sheppard AFB in January 1970 to attend C-5 school. Went to Edwards  
AFB in May 1970 as part of the Test Team Program.

I am now a C-5 aircraft Jacking and Gear Retractor Supervisor, also performing door  
and lock verification checks on all landing gears.

*William E. Hell*  
On 24 March 1975 Sgt Van Dyne and I were given a work order to Cann two each tie rods  
from the aft ramp of Aircraft 213, to be installed on Aircraft 218. We proceeded to  
Aircraft 213, removed the two rods, made the entries in the 781-A and attached the  
1492 (danger tags) in the appropriate places. We then went to Aircraft 218 to install  
the rods. The aircraft was in "Cann Recovery" and many parts yet to be installed. The  
hydraulic systems were inoperative, so the job could not be completed. We installed  
the rods to a "drop fit" and the hooks were in the proper position as called out in the  
Technical Order 1C-5A-2-12. I checked for security, ie., safety wire and cotter keys.  
I signed the 781-A for the installation of the rods, and made an entry for the Rig and  
Ops check. We then went work stop for lack of hydraulic pressure.

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

WCH

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Address)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Address)

William C. Hell  
(Signature)

WILLIAM E. HELL, WL-10,  
60 FMS, Travis AFB CA 94535  
(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized  
by law to administer oaths, this

30th day of June 1975

at Travis AFB, California

Bernard A. Waxstein  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath.)  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer  
(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

STATEMENT

OF

CAPTAIN CHRISTIE E. BIXLER, II

C-5 WEAPONS SYSTEM SAFETY MANAGER

HEADQUARTERS MAC

I, Christie E. Bixler II, Capt USAF, 281-36-6238FR, C-5 Weapons System Safety Manager, MAC Headquarters, participated in the C-5 recovery operations from 6 April until 19 April when we abandoned efforts due to the urgency of the situation in South Vietnam. The following outlines the programs and problems that were encountered. I was not privy to the high level discussions about the movement of our military personnel to the crash site and the diplomatic complications involved. However, for approximately the first four days of investigation we were forced to return to the Philippines each night. This severely limited the amount of time spent at the accident scene during a most crucial phase of the investigation.

Upon arrival at the crash site of C-5A 68-218 on 6 April 1975, and discussion with personnel of the United States Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Saigon, it was obvious that a tremendously high rate of pilferage had begun from the crash site almost immediately after the crash and many items had already been carried off. While there was security which was provided against the Viet Cong, there was no security against pilferage from the crash site. Although the site was within two miles of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, there were no roads available. Therefore all movement to the site was by helicopter.

An initial survey of the site revealed that the aircraft avionics and communications equipment had been removed from the aircraft and crash site by the local populace. Additionally, Vietnamese civilians were continually in the process of removing remaining pieces of wreckage. Attempts to prevent the removal of wreckage were met with resistance.

In an effort to retrieve as many aircraft components as possible, three programs were implemented:

a. United States Navy assistance was requested in locating aircraft components that departed the aircraft at the time of rapid decompression which occurred over water. As a result of Naval efforts, a piece of the torque deck frame was recovered on 20 April; a part of the actuating mechanism for the pressure door toes and left-hand radius driver arm for the aft center cargo door was recovered on 24 April; two cargo roller sets normally mounted on the ramp as well as the ramp cargo winch were recovered on 25 April; both a 20 ft by 12 ft by 4 ft section of the aft ramp and a 7 ft by 12 ft section of the pressure door was recovered on 26 April. Salvage operations were terminated on 27 April.

b. Funds were obtained in an attempt to purchase or "buy back" components that had been pilfered from the crash site by Vietnamese locals. Handbills depicting aircraft components and avionics components were developed and distributed among the local populace. The handbills offered monetary awards for return of components. On 19 April, the Maintenance Data Recorder (MDR) tape was recovered by this method. The effectiveness of this program was limited due to the fall of the South Vietnamese government.

c. Further digging and probing of the crash site was accomplished and several components were recovered. When it became evident that no further components were to be found and military activity was beginning to increase, the remaining wreckage was abandoned on 19 April.

The aircraft components were returned to Clark AB where they were crated for air shipment to the San Antonio Air Logistics Center, Kelly AFB TX, for laboratory analysis. Departure of the components from Clark AB was on 20 April.

*Christie E. Bixler*  
CHRISTIE E. BIXLER II, Capt, USAF  
Weapons System Safety Manager

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT  
OF  
INTERVIEW WITH  
MSGT GARY R. JOHNSON  
CLARK AIR BASE, R. P.

15 APRIL 1975

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF COLLATERAL INVESTIGATING

OFFICER'S INTERVIEW

WITH

GARY ROBERT JOHNSON

MASTER SERGEANT USAF

CLARK AIR BASE, R. P.

15 APRIL 1975

W: My name is Gary Robert Johnson. I'm a Master Sergeant, U. S. Air Force. My social security number is . I'm stationed at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. I am in the 3 MSS and I'm a part of the Emergency Response Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team. My AFSC is 464; Munitions Disposal Technician. I have been in my AFSC for 10 years, this year. In order to get into the career field, when I came in, you had to be a munitions person, worked in some related munitions field and attend the EOD school at Indian Head, Maryland, for six months. I have been back to the EOD refresher school at Indian Head which is a four week course in 1968. I've always served in EOD since that time.

10: As I understand it with regard to the C-5 crash at Saigon, Vietnam, you were asked to go out to Saigon and you were given some direction, is that correct? Can you tell me what you were asked to do.

W: I don't remember the priorities, if there were any, but assuming because I am in EOD, my first priority would be to try to determine if there was munitions on board the airplane or an explosive, or explosive device might have been used to bring the airplane down and that was our main goal to look at the wreckage and try to determine if there was an explosion.

10: When you say explosion, can you tell me technically what that means?

W: Technically, normally what we do is find something. We find something that is ordnance related. That is, in almost any explosion there is always something leftover.

10: Explosion, laymen use the term "explosion". How is it used technically in EOD? What does that mean?

JOHNSON

W: An explosion, normally when we think of explosion we think of an explosive, such as high explosive, TNT, any of your explosives, dynamite, whatever; those are simple real common ones. Composition C4, and things like that. There are other types of explosions, though, mechanical type explosions where they're not chemical related.

I0: We are talking here about chemical explosions.

W: Chemical explosion. That's what we were looking for.

I0: Did you go to Saigon?

W: We went to Saigon. We arrived in Saigon. They ferried us out to the crash site. We started at one end of the crash site and walked to the other and in our travel we stopped and investigated each piece of wreckage in trying to determine if there had been a chemical explosion.

I0: How do you as an expert determine whether there has been a chemical explosion? What kind of test do you use? What do you do?

W: It's mostly just a judgment call. The thing we do is we just look at the wreckage and normally drawing up on past experience. When you see metal that is torn apart it's normally blackened and shredded in such a way as it just almost without any doubt in your mind, it leads you to believe that there was an explosion at this point. The second thing is, probably the most convincing, is to find fragments from known pieces of ordnance and this is where in EOD if you get somebody who has got a decent background it's almost like an automobile mechanic. You can detonate an explosive in an automobile and you take a mechanic or even a layman in most cases and you can look at it and say, Yes, that's a piece of a car because here's a spark plug or whatever. Well, we look at it in the same sense except we are looking for pieces of ordnance. Such as hand grenades. As a matter of fact we did find a piece of hand grenade in the wreckage. As it turns out though it belonged to one of the Vietnamese that was killed when the airplane hit the ground. We really thought we were into something when we found it, but as it turns out it wasn't a detonated piece of a hand grenade. We knew that for sure, which really faked us out for a while.

I0: You looked through the wreckage and you were looking for signs of a chemical explosion. You said the first sign of a chemical explosion is metal and it's blackened or shredded. As opposed to what would happen to a piece of metal on an airplane that had simply impacted with the ground. That's the kind of distinction you were making?

W: When you get up into sections that burned from the fire, obviously there we could never tell because the metal has melted and burned away. The report we had was that the trouble developed in the tail of the airplane. As it turns out there was no fires in the tail of

the airplane. When we investigated that portion of the airplane we found nothing there to lead us to believe that there had been an explosion in the tail of the airplane.

I0: Were you told the fact that the cargo doors had blown out, the rear clam shell doors?

W: Yes, we heard that. One of the crewmen had seen that. It was also reported that a little girl by the name of Bell, if I recall correctly, she was 8 or 9 years old, said that she saw what appeared to be an explosion in one of the handbags aft in the cargo area. But nobody really knows. That was told to us and that was another reason we were asked to investigate the residue.

I0: You examined the tail of the aircraft and you could find no evidence of chemical explosion. When you were looking you were doing this with your eyes, right?

W: Eyes only.

I0: You didn't conduct any tests?

W: The nearest thing we came to a test was with the local dog who comes from there at Clark, owned by the Security Police, and he is trained to detect explosives. That was the second day. We couldn't get him to respond to anything.

I0: Did you ever get to the part of the aircraft wreckage where the clam shell doors would be?

W: We found one of the doors, one of the clam shell doors. There were actually, it works out to be four doors back there, external doors, which was another one of our projects - to locate these doors. At the time we found it we didn't realize that it was one of the doors because it was so small. We were thinking in terms of a C-141 which has a rather large clam shell door. As it turns out the C-5, because it has four clam shell type doors, or doors that close externally, two of them are fairly small. We did find one of them. We looked at it pretty closely. In fact we took three or four photos of it and brought them back. But there was no evidence of explosion there.

O: Did you ever find the other three?

: Not that we could tell, we couldn't.

I0: But the door that you examined, you examined the one door.

W: And it had stayed with the airplane to the second bounce. The first bounce was on one side of the river, skipped across the river and

came probably the door was a good 200 or 300 yards into the crash site, which it must have still been pretty secure when it hit the ground, the airplane I mean. It was still secure when the airplane hit the ground, the first and second bounce. If it was loose it should have come off on the first bounce, I'm guessing, but it stayed with the airplane quite a ways before it came off on the second dragging. We did examine the door.

10: It was pointed out to you or you recognized as one of the loading doors in the aft of the airplane.

W: Later, in fact, it was after we got back we went over and looked at a C-5 and sure enough that's what it was. We talked to one of the tech reps, described what we had found, and it didn't ring a bell with him. We were still kind of up in the air, in fact, what we thought maybe it was, was a piece of one of the gear doors, but as it turns out it was definitely, probably the right hand pedal door. No evidence of chemical explosion.

10: Did you find the area, the aft area of the aircraft, which would be next to where the doors were?

W: We're not too sure. I couldn't tell you because the airplane was so disintegrated. The tail section was in good shape, pretty good shape, but the door that's connected to the tail we couldn't find. The cargo compartment was mostly worn down. Basically, all we found was the deck, the flight deck. It stopped, it was a piece intact, probably the width of the airplane and maybe the length of approximately 50 feet long. It was pretty well intact. It stopped and the rest of the airplane kept going, probably this is when an awful lot of people died, I would guess.

10: We're not talking about the flight deck, we're talking about the cargo compartment. Oh, you mean the upper part, the troop compartment, upstairs.

W: We looked that over pretty closely too. We didn't find any evidence in there. We found that one big flat piece the width of the airplane and probably maybe 30-40 feet long of the cargo compartment. The airplane just started grinding itself away and this big chunk which was the floor, of the cargo part of the first deck just stopped and that was all there was. It was just like a big flat piece of matting, that's what it reminded you of, but obviously the cargo floor.

10: Would you say, in summary, that you did look all over the aircraft, at least all over what could be seen of the aircraft from the wings aft?

W: We inspected the entire airplane. We went to the initial impact point and checked what was left on that side of the river and we came back across on the other side of the river and checked everything that was laying over there.

I0: Would it be fair to say, as a result of your investigation that you could find no evidence of chemical explosion?

W: I would say that would be a fair assumption that we could find nothing. That's four EOD people looking over the wreckage.

I0: Who was with you?

W: Sgt Sloan, who is a member of the investigation board; MSgt Kitt from U-Tapao and MSgt Shehan also from U-Tapao. They arrived at the scene before we did, and reported to us the same thing. They found nothing of any sign of explosions. It is very possible that there could have been an chemical explosion in the aft portion of the airplane back by the rear loading doors and not have discovered it. The airplane was torn up. What we looked at, we didn't find those other doors, so if the explosion had taken place on the other doors, there would be no way that we could tell on any one of the other doors. It's very possible. I wouldn't rule it out.

I0: It's possible for two reasons. (1) because of the condition of the aircraft when you got to it. It was so ground up that you weren't sure of getting every piece of metal. It might have ground up. (2) you never got to see the other 3 doors.

W: Right.

I0: For that reason you couldn't rule it out. The only thing you can say is everything we examined we found no evidence of chemical explosion.

I: That's it exactly.

I0: Besides dynamite, TNT, what other kinds of explosives which might be used to do something like that, if one wanted to do it?

I: You have, the normal explosives found in what we call iron bombs, normal type aircraft delivered bombs. In the case of military explosives it always goes back to TNT. It's a mixture of TNT. TNT is easy to identify, a good clandestine-type explosive deceitful, composition four, and it's easy to identify when you see it. It comes in what they call a pure state because you just don't find C-4 used in very many munitions. In fact, it's only used in one that I know of. It's easy to identify. Dynamite would probably be the hardest one to distinguish because it looks so much like just anything, like dirt as far as that goes. You could grind it up in the ground

and you could hardly tell it from anything else. Whereas TNT normally stays, if it's cast TNT, you'll see the chunks. It takes on a peculiar color depending upon its exposure to the sun. It looks like a rock but yet there's something about it's a reddish looking rock and it really stands out. Some of the foreign explosives are a little bit harder to distinguish from what we call military explosives, especially if they are homemade. They could look like anything. I've seen some of it that looked like soap suds, easter egg blue.

I0: Even though you couldn't identify them - could after the explosion occurred would it be easy to identify that an explosion occurred as it would be from the use of TNT?

W: Umm.

I0: In other words, what I'm getting at is that it appears to me you were looking for a chemical explosion by looking at the aircraft parts and pieces, you were looking for a chemical explosion caused by what you termed "military munitions."

W: Right

I0: Could it have been possible that a chemical explosion might have been caused by other than what you term "Military munitions?"

W: Yes, this is what I was telling about earlier, when we said we normally look for explosions that are caused by normal explosives. There could be other types. There are all types of them. People use them in the back home irradical group. Such things as ammonian nitrate which is nothing but a fertilizer.

I0: Could you have identified that too?

W: Probably not, because there are so many mixtures that you could come up with. It would be pretty difficult.

I0: Assuming that there may have been a chemical explosion aboard the C-5, that was not caused by military munitions, are you saying that evidence of that type would have been harder to identify?

W: My experience has not been with that type of munitions where people make their own. I saw very little of it in Vietnam when I was stationed there, that I couldn't really do it. It would have to be more of the common type, TNT based.

I0: Who could do that kind? Who would have experience?

W: National Bomb Data Center, just south of DC. They are pretty good at that sort of thing. They are affiliated with the FBI.

10: What would be your opinion with regard to an explosive placed in a suitcase, let's say of a military type or TNT type? Could such a device have been placed in a suitcase so it would detonate later?

W: Yes. That would be very simple. Put some type of timing device on there and it would be no trouble at all. It could be relatively small because of airplanes being so easy to knock down, especially when they get to altitude, it seems they are easier to knock down because of pressurization, especially the big cargo airplanes. Again, I'm guessing. I don't know that much about it. I'm just assuming about what I've read in the past.

10: When you say an explosive device, a TNT type, that you are familiar with, a military ordnance type could have been placed in a suitcase with a timing device and detonated later, that is your expert testimony?

W: Yes. That's possible. That's possible that we would find no residue. There's so much to look at out there. We were talking about a rice paddy and what was underwater I couldn't see, but it's very possible. We did look at the luggage however, the Vietnamese had beat us to most of it. I'm sure that if any of it had been detonated and we spotted it, probably couldn't have told you if it had detonated or not. It was torn up. The luggage was very torn up. There was nothing intact in the line of luggage. Like I said, the Vietnamese had beat us to everything. But I'm sure if they had found one that was demolished they would have probably left it alone, having no reason to look at it. Again, we didn't spot anything like that.

10: Assuming that there was a device in a suitcase, would it be your opinion that upon detonation that you wouldn't find very much of that suitcase either?

W: It depends upon how big it is. A small device you'd probably find a lot of it, pieces of it. Here again, because of the wreckage, chances of finding it are pretty slim. If you did find it to just look it probably wouldn't even be able to determine that an explosion had taken place because so much had been shredded up by the crash when the airplane just ground to a halt. I didn't talk to the crew. It would have been nice to have talked to the crew, to have asked them a few questions. It would have only taken a few because normally accompanying an explosion is some type of concussion. Having never been in an airplane that depressurized I should think that you might even feel type of sensation. I don't know, but I would have liked to talked to them, draw upon their experience. If they had felt the concussion or heard an explosion, because it makes a definite sound.

It has a sound of its own and a feel. I should think that with an explosion, the first sensation they would have had would be the pressure on their ears. Whereas with a decompression . . . well, I don't know I was going to say, the more I think about it, the less I think of that idea. With the decompression but they'd still have the sensation on their ears, so they probably know if it was pressure or pressure coming on them or coming off. I really don't. It would have been nice though to talk to them and the people in the back. The report is a very simple report on manhour accounting.

10: Is there any official government record or document in which you will say approximately the same thing? Do you have to officially make a record or account of this thing and file it?

W: Yes, we have one on file. We send it through 13 AF, PACAF and ends up back at Indian Head, Maryland. It has already been submitted. What the report amounted to was that we were asked to go and investigate the airplane for possible clandestine devices. Our findings were negative. That's all I said. The report was cleared with the board, and we did submit it. You can get a copy of the report. We'll give it to you. I'll bring you a copy of it. We do not plan on doing any more investigative work on the any parts of the aircraft as far as I know. Haven't been asked by the board to anyway. In fact, they brought that one door back I found, the pedal door we were talking about. I suppose it's here at Clark somewhere. We talked to no witnesses who saw or heard what occurred just before the doors came off. No witnesses. I don't think that Sgt Sloan has talked to any of the witnesses. No one that was on the airplane, that is. I don't think, because I don't believe he's been back over there except a couple of things to review some slides with them. I can't think of anything from an EOD standpoint. As far as that goes I can't think of anything that I could add to the record that would help in any way.

The above is certified as a true and accurate transcript of the foregoing interview.

  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
Collateral Investigating Officer

SWORN STATEMENT

OF

MAJOR ANTHONY F. DIFERDINANDO

22 AIR FORCE

IRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

EXPERT WITNESS

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

6 June 1975

(Date)

I, Major Anthony F. Diferdinando, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr., has identified himself to me  
as CSA Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.

(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement. I am Major Anthony F. Diferdinando. I am assigned to 22 Air Force Standardization, Travis Air Force Base, California and have been assigned here for approximately 1½ years. I have approximately 6000 hours total flying time in the United States Air Force over 13 years rated service and a little over 1000 hours flying time in the C-5 aircraft. All of the flying time in the C-5 aircraft has been with a crew qualification of Flight Examiner. I was in the initial cadre Flight Examiner in the C-5 in 1969. Better than half my total flying time has been as an instructor and I have been an instructor in the MAC TTU at Tinker and Altus in both the C-5A and C-141. In my capacity as Flight Examiner, it is my job to evaluate the flying capability of any other pilot in 22 Air Force. I have also worked for MAC Standardization as a Flight Examiner during a MAC Aircrew Evaluation Standardization Team visit to Altus during 1974. During my career as a Flight Examiner, I have administered approximately 500 to 750 evaluations to other pilots and at least 250 evaluations to other C-5 pilots up to and including the qualification of Flight Examiner. In my job as 22 Air Force Flight Examiner, one of my duties is to administer evaluations to all other C-5 Flight Examiners in 22 Air Force.

*Writing F. D. Fechner*  
I am familiar with the qualifications of the personnel of the flight crew of C-5 68218 that crashed near Tan Son Nhut Airport, Saigon, RVN on 4 April 1975. I have reviewed the flying records of the pilots, flight engineers and loadmasters of this crew and feel that they were all current and qualified in accordance with current MAC and Air Force Directives (AFM 60-1 with MAC Supplements thereto; MACR 60-1; MACR 51-1 and 51-5). The crew members who were not qualified (in a student status) were under the proper supervision of currently qualified instructor personnel. During my review of the AF Forms 846 I have also reviewed the AF Forms 1042 "Medical Recommendation for Flying Duties" which reveals no medical problems existed for any of these crew members which possibly could have contributed to the cause of this accident.

The Collateral Investigating Officer has shown to me the written statements given to him by the pilot, Captain Traynor, the co-pilot, Captain Harp, Captain Malone, the navigators, Major Wallace and Captain Langford as well as a narrative history of flight. I have carefully examined these documents and the subsequent analysis and opinions are based upon my own expertise and the above mentioned documents.

I have detected nothing in any of these statements up until the time of the start of the airborne emergency which indicated any problems in the crew or any aircraft malfunctions. Based upon the pilot's statement, a rapid decompression occurred approximately going past Vung Tau climbing flight level 230. This emergency in my experience could probably be one of the most dangerous especially when carrying passengers. The crew's initial assessment of the damage indicated that they did not have any elevator control - in effect the normal method of controlling the aircraft

*FB Takahashi*

for nose up/down movement was non-existent. According to the statements, this was caused by a loss of hydraulic system power in Systems 1 and 2 and the actual severing of the mechanical cables which connect the pilot's control columns to the hydraulic power packs which move the flight controls. The pilots analyzed a very dangerous situation and determined that very basic aerodynamics would be necessary to control the aircraft via basically a trial and error method they used a bank and power settings to control pitch attitude. The normal method of controlling an aircraft for pitch attitude (making the nose go up and down) is via the elevators and elevator trim. In this case, the pilots had none of these normal methods. The techniques that they developed were very similar to what is required by a glider pilot who has no power and must depend on the basic lift developed by the aircraft in order to control movement in the vertical plane. During the return to Saigon which the aircraft commander, Captain Traynor, determined was the best course of action due to the emergency and injured personnel on board, they maneuvered the aircraft to an altitude of approximately 4000 feet and 8 miles from the runway via the use of basic power and bank control. At this point the pilot determined that he would have to start a turn to land on Runway 25 at Tan Son Nhut. He had also at this time started to lower the landing gear. During this turn to try to line the aircraft up with the runway due to the fact that he had no elevator control a loss of lift caused the aircraft to drop to a nose low attitude. The increasing rate of descent and acceleration caused the pilots to realize that they were not going to be able to make the runway. At this point he decided to roll the wings level and they applied power to stop the rate of descent. In order to try to land and touch down in a straight and level attitude which would give the best possibility of human survival for a crash landing. The pilots had applied full throttle in a nose down conditions with a very high rate of descent in order to attain a lower vertical velocity for touchdown. (This power increase would raise the nose and allow an increase in aerodynamic lift.) This particular action is alien to normal pilot reaction in a nose down condition with increasing airspeed - in most conditions you would want to pull power back. This indicates to me that the pilots had an exceptional grasp of the basic techniques to maintain aircraft control. The pilot had achieved a wing level attitude prior to touchdown and I surmise that the ground effect (the cushioning effect that all aircraft acquire just prior to touchdown caused by air compression under the wings) helped decrease the rate of descent. Just prior to impact the pilots retarded the throttles to idle and after impact the throttles were left at idle. At this point, the aircraft was basically flying a ballistic curve with the pilots just controlling the ailerons. Upon second impact the aircraft started to break up causing many of the injuries to the people in the cargo compartment. The flight crew in the cockpit area exited the aircraft and there were minimum injuries to any of the flight crew.

After having reviewed the tech manuals, I have determined there is no guidance to a pilot in the handling of an emergency such as Captain Traynor and his crew experienced. His evaluation of the aircraft capability after having analyzed that there was no method of controlling the elevators or changing aircraft trim (the specific airspeed that an aircraft will maintain due to its elevator setting) showed an excellent analytical capability. This very fast analysis of a very unusual situation is indicative to me of a highly trained and capable air crew. The ability of these pilots to clearly analyze the situation as they made the turn to final approach and decide to bring the wings level and apply power to arrest the rate of descent undoubtedly was one of the prime factors which allowed any survivors at all in this crash. In my opinion, if the aircraft would have contacted the runway at the same airspeed that was encountered during contact in the field a much more disastrous result would have occurred.

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

There were no effects on the crew due to crew rest procedures prior to this accident which would be a factor.

ADF

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initiated all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

  
(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_

(Signature)

\_\_\_\_\_

(Address)

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(Signature)

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(Address)


Hq 22 Air Force, Travis AFB CA

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

6th day of June 19 75

at Travis Air Force Base, California.

  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath.)  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C5A Collateral Investigating Officer  
(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

SWORN STATEMENT

OF

CAPTAIN ROBERT L. COVERT

EXPERT WITNESS

SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS

18 JUNE 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

(Place)

18 June 1975

(Date)

I, Captain Robert L. Covert, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr., as identified himself to me  
as C5A Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.  
(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

I am Captain Robert L. Covert and I am assigned to Headquarters Military Airlift Command, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Directorate of Maintenance Engineering, Weapon Systems Division, as one of the C-5 weapons system managers. I have been associated with aircraft maintenance for 22 years in various capacities ranging from crew chief to major command weapon system manager. I am also intimately familiar with all forms and documents related to aircraft maintenance.

In connection with the accident involving Air Force C-5A, S/N 68-218 near Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, occurring on 4 April 1975, I have, at the request of the Collateral Investigating Officer, reviewed the following documents:

- a. Sworn statements of eleven members of the crew of the aircraft.
- b. A document which details the history of the last flight of the aircraft.
- c. All AFTO Forms 781A (Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document) pertaining to the aircraft for the period 29 January 1975 through 4 April 1975, and other maintenance forms associated therewith.
- d. Thirty-five laboratory analysis reports concerning parts recovered from C-5A 68-218, prepared by the Metallurgical Laboratory, Kelly AFB, Texas.
- e. A summary of the Metallurgical Laboratory Analyses, referred to above, by the Director, Maintenance Engineering, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, 22 AF, Travis AFB CA.

I have carefully examined these documents and the subsequent opinions are based on my own expertise and the above mentioned documents.

Based on a review of all AFTO Forms 781A, it is my opinion that there are only three discrepancies relative to the reported aft loading system failure of C-5A, 68-218. These are:

- a. Cannibalization of a tie rod assembly between numbers 2 and 3

right aft ramp locks (AFTO Forms 781A, 7 Mar 75 to 27 Mar 75, page 58, block 1).

b. Cannibalization of a tie rod assembly between numbers 3 and 4 right aft ramp locks (AFTO Forms 781A, 7 Mar 75 to 27 Mar 75, page 58, Block 2).

c. Rig check due as a result of above cannibalizations and subsequent installation of other tie rod assemblies (AFTO Forms 781A, 26 Mar 75 to 29 Mar 75, page 18, Block 1).

After reviewing the 35 laboratory analysis reports and the 22 AF, DCS Logistics Summary thereof, I concur with that summary with one exception. I am of the opinion that since the above reports do not identify any of the exhibits as being from the number one right hand lock assembly, the analysis does not necessarily confirm that the number one lock was not in a locked position.

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement, Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

  
(Signature)

ROBERT L. COVERT, Captain, USAF  
HQ MAC, Scott AFB IL

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

18 day of June 19 75

at   
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath.)  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C5A Collateral Investigating Officer  
(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

SWORN STATEMENT

OF

CWO ROBERT T. GIFFORD

EXPERT WITNESS

TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

1 JULY 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

1 July 1975

(Date)

I, CWO Robert T. Gifford, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr., [redacted] has identified himself to me  
as CSA Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.

(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without  
having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

I am CWO Robert T. Gifford. I am assigned to Travis Air Force Base as Assistant  
Staff Weather Officer to the Commander, 22 Air Force and OIC of the Weather Support  
Unit supporting the 22 AF Operations Center. My entire USAF career of nearly 31 years  
of service has been in the Air Weather Service. I hold professional membership  
status in the American Meteorological Society.

I have reviewed the Flight Weather Briefing material (DD Form 175-1 w/attachments)  
that was provided the crew of C-5 #68218 for the flight from Clark AB to Tan Son  
Nhut and find it to be in complete and proper order. Essentially, what those  
documents record are the meteorological specifics as to what the crew may expect to  
encounter concerning weather conditions on take-off, enroute and at the intended  
destination. Briefly summarized an examination of the records reveal:

- (1) That the take-off data provided to enable the crew to compute take-off  
performance was complete and the data was entirely within routine C-5 operating  
capabilities.
- (2) That the forecast enroute weather was expected to be "routine" in nature  
with only isolated thunderstorm activity to be expected off the South Vietnam coast.  
No icing and/or turbulence (not associated with thunderstorms) was forecast to occur.
- (3) That the weather parameters (ceiling, visibility, wind direction and speed,  
altimeter setting, etc.) forecast to prevail at the estimated time of arrival were  
excellent and certainly posed no limiting factors for the flight as planned.

In summary, from the weather standpoint in the layman's vernacular it was a "no  
sweat flight."

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written. 

**WITNESSES:**

ttten.  
Robert G. Jeffcoat  
(Signature)

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(Signature)

(Address)

1000 J. Neurosci., November 1, 2006 • 26(44):9992–10003

(Address)

(Signature)

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

~~Travis Air Force Base, California~~

*[Signature]* Signature of Person Administering Oath.)  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C5A Collateral Investigating Officer

(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

SWORN STATEMENT

OF

MSGT ELMER W. HARDIN

60 MILITARY AIRLIFT WING

TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

1 JULY 1975

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

1 July 1975

(Date)

I, MSgt Elmer W. Hardin, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr. has identified himself to me  
as C5A Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.  
(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

I am MSgt Elmer W. Hardin. At the present time, I am on temporary duty as Assistant Chief Standardization Loadmaster, 60 MAW. I have been a C-5A Flight Examiner for four years assigned to the 75th MAS and 22 MAS, Travis AFB, CA. I was initial cadre on the C-5A and worked on the joint Lockheed, System Command and Army Test team during 1970, 1971 and 1972. I was on the Air Mobile Feasibility Team that airdropped the Minuteman missile from the C-5A aircraft in October 1974.

In compliance with the C-5A Collateral Investigating Officer's request, I checked the Weight and Balance Clearance Form F of C-5A 68-218 dated 4 April 1975 (Saigon to Clark). Although the takeoff and estimated landing center of gravity (% MAC) were correct, a few minor errors as listed below were found on the Form F.

- a. Block B, Moments should be 4816 instead of 4814.
- b. Block 12 does not reflect the distribution of passengers as per T.O. 1C-5A-5.
- c. Block 13 - Moment should be 6500 instead of 6506.
- d. Block 20 - Moment should be 5485 instead of 5491.

In my opinion, the actual weight of the passengers was less than estimated on the F Form. I reach this conclusion after considering the number of small children in the aircraft.

Based on information given, balance points or C. G station 690 and 1716 are correct, but the clearance form does reflect the distribution of passengers in accordance with T.O. 1C-5A-3.5 ~~3.5~~

In my opinion, none of the above noted discrepancies had any effect on the aircraft's performance.

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

*Elmer*

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

*Elmer W. Handin*

(Signature)

Hq 22 Air Force, Travis AFB CA

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

*1<sup>st</sup> day of July 1975*

at Travis Air Force Base, California

*Bernard A. Waxstein*

(Signature of Person Administering Oath.)  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C5A Collateral Investigating Officer

(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

1 July 1975

(Date)

I, MSgt Elmer W. Hardin, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr., has identified himself to me  
as C5A Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.  
(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

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In my opinion, none of the above noted discrepancies had any effect on the aircraft's performance.

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

*Ex-1*

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

WITNESSES:

*Elmer W. Handin*

(Signature)

(Signature)

(Address)

(Signature)

(Address)

Hq 22 Air Force, Travis AFB CA

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

*1<sup>st</sup>* day of *July* 1975

at *Travis Air Force Base, California*

*Signature*

Signature of Person Administering Oath.)  
BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
C5A Collateral Investigating Officer

(Type Name, Grade & Title of Person Administering Oath.)

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Travis Air Force Base, California

(Place)

1 July 1975

(Date)

I, MSgt Elmer W. Hardin, hereby state that  
Colonel Bernard A. Waxstein, Jr., has identified himself to me  
as CSA Collateral Investigating Officer USAF.

(Special Agent AFOSI, Security Police, Other-Specify)

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T.O. 1C-5A-5 ~~and~~

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performance.

CONTINUATION SHEET FOR AF FORM 1168, 1168a and/or 1169.

31. I further state that I have read this entire statement. Initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

**WITNESSES:**

(Signature)

(Address)

(Signature)

(Address)

ten.  
E. W. Hand

(Signature)

Hq 22 Air Force, Travis AFB CA

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this

Travis Air Force Base, California

at ~~Devon~~ Air Force Base, California

Краснодарск

*[Signature]* Signature of Person Administering Oath.

BERNARD A. WAXSTEIN, JR., Colonel, USAF  
GSA Collection Investigation Office