

IV

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

by

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In the Philippines we have mountains, swamps, and wilderness; we have trees so high and so thick that the sunshine never reaches the ground. In our jungles we have wild carabao, crocodiles, snakes thirty feet long, and Huks. These animals are killers, particularly the last ones.

Immediately after World War II, the leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines utilized the inherent confusion of the reconstruction period to strengthen and enhance the military position of their armed forces. While the legitimate guerrilla forces were surrendering their arms, the members of the military branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Huks did not do so. On the contrary, they sought to gather more, and secretly accumulated as many as possible. While the other guerrilla organizations were demobilizing, the Huks were busy recruiting more men for the hammer and sickle revolution.

In their recruiting, following accepted Communist strategy, the Huks exploited two courses of action for their expansion program. The first course of action was expansion by force, a course of action which was characterized by extremes of terrorism. Their actions were calculated to inject a psychology of terror into the minds of unpretentious citizens, government officials, and even the rank and file of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Murder, arson, robbery and torture meant nothing to them, and each method was employed as thought necessary in order to intimidate the people into forced submission.

Supplementing this military course of action was their second line of attack. This was expansion by indoctrination, a process which involved systematic brainwashing by trained Communist propagandists. I might mention at this point that, to enhance their capabilities in this regard, the top leaders of the Communist Party, those who later expected to overthrow

the government of the Philippines by 1951, early established a Stalin University, complete with the ideological trimmings of its Kremlin predecessor. In this institution, promising converts to the Huk cause were given advanced training in subversive techniques.

In their program of expansion by indoctrination, the Huks took advantage of each item of contention to represent the facts on either side in whatever way they felt would best suit their sinister purposes. They demonstrated an extraordinary ability in attributing all imperfections, all injustices, all misfortunes, to the democratic process. They are masters at the exploitation of this particular line, at the propagation of deceitful catchwords such as "land for the landless," "prosperity for the masses," and many others. These were carried far and wide and inculcated into the rural population.

This situation was challenging to an intelligence officer, and this situation was given to me for solution by Col Valeriano, my commanding officer. Here was a situation where the terrorized inhabitant would not even glance at soldiers for fear of reprisals by the Huk. Here was a predicament where the people were led to bind their hopes to the alluring doctrines of Communism, either because of their exposure to Huk degradation, or because of vicious propaganda expressed by the CPP stooges, exploiting trivial or even personal incidents to effect pernicious distrust of our governmental system. This situation, in which the rural and small town populations were militarily dominated by the Huk, and were ideologically captivated by Communist indoctrinators, was one which, as the intelligence officer of Colonel Valeriano, I found obviously required a major intelligence build-up. The expansion programs of the Communist Party made the success of intelligence operations seem rather problematical. Nevertheless several methods were devised, applied and were found effective. Had they not been effective, our affairs this morning would have been necrological for the five of us, as well as two other people who are with you in the audience.

Gentlemen, I would like to discuss with you for a moment the physical background, the terrain in which we operated, for the different methods which we employed. Central Luzon, which I believe is shown on maps which have been furnished to you, might be considered roughly square. In the center is a single big mountain, called Mount Arayat. Running south from it is a large grassy swamp, called the Candaba swamp. On the east and west sides of the square are mountain ranges, some grassy, some covered with the densest kind of rain forest. The area between the mountain ranges is partly rice land, partly grass land, with numerous streams and patches of forest. Politically, the area is divided into many municipalities, and four provinces, whose common corner is on Mount Arayat. Notice on your maps how Mount

Arayat is most strategically located in the center of these four different provinces. The Huks realized the importance of Mount Arayat, and took every advantage of the complications possibly ensuing from provincial boundaries and command boundaries of our armed forces. From this central mountain (which they never made the mistake of trying to defend against a major force), the Huks maintained courier routes to all parts of the area.

Now, let me discuss the different methods we used in gathering information in this hostile area. Our collection effort was based on the direct approach method and the indirect approach method, which we combined with other methods, the use of prisoners, infiltration, etc. The direct method was a simple interrogation method wherein we invited the Huks families and known sympathizers. The wife and oftentimes wives of Huks commanders could, if they would, tell us something of value. In this approach we would interrogate them, ask them to cooperate, give them some lectures and so on. Well, of course, I'd like to tell you that if we got any information along this line, it was not very useful. We have found these people hostile no matter what method of interrogation we adopted.

The indirect method is a system wherein we use friends of the Huks. Class-mates of Huk children in school, cousins of a Huk commander, relatives of friends of associates of the Huk leaders were approached and induced to cooperate. By this system of making an indirect approach to the sources, we were able to get a lot of information.

Another very important source of our information are prisoners. I think we have been told about it in school and I know that most of you know how to use prisoners, but I would like to talk to you about how we use our prisoners. For the purpose of this discussion and for the purpose of our operation in the Philippines, we have divided prisoners into four categories.

The first category includes those prisoners who have been captured in combat. Everybody knows how to treat a prisoner captured in combat, and how to take advantage of the psychological opportunity afforded by the confusion that this man's mind is involved in. One very striking example of this was when we captured Celia Pomeroy. Celia Pomeroy is the wife of an American GI who was in the Communist Party in the Philippines. He's one of these men whose picture you have seen displayed. This Celia Pomeroy was a very intelligent Huk organizer, a graduate of our University of the Philippines. I had a chance to interrogate her ten minutes after she was captured, and I got as much information as I wanted from her during a short space of time, which compared favorably with the information secured during the one week interrogation which she was later subjected to.

The second classification of prisoners are the surrenderees. In the Huk organization when one surrendered, it meant that this fellow must have been feeling himself to be in some sort of a situation where he faced liquidation. Of course, we have given allowances for the possibility of planted surrenderees. However, I do not recall having any such prisoner during our five years of fighting with the Huks; not one surrenderee that I know of was planted into our intelligence set up.

There are a number of situations where we have found surrenderees very useful. One of them is the technique that we call the "Magic Eye." You will agree with me that fighting a Filipino or fighting an American Communist, fighting Communists among your own countrymen, is extremely difficult for an intelligence officer to identify which man is an enemy and which one is not. That constant problem we often solved by the use of surrenderees, and in which we found the Magic Eye technique effective. This Magic Eye system allowed us to take advantage of psychological opportunities and at the same time protect the life of the families of the surrenderee.

Take for instance a situation wherein we rounded up all the civilians of a town. We would construct a special tent for the prisoner, with a peephole. He would be concealed while the civilians were made to pass before this "Magic Eye," hidden in a tent. Naturally all these people would start feeling a sense of fright because they might be identified. This type of operation helped us a lot tactically and psychologically.

The third type of prisoners were those who were serving sentences in jail. I'd like to mention here that in the expansion program of the Huks they recruited all types of people, especially those who had police records, those who were known killers, and so on. Naturally when we started to operate in an area whose people and inhabitants were hostile to us, we were initially at a loss for contacts. We tried to find out from our national jails which prisoners actually hailed from that particular area. Once such a prisoner was identified, I would interrogate this fellow and try to win him over and get him to start talking. I might give him a pack of cigarettes, I might take him out for a free airing in a night club. In short, I would try to make him feel so happy and so grateful that he would give me some free information.

The fourth category were what might be called "special" prisoners. These usually were friends or close relatives either of Huks, or of people who were cooperating with us, and were made prisoners for their own protection.

In this connection, I would like to discuss with you, in continuation of Colonel Valeriano's discussion, the infiltration method, as illustrated by a particular project which we called the "Relatives Project." It is an example of the infiltration of individuals into the Huk ranks, a type of operation where maximum secrecy and security is necessary. It is a type of operation which demands a great deal from the individuals participating in it, the operative, his relatives, and his project officer alike.

"Relatives Project" dealt with the infiltration of the Huk organization in the Arayat area, in Central Luzon. In the effort to find a suitable person for infiltration, we found it necessary to contact the relatives of several Huk commanders. We did this, without identifying ourselves, until we finally were successful in locating a cooperative individual who was the cousin of a Huk commander.

We found also that this Huk Commander had joined the Huks not specifically for ideological reasons but for personal reasons. The infiltrator was trained for about two months under my personal supervision. While this was being done, necessary arrangements for cover and protection were made. This took the burning of his house, the imprisonment of his brother, and eventually the evacuation of his mother and father to protect and give cover to this infiltrator into the Hukbalahap organization. We had to find the Huks, and the government naturally had to pay for this. His mother did not know that her son was an infiltrator. The brother did not know that he was being placed in jail because we were trying to put up some sort of a ruse. But the news of these activities made them very effective. Slowly, based on his obvious grievances against the government, our agent was able to reach certain categories in the Hukbalahap and the Communist Party organization which has been explained to you by Colonel Lapus.

Our man was made a collector of the National Finance Committee. The National Finance Committee is the organization which supplied the Huks in the field with money, medicine, ammunition, weapons and other equipment. For two months, our supplies were flowing into the Huk lines, through the National Finance Committee and as a matter of fact I think Colonel Lapus will back me up here because we could not tell anybody how we spend our confidential funds, and I could not give any logical explanation at the time. For two months as I say, medicine was flowing into the Huks, ammunition was being given to the Huks, we were also giving weapons to the Huks, through this infiltrator. The purpose, of course, was to enable him to implant himself firmly into the organization and enable him to be promoted. He was eventually promoted, and

and the promotion and the amount of money we have used I think paid off, because he was able to reach Taruc himself.

Our man was made a bodyguard of Taruc, the leader of the Huk field forces, but this duty was done off and on for security purposes. Nevertheless this fellow was able to reach Taruc and we were able to get secret pictures our man took of the entire membership of the Huk organization in Candaba swamp. I think that General Lansdale, Colonel Lapus, Major Bohannon, Colonel Valeriano and General Hobbs were the only ones who knew about this.

The infiltration program went on, and the securing of reports was the most difficult thing that I had to encounter. How could the reports reach me, and how would I get instructions to the man, that was my problem. I discussed it with my commanding officer, with two officers from JUSMAAG, with Major Bohannon, and I got very important points which helped me. I'd like to tell you of some of the very interesting methods we devised which might help you also.

In order to let our man know that he must pick up our instructions to him, we devised a technique of using kites of an ordinary type. At certain pre-arranged points in the area where he operated, we would fly kites simultaneously in three different places. This was done at certain hours of the day exactly on the hour. The kites were not flown continuously, or at random times, to keep him from having to watch for them always, which military operations could have made very difficult. Further, if he were always to be seen scanning the horizon, suspicion would certainly be aroused. So that we did things on the hour. We would fly the kite at 7:00 in the morning, 8:00 in the morning, 9:00 in the morning, 10:00 in the morning, until we were sure that this signal had been received. The moment when he would see this kite, he would know a pre-arranged contact within the swamp was to be effected.

The troops of course couldn't be told anything about this operation. As a matter of fact, I lost two men when the area commander in this area attacked my men and I nearly lost my life too, but I couldn't tell him. Very often there would be no one to meet him, but he would find his messages concealed, perhaps in a messkit, or in an American first aid kit, carelessly abandoned. We would put the instructions into this kit and leave it at certain places along the designated place.

Using this system, how could we make an emergency contact at night? What do we do to make our message reach him when night infiltration is usually being conducted in this area? This is another problem that we faced because, of course, he could not see the kite at night. We devised two things.

We would fly the same kite, with a battery operated light. Then he gets his message. That's one. The other one is by the use of flares. In other words, if we believe that he may not be able to see this small light from the kite, we supplement this with flares, fired on the hour at the same designated spots.

The moment that our man would see this signal, he would know it means that he's got to be very careful because the troops are going in fast. We tell him now to find a way to save himself. It was my biggest concern, to be sure that this fellow was safe because it is so difficult to find one who could fit into the suit, train him, break all the rules necessary, burn houses, imprison somebody, and send supplies to the Huk organization.

But as I say it was very effective. As a matter of fact, I remember that before I presented the first picture taken by our infiltrator to Secretary Magsaysay, there was much skepticism about this project of mine. In fact, I suppose the late Magsaysay gave me the chance because of the confidence he had in me. He was worried about the success of this operation, but when I gave him the pictures taken by this infiltrator, he was in a conference with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Right then and there he left the General Staff conference and immediately went to General Hobbs, the Chief of JUSMAG (Joint US Military Advisory Group) and spread out all the pictures on the table of General Hobbs.

Let me tell you another thing which was done by this infiltrator. If you recall my mentioning the National Finance Committee, as I said we supplied the Huks through it, a matter which went on for two months. In the third month, Colonel Valeriano and Secretary Magsaysay decided it was time for us to hit. It was very easy for me to get out the files of what this fellow had submitted and, based on them, we were able right then and there to apprehend 1,175 members of the National Finance Committee. That destroyed the supply line of the Huk.

I have discussed with you the means by which I contacted one of our infiltrators. Now I would like to take up with you, his means for the transmission of reports to me. As Colonel Lapus has told you, the Huk organization disseminated propaganda material. One regularly issued was a magazine called *Titis*, or "Spark." Their propaganda was mimeographed or printed and scattered to all the rural inhabitants. It was also the medium by which I was able to get reports which were submitted to me as an intelligence officer. The way this

was done was very simple. My infiltrator would take a propaganda sheet which was being given to all the inhabitants. He would simply take a pencil, start reading, and the first word he came to that he wanted to use he would indicate by a small pencil dot under the first letter, just a small dot. And then he goes on down the line to the next word he needs, and puts a little dot under it. When the leaflet gets down to me, I take a magnifying glass, somebody starts writing down the words I call out, and I get my report.

Gentlemen, these are simple things that I want to bring up here. You may find situations where you need to do a lot of things and I hope some of these examples, plus your own ingenuity, will help you with them.

Another topic that I'd like to mention briefly, as being of much assistance in our campaign, was the reward system. The reward system is basically a money matter. In other words, for the head of a Huk, or for his capture or surrender, a reward would be given, ranging from 200 pesos to about a hundred thousand pesos. If any of you would want to earn \$50,000, that price is still offered in the Philippines for the capture of one top Communist leader, Jesus Lava. The fellow is still at large. This reward system brought up a lot of opportunities, and a lot of problems. Through it, we were able to get a number of Huk commanders and key personnel.

Next I would like to discuss psychological operations, especially in supporting intelligence operations. It is a very interesting subject and I suppose I will be criticized about some of the things I will discuss with you. You will remember that I said in the beginning of my briefing that the Huks used the psychology of fear to incite and enforce non-cooperation with the Armed Forces by the civilian masses. Naturally when we go into an area where Huks are active, the civilians, even if they are not ideologically indoctrinated, would not want to give us information because of fear, because the Huks have a practice of slicing the tongue of an informant, if they do no worse. These civilians and their families are living in very remote places; what else can they do but cooperate with the Huks. The Philippine Army cannot provide enough guards, not even one soldier for each of these families. In such areas we practiced several different techniques for gaining cooperation.

In the early days, we practiced what I might call counter-terrorism, if we may put a coined word to work. To cite one particular case, there was our operation at San Luis, the home of Taruc. All the people there, as far as I was concerned, were all Huks, were all sympathizers of the Huk organization. The

Mayor, the Chief of Police, all were Huks or sympathizers. As a matter of fact, when we went there, we asked for some water because we were so thirsty - and Colonel Valeriano got poisoned. They talked to us nicely, but when we turned our backs, what happened? Four of my men got killed there. They used a bayonet, opened up the intestines and then chopped them into pieces, and scattered the pieces for several kilometers along the roads. I know it was quite an ugly sight, but their idea was to inject some sort of terror into the civilian minds.

So, here is what we did to counteract the terror inspired by the Huk. We gathered together the civilians of the region, including the Mayor and the policemen, and took them to the bank of the river which runs by the village. On the other side, 100 to 200 yards away, were my troops in uniform. In the presence of the townspeople these troops, in full uniform, began to kill about a dozen "captured Huks." We just used our bayonets and killed them. But there was a procedure in killing them. While the civilians were gathered across the river, our troops brought out the "Huks" blindfolded, still with their equipment, and began to bayonet them one by one. While we were killing them, some were shouting out the name of the Mayor, the names of the policemen, and shouting out the names of their principal suppliers. Seeing the Huks killed before their eyes, hearing themselves named as the supporters of those we had just massacred, these civilians naturally expected to be next on the death lists.

Our psychological officers now started talking to the people. What they said was, in effect: "Now we know everything about everyone in this town, from the Mayor to the Chief of Police to all of you. Now we realize that if you came to us to give us information and everybody knows that you came to us, you might be beheaded the next day. We are going to give you ten places tonight where you can report and there we shall accept your confessions. If you confess, we will not treat you like we have these Huks." Almost all of the people reported to these spots, practically one after the other. We learned a lot of things, the Mayor was put in jail. We effectively broke the Huk support in this town.

But don't criticize me for these atrocities, gentlemen. They were not true. The people that the civilians thought we killed were our own soldiers. But, we really didn't harm them. It was a show. We used chicken blood, pigs blood and so on, to make it look real, because we cannot commit any atrocities like those committed by the Huks. We have our Constitution, our laws. But when that pretended atrocity was followed up by psychological operations, it really paid off.

Another way by which we have counteracted the psychological terror that was injected into the minds of the masses by the Huks, by instilling greater fear of us, was by the use of dead bodies. For examples, in one particular operation discussed by Colonel Valeriano, we killed a large number of Huks. We piled these dead Huks into a truck with the hands and feet dangling outside a whole truck load of dead bodies, and we drove this truck clear around town, and through the area.

I have discussed some of the difficult phases of intelligence activities in counter-guerrilla operations during our anti-Communist campaign in the Philippines. Training, ingenuity, a stout heart, a practical knowledge of human psychology, that is of knowing people and how to treat them, are the vital ingredients necessary in accomplishing this hazardous mission. But, above all the transcendent element in our fighting for the free world, is our undying Philippine love for liberty and an ever increasing determination to survive Communist bondage and oppression.

In the Philippines, 13,000 miles from here, we are 27 million strong. As many and as big as the combined population in the area of New York, Rhode Island, Delaware, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut and New Jersey. We have contributed a humble share to our brother nations in the free world by crushing a rebellion of the Communist Party. We will continue to do our level best as the Vanguard of the free nations. Coming from all corners of the globe, let us all act in concert to fortify the framework of international solidarity. Against a wicked enemy, let us therefore break from the shackles of complacency and finally with freedom as our battle flag let us stand united as one race and one nation and bury those who seek to trample our priceless legacy of liberty and justice.

UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

By

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Unconventional operations as we saw them in the Philippines can be divided roughly into three categories: Unconventional operations designed to kill, harass, or incapacitate the armed enemy; unconventional operations designed to gain intelligence; and finally, unconventional operations designed to influence the thinking of people. These last perhaps may be understood as those meant by the term psychological operations.

First, and most interesting to some people, are those unconventional operations designed actually to damage the enemy. There were a number of such operations in the Philippines. The Armed Forces of the Philippines set up, about 1949, a Research and Development Unit, a little department of dirty tricks. They had a nice old colonel in charge, the nicest man that I have ever known and with one of the nastiest minds.

One of his brightest ideas was a double-barreled, fully automatic carbine. I won't tell you what its cyclic rate of fire was, because I never believed it myself, but it was somewhere up around 1500 rounds a minute. Naturally, you're not going to hit a hell of a lot, spitting out ammunition at that rate. On the other hand, if you are out on a one-, or two-, or three-man patrol, way back in the bushes, and you get jumped by a larger force, think of its effect. You turn something that throws as much lead as that and rattles as fast as that loose at them, they think they've run into a couple of machine guns and are apt to leave that place without further bothering you. So there's a killing weapon, and yet it is one designed to influence the actions of people, more than it is to inflict actual casualties.

Due to policy and other complications, the Armed Forces of the Philippines were unable to secure napalm to use in the quantities they desired and the way they desired to use it. So the old

colonel fooled around with coconut husks and gasoline, and this and that and the other, and came up with a very satisfactory substitute. This was much better than what was first used. I think the first home-made substitute for napalm used in this campaign was in an operation in Candaba Swamp in 1950. The Secretary of National Defense and a few other characters flew over an area which it was desired to burn, kicking out 5-gallon cans of kerosene and throwing white phosphorous hand grenades at them. It didn't really burn too much of an area, but it accomplished the job at that time.

Another aspect which the Research and Development unit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines went into quite a bit was what we might call bobby-traps. These were devices designed to be planted out in the fields for the enemy to run into or devices to be inserted into the enemy's supply lines. The idea is that if you stick stuff into the enemy's supply lines, that's the surest way of getting it into the hands of the ultimate consumer. A number of interesting problems developed there. One of them was that on such things as flash lights, radios, and so on, a courier who was taking them out would be bound to experiment with them. So, if it was really a "reporting" form of supplies, you had to fix it so that the first and last report wouldn't be rendered before it got to the intended consumer.

Way back about 1903 or 1904, when the Philippine Constabulary was fighting the Moros down in the southern part of the islands, some bright guy dreamt up the idea of losing some rifle cartridges, big old 45-70 ones. They had had their loads tampered with and that, they found, had quite an effect. There are indications that something like that may have been used in the Huk campaign. Again, this was a weapon which would produce or might produce an injury to the man who used it, or two or three men. But its principal effect was psychological. If one man's rifle blows up on him, everybody else who knows about it is going to be wondering, "Is my rifle going to blow up on me the next time I fire it?" I have heard stories about outfits which shed quite a bit of ammunition and so on because of things like that. I have shown you a part of a carbine which apparently had something like that happen to it. I understand that the Huk unit from which that was recovered was notably gun-shy for sometime after that incident occurred. They tell me the man who fired it recovered.

I might say that the use of improvised gadgets and gimmicks either to influence thinking or to produce casualties is as old as the

art of warfare in the Philippines. Frankly, I've never head of anybody more ingenious than some of my Philippine friends in dreaming up things which would have a significant effect. Again, the major effect was usually on the thinking of people.

One of the classic items is the "anting-anting" or amulet, widely used since very early times as protection against the enemy. Most commonly, an anting-anting charm is supposed to turn bullets. Well, obviously it doesn't. But the man who has it on, if he believes in it, is a great deal more daring combat soldier than one who doesn't have it. If the charm happens to seem to work for him, for a while he gets a reputation which makes him seem like a very valuable leader.

Some work was done in exploiting that and other similar "magic" during the anti-Huk campaign, but actually not too much was done in the way of direct psychological attack, expressly aimed directly at the armed enemy. Most of the psywar that was aimed directly at the enemy was in the form of leaflets, surrender passes, loud-speaker broadcasts, and airplanes. Each of these did have some effect.

You heard a good deal this morning from Major Justiniano about some of the ruses and devices that were used for the collection of intelligence. One particular feature of his actions that he did not mention was his system for the pick-up messages. I think it should be brought out. Along the principal highways in the Philippines there are kilometer posts. Every kilometer there is a post telling how far it is to the next town and how far it is to Manila, the capital. His people used the practice of smearing a blob of mud or anything on a kilometer post as an indication to reporting agents, couriers or pick-ups, that there was a message at a pre-arranged direction and distance from that kilometer post. I think that that sort of thing could be applicable in many places.

I want to spend most of the time left to talk about operations intended to influence the thinking of people. You will recall that in the discussion this morning it was pointed out that the Huk movement was started by the Communists deliberately impersonating what we might call a legitimate resistance movement against the enemy occupier of the country. As they began to show their hand in actions against those who disagreed with them, those who challenged their control over the area, they began to publicize their slogans of "land for the landless," "agrarian reform," and "aid to the poor down-trodden peasantry." They peddled that idea very successfully both during and after the Japanese occupation.

In 1945 I came back to the States with a military police officer who claimed to have examined the dossiers on 10,000 members of the Huk movement without finding any evidence that a single one of them was a Communist. Six months before that, I had had a bunch of guerrillas join me carrying freshly wounded men. They also had Huk ID cards taken from Huks who had jumped them from the rear while they were attacking a Japanese patrol. Those ID cards bore the hammer and sickle which to my simple way of thinking was some evidence of some Communist interest.

The Huks, their sponsors and then sympathizers, kept pressing and pressing this idea of agrarian reform, and there was a need for agrarian reform in the area in which they were operating. The extraordinarily unfortunate part of it was that they got so many people to thinking that agrarian reform was really their objective.

I have here a column written by perhaps the most vitriolic, free-spoken columnist in a country which I believe has and had the freest press in the world. He is the man who, when his President called him in and spoke to him about the language he used in his column, came out the next day and wrote that he had been called to Malacanang Palace and told that he could no longer call a spade a spade. Therefore, gentlemen, he continued, I will no longer call a spade a spade. Hereafter when I have an occasion to refer to a spade, I shall simply call it a goddamn stinking shovel.

This joker in May of 1948 wrote: "Long before the kidnapping and brutal murder of Juan Feleo on August 24 of 1946 precipitated the armed explosion in the central provinces, I have repeatedly tried to correct the systematic campaign of information which branded the Hukbalahap as Communists." He knew better, but most of his readers didn't.

Right along with their campaign for agrarian reform, their pose of seeking land for the landless, the Communists carried on a systematic campaign of vilification against the Government. All government officials are corrupt. They're puppets. They're running dogs of the American imperialists. That last one they would try every so often, and then they'd take it off the record for a while, because somehow customer acceptance wasn't so very good.

Corruption, corruption, they cried. Sure, there was corruption. You heard this morning about some of the corruption, some of the malfeasance of government officials, some of the inefficiency of the armed forces, of the election of 1949 in which there were exploitable frauds. Those things are true, but they weren't nearly as bad, nearly as common, as they were made to seem. Isolated instances were taken out of context. Isolated cases were fabricated. Systematically, day after day, I regret to say that most of the Manila press faithfully echoed the line, "Everybody in government is corrupt, the army is no damn good, the MPCs are a bunch of bloody murderers. Before you disarm these poor Huks who are striving to protect the rights of the landless peasants, first you must disarm and jail these brutal MPCs whose hands are dyed in the blood of their innocent fellow countrymen and so on, etc."

Nobody really believed everything they read, but there was enough suspicion left so that people lost confidence in government. The Huks had a mass base of perhaps a million. That's a reasonable estimate. I'm afraid, by the middle of 1950, the government didn't have a very much bigger mass base. Of those people who were concerned with and interested in such things as the actions of government, there were probably three times as many who said to hell with the government and to hell with the Huks both as were in favor of either one.

It was in changing this situation that Mr. Magsaysay scored his greatest successes in combating the Huk. He shook up the army. I don't mean wholesale relief of officers, trials, court martials, or anything like that; he just simply shook them. And I mean they were shook. I sat in his office one afternoon. First, he called in Colonel Lapus, the G-2. If I recall correctly (that was a long time ago), he said to Colonel Lapus: Go find out personally why such and such a unit hasn't gotten its rations. He called in the G-4 to make an investigation why a lieutenant way out in the boondocks hadn't been promoted after killing a Huk leader. G-1 was sent out on an intelligence mission. What he had G-3 doing, I don't recall, but it was probably rounding up gasoline. He was ruthless in putting his foot on misbehavior by armed forces personnel.

Mr. Magsaysay was even more strenuous in emphasizing that the armed forces must make the civilians in their area realize that the armed forces were their friends and not their enemy. For example, in this Huklandia area, where the Huk forces could move fairly freely

by day and very freely by night, you would see a truck loaded with soldiers pause in a town in broad daylight for a few minutes. Everybody would be in the truck pointing his rifle out as though the truck were going to be jumped any minute. Needless to say, the civilians around didn't particularly appreciate that treatment and they would have been quite willing to jump the army.

Three months after he started shaking things up, when a truck load of soldiers pulled into a town, you could see the kids come running, because probably those soldiers had a few pieces of candy, or at least they'd tell them some jokes. People would come and hear the news from the soldiers. There were many different operations designed to demonstrate to the people that the soldiers were their friends, that the government was their government and what the hell were the Huks fighting for anyhow. The Huks claimed it was for land, that they wanted land, that they couldn't own land in Central Luzon.

Mr. Magsaysay dusted off a proposal that had been gathering dust in his office for a couple of years for an outfit known as EDCOR. Now that was originally conceived as a modification of the old Roman "colono" system, where troops would be stationed in virgin territory, would set up a village, start farming and supporting themselves, and then be discharged to live on there.

Mr. Magsaysay took that proposal, which had been approved by the Philippine Congress, and turned it into a "land for the landless" program specifically for the benefit of surrendered Huk. He placed relatively little emphasis on advertising this program directly to the Huks. Instead, he saw to it that the program was broadly publicized among the civilians throughout the Huk-infested areas. The idea, of course, was to get these civilians, the willing or unwilling mass base, to thinking and saying: "Now why should we be giving contributions to these guys, these Huks, who are coming to us? Sometimes they are nice to us, sometimes they are cruel. Why should we be supporting them and suffering for or from them? They say that they are fighting for land. If that is true, all they have to do is surrender, and Magsay will give them a homestead down in Mindanao. He will take the man, and his family too, put them down there on a piece of land, support them until their first crop is harvested, and even give him title to the land if he works it for five years. What are they really fighting for, these Huks?"

That had a terrific effect, that sequence of ideas. The Huks soon got word of it, often blunt word. Of course, they scoffed at the whole thing as a trick, but they soon found out that it wasn't, that some of their former comrades really were doing well on their new homesteads. In actual fact, as a resettlement program, EDCOR did not accomplish a great deal. I doubt if more than perhaps 300 families of Huks were resettled under that program. But I will guarantee you that at least 3,000 Huks surrendered, or simply melted peacefully back into a peaceful country life as persons who didn't want any parts of this rebellion any more. One reason was that they were made to doubt the propaganda of their own leaders; a more significant reason perhaps was the effect the thinking outlined above had on their supply, support, and even intelligence channels.

As a former guerrilla himself, Mr. Magsaysay realized full well the vital importance of popular support to any guerrilla organization. Knowing that many of the common complaints of the peasants often had all too real justification and that these were magnified many times over by the Huk propaganda, he set out to eliminate the grounds for complaint, or at least to prove to the farmers that he was sincerely trying to do so.

One of the favorite complaints of the farmers in Huklandia, as in almost every similar region in the world, was that they always lost the case if they went to law. Tenants felt they had no legal defense against their landlords, because they couldn't afford to hire lawyers. Mr. Magsaysay gave to the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines the role of public defenders. If some poor devil who couldn't afford a lawyer had a serious case, either criminal or civilian, particularly a civil suit over land tenure, all he had to do was to send word to Mr. Magsaysay's office and there would be an Army lawyer to represent him in court proceedings. The peasant knew that he would have forceful representation and that the judge would be at least as much in awe of a lawyer from Magsaysay's Army as he would be of the landlord's lawyer.

Army lawyers also assisted in the prosecution of individual Huks before the criminal courts. In this connection, I wish to mention another facet of the anti-Huk operations that has not been brought up as yet. The Huk movement was never officially recognized as constituting rebellion in the sense of conferring upon the Huks, the members of the armed forces of the Communist Party, the rights of belligerents. In practice, they could only be prosecuted

for whatever common crimes they may have committed in the course of their activities, or they could be turned loose, or they could be disposed of permanently. Prior to Mr. Magsaysay's tour as Sec/Def., very little was done in the way either of punishing or of holding on to Huks who were captured or surrendered.

Under the Philippine Constitution there is a right of habeas corpus, the same as in the U.S. Constitution. From 1946 to 1950, that right was vigorously exercised. Let us say you catch a Huk. You are supposed to turn him over immediately to civil authorities. Unless you immediately could arraign him for a common crime with a plausible showing of probable guilt, he'd be out on a writ of habeas corpus and possibly out in the hills the next day. Don't forget that the prosecuting attorney and the judge lived right in the Huk infested area and were quite as susceptible to being terrorized as anyone else.

Mr. Magsaysay secured Presidential approval of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the cases of those who could be accused of rebellion and common crimes incident to rebellion. It was a very risky move on his part. Here he was basing most of his hope of success on proving that the government and the Armed Forces were the true friends of the people; yet here he was suppressing one of their prime rights. A horrible cry went up immediately that he was turning the country into a police state. But it didn't work out that way. His office exercised extremely close control over the use of this privilege of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and there were very few serious complaints. When people promptly saw that the denial of the privilege of habeas corpus was being used justly and fairly, that it was not being used as an implement for persecution, then they accepted it.

Actions of the army to help the civilians were almost innumerable. They ranged from patrols regularly carrying medicine so that they could attend the needs of sick or injured civilians whom they might encounter in remote places to the building of roads, the rebuilding of villages, later on the building of schoolhouses. Mr. Magsaysay made it clearly understood by everyone in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the troops quickly made it clear to those with whom they came in contact, that the purpose of the army was to help the people in every way they could. First in priority to accomplish this was, of course, to suppress armed rebellion. But if there was anything soldiers could do to help the people without seriously jeopardizing the actual prosecution of an armed action against an armed enemy, they were to do it. To a remarkable extent, they did.

This all came to a climax, as General Lansdale said, with the use of the Armed Forces in the 1951 elections to guard the polls. There had been fraud in the 1949 elections. This fraud was magnified out of all recognition by the press, by gossip, by Communist propagandists, witting and unwitting, by Communist propaganda, direct and indirect, back, white, and grey, so that "everyone knew" that the 1951 elections would be a complete farce.

The President, as was customary, announced that the elections would be absolutely free and clean, that everyone eligible to vote might vote freely for the candidate of his choice. Mr. Magsaysay, as Secretary of Defense, said "Wen Apo," "Yes, Sir," and that he would personally see to it that the elections were conducted precisely as the President had publicly said that they would be. Magsaysay announced his intention of having the polling places guarded by college students in the ROTC called to active duty and by regular soldiers. He assured one and all that they might vote freely and might rely upon their vote being honestly counted. Further, he set up procedures by which anyone could telegraph to him for an investigation if he thought a polling place was improperly conducted. Mr. Magsaysay made it clear to all in the Philippines that he meant what he said in an aggressive publicity campaign well before election day.

This move on his part caught the Communists and their supporters with their trousers down around their ankles. For nearly two years, they had been pointing to elections as the irrefutable proof of the corruption of the government. The only answer which they could come up with was a campaign urging people to boycott the election. They put out all kinds of dire predictions as to what the soldier thugs would do to anyone incautious enough to vote. "Magsaysay's armed goons will surely club you or kill you, or destroy your ballots." In some areas they added pointed hints as to what the Huks would do to those incautious enough to vote. When election day came, the people had enough confidence in Magsaysay and his troops to turn out and vote, to vote in unprecedented, overwhelming numbers.

After the results were counted, everybody but the Communists were satisfied with the results. Even those who lost had to admit that they lost honestly, that they weren't counted out by someone on the opposition payroll. Most important, the elections of 1951 were the ponderous last straw which broke the camel's back, so far as armed Communist resistance in the Philippines was concerned

For over a year, the Armed Forces had been seeking to demonstrate by deeds and words that the legal government of the Philippines was a government for the people, a government whose primary purpose was service to the governed. That they included in this service relentless action against unrepentant enemies of the peoples' government underscored their claim. From that time on, the campaign was, in effect, a mopping-up operation, one which is still going on. The loss of popular support and the abyss into which sank the morale of those Huks who sincerely believed that they were fighting for the welfare of the people were dramatically illustrated in 1954.

You have heard each of us speak here today about Luis Taruc, one-time leader of the Huk field forces. Taruc was a man of great personal charm, of sincere devotion to Communism, and of sincere devotion to the welfare of the people, as he saw it. In 1954, Taruc became convinced that he could do more to help his people by coming in and surrendering to the government than by continuing to fight it. Has there been any other instance of the top Communist guerrilla leader of a country surrendering unconditionally to the government he had fought for almost fifteen years? Perhaps this was the most unconventional operation of all.

I am going to wind this up in a minute. First, however, I want to say a couple more things about the personnel who are responsible for unconventional operations, the type of individual who is likely to be successful in such operations. All sorts of qualifications have been suggested at various times as being essential to the unconventional operator. I would like to tell you about two of the most successful whom I have known.

One of these men drove a truck at the time of Bataan, of the fall of the Philippines to the Japanese, but he wound up at the time of the liberation of the Philippines leading a couple thousand guerrillas. He had himself a fine time during the enemy occupation of his country, running after the Japanese or running from the Japanese. He learned a great deal about the essentials of guerrilla warfare, about basic survival for guerrillas, which means securing popular support, among other things. But he had absolutely no use for military textbooks and military doctrine. As far as he was concerned, such things were all right for instruction at Leavenworth, but from what he had seen of it, the practical value was nil. Because he saw the big picture, because he saw the need of changing the thinking of the

people, the urgent necessity for building a sound political base, Mr. Magsaysay was an outstanding success in dealing with the over-all problem. What he thought of such subjects as the allocation of staff responsibility, I told you earlier.

The other man I am thinking of was a combat unit leader. In the field of unconventional tactical operations against the armed enemy and his mass base, this man was most successful. That man was so "GI," so thoroughly indoctrinated with conventional military thinking that, as we used to say in the Army, he wasn't born, he was issued by the company supply room. He was so "Leavenworth-minded" that after taking the short course there he went back for the long one. But, gentlemen, he did not limit his thinking to the doctrine expressed in texts. Rather, he used the "book" as a basis on which to build with the use of a thoroughly well-fertilized imagination. He could think of more stunts to harass the enemy, and make them work better, than anyone I ever knew.

I want to tell you about one of his simple little stunts. Justi, Major Justiniano, told you this morning about a more complicated one where they simulated liquidation of a bunch of simulated Huks with the objective of putting the fear of God, and the command, into the hearts of people so that they would stop collaborating with the enemy.

This guy I am telling you about developed a much simpler and more effective stunt. He knew full well that the Mayor of a certain village was actively assisting the Huk, one of their most trusted and valued men in that area. But he couldn't touch him. He did not have ironclad evidence which he could produce in court; worse, the Mayor had excellent political influence running all the way up to the Presidential Palace. (This was before the time of Magsaysay.) A good deal of thought was given to a means, short of kidnapping or assassination, by which this Mayor could be taken out of play. One day there was a little stroke of luck; the troops knocked off an important courier, carrying important documents, just outside that village.

The next morning Val drove into the village, siren blowing, armed escort and all, and called on the Mayor. He brought him out into the town square, with all the citizens fearfully crowding around, shook the Mayor by the hand and publicly congratulated and thanked him for his fine patriotic service in furnishing the

information which led to the killing of the courier. Val really laid it on thick, wouldn't listen to any protestations, made a big thing of the fine betrayal, and then climbed in his jeep and drove off.

About three o'clock the next morning that Mayor, with his family and his household goods, drove up to Colonel Valeriano's command post, seeking refuge. He was willing to tell everything he knew, do anything, confess and go to prison, anything as long as he wouldn't be left out where those wild Huks might bite him.

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DISCUSSION

Query: Were any special forces, other than regular troops, used in the anti-Huk campaigns.

Answer: (Maj. Bohannon). Yes. Many forces other than regular troops were used, ranging from wild mountain pygmies, Negritos, to home guard and church congregation units. However, I assume that you are thinking primarily of units in the regular establishment.

There was such a force, called the Scout-Rangers. I did not touch on it earlier, because I assumed that you people had already studied this force. It was a small organization, never larger than two companies, with the mission of executing small long-range patrols, operating for periods up to two or three weeks, in very small groups, deep in enemy or unexplored territory. Its personnel executed many very successful missions, harassing the enemy where he least expected it, securing intelligence, and guiding other forces. A Scout-Ranger team, of an officer and four men, was assigned to each BCT in active combat areas. In some BCT's, they set fine examples which got the whole BCT into the spirit of active patrolling. I certainly recommend that you study the Scout-Ranger organization, techniques, and tactics.

Query: (Gen. Lansdale). Col. Valeriano, I would like you to describe an intelligence technique which I learned from watching your operations. I might remark that I passed this idea along to the French in Indo-China in 1953, when they were having difficulty in getting information on enemy movements from their agent networks. Since then, I have learned that this method has been adopted in other countries. It's a good "export" idea for the class here. So, please tell them about your use of light aircraft for intelligence collection.

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). This was evolved from the practical experience of my subordinate commanders. It is the use of light aircraft of the L-5 or any other model to conduct daily flights planned by the operations section, by the S-3. By the flight plan, the pilot will observe certain specific points, houses or inhabited areas occupied or used by our informants on the ground.

At these places, the pilots watch for pre-arranged signals which give the intelligence we are seeking. These signals are such things as an open gate, an animal tied in the southeast corner of a yard, two windows of a house open. Those three signals would indicate three essential elements of information. The two open windows indicate that there is an enemy concentration approximately 200 strong in the area. The position of the animal tied in the yard in relation to the house indicates the direction of the enemy concentration. The open gate indicates that the enemy are planning to stay in this area.

If one has similar information from two or three points, the information is not only confirmed but the position of the enemy concentration can be pinpointed with considerable accuracy.

This system is susceptible to great variation and possesses infinite flexibility. Certain obvious precautions are necessary. The flight path of the airplane must be such as not to identify the informant. Usually this is best achieved by laying out a flight path which covers the entire area, and having the pilot fly the

same route every time. Signals must be the unobtrusive and natural-appearing use of normal items in the area and must conform to the customs of the area. Your informant can't have his windows open when all the windows in the other houses around are closed. He can't spread out his laundry to dry on a Wednesday if everybody in that area does their laundry only on Monday.

The advantages of this system are manifold. On one occasion I had to pull one battalion out of its area of responsibility and move it far away to assist in a task force operation, leaving only one company to control the area. Had it not been for the help of our two light planes and our ground spotters, it would have been impossible for this remaining company to prevent Huk attacks in the area.

Query: (Maj. Bohannon). Col. Valeriano, in your discussion of large unit infiltration you emphasized that this activity should only be employed if there was an appropriate opportunity; i.e., when undeveloped or long disrupted communications among enemy units would allow a fair chance for the infiltrators cover story to stand up.

I know that you trained a unit for a possible large unit infiltration, a "Force X," which you did not use that way, yet found very valuable. Since we believe that it is highly desirable to have such a group trained, to seize upon opportunities which may arise, I believe it would be helpful if you would discuss Charley Company.

Answer: (Col. Valeriano). I would be glad to, because I believe that the "Force X" training we gave Charley Company (of the 7th BCT) was as fully rewarding in results from the way we used those people as if they have been used on large unit infiltration. In fact, I think the history of that operation will demonstrate the value of intensive training in enemy modus operandi in almost any counter-guerrilla operations.

First, I would like to tell you the circumstances leading up to the training of Charley Company. On 20 July 1950, the writer took over the command of the 7th BCT AFP, with

headquarters at Pinaod, Bulacan. The organization was recently activated and was found to be partially organized, half trained, and deficiently armed and equipped. It was also found that the battalion was dangerously exposed by dispersion into small garrisons which were attacked many times by superior Huk forces.

Bulacan province boasted of the best organized and best armed Huk regional command (Regional Command 3) under the leadership of Jesus Lava, a veteran Communist guerrilla leader. This Huk commander had held the initiative even before the 7th BCT was deployed in the province (20 June 1950).

The first action taken was the concentration of troop units for reorganization and training. A motorized rifle company (C Company) was organized as a mobile force to cover the province while other battalion units underwent four weeks of intensive training. This arrangement was found just enough to contain the Huks but did not deliver any hard blow.

We were fortunate in acquiring the services of veteran officers, who served with the Nenita and the Pampanga PC Command. Capt. Marana (Force X) was detailed as S-3, with Capt. Justiniano (formerly S-3 of the Nenita) assigned as BCT S-2. Between these two officers, a plan was submitted which substantially called for a repeat of Operation "PANDEMONIUM," which was staged so successfully in 1948, and which I described in my talk this morning. In spite of the fact that the Huks were well aware that Force X type units might be employed, especially under the auspices of the undersigned, the sponsoring officers earnestly believed that a Force X organization might come in "handy" in the immediate future.

Capt. Marana was assigned Project Officer for the organization, training, and equipping of the force. Charley Company, 7th BCT was the unanimous choice, it being the only unit that had not undergone the regular re-training program I had instituted. Also, it was noted that the company had young aggressive and experienced officers, who were

guerrilla leaders during World War II during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Charley Company was carefully screened, secretly, and the physically deficient were reassigned. Replacements came from volunteers coming from other battalion units. Training commenced immediately, after construction of shelters were completed at a secret training base located about seven miles southeast of BCT headquarters, deep in the Sierra Madre. It was already foreseen by S-2, that unlike Force X of the Pampanga Command, Charley Company would eventually be employed in the Sierra Madre mountain ranges.

The training course lasted about eight weeks, because the personnel involved were mostly AFP recruits who did not have as much combat experience as had the members of Force X in 1949. Essentially, the following training subjects were covered:

1. Weapons (Including jungle knife; bow and arrow; brass knuckles).
2. Marksmanship (Specialization on sniping and hip-firing).
3. Pathfinding & Tracking (Study of animal and human tracks; elimination of tracks and spoor, etc.).
4. Map Reading & Sketching (Terrain appreciation and exercises).
5. Elementary Astronomy (Ready identification of constellations, directions during darkness; dead reckoning, etc.).
6. Jungle & Field Craft (Study of local vegetation and materials for human comfort, food resources, medical values, etc.).
7. Escape & Evasion (Methods applicable in the locality).
8. Caches & Field Storage (Methods to cache rations, weapons, radio sets and military equipment).

9. Pyrotechnics (Types and kind of pyrotechnics, uses; deceptions, etc., field expedients, etc.).
10. Explosives & Demolitions ("Home-made" bombs).
11. Basic Training Subjects (First Aid, Personal Hygiene, Care of Weapons and Equipment, Camouflage, Scouting and Patrolling, etc.).
12. Physical Training (Including contact sports, unarmed combat, cross-country running, swimming, rope climbing, and gymnastics).

As in the training of Force X, Charley Company personnel were not allowed to use any regular issue military equipment, accoutrements and general issue articles while in the training base. The men were encouraged to supply themselves with locally procured gourds for drinking water, whittled sticks to serve as toothbrushes, etc. Forced to live like Huk guerrillas, the men received lectures of Huk propaganda during meal times or at any opportunity. Dress, speech, customs, known Huk habits and practices, were emphasized, with the men constantly under the critical eye of tested and trusted ex-Huks, who furnished around the clock coaching and instruction.

Daily training schedules followed the daily routine of the Nenita unit, whose activities commenced at sundown, generally terminating at noon. Field exercises were given during hours of darkness. Outdoor lectures were given during daylight hours. This method inured the men, developing "night vision," and teaching them to move with confidence and speed across rough terrain. Courage, confidence and stamina tests were always injected in these exercises, which often lasted for as long as 50 hours without rations being issued to the students.

As a whole, the unanimous evaluation was that Charley Company was better trained and prepared than Force X of 1948, for large unit infiltration missions which might be assigned. This was because of the experience factors already gained, the longer period of training, and better training supervision.

Charley Company, 7th BCT never had the opportunity of being employed in the same manner as Force X. The overall situation in

the entire campaign area since the termination of the training up to the end of the Huk campaign in 1954 did not in any instance offer the "proper setup" to make up a "plausible" cover story for a strange force trying to link up with Huk units who were already wary and still smarting from the lessons they learned from the PC in 1948. Further, there were several tragic-comedy incidents which occurred when other BCT commanders threw into the field their versions of Force X in their respective areas. They employed troops who were not trained nor prepared to perform the mission successfully. Several mistaken encounters took place between AFP units, most often between units of the same BCT.

However, after a month and a half, we found several promising situations wherein squads and sections of Charley Company were successfully employed. These missions were generally long range or deep reconnaissance missions in the Sierra Madre. The great amount of intelligence gained from these reconnaissance units were made the basis of 7th BCT operations (Talaguto, Biac Na Bata, Mount Tacbuhan) between 1950 to 1952, which resulted in the complete destruction of Huk Regional Command 3, the first major Huk command that was deactivated by Taruc.

Broken up into small teams ranging between four to twelve men, the units were assigned areas to cover. Though most of these units were not equipped with radios, they managed to submit daily situation reports on their areas which made it possible for headquarters 7th BCT to be well informed of enemy concentrations, movements and activities. These units were capable of operating in disguise or in uniform as their situation would demand at a given moment. There were many instances where a six-man team did not hesitate to attack a village sheltering no less than 20 to 30 Huks. By means of bluff and skillful use of flares at night, small units were able to contain or drive off large Huk concentrations. The training had also cultivated the resourcefulness and imagination of the students.

About mid-1951, due to high level policies of assisting local police forces and armed civilian bodies for local security purposes, in collaboration with the PC and BCTs, Charley Company was concentrated for an additional one week of instruction at BCT Headquarters. The instruction given during this period substantially resembled that given present-day Special Forces units.

Twenty-four man teams were organized to perform the following missions with municipal police forces and civilian guards in the 7th BCT area:

- (1) Serve as adviser-instructors (except in the case of local civilian guard units, NCOs take command).
- (2) Screen all personnel and submit reports. Also, take inventory of all weapons on hand. Excess to be turned in to Headquarters 7th BCT.
- (3) Submit training program (limited to basic subjects only).
- (4) Submit plan of local defense, including security measures, etc.
- (5) Function as sub-agents of the 7th BCT Civil Affairs Officer.

As can be seen, these missions were elastic, leaving many things to the initiative, energy and dedication of team leaders to assist local authorities and the populace.

The new approach drew immediate response from the general public, who felt for the first time since 1945 that they were active participants in the anti-Huk campaign. Because of better control and discipline being maintained, tested civilian guard units were enlarged and given better weapons. Relatives of civilian guards became potent anti-Huk spies in spite of lack of instruction. The whole operation snow-balled into entire communities backing up their own home guard organizations against the Huks. Much later, we found team leaders marching their home guard units to work on community projects, such as digging community wells, drainage canals, or assisting in the rice harvest. Team members were active in local socials for civic purposes, frequently winding up by delivering anti-Communist speeches.

7th BCT records show many instances where Charley Company teams led aggressive home guard units against Huk units traveling through their areas, most often with a high degree of success. Raids and ambushes were successfully

staged against unsuspecting Huks so that large areas were considered "dangerous" for Huks to travel. This also meant cutting off supplies for the Huks, a requirement which was already critical for them in 1951.

The crowning achievement of Charley Company units was their collaboration with the S-2 Section (all ex-nenita), MIS "A" & "B" Teams (partly manned by Nenita men) in breaking up the Pandi Refuge Area. The project officer in charge was Major Justiniano, who was partly responsible for the training of all personnel involved. The operation involved was titled "COVER UP."

The municipality of Pandi (the municipal capital also bears the same name) covers all back routes to Manila, sparsely populated and is not as well developed as the surrounding areas. For some time since 1950, the S-2 Section had consistently noted that Pandi was a "quiet" sector, while neighboring municipal areas drew high operational priorities due to frequent Huk troop concentrations movements and other guerrilla activities. Personal interviews with municipal authorities drew blank stares from these individuals who invariably admitted nothing about Huks or guerrilla activities in the town of Pandi or the municipal area itself.

On the other hand, G-2 reports indicated that Huk couriers, or VIPs were accustomed to travelling through Pandi on commercial busses without being molested or investigated. Huk wounded were allegedly sheltered and convalescing in Pandi, as at about this time the home guards and police forces in other municipalities around Pandi were on the offensive against Huk foraging parties. To cite one instance, an encounter took place between a civilian guard unit led by a 7th BCT MIS operative and a 15-man Huk band at SAPANG PALAY, a village about eight miles east of Pandi. During this encounter, two Huks were killed. The Huk band fled westward with the home guards in pursuit. The withdrawing Huks completely disappeared leaving no trace. An elaborate report was submitted on this particular incident.

Operation "Cover Up" was decided. Four teams (combined MIS and Charley Company) with radio sets were organized, consisting of six to eight men, with the ranking NCO in charge. Later six more teams of the same composition were added. Assigned missions were

varied, but essentially, the teams were required to penetrate the suspect area secretly and report all observations on the inhabitants by radio. Contact frequency was every other hour on the hour. S-2 rented a house in the town of Pandi and hired a family to occupy the house as cover for MIS operatives. The latter group was assigned to effect surveillance on the municipal executive and the town chief of police, already held suspect by S-2.

Because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Huklandia since 1950, it was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely if there were good grounds. On the theory that the populace were being subjected to a deep-covered "terrorism," it was recommended that several individuals be "snatched" and brought to 7th BCT Headquarters for interrogation, hoping that these individuals, after being convinced of the protective motives of the government under skillful handling, would tell the truth about Pandi. The recommendations were approved and appropriate orders were issued.

The teams were able to snatch no less than 70 individuals from different points of the area without being detected by the inhabitants. Suspicions about hidden power of the Huks in Pandi grew, since in no single case did either the mayor or the chief of police report the disappearances of the PC or to the 7th BCT.

With good treatment and frequent appeals to the detainees, (the Secretary of National Defense participating), to cooperate with the government and promises of monetary rewards, the knowledgeable eventually came up with startling information. However, all detainees agreed on their fear of Huk reprisals. Allegations from detainee-affiants were radioed back to field teams covering Pandi for verification or confirmation. Their statements were carefully classified and analyzed and compared with past intelligence files as far back as 1948. Out of these painstaking efforts, S-2 was able to establish the following intelligence pattern:

- (1) Pandi was important to the Huk organizations in Luzon due to its proximity to the city of Manila, the center of underground activity of the Communist Party of the country;


- (2) Therefore, it was important that Pandi should not draw the attention of the AFP or PC. In order not to be garrisoned by the AFP or PC, the area must be kept a "quiet" sector, prohibiting the staging of raids, ambushes, or any Huk activity that will draw troops.
- (3) It was commonly known in the area that Huk troop concentrations are prohibited in the area. The area, as a matter of fact, was supposed to be avoided by traveling units. Foraging was done only through supply agents specifically appointed by the municipal mayor. Direct approach to houses or inhabitants was punishable by death.
- (4) Huk wounded or fugitives desirous to seek shelter in Pandi must first get proper permission from their superiors, who in turn would make proper arrangements with Pandi authorities.
- (5) Huk couriers traveling to or from Manila would receive briefings from Pandi Huk intelligence officers on the current situation at their destinations, given pass words, and taught new counter-signs.
- (6) Pandi inhabitants adjudged "reactionary" or recalcitrants were not disciplined within the municipal area, but in accordance with long-standing practice, secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandi. Several instances were cited where the mayor and the police chief conspired in the Communist's kidnap-murder of individuals whom the Huk high command ordered to be punished.
- (7) During the past years, PC garrisons had occasionally been maintained in Pandi. Although, because of their small size and poor security, they could easily have been wiped out by local Huks, these garrisons were left unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals.
- (8) Names of individuals were submitted as active Huk agents in Pandi, starting off with the mayor's name, policemen, rich and prosperous businessmen, etc.

With several sworn statements, each statement corroborating others, criminal actions were instituted against all individuals cited or involved.

The liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge area near Manila, which in a large way hamstrung their clandestine activities in the city and their liaison and control lines with their active field units in Central Luzon. Travel for Huk couriers and VIPs to and from Manila became more difficult.

I could go on almost indefinitely telling you about the accomplishments of individuals and small units formed from Charley Company. As a matter of fact, some of these men are still in the field against the Huk. I believe, however, that I have said enough to show you the value of trained soldiers who are equally well trained as enemy guerrillas. Thorough knowledge of the enemy not only permits penetration, it greatly facilitates identification, prediction of enemy actions, and the training of other personnel who must be prepared to fight, particularly the training of such groups as civilian guards.

DAHIL SA MGA SA PILIPINAS



KAYAT NAGUMAP SA
ANTIPULO R ZAL ANG
TUNAY NA KASAYSAYANG
HARDIE