

IV. Organization, Direction, Command, and Control of the Attack on South Viet-Nam Are Centered in Hanoi

The VC military and political apparatus in South Viet-Nam is an extension of an elaborate military and political structure in North Viet-Nam which directs and supplies it with the tools for conquest. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government in South Viet-Nam and of bringing all Viet-Nam under Communist rule.

A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Political direction and control of the Viet Cong is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e. the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the Viet Cong.

Overall direction of the VC movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the Central Committee a special Reunification Department has been established. This has replaced the "Committee for Supervision of the South" mentioned in intelligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad strategy for the movement to conquer South Viet-Nam.

Until March 1962 there were two principal administrative divisions in the VC structure in the South. One was the Interzone of South-Central Viet-Nam (sometimes called Interzone 5); the other was the Nambo Region. In a 1962 reorganization these were merged into one, called the Central Office for South Viet-Nam. The Central Committee, through its Reunification Department, issues directives to the Central Office, which translates them into specific orders for the appropriate subordinate command.

Under the Central Office are six regional units (V through IX) plus the special zone of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh. A regional committee responsible to the Central Office directs VC activities in each region. Each regional committee has specialized units responsible for liaison, propaganda, training, personnel, subversive activities, espionage, military bases, and the like.

Below each regional committee are similarly structured units at the province and district levels. At the base of the Communist pyramid are the individual party cells, which may be organized on a geographic base or within social or occupational groups. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined mainly by the extent of VC control over the area concerned.

1. The "Liberation Front"

The National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam is the screen behind which the Communists carry out their program of conquest. It is the creature of the Communist Government in Hanoi. As noted above the Communist Party in the North demanded establishment of such a "front" three months before its formation was actually announced in December 1960. It was designed to create the illusion that the Viet Cong campaign of subversion was truly indigenous to South Viet-Nam rather than an externally directed Communist plan.

The front has won support primarily from the Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats the propaganda themes of Hanoi and Peiping. When its representatives travel abroad, they do so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsorship.¹ The front's program copies that of the Lao Dong Party in North Viet-Nam.

¹ Pictures of North Vietnamese passports and travel documents used by front officials are in appendix F.

In late 1961, in still another effort to conceal the extent of Communist domination of the front, the Communists announced formation of a new Marxist political unit, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This mechanism provided a way to explain the Communist presence in the front while at the same time making it appear that the Communist voice was only one of several affiliated organizations in the front. The PRP itself claimed direct descent from the original Indo-chinese Communist Party and from the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.²

B. MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Military affairs of the Viet Cong are the responsibility of High Command of the People's Army of North Viet-Nam and the Ministry of Defense, under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party. These responsibilities include operational plans, assignments of individuals and regular units, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six military regions are the same as those of the VC political organization.

The military structure of the Viet Cong is an integral part of the political machinery that controls every facet of VC activity in South Viet-Nam under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political headquarters from the Central Office down to the village has a military component which controls day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each military headquarters has a political element, an individual or a small staff. This meshing of political and military activity is designed to insure the closest cooperation in support of the total Communist mission. It also gives assurance of political control over the military.

Associated with the Central Office, believed to be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct contact with its principal military units in the South.

² For evidence that the People's Revolutionary Party in the South and the Communist Lao Dong Party in the North are one Party, see appendix G.

In addition to its supervision of the general military effort of the VC, the military section of the Central Office is believed to have direct command of two regimental headquarters and a number of security companies.

The hard core of the VC military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military and one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

The size of the Viet Cong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Viet Cong have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. And the main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at about 35,000, whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

The main force battalions are well armed with a variety of effective weapons including 75-mm. recoilless rifles and 81-82-mm. mortars. The companies and smaller units are equally well equipped and have 57-mm. recoilless rifles and 60-mm. mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the Viet Cong have at least 130 81-mm. mortars and 300 60-mm. mortars. There is no precise estimate for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands, but it is believed that most main force units are equipped with them. In at least one recent action the Viet Cong employed a 75-mm. pack howitzer. This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500 yards, will increase the Viet Cong capabilities to launch long-range attacks against many stationary targets in the country.

Supporting the main force units of the Viet Cong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each. These troops receive only half pay, which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a living.

Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the district are the part-time, village-based guerrillas.



The smoking ruins of a Cao Dai temple in Tan Hanh village, Vinh Long Province, burned down by VC terrorists on Aug. 10, 1964. The 64-year-old caretaker died in the flames.

They are available for assignment by higher headquarters and are used for harassment and sabotage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units of the approach of any force of the legal government. They provide a pool for recruitment into the VC district forces.

The record shows that many of the village guerrillas are dragooned into service with the Viet Cong. Some are kidnaped; others are threatened; still others join to prevent their families from being harmed. Once in the Viet Cong net, many are reluctant to leave for fear of punishment by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists.

Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. He was a member of the Village Civil Defense force in his home village in Kien Giang province. In March 1960, he was kidnaped by the Viet Cong and kept a prisoner in the highlands for one month. There he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoctrination. He was returned to his village but kept under close observation and steady pressure. Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC.

Later, he was transferred to a Communist military unit in another province. After learning of the Government's "Open Arms" program, he decided to defect from the VC. In May 1964, he walked into a Government outpost and asked for protection.

Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnaped for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses and taken the money and valuables of all on board.

For the most part, the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals, isolated or poorly defended outposts, and small centers of population. They have mercilessly killed or kidnaped thousands of village chiefs and other local officials.

But over the past year the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Their ability to operate on a battalion-level or larger has substantially increased.

C. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (C.R.A.) (Cuc Nghien-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Viet-Nam. This agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese armed forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the C.R.A. has become available from captured Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons, but it is possible to describe the C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

C.R.A. headquarters directs a number of special centers for overseas operations. One such center maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas.

It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

A second special center is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Viet-Nam. This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Viet-Nam, is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the South by sea. It also cooperates with the North Vietnamese army in planning and carrying out infiltration. The C.R.A. maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.

Inside South Viet-Nam the Viet Cong have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Viet Cong units in the South.

Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Viet-Nam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations. Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the C.R.A.

Each of the main centers operating under C.R.A. headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Viet Cong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The C.R.A. maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Viet Cong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.¹

¹ Charts of the VC organizational structure are in appendix H.

V. A Brief History of Hanoi's Campaign of Aggression Against South Viet-Nam

While negotiating an end to the Indochina War at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in Southeast Asia. When Viet-Nam was partitioned, thousands of carefully selected party members were ordered to remain in place in the South and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use. Guerrilla fighters rejoined their families to await the party's call. Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain hideouts. The majority—an estimated 90,000—were moved to North Viet-Nam.

Hanoi's original calculation was that all of Viet-Nam would fall under its control without resort to force. For this purpose, Communist cadres were ordered to penetrate official and non-official agencies, to propagandize and sow confusion, and generally to use all means short of open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions and to weaken South Viet-Nam's Government and social fabric.

South Viet-Nam's refusal to fall in with Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came as a heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Viet Cong subversion and to expose Communist agents. Morale in the Communist organization in the South dropped sharply. Defections were numerous.

Among South Vietnamese, hope rose that their nation could have a peaceful and independent future, free of Communist domination. The country went to work. The years after 1955 were a period of steady progress and growing prosperity.

Food production levels of the prewar years were reached and surpassed. While per capita food output was dropping 10 percent in the North from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 percent in the South. By 1963, it had risen 30 percent—despite the disruption in the countryside caused by intensified Viet Cong military attacks and terrorism. The authorities in the North admitted openly to continuing annual failures to achieve food production goals.

Production of textiles increased in the South more than 20 percent in one year (1958). In the same year, South Viet-Nam's sugar crop increased more than 100 percent. Despite North Viet-Nam's vastly larger industrial complex, South Viet-Nam's per capita gross national product in 1960 was estimated at \$110 a person while it was only \$70 in the North.

More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from Communist rule in the North were successfully settled in South Viet-Nam. An agrarian reform program was instituted. The elementary school population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and 1960. And so it went—a record of steady improvement in the lives of the people. It was intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi; under peaceful conditions, the South was outstripping the North. They were losing the battle of peaceful competition and decided to use violence and terror to gain their ends.

After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and expanded its covert political and military machinery in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained personnel from party ranks in the North. Military units and political cells were enlarged and were given new leaders, equipment, and intensified training. Recruitment was pushed. In short, Hanoi and its forces in the South prepared to take by force and violence what they had failed to achieve by other means.

By 1958 the use of terror by the Viet Cong increased appreciably. It was used both to win prestige and to back up demands for support from the people, support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to produce. It was also designed to embarrass the Government in Saigon and raise doubts about its ability to maintain internal order and to assure the personal security of its people. From 1959 through 1961, the pace of Viet Cong terrorism and armed attacks accelerated substantially.

The situation at the end of 1961 was so grave that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam asked the United States for increased military assistance. That request was met. Meantime, the program of strategic hamlets, designed to improve



The wreckage of a civilian bus destroyed by a Viet Cong mine on Mar. 22, 1964, in Long An Province; 22 civilian passengers, including 6 children, were killed in the incident.

the peasant's livelihood and give him some protection against Viet Cong harassment and pressure, was pushed energetically.

But the Viet Cong did not stand still. To meet the changing situation, they tightened their organization and adopted new tactics, with increasing emphasis on terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks by small groups. They also introduced from the North technicians in fields such as armor and antiaircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the regular guerrilla forces.

The military and insurgency situation was complicated by a quite separate internal political struggle in South Viet-Nam, which led in November 1963 to the removal of the Diem government and its replacement with a new one. Effective power was placed in the hands of a Military Revolutionary Council. There have been a number of changes in the leadership and composition of the Government in Saigon in the ensuing period.

These internal developments and distractions gave the Viet Cong an invaluable opportunity, and they took advantage of it. Viet Cong agents did what they could to encourage disaffection and to exploit demonstrations in Saigon and elsewhere. In the countryside the Communists consolidated their hold over some areas and enlarged their mili-

tary and political apparatus by increased infiltration. Increasingly they struck at remote outposts and the most vulnerable of the new strategic hamlets and expanded their campaign of aggressive attacks, sabotage, and terror.

Any official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Viet Cong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings, the Viet Cong succeeded in closing hundreds of schools and interrupting the education of tens of thousands of youngsters.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Viet Cong with needed medical supplies. The Communists have encouraged people in rural areas to oppose the Government's antimalaria teams, and some of the workers have been killed. Village and town offices, police stations, and agricultural research stations are high on the list of preferred targets for the Viet Cong.

In 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other Government officials were killed outright by the Viet Cong and 1,131 were kidnaped. More than 1,350 civilians were killed in bombings



The maternity hospital of My Phuoc Tay in Dinh Tuong Province, destroyed by Viet Cong terrorists on Apr. 8, 1964

and other acts of sabotage. And at least 8,400 civilians were kidnaped by the Viet Cong.¹

Today the war in Viet-Nam has reached new levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to conquer the South has grown, not diminished. Military men, technicians, political organizers, propagandists, and secret agents have been infiltrating into the Republic of Viet-Nam from the North in growing numbers. The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. Communications links with Hanoi are extensive. Despite the heavy casualties of 3 years of fighting, the hard-core VC force is considerably larger now than it was at the end of 1961.

The Government in Saigon has undertaken vigorous action to meet the new threat. The United States and other free countries have increased their assistance to the Vietnamese Government and people. Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Viet-Nam in 1964, and he promised the Vietnamese: "We shall remain at your side until the aggression from the North has been defeated,

until it has been completely rooted out and this land enjoys the peace which it deserves."

President Johnson has repeatedly stressed that the United States' goal is to see peace secured in Southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace."

Though it has been apparent for years that the regime in Hanoi was conducting a campaign of conquest against South Viet-Nam, the Government in Saigon and the Government of the United States both hoped that the danger could be met within South Viet-Nam itself. The hope that any widening of the conflict might be avoided was stated frequently.

The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with greater violence. They apparently interpreted restraint as indicating lack of will. Their efforts were pressed with greater vigor and armed attacks and incidents of terror multiplied.

Clearly the restraint of the past was not providing adequately for the defense of South Viet-Nam against Hanoi's open aggression. It was mutually agreed between the Governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States that further

¹ For additional details of VC terrorism, see appendix I.

means for providing for South Viet-Nam's defense were required. Therefore, air strikes have been made against some of the military assembly points and supply bases from which North Viet-Nam is conducting its aggression against the South. These strikes constitute a limited response fitted to the aggression that produced them.

Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its intervention in the South, or until effective steps are taken to maintain peace and security in the area, the Governments of South Viet-Nam and the United States will continue necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Viet-Nam.

VI. Conclusion

The evidence presented in this report could be multiplied many times with similar examples of the drive of the Hanoi regime to extend its rule over South Viet-Nam.

The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North Viet-Nam has intensified its efforts in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. It proves that Hanoi continues to press its systematic program of armed aggression into South Viet-Nam. This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva accords of 1954 and of 1962 to which North Viet-Nam is a party. It shatters the peace of Southeast Asia. It is a fundamental threat to

the freedom and security of South Viet-Nam.

The people of South Viet-Nam have chosen to resist this threat. At their request, the United States has taken its place beside them in their defensive struggle.

The United States seeks no territory, no military bases, no favored position. But we have learned the meaning of aggression elsewhere in the post-war world, and we have met it.

If peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam, the United States will be ready at once to reduce its military involvement. But it will not abandon friends who want to remain free. It will do what must be done to help them. The choice now between peace and continued and increasingly destructive conflict is one for the authorities in Hanoi to make.

APPENDIX A

Findings of the International Control Commission

(See Introduction, page 1)

On June 2, 1962, the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam (I.C.C.) sent a special report to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union in their role as Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. The I.C.C. is composed of delegates from India (chairman), Canada, and Poland.

In its report the I.C.C. noted the following findings of the Commission's Legal Committee:

Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of supporting, organising and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

In examining the complaints and the supporting material in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the fur-

ther conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN [People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

The I.C.C. report then stated:

The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances. The Polish delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case.


The full text of the I.C.C. report is contained in a publication, "Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China" issued by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State on July 2, 1962.

APPENDIX B


Infiltration of Military Personnel From North Viet-Nam Into South Viet-Nam

(See section I, B.)

1. Map showing the route over which Huynh Duc Tha, deputy commander of a Viet Cong company, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam from the North in Mar.-Apr. 1962. Tha surrendered to Government forces in July 1963.



2. Map showing the infiltration route of VC Master Sergeant Tran Huu Hung, who was taken prisoner in June 1963.



APPENDIX C

Detail on Military Infiltration With Case Studies

(See section I, B and C.)

The following table shows the scale of infiltration of military personnel from North Viet-Nam into the South since 1959. The confirmed list is based on information on infiltration groups from at least two independent sources.

Year	Confirmed	Estimated additional	Total
1959-60	1,800	2,700	4,500
1961	3,750	1,650	5,400
1962	5,400	7,000	12,400
1963	4,200	3,200	7,400
1964	4,400	3,000	7,400
Total	19,550	17,550	37,100

Photographs and brief case histories of typical Viet Cong who were sent into South Viet-Nam by the authorities in Hanoi follow.

Name: Le Van Thanh

Alias: Huu Tam


Date and place of birth: July 12, 1936, Hoa Hao hamlet, Cat Tai village, Phu Cat district (Binh Dinh)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Lt., formerly platoon leader of signal platoon of 3d Bn., 90th Regt., 324th Div.

VC position in South Viet-Nam: 1 platoon leader of signal platoon of 95th Bn., 2d Regt., 5th Inter-Region

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Departed Nov. 27, 1961, arrived Do Xa station early Feb. 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied to Government at Nhon Loc post, Nghia Hanh district (Quang Ngai) May 24, 1962



Name: La Thanh

Alias: Nguyen Ba Tong - La Giau

Date and place of birth: 1928, Can Tho city (Phong Dinh)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sr. sgt., formerly squad leader in charge of construction of barracks for 338th Div.

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Squad leader, 8th Squad, 3d Platoon, 3d Co., 218B Bn. (War Zone D)

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed Apr. 4, 1962, arrived War Zone D early Aug. 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Cau Song Be (bridge) post Sept. 8, 1962, with 1 MAS 36



Name: Le Van Quyen

Alias: Ho Hai, Hong Thanh

Date and place of birth: 1929, Tan Binh Than village, Cho Gao district (My Tho)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Lt., formerly assigned to 338th Brigade as instructor on heavy weapons such as 57 mm. recoilless rifle and machinegun

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 2d Co., Infiltration Group 15

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed Apr. 3, 1962, arrived Suoi Da (War Zone D) Sept. 10, 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Hieu Liem district (Phuoc Thanh) Oct. 7, 1962



Name: Nguyen Van Do

Party name: Thanh Minh

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Thuan


Date and place of birth: 1923, Thuan Giao village, Lai Thieu district (Binh Duong)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sr. capt. (Bn. comdr.) 1st Bn., 338th Brigade

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Subject was to be appointed comdr. of Phuoc Tuy Province Main Force Battalion

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Comdr. of Infiltration Group H. 26; departed Xuan Mai, Ha Dong (North Viet-Nam) July 4, 1963; arrived Ban Me Thuot Oct. 23, 1963

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Ban Don post, Ban Me Thuot, Oct. 23, 1963, while guiding Group H.26 to Ha Yen Zone



Name: Nguyen Thanh Phi

Party name: Hung Phuong

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Tu

Date and place of birth: Nov. 16, 1926, Thanh Van village, Thanh Chuong district (Nghe An)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Doctor, chief of internal disease section, Tiep Viet Hospital

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Doctor, health team leader, 5th Region base construction group (Do Xa)

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Mar. 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Armed Forces May 4, 1963, with 1 12mm. Colt pistol and 5 rounds



Name: Le Van Net

Party name: Le lung Tien

Infiltration alias: Le Na

Date and place of birth: 1924, Tan Hiep village, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Discharged Lt., served in Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) with grade of sr. sgt.

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Sr. sgt., 6th Squad, 2d Platoon, Infiltration Group H.26

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Late June 1963 with Infiltration Group H.26

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured Nov. 16, 1963, by inhabitants in strategic hamlet in Ban Me Thuot (Darlac) with 1 Communist Chinese rifle and 70 rounds



Name: Van Cong Khanh

Party name: Pham Tien

Date and place of birth: 1924, An Hoi village, Chau Thanh district (Kien Hoa)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Discharged and reassigned to Co Dinh chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) as sr. sgt.

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Aspirant, leader of 7th Squad, 3d Platoon, 608th Engineer Co. subordinate to Hdqtrs. Region 7

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Group 49, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam Mar. 18, 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured Nov. 23, 1962, in Bung Dia hamlet



Name: Nguyen Thanh Hoa

Party name: Quoc

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Quoc Trung

Date and place of birth: 1917, Phong Coc village, Ha Nam canton (Quang Yen)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Capt., discharged and reassigned to Chi Ne agricultural camp May 1957

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Comdr., 4th Main Force Battalion

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 52; departed Xuan Mai Apr. 13, 1961, arrived about Aug. 1961

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Armed Forces with 1 PA 38 (pistol) in Quon Long (Dinh Tuong) Aug. 1962



Name: Tran van Khoa

Alias: Tran Hong Hai


Date and place of birth: 1935, Giong Gach hamlet, An Hiep village, Ba Tri district, Ben Tre Province (Kien Hoa)

Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sgt., formerly driver of Transportation Group 3 of (Hanoi) Logistical Bureau

VC position in South Viet-Nam: Member of 46th Infiltration Co.; cover designation V.2 (infiltrated unit)

Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied the 46th Infiltration Co.; departed for South Viet-Nam Apr. 17, 1962

Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Vietnamese Rangers in nmbush (after being wounded) along with 1 MAS 36 July 7, 1962, in Phuoc Long Province



APPENDIX D

List of Communist Weapons Captured in South Viet-Nam

(See section 11.)

On January 29, 1964, the Government of Viet-Nam submitted to the International Control Commission a list of weapons and other military equipment which had been captured from the Viet Cong. The weapons and equipment came from Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam and obviously had been introduced clandestinely into the country in support of the Viet Cong campaign of conquest directed by Hanoi.

I. CHINESE COMMUNIST ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
75-mm. recoilless rifle	1	9/10/63 . .	An Xuyen Province
	1	12/2-6/63 . .	An Xuyen Province
	1	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	3		
57-mm. recoilless gun	1	11/25/62 . .	Phuoc Chau in Quang Tin (1 gun and 7 gun carriages)
		12/5/62 . .	Phu Bon (1 gun carriage)
	2	8/31/63 . .	Province of Quang Ngai
Total	3 guns (8 gun carriages)		
Shells for 75-mm. gun (shells bear markings in Chinese characters. On some shells, markings were scratched out and replaced by "American" markings.)	8	11/24/63 . .	Province of An Xuyen
	120	12/22/63 . .	Operation Duc Thang at Dinh Tuong
Total	128		
Shells for 57-mm. gun	49	11/25/62 . .	Phuoc Chau, Province of Quang Tin
	8	2/20/63 . .	Viet Cong attack on the post of Ben Heo (Tay Ninh)
	33	5/24/63 . .	On a Viet Cong vessel on the Bassac River
	6	8/31/63 . .	Quang Ngai
	1	10/8/63 . .	Province of Binh Dinh
	58	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	155		

I. CHINESE COMMUNIST ORIGIN—Continued

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
80-mm. mortar	1	3/25/63 . . .	Province of Tay Ninh
60-mm. mortar	1	1/7/63 . . .	Phuoc Thanh
	2	12/22/63 . . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	3		
Shells for 60-mm. mortar	18	9/10/63 . . .	Province of An Xuyen
	165	12/22/63 . . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	183		
90-mm. bazooka	1	12/22/63 . . .	Dinh Tuong.
Caliber 27-mm. rocket launcher . .	2	6/10/62 . . .	Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Duc.
Total	3		
Caliber 7.92-mm. model 08 Maxim machinegun	2	9/10/63 . . .	Province of An Xuyen
	4	12/21/63 . . .	Chuong Thien
Total	6		
MP-82 rocket	142	4/24/63 . . .	Quang Ngai
TNT explosives	365 charges	6/13/62 . . .	Quang Duc
	43	11/25/62 . . .	Phuoc Chau (Quang Tin)
	29	5/7/63 . . .	Can Tho
	140	12/22/63 . . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	577 charges		
Red phosphorous	5 kg.	4/19/63 . . .	Province of Kien Phong
Potassium chlorate	17 tons	Sept. '62 . . .	On a Viet Cong vessel at Phu Quoc
	2 tons	4/19/63 . . .	Province of Kien Phong
	150 kg.	7/10-15/63 . . .	Phu Quoc
Total	19 tons 155 kg.		
Cartridges for 7.92-mm. machinegun.	100, 000	12/22/63 . . .	Dinh Tuong
Detonating fuses for 60-mm. mortar shell.	150	. . . do . . .	Do.

II. SOVIET ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
MP-82 rifle		5/10/62 . .	Binh Dinh
Launching cartridges do . .	Do.
Mossin Nagant carbine (with automatic bayonet).			
1		6/13/63 . .	Kien Phong
2		7/13/63 . .	Long An
5		7/20/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
7		9/8/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Total	15		
Rifles			
6		10/6/63 . .	Long An
1		10/19/63 .	Dinh Tuong
11		11/6/63 . .	Vinh Binh
1		11/17/63 .	Dinh Tuong
1		11/25/63 .	Hau Nghia
1		12/6/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
8		12/7/63 . .	Phong Dinh
1		12/12/63 .	Kien Tuong
1		12/13/63 .	An Xuyen
1		12/16/63 .	Kien Giang
1		. . . do . .	Ba Xuyen
3		. . . do . .	An Xuyen
1		12/17/63 .	Phong Dinh
1		12/20/63 .	Kien Hoa
6		12/21/63 .	Chuong Thien
2		12/22/63 .	Dinh Tuong
Total	46		
Automatic pistol	1	10/19/63 .	Phan Thiet
Grenades	5		Long An
Rifle cartridges	160,000	12/22/63 .	Dinh Tuong
Submachinegun (machine pistol) . .	2	9/23/63 . .	Long Xuyen

III. CZECH ORIGIN

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
7.65-mm. automatic pistol	1	1/2/63 . . .	On person of Viet Cong leader arrested at Phu Yen
K-50 submachinegun	2	11/25/62 . . .	Quang Tin
	1	11/29/62 . . .	Phuoc Long
	7	4/24/63 . . .	Quang Ngai
	5	5/9/63 . . .	Quang Tin
	2	7/11/63 . . .	Operation Hau Giang
	3	8/31/63 . . .	Quang Ngai
	1	9/8/63 . . .	Dinh Tuong
	1	9/16/63 . . .	Long An
	1	10/17/63 . . .	Quang Nam
	2	11/13/63 . . .	Phu Yen
	1	-----do-----	At Hué
	9	10/8/63 . . .	Binh Dinh
	1		Operation Phuoc Binh Thang
	1	12/20/63 . . .	Kien Hoa
	1	12/26/63 . . .	Cbuong Thien
	1	12/17/63 . . .	Long Xuyen
Total	40		
Rifles			
	9	9/10/63 . . .	An Xuyen
	1	10/19/63 . . .	Chuong Thien
	1	11/6/63 . . .	Ba Xuyen
	2	11/9/63 . . .	Chuong Thien
	3	11/13/63 . . .	Kien Giang
	1	11/17/63 . . .	Ba Xuyen
	2	11/26/63 . . .	Hau Nghia
	1	12/2/63 . . .	Phong Dinh
	6	12/21/63 . . .	Chuong Thien
Total	26		

III. CZECH ORIGIN—Continued

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Machinegun cartridges	14,000	12/22/63 . .	Dinh Tuong
Grenade launcher	1	7/14/63 . .	Long An
3.5 antitank bazooka	1	12/22/63 . .	Din Tuong

IV. (a) WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MODIFIED BY THE
REGULAR ARMY OF NORTH VIET-NAM

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Modified MAT-49.	16	11/25/62 . .	Quang Tin
	2	12/ 5/63 . .	Phu Bon
	6	11/13/63 . .	
Total		24	
12.7-mm. machinegun	2	11/24/63 . .	Operation at Due Hoa

IV. (b) MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MANUFACTURE

Uniform	12/21/62 . .	Phuoc Thanh
Helmets	10/8-10/63 . .	Kien Hoa
Socks	(No number given)	Phuoc Thanh
Sweaters (made in Ha Dong)	do	Do.
Belts (made in Hanoi)	do	Do.
Mess Kits (made in Haiphong)	do	Do.