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NORTH VIETNAM

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NHAN DAN COMMENTATOR REVIEWS U.S. NEGOTIATING POLICY

Hanoi in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0330 GMT 26 Feb 72 S

["Recent" NHAN DAN article by Nguoi Binh Luan--Commentator: "The Policy of Negotiating From a Strong Position"]

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[Text] For a long time after World War II, relying on the superiority of their nuclear weapons, the U.S. imperialists frenziedly opposed socialist countries, the national liberation movement and the international workers' movement. They intensively participated in the arms race and prepared themselves for a new world war in the hope of becoming master of the world. Their strategy during these years was to massively counterattack the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, attack the peoples struggling to liberate themselves and create world tension. Thinking they had absolute military superiority, they almost never mentioned negotiation.

Meanwhile, in the United Nations, they directed the voting machinery of U.S. lackey and allied governments--who were dependent on the United States--to pass U.S. resolutions. The Eisenhower-Dulles-Nixon administration, 1952-1960, sometimes mentioned negotiation, but openly described it as "a diplomatic policy bordering on war". With this strategy, the U.S. imperialists brazenly sabotaged various peace negotiations. However, they could not prevent the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina from yielding good results because the French colonialists' aggressive spirit had been broken and the French people were resolutely demanding an end to the war.

The balance of forces in the world quickly changed unfavorably for the U.S. imperialists as the socialist system was consolidated and developed, as the Chinese revolution became successful, as the Soviet Union made rapid progress in national defense, science and technology and as the national liberation movement rose vigorously. This situation forced the U.S. imperialists to alter their global strategy although their objective--to become master of the world--remained unchanged. To cope with the new situation, in the 1960's, Kennedy applied the "for the sake of peace" strategy and the military strategy of flexible response to the three types of war. Since then the Americans have stepped up negotiations and contacts in an attempt to achieve objectives they know they cannot achieve through military power.

In their Vietnam and Indochina policy, the U.S. imperialists' aggressive and colonialist design has remained consistent for several dozen years now. In 1953, Eisenhower-Nixon were determined to rule out any negotiated settlement. In 1954, they prepared a plan for armed intervention to save the French expeditionary troops at Dien Bien Phu. They brazenly sabotaged the Geneva conference on Indochina and when the sabotage plot failed, the U.S. Government called the conference a tragic disaster. In the middle of 1954, it presented the policy of preventing communist victory through the general election in Vietnam. According to this policy, the United States would play a direct role in eventually sabotaging the Geneva agreements. This policy was outlined in an instruction from U.S. Secretary of State Dulles. Because the general election would surely lead to the reunification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, it was most important for the Americans to delay it, the longer the better. Even President Eisenhower said that if an election were held--as the Geneva agreements stipulated--80 percent of the Vietnamese people would vote for Ho Chi Minh.

Under the Kennedy administration, 1961-63, the Americans engaged in a number of big power negotiations, but in South Vietnam they conducted a "special" war, strengthening the puppet army, increasing monetary and weapons aid and sending tens of thousands of U.S. advisors to command puppet troops to oppose the patriotic movement.

After Kennedy died and was succeeded by Johnson, the Americans increased their aggressive policy in Vietnam. On 5 August 1964, they fabricated the so-called "Gulf of Tonkin incident" and had aircraft attack various coastal areas in North Vietnam. In February 1965, they started the air war of destruction against the DRV. At the same time, Johnson sent in U.S. combat troops to start the local war in South Vietnam.

Faced with the movement to oppose U.S. aggression in Vietnam which was increasingly developing in the world and the United States, on 7 April 1965, Johnson announced his readiness to negotiate without preconditions and advanced the carrot of \$1 billion in aid. This was designed to force the Vietnamese people to negotiate under pressure and to accept U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam.

Dealing with Johnson's acts, many officials in the U.S. administration said that Secretary of State Rusk told them that although the U.S. position seemed reasonable, it was truly unbending and Johnson's statement on negotiations was aimed at preparing for continued bombings with greater intensity. Only months after the South Vietnamese armed forces and people made a general offensive during the Mau Than Tet did Johnson agree to talk with our government's representatives in Paris. The heavy U.S. military and political setbacks in Vietnam led to Johnson's withdrawal from the 1968 U.S. presidential election race.

Nixon entered the White House with the solemn pledge to the American people that he would soon end the war. In his presidential election campaign, Nixon affirmatively stated: "I can sit in this television station and say vote for me and I will end the war within 6 months." This statement was made on 13 October 1968 at (Philadelphia), according to UP on 14 October 1968.

In his inaugural speech on 20 January 1969, Nixon again ballyhooed: During my presidency I will devote all my abilities and intelligence to serving peace. Yet so far, after more than three-fourths of Nixon's term, the Vietnam war continues to rage. Exactly as broad segments of public opinion stated, when he took office Nixon had many favorable conditions for ending the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam. But he did not end the war as he promised the American people. Conversely, he has turned Johnson's war into his war and has expanded it all over Indochina.

For more than 3 years, Nixon has talked at length about peace and negotiations and ballyhooed that the Americans would strive to turn an era of conflict into the era of negotiations. Negotiations are one of the three subjects outlined in the Nixon doctrine--the U.S. imperialists' present global strategy. But Nixon has always stressed that the U.S. policy of negotiation is based on a position of strength. In a speech on the U.S. foreign policy in the 1970's, Nixon stated on 25 February 1971 that U.S. strength would certainly not be inferior to that of any country and that present U.S. foreign policy was following a firm path, between too great a degree of participation and too small a degree of participation. Also in this speech, Nixon pointed out the bases of his doctrine and stressed that the theories [words indistinct] which have developed in the communist world have brought to the United States other challenges and new opportunities.

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The balance of forces in the world quickly changed unfavorably for the U.S. imperialists as the socialist system was consolidated and developed, as the Chinese revolution became successful, as the Soviet Union made rapid progress in national defense, science and technology and as the national liberation movement rose vigorously. This situation forced the U.S. imperialists to alter their global strategy although their objective--to become master of the world--remained unchanged. To cope with the new situation, in the 1960's, Kennedy applied the "for the sake of peace" strategy and the military strategy of flexible response to the three types of war. Since then the Americans have stepped up negotiations and contacts in an attempt to achieve objectives they know they cannot achieve through military power.

In their Vietnam and Indochina policy, the U.S. imperialists' aggressive and colonialist design has remained consistent for several dozen years now. In 1953, Eisenhower-Nixon were determined to rule out any negotiated settlement. In 1954, they prepared a plan for armed intervention to save the French expeditionary troops at Dien Bien Phu. They brazenly sabotaged the Geneva conference on Indochina and when the sabotage plot failed, the U.S. Government called the conference a tragic disaster. In the middle of 1954, it presented the policy of preventing communist victory through the general election in Vietnam. According to this policy, the United States would play a direct role in eventually sabotaging the Geneva agreements. This policy was outlined in an instruction from U.S. Secretary of State Dulles. Because the general election would surely lead to the reunification of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, it was most important for the Americans to delay it, the longer the better. Even President Eisenhower said that if an election were held--as the Geneva agreements stipulated--80 percent of the Vietnamese people would vote for Ho Chi Minh.

Although U.S. officials have sought ways to conceal the truth, the Nixon doctrine's contents regarding foreign relations and diplomacy continue to aim at settling U.S. squabbles and contradictions with U.S. allies in order to share responsibilities with these countries, at using these countries as U.S. shock forces, at building and turning the U.S. satellites into lackeys in order to oppose and sabotage the world people's revolutionary movement and at using other peoples' blood to wage U.S. wars.

On this basis, the United States is ready to negotiate with a number of countries, especially the USSR and China, in an attempt to (?deceive) the two biggest socialist countries and fully take advantage of the contradictions between them and, in general, to create contradictions among the socialist countries in order to gain conditions favorable to the United States, create a position of compromise among the big countries and continue threatening small countries.

The Vietnamization plan is the application of the Nixon doctrine in South Vietnam. This plan consists of building a sufficiently strong puppet administration to use as a tool to implement U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam. The objective of this plan is to turn South Vietnam into a U.S. neocolony and military base and to permanently split Vietnam. All of the frenzied war acts and bloody crimes of the U.S. imperialists in both zones of Vietnam in the past 3 years have been aimed at implementing the Vietnamization plan. The Vietnamization plan is itself the Nixon administration's strong position in negotiations.

Since 1969, this administration put forth various peace plans, including the 25 January 1972 eight-point proposal. Their various peace plans have some differences regarding presentation and details, but they are all identical on two basic problems: conditions for ending the war and withdrawal of all U.S. troops and clinging to the bellicose Saigon puppet administration.

What the Americans plotted in the negotiations was to demand that our people accept their neocolonialism in South Vietnam. If our people fail to accept their demand, they will continue their Vietnamization plan in South Vietnam. In sum, the U.S. negotiating position demands that our people accept Vietnamization. This plan represents a "strong position" from which the Americans can negotiate.

Because of this evil design, the Paris conference on Vietnam has held 143 sessions in the past 3 years without any results. Nixon hopes to find a strong position in Vietnam and Indochina, but that is illusory. Johnson sent more than one-half million U.S. troops to South Vietnam and used the air force to strike at North Vietnam for nearly 4 years. However, he could not avoid pitiful failure. The Nixon doctrine is a product of the U.S. imperialists' weakened and defeated position in the world. The Vietnamization plan is a U.S. imperialist scheme to try to cling to South Vietnam with fewer U.S. expeditionary troops and smaller expenditures than under Johnson's tenure.

The Vietnamization plan and the Nixon doctrine have many contradictions and difficulties and no promising future. The situation on the South Vietnam and other battlefields in the recent past clearly indicates the Indochinese patriotic forces' victorious and

offensive position over the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys. In South Vietnam many elements of the Saigon puppet main force divisions were smashed. A major part of the puppet main force divisions suffered painful blows. The U.S.-puppet pacification scheme is being rejected. The urban people's struggles are continuously mounting. The puppet troops and administration are facing a deadlocked and acute crisis.

In Laos, the Americans' three war tools--the Vientiane puppet troops, the Vang Pao pirates and the Thai mercenaries--are disintegrating in big chunks. Two key strategic areas, the Plaine des Jarres in Xieng Khouang and the Bolovens highlands, have been liberated. In Cambodia, the patriotic movement controls four-fifths of the country. The Cambodian puppet troops are suffering deadly blows. The Phnom Penh puppet administration is dangerously encircled and sharply divided. U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam have all been properly punished.

In such a defeated and bogged-down situation how can Nixon establish a strong position? The fact that so far the Americans still refuse to enter serious negotiations to peacefully solve the Vietnam problem has laid bare Nixon's colonialist stand and stubborn and bellicose attitude. The so-called "eight-point peace proposal" of 25 January 1972, which was regarded as being "generous" and "appropriate" by Nixon, was merely a repetition of the U.S. stand.

According to this proposal, Nixon will agree to withdrawal of all U.S. troops 6 months after an agreement is arrived at. Nixon thought he had put forth the conditions for the U.S. troop withdrawal: Either the Saigon puppet troops must be strengthened enough to replace the U.S. troops or our people must, in the negotiations, accept U.S. neocolonialist domination. Nixon also said that he would have Nguyen Van Thieu resign 1 month before the general election. He thought that in this way he was respecting the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.

In reality, Nixon still sticks to his stand of maintaining the entire bondage apparatus established by the Americans in South Vietnam which includes more than 1 million puppet troops, civil guards and secret agents and a system of puppet administrative despots at all levels. In such a situation how can an election be democratic and just? Such is Nixon's idea of the South Vietnamese people's "right to self-determination."

Our people are determined to reject Nixon's deceitful peace proposal, to denounce his policy of negotiating from a strong position and to lay bare his maneuvers designed to win over public opinion and exert pressure on our people, such as raising the "POW problem" and making announcements on the secret meetings. The proper way to peacefully solve the Vietnam problem is the South Vietnamese people's rational and just seven-point solution. This solution was further clarified by the PRGRSV's important 2 February 1972 statement. All the U.S. imperialists' cruel war crimes and deceitful and threatening maneuvers will surely be unable to prevent our people from their desire to struggle against the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys in order to liberate the south, defend and construct the socialist north and advance toward peaceful national reunification. Our people will surely win, the Vietnamization-of-the-war scheme, the policy of negotiating from a strong position and the Nixon doctrine will certainly be bankrupted.

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NEW YORK TIMES EDITOR SENDS LETTER TO PHAM VAN DONG

Hanoi VNA in English to VNA Paris 1354 GMT 15 Jan 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

["Message from A.M. Rosenthal, New York TIMES"]

[Text] Honorable Pham Van Dong, Foreign Ministry, Hanoi

In view of the conflicting accounts we have had recently [on the] negotiating position of your government and PRG on ways to end the Indochina war, we invite your answers to the following questions because we believe they can clarify the situation.

1--If the United States sets a firm troop withdrawal date would you agree to the release of American prisoners in your control?

2--Would you negotiate on military withdrawal and the release of prisoners completely separate from questions pertaining to the political future of Vietnam?

3--Which of the following must be wholly withdrawn or halted to obtain the release of all American prisoners in your control?

- 1/ American ground troops in South Vietnam.
- 2/ American transport and logistic air support to South Vietnamese forces.
- 3/ American bombing in North Vietnam.
- 4/ American air reconnaissance in North Vietnam.
- 5/ American bombing in South Vietnam.
- 6/ American bombing in Laos and Cambodia.
- 7/ American airbases in Southeast Asia outside Indochina.
- 8/ American military advisory activities in South Vietnam.
- 9/ American military aid shipments to South Vietnam.
- 10/ American economic aid to South Vietnam.

4--Are there any additional conditions for the release of all American prisoners?

5--Assuming an agreement is possible under the terms of Question 3, how soon could all prisoners be released and how much time would be available to arrange the American disengagements?

6--Would the elements of such an agreement be separate? Could some prisoners be released before others in exchange for some acts of disengagement?

7--What in concrete terms is the meaning of your demand that the United States withdraw all political support from the present Saigon government? How could such a withdrawal be acted upon?

8--Quite apart from negotiations for withdrawal and prisoner release, under what conditions would you agree to a larger international peace conference on all Indochina? Who should attend? At what stage could such negotiations prove profitable?

A.M. Rosenthal, Managing editor, the New York TIMES

Ngo Dien's Reply

Hanoi VNA in French to VNA Paris 1340 GMT 15 Jan 72 B--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Reply by Ngo Dien, Head of DRV Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Department to A.M. Rosenthal's message to Pham Van Dong]

[Text] Mr A.M. Rosenthal, managing editor of the New York TIMES.

Dear sir: Concerning your questions addressed to Premier Pham Van Dong, I am authorized to draw your attention to the following points:

--The fundamental problem is the cessation of the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam and the restoration of peace in Vietnam with respect for the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people. Therefrom, the aspiration of the Vietnamese people for a peace in independence and freedom will be satisfied, as well as the wish of the American people who are demanding the extrication of their country from the current quagmire in Vietnam and the repatriation of all their sons engaged in the ranks of the U.S. expeditionary corps in Vietnam, including the U.S. militarymen captured in Vietnam.

--At present, forced to carry out a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops, President Nixon has not, however, resigned himself in putting an end to his war of aggression. Implementing his Vietnamization policy, he intends to pursue it through the Nguyen Van Thieu clique and the Saigon puppet army, which the United States has provided with colossal aid and massive participation of the U.S. Air Force and Navy in combat.

--By simultaneously raising the issue of prisoners of war and that of U.S. troop withdrawal, without renouncing all commitment to and support for the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet administration, President Nixon does not aim at bringing a solution to the above-mentioned fundamental problem, but simply at placating the legitimate demands of the American people. In fact, he aims at evading the pressure of U.S. and world public opinion with a view to prolonging and extending the war in Indochina.

--Concerning the solution to the Vietnamese problem, the DRV Government approves of and fully supports the seven points put forward on 1 July 1971 by the PRGRSV. You can find in this the answer to the questions which you raised in your telegram.

In refusing to comply with these seven points, the Nixon administration has turned away from the path leading to a correct solution of the Vietnam problem, rejecting at the same time the opportunity to bring home last Christmas all U.S. militarymen, including those who have been captured in Vietnam.

I am, sir, your very truly,

Ngo Dien, head of the Information and Press Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry.

~~NEWLY CAPTURED POW KENNETH JOHNSON SENDS MESSAGES TO FAMILY~~

Hanoi in English to American Servicemen in South Vietnam 1300 GMT 18 Jan 72 B--FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Here is a recorded message home from a captured U.S. pilot in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. [Follows recorded male voice with American accent]

From Maj Kenneth Richard Johnson, 470406482 FR, camp of detention for captured U.S. pilots in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

To Mr and Mrs Lawrence F. Johnson, 3601 53d Place North, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
U.S.A. 55429

[Repeating] From Maj Kenneth Richard Johnson, 470406482 FR, camp of detention for captured U.S. pilots in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam