VIET-NAM
INFORMATION NOTES

OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN VIET-NAM

SUMMARY

The United States has consistently stated its readiness to negotiate peace in Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva accords of 1954 on Viet-Nam and the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos. The ultimate goal of these agreements was the reestablishment of peace in the Indochina area--Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam--and the security and territorial integrity of the countries involved.

Although the Government of North Viet-Nam signed the Agreement of July 20, 1954 on the Cessation of Hostilities and adhered to the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva conference and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, it never accepted the obligations and restrictions imposed by those three international instruments. Hanoi has never paused in its drive to take control of the South, and in 1959 it shifted from subversive terrorist tactics (beheading of village chiefs, murder of relatives of South Vietnamese serving in the army, kidnaping of school administrators, health officials, etc.) to overt military action (the sending of large numbers of battle-equipped guerrilla cadres and troops into South Viet-Nam to engage in military combat). It has flatly rejected or ridiculed all overtures or initiatives which might have led to a peaceful settlement.

Despite Hanoi's intransigence, President Johnson has pledged that our efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Viet-Nam situation "will continue day and night." The United States has welcomed the numerous proposals and initiatives of other governments of the world to bring the conflict to an end. As this paper demonstrates, there has been a virtual barrage of efforts, all of them futile, to bring Hanoi to the conference table.

THE UNITED NATIONS

A U.N. presence in the area and formal debate in the United Nations have long been urged by the United States. However, North Viet-Nam and Red China have repeatedly rejected any U.N. role in the area.

The United States joined South Viet-Nam in the U.N. Security Council during May 1964 in suggesting that a U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping or observation group might be established on the border between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam to stabilize conditions upset by Viet Cong operations there. A fact-finding Security Council mission visited the area and reported that such a group might well be useful. Hanoi and Peiping, however, condemned even this limited U.N. involvement in Viet-Nam, and the border watch was not established.

In August 1964 the United States supported the Security Council invitation to the Hanoi government to discuss the U.S. complaint of North Vietnamese torpedo-boat attacks against U.S. naval vessels in international waters as well as the American military response. The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister replied that the Viet-Nam problem was not within the competence of the Security Council and that his government would consider any decisions by the Council as "null and void."

It was also in the autumn of 1964 that the late Adlai Stevenson was informed by Secretary-General U Thant that Hanoi had indicated to him indirectly that it would be willing to make contact with the United States. The Secretary-General suggested Rangoon as a suitable site. As Secretary Rusk later said in discussing these events, "When this matter arose, it was considered in the light of a great deal of information available at the time about the attitude of the authorities in Hanoi and, indeed, of other governments in the Communist world.... It seems clear beyond a peradventure of doubt that Hanoi was not prepared to discuss peace in Southeast Asia based upon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and looking toward the lifting of aggression against South Viet-Nam.... They undoubtedly felt that they were on the threshhold of victory. Just yesterday Hanoi denied that they had made any proposals for negotiations." (Press conference of Nov. 26, 1965).

Speaking at San Francisco in June 1965 on the 20th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter, President Johnson appealed to members of the United Nations "individually and collectively to bring to the table those who seem determined to make war. We will support your efforts," he pledged, "as we support effective action by any agent or agency of these United Nations." The President reiterated this appeal on July 28 in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant. At the same time,

Ambassador Goldberg, in a letter to members of the Security Council, reminded them of their responsibility to persist in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security in Southeast Asia, and of U.S. readiness to collaborate unconditionally in this quest. Peiping termed this move "insidious and brazen," while Hanoi again demanded unconditional acceptance of its four points, which, in effect, would extend Hanoi's control throughout all Viet-Nam.

But the United States continued to seek a solution through the multilateral framework of the United Nations.

On January 31, 1966, the United States formally requested that the United Nations consider the problem of achieving a peaceful solution in Viet-Nam. Our Government proposed a draft resolution in the Security Council which called for immediate unconditional discussions to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia. The proposed resolution also recommended that the conference arrange a cease-fire under effective supervision, offered to provide arbitrators or mediators, and asked the Secretary-General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of the resolution. The Security Council voted on February 2 to inscribe the Viet-Nam problem on its agenda and adjourned immediately after the vote for private consultations among members to determine whether and in what manner the Council might assist in moving the conflict to the conference table.

The United States in a letter on December 19 appealed to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant to "take whatever steps are necessary" to "bring about the necessary discussions" which could lead to a mutual cessation of hostilities. On the following day Communist China urged North Viet-Nam and the Communist Viet Cong to reject such attempts to draw them into negotiations.

The 21st General Assembly debated the Viet-Nam issue, but was unable to take effective action because some key members were unwilling to give their consent. There was some feeling that because of Hanoi's opposition to U.N. involvement, more progress might be made through other diplomatic channels.

U THANT'S GOOD OFFICES

Secretary-General U Thant indicated in April 1965 that he would be willing to visit certain world capitals, including Hanoi and Peiping, to discuss prospects for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. Hanoi rejected "meddling by the U.N." or any approach which tended to secure U.N. intervention in a Viet-Nam settlement.

On March 14, 1967, Secretary-General U Thant delivered an aide memoire to the parties concerned in the Viet-Nam conflict which envisaged a general standstill truce, preliminary talks, and reconvening of the Geneva conference. The U.S. response was immediate and favorable, accepting the Secretary-General's plan. The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam also responded affirmatively, offering on March 29 to negotiate a cease-fire directly with North Viet-Nam within a week's notice "at the demiliarized zone or at any other place the Hanoi government may choose."

Hanoi, however, after a silence of almost 2 weeks, protested that it was unreasonable to call for negotiations "while the U.S. is committing aggression against Viet-Nam and taking serious steps in its military escalation in both zones of Viet-Nam." Furthermore, the Government of North Viet-Nam emphasized, "the Viet-Nam problem has no concern with the United Nations, and the United Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any way in the Viet-Nam question."

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

In an effort to get peace negotiations under way the United States has engaged in talks with hundreds of world figures, including officials of the Hanoi government.

In 1965 U.S. officials engaged in some 300 high-level private talks for peace in Viet-Nam with friends and adversaries throughout the world. In the 2-month period December 1965-January 1966 alone, President Johnson dispatched 5 special envoys—among them Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman—to 34 world capitals to explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

The President communicated the American position on Viet-Nam to many more chiefs of government and to numerous international organizations.

Discussions were held with His Holiness Pope Paul VI, the North Atlantic Council of NATO, the Organization of American States, the Organization for African Unity, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

During this worldwide peace effort seeking negotiations without conditions, the United States made private contact with North Vietnamese officials in one of the 22 capitals with which both countries maintain diplomatic relations. The U.S. message was accepted, but within a week the Hanoi government had issued an official statement calling the peace probe a "trick" and demanding an "unconditional" end of all acts of war against it.

On March 25, 1965, the President declared that the United States "looks forward to the day when the people and governments of all Southeast Asia may be free from terror . . . when they will need . . . only economic and social cooperation for progress in peace." In his speech at Johns Hopkins University on

April 7 he elaborated further, saying that in addition to being ready at all times to hold "unconditional discussions" aimed at bringing about an end to the conflict in Viet-Nam, the United States also is ready to see North Viet-Nam take its place in a cooperative billion-dollar regional development plan for Asia as soon as peace is achieved.

In October 1966 President Johnson visited seven nations of Asia and the Pacific to consider with them "ways of bringing about an honorable peace at the earliest possible moment" in Viet-Nam. The high point of the journey was the Manila Summit Conference on October 24-25. There the United States and six Asian-Pacific nations (Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, South Viet-Nam) declared that the search for peace would continue despite Hanoi's unresponsiveness, and a timetable was announced for the withdrawal of allied forces in the hope this would meet some of Hanoi's conditions. Conference participants pledged in a communique at the close of the Conference that allied forces would be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam not later than 6 months after the North Vietnamese Army units are recalled across the 17th parallel.

Continuing his Pacific journey from Manila, President Johnson appealed from the platform of Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University on October 29 to the leaders in Hanoi: "Let us lay aside our arms and sit down at the table of reason. Let us renounce the works of death—and take up, instead, the tasks of the living. . ."

Immediately after the Manila Conference, President Johnson sent Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman on a second mission to explain to a number of friendly governments the purpose and results of the Conference and to make clear our continued willingness to discuss the issue of peace in Viet-Nam with the other side at any time or place, and in any forum. Ambassador Harriman's trip included Indonesia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Iran, Italy—where he had an audience with His Holiness the Pope—France, Germany, Britain, and Morocco. Several weeks later he made a separate trip to Tunis, Algiers, and Madrid on a similar mission.

Secretary Rusk, in Paris for the NATO Ministerial Council Meeting, declared on December 13 that we would welcome help "from all quarters" in bringing the war in Viet-Nam to a prompt and satisfactory conclusion. He asserted it was "important" that the war be "wound up promptly and on a basis that is satisfactory to the security of the South Vietnamese people and the interests of the free world."

JOHNSON-HO EXCHANGE

During a pause in the bombing at the time of the Tet holiday in February 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to President Ho Chi Minh suggesting direct talks between the United States and North Viet-Nam "in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity." He offered to cease the bombing of North Viet-Nam and to freeze U.S. troop levels in South Viet-Nam if North Viet-Nam would give assurances that it "had stopped infiltration into South Viet-Nam by land and sea."

Hanoi did not respond until a day after President Johnson was obliged to order a resumption of the bombing because Hanoi, in effecting a major resupply of its forces during the Tet ceasefire, was preparing for expanded action. President Ho emphasized on February 15 that North Viet-Nam would "never accept talks under the threat of bombs," and he insisted that talks are out of the question until after the United States stopped unconditionally its bombing raids "and all other acts of war."

The United States again appealed for talks during Secretary Rusk's press conference on February 28. "We will negotiate," he said, "without conditions, or we will negotiate about conditions, or we will discuss a final settlement and we will be prepared to take up any part of this problem such as the deescalation of military activity, or the demilitarization of the demilitarized zone, or the exchange of prisoners, or any part of it which might move us a little step toward peace." He pointed out that "we have indicated many times, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to others, including Hanoi, that we would be prepared to stop the bombing if they would take corresponding military moves on their side, but that we cannot stop half the war."

Indicating its reliance on the effect of the peace demonstrations in various countries, Hanoi rejected the idea of talks because the "U.S. aggressors are continuing their escalations, thus defying public opinion and the universal conscience of the peoples." Premier Pham Van Dong told a correspondent of Agence France-Presse on March 1 that Hanoi's four-point program remains "the most correct political solution to the Vietnamese problem."

U.S. FOURTEEN POINTS

The United States feels that its 14-point proposal offers the best basis for peace negotiations. In contacts with the governments of 113 nations, the United States set forth the elements which it believes should be included in a peace settlement in Southeast Asia. They are as follows:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia.

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or any part thereof:

--We are ready to negotiate a settlement based on a strict observance of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements, which observance was called for in the declaration on Viet-Nam

of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest on July 6, 1966. And we will support a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or an Asian conference, or any other generally acceptable forum.

3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as called for by 17 nonalined nations* in an appeal delivered to Secretary Rusk on April 1, 1965.

4. We would welcome "unconditional discussions" as called for by President Johnson on April 7, 1965:

--If the other side will not come to a conference, we are prepared to engage in direct discussions or discussions through an intermediary.

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions:

--We have attempted, many times, to engage the other side in a discussion of a mutual deescalation of the level of violence, and we remain prepared to engage in such a mutual deescalation.

--We stand ready to cooperate fully in getting discussions which could lead to a cessation of hostilities started promptly and brought to a successful completion.

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along with other points which others may wish to propose:

--We would be prepared to accept preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points as a basis for negotiations.

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia:

--We are prepared to assist in the conversion of these bases for peaceful uses that will benefit the peoples of the entire area.

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured:

--We seek no permanent military bases, no permanent establishment of troops, no permanent alliances, no permanent American "presence" of any kind in South Viet-Nam.

--We have pledged in the Manila Communique that "Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice:

--We support the development of broadly based democratic institutions in South Viet-Nam.

--We do not seek to exclude any segment of the South Vietnamese people from peaceful participation in their country's future.

10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese through their own free decision:

--It should not be decided by the use of force.

--We are fully prepared to support the decision of the Vietnamese people.

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be nonalined or neutral if that be their option:

--We do not seek to impose a policy of alinement on South Viet-Nam.

--We support the neutrality policy of the Royal Government of Laos, and we support the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam could participate in a regional effort to which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion dollars:

--We support the growing efforts by the nations of the area to cooperate in the achievement of their economic and social goals.

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression. And I would not think that would be an unsurmountable problem at all."

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped:

--We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam, the moment we are assured--privately or otherwise--that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate deescalation of the other side.

--We do not seek the unconditional surrender of North Viet-Nam; what we do seek is to assure for the people of South Viet-Nam the right to decide their own political destiny, free of force.

*The "Appeal of the Heads of State and Government of Seventeen Non-aligned Countries Concerning Crisis in Viet-Nam" was handed to Secretary Rusk for President Johnson on April 1, 1965, by a delegation composed of Ambassadors of Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Ghana (the other 13 nations were: Algeria, Cyprus, Ceylon, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nepal, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Zambia, and Uganda). It also was delivered on the same day to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

SUSPENSIONS OF BOMBING

The United States has five times suspended the bombing of North Viet-Nam in the hope of some "response in kind" from the Hanoi government. The response has been negative.

The first suspension of U.S. bombing was ordered by President Johnson May 13-17, 1965, in an effort to seek Hanoi's cooperation toward a peaceful settlement. On the third day of the pause Hanoi denounced it as a "trick"; Peiping assailed it as a "swindle." Only after the harsh rejection of this peace overture were the U.S. air attacks resumed.

A second and greatly extended bombing pause was carried out during the 1965 Christmas truce. This time, in response to the contention of a number of governments that a bombing pause might create a situation in which the possibilities of peace could be greatly improved, the United States suspended the bombing of North Viet-Nam for 37 days, from December 24, 1965, to January 30, 1966. Hanoi was informed publicly of a pause in advance, and during the early period of the pause was told privately that if it would reciprocate by taking some concrete step to reduce its military effort in South Viet-Nam the pause might be extended. Hanoi, in return, demanded U.S. recognition of the [Communist] National Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Viet-Nam, and reiterated its call for withdrawal of U. S. troops and materiel from South Viet-Nam, with no suggestion of any slackening of the North Vietnamese assault.

The third bombing pause took place as part of the general cease-fire which South Viet-Nam and its allies observed from December 24-26, 1966, and from December 31, 1966-January 2, 1967. Hanoi and Peiping attacked the motives behind these arrangements, and during the Christmas-New Year pause the cease-fire was marred by 178 Communist incidents.

A fourth suspension of bombing was carried out during the lunar New Year holidays, February 8-12, 1967, during which Saigon indicated its willingness to meet with Hanoi's representatives to discuss extending the suspension of military activity.

The United States extended the bombing suspension on a day-by-day basis while the diplomatic search for peace continued. The pause lasted for 42 hours beyond the 4-day lunar standdown. It was resumed only when photographic evidence gathered by the Department of Defense showed that North Viet-Nam was using the Tet pause for major resupply efforts of their troops in South Viet-Nam (an estimated 23,000 tons of supplies and equipment were moved during the bombing pause). Although obliged to order the bombing resumed, President Johnson reaffirmed that "the door to peace is and will remain open and we are prepared at any time to go more than halfway to meet any equitable overture from the other side."

The United States agreed to observe a fifth bombing suspension during the Buddha's birthday cease-fire of 24 hours on May 23, along with Saigon and the other allies.

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Collectively and individually, nations of the West, of the nonalined or neutral countries, and some Communist-bloc members, have sought to bring the Viet-Nam issue to the conference table. World leaders have exerted their influence to persuade Hanoi to discuss rather than fight. All these overtures have been rejected by North Viet-Nam.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has been untiring in its efforts to bring the conflicting parties to the conference table. As co-chairman with the U.S.S.R. of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conferences it has tried since 1965 to persuade the Soviet Union that together they should exert their influence to bring about negotiations at this level. The United Kingdom has sent distinguished British officials to explore Hanoi's position as to "the circumstances in which a conference might be held to end the fighting in Viet-Nam." In December of 1965 the United Kingdom proposed that the Soviet Union join in organizing a 12-nation appeal to North Viet-Nam to negotiate. This appeal was to be signed by the nine nations participating in the 1954 Geneva conference, plus India, Canada, and Poland, the members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC) established by that conference to supervise the carrying out of the Geneva accords. Both Moscow and Hanoi rejected the proposal.

During the February 8-12 Tet holiday, Prime Minister Wilson attempted unsuccessfully during conferences with Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.R. to obtain from the Soviet leader an indication that Hanoi would take some reciprocal military action if the United States permanently halted the bombing raids.

India

The Government of India in April 1965 put forward a proposal in the United Nations for the cessation of hostilities by both sides in Viet-Nam, the policing of borders by an Afro-Asian patrol force, and the maintenance of present boundaries in Viet-Nam as long as the Vietnamese people so desire. Hanoi and Peiping turned this down.

Following talks in Belgrade in August 1965, Indian Prime Minister Shastri and Yugoslav President Tito called for a conference on Viet-Nam. Hanoi condemned this initiative.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in July 1966 made a detailed proposal for negotiations within the framework of the Geneva agreements

and proposed a reconvening of the Geneva conference. Hanoi rejected the main features of the proposal through its army newspaper.

Ceylon

At the end of March 1967, Ceylon proposed that three-way Vietnamese talks be held involving North and South Viet-Nam and the [Communist] National Liberation Front to set preconditions for a peace conference. Saigon's response was affirmative. Hanoi, however, refused to consider any proposals as long as the United States continued to bomb North Viet-Nam.

South Viet-Nam

In addition to responding affirmatively to virtually all the proposals for negotiations put forward by other nations, the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam proposed the most recent cease-fire agreement—that of May 23, the birthday of the Buddha. With the United States and its other allies concurring, the Government of South Viet-Nam on April 8, 1967, also proposed a meeting between representatives of North and South Viet-Nam to consider an extension of this truce. In a formal statement the United States said: "This is an important Buddhist holiday, and we agree that there should be a cease-fire for its observance, as there was in the case of Christmas, New Year's and Tet."

Canada

As a member of the International Control Commission, Canada has persistently tried to carry out its supervisory role in both North and South Viet-Nam. In June 1965 the Canadian representative on the ICC discussed in Hanoi the possibilities for peace with representatives of the North Vietnamese government, but received no encouragement. In March 1966 Ambassador Chester A. Ronning visited Hanoi to discuss the Viet-Nam conflict. He reported that North Viet-Nam's attitude toward negotiations was unchanged.

On April 11, 1967, the Government of Canada made public a four-stage plan for peace. The first step would involve "some degree of physical disengagement of the parties"—perhaps by restoration of the demilitarized zone by withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and equipment from that zone; second, a freeze on military strength at its present level; third, cessation of all ground, sea, and air activity; and finally, a return to the cease-fire provisions of the Geneva settlement with provisions made for repatriation of prisoners, withdrawal of outside forces, and dismantling of military bases.

South Viet-Nam on April 18 welcomed the plan and proposed "specific courses of action, such as the pullback from the demilitarized zone, inspection by the ICC, further deescalation of the conflict, and talks, secret or otherwise." It offered to "meet with or contact the Hanoi authorities either directly or through the good offices of a third party such as Canada."

The United States also welcomed the Canadian proposal, asserting that "it offers considerable promise for deescalating the conflict in Viet-Nam and for moving toward an overall settlement." Amplifying South Viet-Nam's proposal, the United States suggested that military forces be withdrawn to a line 10 miles from either side of the DMZ. If North Viet-Nam agreed to such a mutual withdrawal, the United States stated all military actions in and over the DMZ and the areas extending 10 miles north and south of the zone could stop. The ICC would be given complete access to the areas involved in order to supervise the withdrawal on both sides. As soon as the pullback was certified by the ICC, talks could take place at any appropriate level and site that the Government of North Viet-Nam might suggest.

Others

Seventeen nonalined nations appealed collectively in the United Nations during April 1965 for "negotiations without preconditions" in Viet-Nam. The response from Hanoi was negative.

At Christmas 1965 His Holiness Pope Paul VI publicly appealed for a truce in Viet-Nam during the holiday season and for efforts by all parties to move toward negotiations. He addressed a similar appeal directly to Hanoi through private channels. Ho Chi Minh replied that U.S. talk about "unconditional negotiations" is a "maneuver to cover up plans for further war intensification." His Holiness renewed the appeals during the Christmas season 1966, and on February 8, 1967, when he raised the need for "reciprocal suspension of acts of war by all parties to the conflict."

In December 1966, Poland, a member of the International Control Commission, attempted to arrange talks at Warsaw between Washington and Hanoi representatives. Details of these efforts are still covered by diplomatic privilege and therefore cannot be published at this time. In any event, the Polish initiative did not succeed.

POLICY OF NORTH VIET-NAM

The United States is not aware of any initiative which has been taken by Hanoi during the past 5 years to seek peace in Southeast Asia. All reports of "peace feelers" upon close investigation have inevitably turned out to be initiatives being taken by third parties. Hanoi itself has categorically denied that it has ever made any "peace feelers."

Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of North Viet-Nam has defined his government's position in four basic points, which he contends are

correct implementation of the terms of the 1954 Geneva agreements. These points are:

1. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Viet-Nam all U.S. troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its military alliance with South Viet-Nam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Viet-Nam. According to the Geneva agreements, the U.S. must stop its acts of war against North Viet-Nam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam, while Viet-Nam is still temporarily divided into 2 zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements must be strictly respected . . . the 2 zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries; there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel in their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Viet-Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

"If this basis is recognized," Prime Minister Pham Van Dong stated in April 1965, "favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam problem and it will be possible to consider the convening of an international conference in the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Viet-Nam. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam Government declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to secure a U.N. intervention in the Viet-Nam situation is also inappropriate, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam."

Hanoi's reaction to all the bombing pauses has been one of attack against the allegedly "largescale deceptive peace campaign" which accompanied what it calls the "trick of temporary suspension of air attacks on North Viet-Nam." It has obdurately argued that in demanding that the Vietnamese people "stop or reduce their fight against the U.S. aggressors in exchange for an end to the bombing of North Viet-Nam," the United States is "putting on a par the aggressor and the victim of aggression" and "depriving the Vietnamese people of their right to strike back." Unless the United States is prepared clearly to label as "permanent and unconditional" its cessation of bombing in advance of peace negotiations, the "threat of resumption" would be left intact, according to Hanoi. North Vietnamese representative Mai Van Bo, in Paris on February 22, 1967, hinted that Hanoi has modified its position somewhat. Bo said this "basic change" in Hanoi's position was expressed by North Viet-Nam's Foreign Minister on January 28. During an interview with pro-Communist correspondent Wilfred Burchett of Australia, Nguyen Duy Trinh suggested that talks could be held if first the bombing were permanently stopped. Earlier, Bo said, Hanoi's stand was that if there were an unconditional halt to the bombing this would be "studied," and if Washington then proposed to negotiate, this proposal also would be "studied." In an article in the April issue of the authoritative journal Hoc Tap, however, the Foreign Minister emphasized North Viet-Nam's "hardline" position in this regard.

U.S. EFFORTS CONTINUE

Nonetheless, the United States and its allies continue the search for a just and peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

The United States has agreed to, or originated, some 28 proposals designed to permit the initiation of serious peace negotiations, Secretary Rusk told the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on May 1.

Recalling these items from memory, he added that "there may be more." What is important is that Hanoi has rejected all of them. Nonetheless, as President Johnson has reasserted: "Though the battle has been long and hard, and though our adversary has shown no desire to reduce the level of his aggression and bring the controversy to the negotiating table, we shall persist . . . in our pursuit of an honorable settlement."

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PRESENTLY AVAILABLE ...

1. Basic Data on South Viet-Nam (Dept. of State pub. 8195) summarizes general information on the land, people, history, government, and economy of the country.

2. The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (Dept. of State pub. 8196) reviews the efforts of individuals, governments, and international bodies to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict in Viet-Nam. The policy of the Government of North Viet-Nam with regard to a peaceful settlement is included.

3. Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam (Dept. of State pub. 8197) seeks to answer such questions as: What is the Viet Cong? Who are its leaders? How is it related to party and government organs of North Viet-Nam? What are the Communists' objectives? Their strengths? Their weaknesses? 7 pp., illustrated.

4. Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam (Dept. of State pub. 8213) describes the scope of the international aid program for the Republic of Viet-Nam. It gives facts and figures about the contributions of 36 participating nations (U.S. aid is not included--a separate Note is to be devoted to that subject). 6 pp., illustrated.

5. Political Development in South Viet-Nam (Dept. of State pub. 8231) discusses South Viet-Nam's steady progress toward an elected government and representative institutions at all levels of government.

6. Why We Fight in Viet-Nam (Dept. of State pub. 8245) describes the principal factors involved in the U.S. decision to participate in the defense of South Viet-Nam against aggression from the North.

COMING SOON . . .

Several other Viet-Nam Information Notes will be available in the near future. Anticipated subjects include "The Legal Basis of the U.S. Commitment"; National Reconciliation in South Viet-Nam"; "The Military Struggle"; and "Communist Aggression against South Viet-Nam." The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, on request, will place individuals on its mailing list to receive Selected United States Government Publications--a free, biweekly announcement of new publications, including subsequent numbers of this series.

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