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15. SUMMARY:

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(U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns Directive 18/CT, signed by Thi for the CO of Unit 123C ((possibly the Rear Service Section, VC Quang Nam Province Unit, VC Military Region 5)), addressed to the CO's and Chapter Party Committee members of subordinate units. The directive, dated 14 July 1971, pertains to political and ideological tasks to be carried out to provide cadre and troops with a thorough understanding of the seven-point-peace proposal made by the ((VC)) Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of SVN in the Paris Peace Talks on 1 July 1971.

(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 24 January 1972 in South Vietnam (BT120210; RVN MR 1) by the 3/5th Inf, 2nd RVNAF Inf Div. The document was received at CDEC on 19 February 1972, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 47,673, dated 26 February 1972, under CDEC Document Log Number 02-1364-72. Translation was requested by JUSPAO, Vietnam.

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02-1364-72

Unit 125

No. 18/CT

D I R E C T I V E

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TASKS TO BE CONDUCTED FOR
THE ARMY TROOPS AFTER THE DECLARATION OF
THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SVN ON 1 JUL 71.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of SVN brought its seven-point peace proposal to the Paris Conference on 1 Jul 71, just at the time when the US and Puppets were suffering serious failures in their attempt to Vietnamize the SVN war and develop the Indochinese war.

The VN, Laotian, and Khmer armies and peoples have attained great achievements. The movement in the USA to demand the cessation of the aggressive war has become intensified and the dissensions among US internal organizations have increased.

At present, the VC are dealing yet another diplomatic blow at the enemy with the aim of further weakening him.

Party Committee cadre and unit commanders must carefully study the proposal and provide full explanations for cadre, Party members, unit members and the local inhabitants in areas ((one word missing)) so they will clearly understand the significance and purpose of the proposal ((one word missing)). They must take advantage of this situation to intensify attacks against the enemy in order to gain new victories.

1. Anticipation of the evolution of the situation in relation to the above proposal.

In our internal organizations, a false hope for peace and a wait-and-see attitude may prevail, thus complicating the situation. Due to the lack of a full knowledge of this proposal, some of our personnel may have a wrong concept of both matters concerning PW's and the future relationship with the US. If the above attitudes are not promptly eliminated, a certain amount of pessimism may develop. On the contrary, if the political and ideological task is successfully performed everyone will be enthusiastic in his performance, confident of success, and will exert new efforts to gain greater victories. The proposal will have a strong affect on the enemy. It will serve to isolate him and provide favorable conditions for us to impair the morale of the US, satellite, and Puppet troops while turning world opinion to our advantage.

It will create a new struggle position for the people, promote the revolutionary movement against the Americans and their henchmen in the cities, and give strong support to our military and political offensives.

2. Requirements of the political and ideological task:

We should realize that this is a new diplomatic step which results from our great victories and the enemy's heavy defeats. We should develop our strong and victorious position and take the initiative in intensifying our struggle against the belligerent and stubborn Americans and their lackeys. We should seize this opportunity to step up the people's struggle movement in the cities in order to drive the US and puppet troops further into a defensive position, deepen the dissensions among their ranks, isolate the Nixon and Thieu-Ky Clique, and create favorable conditions to increase our military and political activities. We must realize that this proposal is a great political achievement which is the direct result of our successful implementation of our

((Page 2 of O.T.))

revolutionary policy lines.

However, we should also realize that the Nixon Clique is very stubborn and cunning. Experience shows that with each serious setback he incurs, he resorts to more cruel and cunning schemes. Indeed, although he has sustained heavy defeats, the enemy still maintains his Vietnamization plan in an attempt to extend his aggression. In the near future, he will carry out more wicked plans for his pacification program.

Some of our comrades still have an unstable concept of the class struggle and have displayed a poor will to fight.

For that reason, we must stabilize and strengthen our ideology and determination to fight, intensify the resistance in order to successfully achieve the immediate tasks prescribed by the Party, and completely defeat the American aggressors.

We must defeat the enemy on the battlefield, not at the conference table. We should not neglect our combat mission because great movements are going to take place on the battlefields and the change in the general situation will depend on our activities in the theater of operations.

For that reason, we should not rely upon negotiation nor should we nurture a false hope for peace. We should be confident of victory and determined to build our forces. We should not have illusions about the enemy allegations or believe in his propaganda themes. We must fight him vigorously and continuously until the US troops are completely defeated and withdraw ((from SVN)) and the Puppet government is overthrown. We must fight until peace, independence, and freedom are restored. This strong determination must be translated into actions. We must overcome our weaknesses and struggle for the cause of the Revolution.

3. Contents of propaganda on the various points in the proposal:

We must carefully study all matters related to our policy lines and the basic rights of our people. We must thoroughly understand each point of the proposal in order to force the enemy into a deadlocked and confused position. We must try to gain the support ((of the majority of the world's peoples)) but continue to maintain our fundamental rights.

The three main objectives are: The US must recognize the independence of SVN; fix a date for a complete withdrawal of US and allied troops from SVN; and let the SVN people settle their internal affairs. In addition the US must stop providing support for the Thiệu-Kỳ Puppet Government.

((Page 3 of O.T.))

The freedom and democracy of the South Vietnamese people must be strictly respected. We should base our propaganda on the flexibility of the above principles so as to deal the enemy a heavy blow. We should broadcast our good will to deal with the policies concerning PW's, the neutrality of SVN, and the relationships with the US in the future.

4. Plan for countering enemy psywar activities and distorting propaganda themes:

It is necessary to lay bare and smash such enemy schemes as his deceitful allegations for peace and his illusory statements. He states that our flexibility is our weakness, and that our proposed conditions are unreasonable. He demands the withdrawal of troops of both sides ((NVN and US)) and uses misleading terms to deceive the peoples in the US and in the world.

5. The following points must be taken into consideration in leadership and in the implementation of the assigned tasks:

Due to the importance of the above matters, Party Committees and unit commanders are requested to properly implement the ideological task and provide guidance for troops, Party members, and cadre to fully understand the above points, heighten the revolutionary prestige, and put more confidence in the Revolution so that they will be enthusiastic in performing their assigned tasks, especially the task of strengthening our forces and fighting the enemy.

To achieve this end, we should make various units fully understand the following main points:

I. REASON, PURPOSE, AND SIGNIFICANCE: ((of our seven-point proposal))

1. Why has the seven-point proposal been brought out at this time and not earlier? We will explain this to ((our troops and cadre)) as follows:

The US has suffered serious failures in all fields.

The peoples and troops of the three nations ((VN, Khmer and Laos)) in Indochina have achieved great victories.

The struggle movement in the US has developed further.

The US internal dissensions are serious.

2. The purpose of the seven-point proposal:

Weaken and isolate the enemy;

Use public opinion to our advantage;

Demoralize US and Puppet troops;

Create favorable conditions for the people's struggles;

Intensify struggle movements in cities;

Create conditions for our forces to defeat the enemy on the battlefields. This final point is the most important one.

II. CONTENTS:

Our seven-point proposal covers many details, but, we should make our troops fully understand the three basic objectives. The main substance of this proposal is similiar to that of previous proposals and there is no change in our following policies:

((Page 4 of O.T.))

1. The US must recognize the sovereignty and independence ((of VN)).

2. The US must specify the date for a complete withdrawal of US and satellite troops.

3. The SVN internal affairs must be settled by the VN people. The Thiệu-Ky-Khiêm Government must be abolished. Freedom and democracy must exist.

However, there are some details which require tactful explanation, for example:

The questions of the ((US)) PW's. This question is a blow dealt at the US imperialists' stubborn nature. The enemy maintains that because we will not release the ((US)) PW's, he has to prolong the war. We should denounce this distorted propaganda and eliminate the misunderstanding in order to gain the support of world opinion, particularly the opinion of the American people.

The safe withdrawal of US troops: The enemy refuses to set a fixed date for the withdrawal of US troops, arguing that it may set up a chance for the friendly forces to attack. Therefore, he withdraws his troops in small numbers only. For this, we should explain that we have proposed a cease-fire with the US troops in order to enable them to withdraw safely. This point will frustrate the US propaganda allegation regarding its motive for continuing the war in SVN.

Concerning other strategic problems, we should study and explain them specifically.

III. WE MUST BE FULLY AWARE OF THE ABOVE POINTS AND CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT ACTIONS WE MUST IMPLEMENT:

1. Strengthen our determination to fight the enemy and intensify the anti-American resistance.
2. Make our troops realize that their responsibility is to fight and defeat the enemy on the battlefields and that cadre and personnel who do the rear service tasks must try their best to help the army troops accomplish their missions.
3. We should not nurture an illusion about peace, nor should we depend on negotiations at the Paris conference table.

IV. LEADERSHIP AND METHODS:

Methods: To perform the ideological motivation tasks, incite the people to voice their thoughts and confidences, then, try to act on these findings. Do not simplify the ideological tasks, rather, make a detailed indoctrination plan to ensure success.

After discussions, introduce the above main questions, develop sound solutions, and help others to understand ((the proposal)).

During these discussions, it is suggested that the following questions be considered: Why do we issue the seven-point peace proposal at this time?

Is the main substance of this proposal different from that of previous proposals?

What are the purposes of this proposal?

((Page 5 of O.T.))

Schedule:

Schedule a three or four-hour training session for unit members.

Conduct propaganda on a broad front among the people, and enemy troops.

Upon receipt of this directive, various units must report on their members' understanding of the purpose of the seven-point ((peace)) proposal to higher echelons for further guidance.

14 Jul 71

For the Commander of Unit 123C

/S/ THI

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