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10-26-72

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164TH PARIS SESSION DISCUSSES DRV STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS

VNA Reports Xuan Thuy's Speech

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1657 GMT 26 Oct 72 B

[Text] Hanoi VNA October 26--At the 164th plenary session of the Paris conference on Vietnam today, Minister Xuan Thuy, head of the DRV Government delegation, said:

In the peace negotiations on Vietnam, the DRV Government has shown the maximum goodwill. Together with the PRGRSV, we have not ceased striving for a solution fair to all sides.

In this spirit, the PRGRSV and the DRV Government, at this congress, have made many peace overtures. We give our complete approval and support to the statement of Sept. 11, 1972, the latest proposal of the PRGRSV. This statement shows a correct stand and presents a very practical solution. For this very reason, it has been welcomed by broad sections of the public in the world and the United States as well.

In full agreement with the PRGRSV, the DRV Government has conducted private talks with the U.S. Government with a view to settling the Vietnam issue peacefully. Yet, after 4 years, by Sept. 1972, no result had been obtained at the talks on the Vietnam issue.

To advance the talks, the DRV side, at the private meeting on Oct. 8, took a new, extremely important initiative. It put forward a draft "agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam," and proposed that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, and the Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of Republic of Vietnam, immediately agree upon

and sign this agreement in mid-October 1972 to rapidly restore peace in Vietnam. According to this draft agreement, the Vietnam issue will be settled in two stages in accordance with the oft-expressed desire of the American side.

First of all there will be a cessation of the war in South Vietnam, a cease-fire in South Vietnam, a cessation of the U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam, a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops of the United States and those of the foreign countries allied with the United States and with the Republic of Vietnam, the return of all captured and detained personnel of the parties, and an agreement on the principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall settle together the internal matters of South Vietnam within 3 months after the cease-fire comes into effect. From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the installation of the government formed after free and democratic general elections, the two present administrations in South Vietnam shall hold consultations with a view to the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, achieving national concord, ensuring the democratic liberties of the South Vietnamese people, and forming an administration of national concord, which shall have the task of promoting the South Vietnamese parties' implementation of the signed agreements and organizing general elections in South Vietnam.

This initiative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam brought the negotiations on the Vietnam problem, which had dragged on for 4 years, onto the path to a settlement. The American side itself admitted that the draft "agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam" put forward by the DRV side was indeed an important and very fundamental document which opened up the way to an early settlement.

It is a pity that now that an agreement has been reached at the talks and a date has been fixed for the signing of the "agreements on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam," the American side has put up new obstacles to avoid implementing what the two sides have agreed upon. At the same time, to deal with public opinion, the American side makes believe that it is striving for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, that the war will end soon.

For this reason, the DRV Government, on Oct. 26, 1972, was forced to make a statement on the state of negotiations to help the public see the truth.

After reading out the main paragraphs of this statement, Minister Xuan Tuuy concluded:

As pointed out by the statement of the DRV Government, "this information is in the interest of peace and will in no way affect the negotiations."

It is clear that every condition is available now for a prompt settlement of the Vietnam issue and for the instant restoration of peace. The point is that the Nixon administration must immediately implement what has been agreed upon by the DRV and the United States.

Any pretext of the American side for delaying the signing of peace will not hold water, but will only show that the Nixon administration, while speaking of peace, is actually making war. [This is the only version of Xuan Thuy's speech monitored from VNA transmitters.]

In her speech, RSV Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh pointed out: To break the long deadlock at this conference and pave the way for a correct settlement to the Vietnam issue, the PRGRSV, on Sept. 11, 1972, made public an important statement on the ending of the U.S. war of aggression and the restoration of peace in Vietnam. The PRGRSV, for the same purpose, completely agreed with the DRV Government on the conduct of private meetings between the DRV and the United States.

Thanks to these efforts, the DRV and the United States have arrived at an agreement, whose main contents are in line with the main principles and contents of the peace proposals of the PRGRSV. Such an agreement, once signed, will meet the desire of the Vietnamese people, the American people, and broad sections of the world public. It will provide the South Vietnamese parties with good opportunities to settle satisfactorily the internal affairs of South Vietnam. The U.S. side, despite its own agreement and pledge, has many times sought to obstruct and delay the signing of this agreement. One of the main pretexts it makes is the difficulties in Saigon. Of course, it is universal knowledge that Nguyen Van Thieu is a dictator, a war-seeker and a fascist, an obstacle to peace and national concord in South Vietnam. This corroborates the PRGRSV in its oft-repeated affirmation that if the U.S. Government continues backing Nguyen Van Thieu, it can never end its involvement in Vietnam. This also shows that if peace is to be had at all, the U.S. must terminate its support for the clique of war-mongers now in power in Saigon, and Nguyen Van Thieu must resign.

On the other hand, Nguyen Van Thieu, put in place, kept and commanded by the U.S. cannot resist whatever policies and decisions of the U.S. The U.S., therefore, cannot pretext Thieu's reaction to delay the implementation of what has been agreed upon. So doing, the U.S. Government only shows its obdurate stand and bad faith. It will show that it does not want a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue, that it seeks to prolong negotiations to fool the public and serve its "Vietnamization" policy.

In such a situation, the PRGRSV fully supports the DRV Government in issuing the Oct. 26, 1972 statement on the state of negotiations to make the public see the truth.

The PRGRSV foreign minister stressed in conclusion: The PRGRSV delegation once again affirms its correct stand, its good faith and its seriousness at the Paris conference on Vietnam.

Victimized by the U.S. war of aggression for decades now, the South Vietnamese people, more than anyone else, desire peace. But that must be peace in independence and freedom.

As long as the U.S. continues its war of aggression, the South Vietnamese people, together with their compatriots in the whole country and in firm solidarity with the brother peoples of Cambodia and Laos, will fight on till the obtainment of their sacred objectives.

The U.S. delegate, confronted with this truth, became confused and tried to beat about the bush.

The next session will be held on November 2, 1972.

Xuan Thuy's Press Conference

[Transcript of DRV press briefing by Xuan Thuy (vice Nguyen Thanh Le), October 26, 1972]

My dear friends, today I set forth the reasons why the Government of the DRV was obliged to issue the statement of October 26, 1972. I also set forth the essential content of the statement made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Our government's statement and my statement today are already in your hands. I am now ready to answer your questions.

Question: Nahon, Radio Monte Carlo. What is the only obstacle to peace at the present time?

Answer: It should be pointed out that the U.S. reached agreement with the DRV on an agreement on ending the war in Vietnam and restoring peace in Vietnam. The U.S. also reached agreement with the DRV party on the time-table for signing this agreement. The U.S. is now putting forward one pretext after another in order not to keep its commitments. This is the only obstacle at the present time.

Question: Bousquet, ORTF-TV. Mr Minister, would you agree to the U.S. postponing this date of October 31 once again to some ulterior date and what would be the deadline for the signing of an agreement insofar as the North Vietnamese side is concerned?

Answer: You have read our statement, the DRV's statement. In this statement we made it known that these timetables were proposed by the American party. The U.S. sought to modify these timetables three times, therefore we believe that the date of October 31 is the date the U.S. must stick to in fulfilling its commitments.

Question: Bousquet, ORTF-TV. Is this a deadline?

Answer: We have already provided clarification in our statement.

Question: Kalisher, CBS. Are you expecting any further meetings with Mr Kissinger?

Answer: With regard to the agreement in question, the two parties were in accord on everything included in this agreement. Therefore, the essential point now is to await October 31 to sign the said agreement.

Question: De Gunzburg, AFP. What will the DRV's attitude be if the U.S. wants not only to change the date of the signing of the agreement but also insists on renegotiating certain aspects, as seems to be the case?

Answer: We have shown maximum goodwill. If the U.S. continues to advance further timetables and new pretexts, that proves it is seeking to prolong the negotiations and the war.

Question: Redmont, Westinghouse. Mr Minister, do you think that the U.S. should sign the agreement now even if there are objections from the Saigon administration?

Answer: The U.S. told us that both parties should reach agreement with their allies in order to be able to sign the agreement in question. Therefore, the American party was to obtain agreement from the Saigon administration or from other allies. Everyone knows that the Saigon administration was set up by the U.S. to claim that Saigon has created difficulties is to establish a pretext for prolonging the negotiations and the war.

Question: Ullman, AFP. Mr Minister, on his way out Mr Porter spoke of an understanding which was apparently reached not to reveal the terms of the declaration.

Could you tell us whether it was understood that the declaration would be issued and the timetable would be observed only to the extent that the U.S. obtained agreement from Saigon?

Answer: There was no understanding on this subject. Just a while ago during the session I gave the reasons why the Government of the DRV was obliged to issue the statement in question. Mr Porter made the following remark: "I am surprised that you have chosen to reveal the content of the private talks." I answered as follows: "I've already stated the reasons why our government issued this statement, but you will have to agree that if you want to talk about disclosing the content of the secret talks, the American party has so far on several occasions disclosed the content of the private talks." To corroborate this I quoted the following statement made by President Nixon on January 25, 1972, when he presented the American party's 8 points after having presented them in the secret talks. Here is President Nixon's sentence: "The best way to serve peace is to make public the proposals which we have put forward in the private meetings."

Question: Rolfson, BBC: Mr Minister, I have two questions: You said that in your original proposition in October there were two points of disagreement on which you accepted the American proposition. Could you specify what these two points were? And could you say on the 22nd of October in what form President Nixon gave personal approval to both the text of the agreement and the timetable?

Answer: I should like to provide clarifications on the two remaining questions following the October 17 private meeting. The first question deals with the replacement of the two South Vietnamese parties' weapons after the cease-fire. This is the sentence: "The two South Vietnamese parties will be authorized to replace periodically weapons, ammunition and war material which has been worn out or damaged after the cease-fire on the following basis: one for one, with the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of two South Vietnamese parties' joint military commission and of the international control and supervision commission.

The second question deals with the return of persons captured by both parties. The American party wanted to recover American military personnel but on the other hand it did not want to release persons from the PRG and the NLF captured and held by the U.S. or by the Saigon administration.

Thus the American party feels it is not responsible for the detention of these persons. It claims that this responsibility falls upon the Saigon administration.

But to demonstrate our goodwill and because we are anxious to reach a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem, we reached agreement with the American party, on this question: The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties will take place parallel to the withdrawal of American troops. (Answer as repeated in English) With our goodwill and with a view to reaching an early, peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem we agreed with the U.S. side on the following: The return of the captured military men and captured people of the parties will be completed, will be carried out parallel with and completed on the same day as the U.S. troop withdrawal.

Question: (Several journalists at once). If there is a difference between the two translations... which should we go by?

Answer: In the English version, the word "foreign" was omitted... If you like we will repeat: The return of the parties captured military personnel and foreign civilians will take place parallel to the troop withdrawal and will be completed on the date of the completion of this withdrawal.

Question: Withdrawal of what troops?

Answer: The American troops.

Question: Sullivan, Baltimore SUN. Is this formulation more recent or more accurate than the one which we have on page 4 of the statement, where it says that "the release of all persons of the various parties captured and held, parallel to the withdrawal of the American troops"?

Answer: Concerning the case of Vietnamese civilians in South Vietnam captured by one party or the other, that is, the Saigon administration, or the PRG, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult to settle this question within a period of 3 months, to wipe out hatred and achieve national concord.

Question: Kalisher, CBS. After a period of 3 months or within a period of 3 months?

Answer: Within 3 months.

Question: Redmont, Westinghouse. The other part of the question was on the form of President Nixon's message.

Answer: Excuse me, but we are not in a position to provide details on this question. I hope you will understand.

Question: Lewis, New York TIMES. Mr Xuan Thuy, in the statement you talk of proposals put forward by your government on October 8. Did the American Government, for its part, put forward any proposals?

Answer: On October 8, we put forward a new initiative to end the war in Vietnam and to restore peace. This initiative takes the following form: We put forward a draft agreement on the end of the war and the restoration of peace in Vietnam. And we proposed that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the approval of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the United States with the approval of the Republic of Vietnam proceed to the signing of this agreement to end the war, and the American party agreed to this initiative. On that day the American party stated that it appreciated our initiative.

Question: Edith Lenart, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW. Mr Minister, you explained to us that the two South Vietnamese parties were to agree on the question of political prisoners in South Vietnam. Now in point 4, at the end of the paragraph, you mention the fact that "the two South Vietnamese parties will reach agreement on internal questions in South Vietnam". Could you give some indication of what other South Vietnamese questions will be agreed upon aside from the question of civilian prisoners?

Answer: The internal questions in South Vietnam are the following: For example, the question of democratic freedoms for the people, the question of the organization of elections in South Vietnam, the question of the establishment of a national council for reconciliation and national concord--centrally and on the various lower levels.

Question: Sullivan, Baltimore SUN. Mr Minister, certain American circles have reported a parallel understanding according to which the North Vietnamese troops, if there were any in the south, would withdraw to the north at the time of the cease-fire. Could you tell us whether such a clause or agreement exists?

Answer: Our government's statement also discussed this question. I should like to make our point of view clear. The only aggressor in South Vietnam is the United States. American aircraft, moreover, have bombed North Vietnam and has recently mined the harbors and waterways of North Vietnam. Therefore, the Vietnamese people, in the south as in the north, have a perfect right to oppose the aggression committed on Vietnamese soil. To claim that North Vietnam is committing aggression against South Vietnam in order to demand mutual withdrawal afterwards amounts to putting forward a line of reasoning designed to justify aggression, to justify prolonging the war. For our part, we have already, and on many occasions, rejected this false line of reasoning.

Question: Bousquet, ORTF-TV. Mr Minister, would you accept the modification on one or several of the nine points in the agreement reached between Washington and Hanoi, between now and the official signing of this agreement?

Answer: For the moment, I can tell you simply that the text of the agreement was accepted by the United States and the DRV.

Question: Bousquet, ORTF-FV. Compromise is still possible on one of the nine points?

Answer: I have nothing to add on this subject.

Question: De Gunzburg, AFP. I have two questions, one on content, one on form. Concerning the publication of the agreements, the minister said that during the session he had explained to Mr Porter the reasons why the DRV was obliged to publish them. I wonder if the minister could tell us what his arguments on this subject were....

Answer: After my answer to Mr Porter, which you were given a while ago, Mr Porter contented himself with remaining silent.

Question: De Gunzburg, AFP. My second question is on paragraph 6 of the agreements, where the four member joint military commission is discussed--this is quite clear--but I wonder if the minister could provide some clarification concerning the international control and supervision commission and the international conference on Vietnam, for rumors have been circulating concerning French participation in the ICC. And in addition, concerning the international conference on Vietnam also, the participation of the four permanent members of the Security Council has been discussed. I would like to know if these rumors are true or false and what the opinion of the DRV is on this subject.

Answer: In light of the fact that these agreements have not yet been signed, I am not in a position to disclose what countries have been proposed for participation in this conference.

Question: Nahon, Radio Monte Carlo. Mrs Binh said she would see us next Thursday. By next Thursday, October 31 will have passed, should we understand by this that the negotiations will continue or that on the other hand you might take the initiative of breaking off the negotiations if this date is not respected by the Americans?

Answer: Wait and you will find out when the day comes.

Question: Valery, New York DAILY NEWS. I would like to understand clearly the reasons for this press conference today. What exactly is the situation today on the talks with the Americans. The impression which one has from your statement is as follows:

The Americans apparently requested on October 23rd the renegotiation of certain points in the 9 points which you had agreed on with them. Is this accurate? In this event what is it they want to renegotiate? And if it is not correct, what are your reasons for doubting that the Americans will sign this agreement on October 31? Do you have specific reasons for doubting that the Americans will sign this agreement on October 31st as they apparently committed themselves to do?

Answer: The U.S. has already agreed with us on this question and now they are creating new obstacles, taking difficulties encountered in Saigon as a pretext. We believe that this attitude on the part of the U.S. proves that it is seeking to prolong the negotiations and the war. This is why we demand that the American party implement the agreements which have already been reached.

Question: Behr, NEWSWEEK. Could you tell us through what channel this request for renegotiation reached you? Was it a personal message from Mr Kissinger or did it reach you through the American delegation in Paris?

Answer: Just a while ago, one of our journalists friends asked a similar question and I said that you should understand that we are not in position to answer these questions for the time being.

Question: (Woman journalist from a Saigon paper). What do you think of the statement made by Mr Tran Van Lam, foreign minister of the Republic of Vietnam? Mr Lam stated that the cease-fire will not be declared, decided upon before November 7?

Answer: The Saigon administration is free to think whatever it pleases.

Question: Freudenheim, Chicago DAILY NEWS. Mr Minister, you said that the two parties, the DRV and the American party, reached agreement on October 22. Are you saying that the American party agreed unconditionally without any reference to the Saigon administration?

Answer: The U.S. created the Saigon administration, and the U.S. stated that it could represent the Saigon administration in the bilateral conversations.

Question: Rosenberg, AP. Excuse me, but we have not been able to hear all the questions, perhaps this question has already been asked. I would like to ask whether you would continue the negotiation either here at Avenue Kleber or in private if the agreement is not signed on October 31st?

Answer: Just a while ago I already told a journalist friend: "Wait and you'll see on October 31st."

Question: Sal Tass, HET PAROOL. In your statement you talk about a tripartite government and you continue to say that the two South Vietnamese parties will consult. One of these parties is either the Thieu Government or the government of concord. In general, what will be the role of the Thieu administration after the agreement?

Answer: Could you please repeat that? I did not understand.

Question: Sal Tass, HET PAROOL. First of all, you talk about a tripartite government.

Then you say that the two South Vietnamese parties will consult. Now who is the second party, the first is your party, then is it the government of concord or the Thieu government? And in general, what will be the role of the Thieu government after the signing of the agreement?

Answer: According to the agreement concluded, before the free general elections for the establishment of legislative and executive bodies there will exist, parallel to each other two armies, two administrations and three political forces. This is why when we spoke of a 3-month period following a cease-fire, that is, during this period the two South Vietnamese parties will enter into consultations, I am talking about the PRGRSV and the Republic of Vietnam.

Question: Lewis, New York TIMES. In the agreement which you concluded with the American Government did you decide upon the third component, the other political forces which ought to represent it, and if not by what procedure will they be chosen?

Answer: The agreement in question makes it clear that while the two administrations exist, one parallel to the other, that is, the PRGRSV and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, there will exist alongside a national council for reconciliation and national concord with three equal components.

Question: Lewis, New York TIMES. That did not answer my question. How will the third component be chosen and if this has not already been decided between your government and the U.S. by what procedure will the choice be made?

Answer: I do not wish to go into details on this question but I believe that by reading the PRG's statements, the seven points, the two clarified points, the September 11 statement, you could obtain some indication of the procedure concerning the third component. In particular the PRG's September 11 statement provided specific indications concerning the third component.

Question: Randal, Washington POST. Mr Minister, when the Americans spoke about the difficulties which made the signature of this agreement impossible on the date which has been agreed upon, did they provide any details on the nature of the difficulties or did they simply talk about difficulties without going into details? In other words did the Americans give you a new list of points in contention or not?

Answer: Just a while ago I answered a journalist friend by saying that I did not believe in the actual existence of these difficulties encountered by the American party. I still consider these so-called difficulties as a pretext for prolonging the negotiations and the war.

Question: Randal, Washington POST. All right, I accept your thesis but did the Americans give any details on these so-called difficulties?

Answer: The American party contented itself with saying that it had not obtained Saigon's approval.

Question: Sedbon, REUTER. Mr Minister, up to this morning the tripartite government was being discussed. This morning this expression disappeared, replaced by the term "administrative structure" or "national council". Is this the same thing?

Answer: It should be pointed out that logic requires the formation of a tripartite government of national concord in keeping with the PRG's proposal and without parallel existence of two administrations.

But precisely because the DRV and the PRG, having demonstrated their goodwill, accepted the formula of a national council of reconciliation and national concord, which I just mentioned. [as received]

Question: Behr, NEWSWEEK. When was the second formula accepted, did this occur for example in the past 48 hours?

Answer: During the course of the private negotiating and discussion process.

Question: Tim Craery, SOUTHERN NEWS SERVICE Canada. Has there been agreement on the line of demarcation between the two jurisdictions in South Vietnam?

Answer: The agreement mentions a cease-fire in place.

Question: Tim Craery, SOUTHERN NEWS SERVICE Canada. Did the two parties to the talks agreed on who occupied what territory?

Answer: These are very concrete matters and they cannot be decided upon before the act goes into effect.

Question: Edith Lenart, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW. Mr Minister, you said that the Americans want to prolong the negotiating process. Do you think that it is because it will be easier for Mr Nixon to put pressure on President Thieu after the elections than to do so now to obtain the agreement of the Republic of South Vietnam on the signing of the agreement which you have concluded?

Answer: With regard to the election in the U.S. it should be said that it is the Americans who will be going to the polls. I am not eligible to, therefore I have no opinion on this matter. As for what Mr Nixon really thinks, it is hard for me to know this. All I know is that at the present time the American party is seeking to prolong the negotiations and to prolong the war.

Question: Bousquet, ORTF-TV. Mr Minister, I should like to return to the question which Mrs Lewis asked you concerning the choice of the men of the third component, the neutralist component. Without going into details I would like to know whether this choice will be made by Saigon or the PRG or by the four delegations to the Paris conferences?

Answer: The PRG's September 11 statement made it clear that concerning the formation of a tripartite provisional government of national concord the PRG will name the members of the first component, the republic of Vietnam will name the members of the 2nd component, and the PRG and the Republic of Vietnam--that is Saigon--will enter into consultation to name the members of the third component. Now I believe that this principle will be applied also for the establishment of the national council of reconciliation and national concord.

Question: Flora Lewis, New York TIMES. Did the Americans accept this?

Answer: We believe that the PRG's proposal is designed to banish hatred and achieve national concord in South Vietnam. But Mr Thieu on the other hand in his last speech, on the 24th, showed himself to be hostile to the third component.

Question: Sal Tass, HET PAROOL. What is the difference between this administration and provisional government?

Answer: The difference is in the following: If a provisional government of national concord existed, there would not be paralled existence of two administrations in South Vietnam.

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On the other hand, if a national council of reconciliation and national concord exists there will be the parallel existence of the two administrations.

Thank you for your attention.

GEN VO VAN SUNG MEETS WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER

For an AFP report on the meeting at which Gen Vo Van Sung gave French Foreign Minister Schumann a copy of the DRV Government statement see the France section of the 27 October Latin America & Western Europe DAILY REPORT.

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES 25 OCT U.S. BOMBINGS

Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1402 GMT 26 Oct 72 S

[26 October statement by DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman]

[Text] The U.S. imperialists on 26 October continued to send aircraft to strike barbarously at many populous areas in Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and in the Vinh Linh zone.

On the same day, U.S. B-52's carpet-bombed a number of places in Quang Binh Province. The U.S. aircraft rained bombs and shells on agricultural cooperatives of Van Xuan in Xuan Lam village, Xuan Nguyen in Xuan Binh village, Chon Thanh and Tien Tien in Me Lam village, and Xuan Tinh in Tinh Hai village, on Khe Sanh dam in Vinh Giang district, Thanh Hoa Province, and in the (Trinh Mon) farm in Quynh Son village, Quynh Luu district, Nghe An Province, killing or wounding many civilians and extensively destroying the Vietnamese people's homes and property.

In an attempt to deceive public opinion in the United States and elsewhere in the world, the Nixon administration has ballyhooed incessantly that it will end the war and that it is negotiating seriously to solve the Vietnam problem. However, the Nixon administration has in fact continued the war, and has continued to send aircraft day and night to conduct extermination bombings on and strafe many municipalities, cities, towns, and population centers of the DRV. These criminal war acts of the Nixon administration prove that the United States does not have a serious attitude and good will for negotiation to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam.

The DRV Foreign Ministry vehemently denounces and strictly condemns these savage war acts by the Nixon administration, and resolutely demands that it immediately end the bombing and strafing of North Vietnam, the mining and blockade of North Vietnamese harbors, and all other acts encroaching on DRV sovereignty and security.

The Nixon administration must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising from its war acts in Vietnam.