

# GIST

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VIET-NAM: TWO YEARS AFTER THE PARIS AGREEMENT 3/75


1. The issue: The January 1973 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam was signed by North Viet-Nam while it was conducting a last-minute offensive designed to seize as much South Vietnamese territory as possible before the cease-fire. After that offensive was turned back and the agreement was concluded, hostilities declined for a time. The US was able to withdraw its forces, and we made clear our intention to end our remaining involvement as quickly as circumstances would permit.

During negotiations with Provisional Revolutionary Government representatives (Viet Cong) in 1973-74, the Republic of Viet-Nam made comprehensive proposals aimed at a political settlement in the South. As stipulated in the Paris Agreement these proposals called for supervised general elections throughout South Viet-Nam. The Communist side, however, refused South Vietnamese offers to set a specific date for free elections and broke off all further talks with the Republic of Viet-Nam. In addition, the Communist side has repeatedly violated the terms of the Agreement calling for a cessation of hostilities.

2. The Communist side has charged South Viet-nam (and the US) with:
  - Responsibility for the resurgence in fighting;
  - Replacing military equipment and supplies in excess of the "one-for-one" provision of the Agreement (Article 7).
  - The return of 25,000 American military advisors disguised as civilians.
  - Holding 200,000 "political" prisoners in the South and failing to return Communist personnel as called for in the peace agreement.
  - Sabotaging the political talks in Paris and the Joint Military Commission talks in Saigon as well as the work of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) in South Viet-Nam.
3. The facts are: Responsibility for the resurgence in fighting and breakdown in negotiations rests with the Communist side. Further,
  - US military assistance to South Viet-Nam has been substantially less than the one-for-one replacement allowed by the Agreement; it has not included aircraft equipment replacement or maintenance.
  - There are no US military advisors in Viet-Nam; US Government and contract personnel number less than 4,000.
  - South Viet-Nam has returned all of the more than 5,000 civilians it listed for exchange at the time of the cease-fire. It received fewer than 700 of its own citizens in return. It has some 33,000 persons incarcerated at this time for all types of offenses.
  - South Viet-Nam has not increased the size of its armed forces, nor has it sent its forces into the North or tried to overthrow that government.

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- South Viet-Nam has cooperated fully with the ICCS and paid its share of the Commission's expenses.
- South Viet-Nam has made positive proposals for a political settlement, including internationally-supervised elections at a specified time. It has also called for an unconditional resumption of talks with the Communist side.

4. Communist violations include:

A. Military

- Infiltration of over 170,000 troops into the South and buildup of their main-force army in the South from some 220,000 at the time of the Paris Agreement to 300,000 now.
- Tripling their armored strength in the South, adding 400 new vehicles, increasing their artillery and anti-aircraft weapons, and expanding their armament stockpiles.
- Improving their military logistics system through Laos, Cambodia, and the Demilitarized Zone, which Article 15(b) of the Paris Agreement specified was to be respected "by both sides."
- Moving the North Vietnamese Army's 983d Division from Laos into the Central Highlands of South Viet-Nam.
- Refusing to deploy the teams established by the agreement to implement the cease-fire, or to pay their prescribed share of the expenses of the ICCS.
- Increasing their military pressure, overrunning several areas unequivocally held by South Viet-Nam at the time of the cease-fire, and an entire province in January 1975, the population centers of which were clearly under South Vietnamese control when the Paris Agreement was signed.

B. Political

- Breaking off all negotiations with South Viet-Nam, including political talks in Paris and the meeting of the Two Party Joint Military Commission talks in Saigon. Refusing since October 1974 to negotiate with the present Saigon government, despite the fact that they committed themselves to do so in the Paris Agreement.
- Failing to honor their commitment to resolve the status of "military personnel and foreign civilians ... missing in action" (Article 8(b) of the Paris Agreement).

5. The US goal is to:

- See the Paris Agreement fully implemented on all sides.
- Continue helping the Republic of Viet-Nam to defend itself so long as the Communist side attempts to impose its own, unilateral military solution.
- Avoid a political, economic, or military collapse in South Viet-Nam which would lead to new instability in Southeast Asia.

6. US aid: The South Vietnamese have been fighting hard in their own defense, as the casualty figures clearly show. Unfortunately the current appropriations for military and economic aid are inadequate to South Viet-Nam's needs and to our continuing responsibilities, particularly in light of the escalated level of North Vietnamese attacks. Even if President Ford's request to the Congress is approved for appropriation of \$300 million in military aid, which is the balance remaining of the \$1 billion authorized for South Viet-Nam last year, these funds will still not allow for replacement of equipment lost in combat. They are the minimum needed for current supplies to prevent serious reversals in South Viet-Nam.