


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
2D BATTALION, 32D ARTILLERY




OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JAN 69

(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) UIC: WA2AAA (U)

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CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
2D BATTALION, 32D ARTILLERY  
APO San Francisco 96216

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY: 48 CFR 1.101  
DATE: 11/11/03  
BY: [illegible]

AVGE-ZC

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (UIC-JA2AAA)  
Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS-CSFOR-65

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. Personnel

(1) Strength:

(a) The authorized strength as of 31 January was 37 officers, 6 warrant officers, and 522 enlisted men.

(b) The assigned strength as of 31 January was 35 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 482 enlisted men.

(2) Gains and losses:

(a) During the period 1 November 1968 thru 31 January 1969, 8 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 54 enlisted men were assigned.

(b) During the same period, 8 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 73 enlisted men rotated.

(3) The only casualty during the period 1 November 1968 thru 31 January 1969 was 1 wounded in action.

(4) Personnel Management:

(a) The Battalion received replacements in most required MOS's.

(b) Personnel strength has remained slightly below the authorized level with fluctuation from a low of 84% to a high of 106%.

(c) There were no changes in educational opportunities.

(d) There were no religious problems. Religious coverage has been excellent for all batteries in both field and base camp locations.

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(5) R & R

(a) Out-of-Country

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
Australia	10	9	7
Bangkok	6	8	4
Hawaii	9	9	8
Hong Kong	2	2	4
Malaysia	0	0	0
Manila	0	1	0
Singapore	2	4	3
Taipei	4	5	6
Tokyo	2	1	1

(b) In-Country

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
Vung Tau	1	6	5

(6) Morale: The R & R program has been extremely helpful in maintaining the morale of the command at a high level.

(7) Awards and decorations: During the period ending 31 January 1969, personnel of the Battalion have received 1 Soldiers Medal, 1 Bronze Star Medal with "V", 3 Air Medals, 6 Bronze Stars, 9 Army Commendation Medals and 1 Purple Heart.

(8) Discipline, Law, and Order: During the period ending 31 January 1969, the Battalion has had 50 Article 15's and 11 Special Court Martials.

(9) The Battalion has one (1) Rotary and one (1) Fixed Wing Aviator assigned. Both are TDY to 23d Artillery Group Aviation Section.

b. Operations

(1) The Battalion remained deployed as follows: Hq, Svc, and Btry B - Tay Ninh Base Camp, Btry A at Camp St Barbara, and Btry C at Dau Tieng.

(2) The Battalion provided artillery support for the 25th Infantry Division Team Thang Phase II to include AO Orange, AO Stogie, AO Centaur, AO Charlie Horse, AO Trunk, AO State, AO Bobcat, and AO Park. Fire support for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) included AO Eagle, AO Tiger, AO Sky, AO

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Date: 11/11/2000  
By: [illegible]

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Search, and AO Cat. Fire support for the 1st Infantry Division was provided in AO Apple. Fire support was also provided for numerous Special Forces Operations, Regional/Popular Forces Operations, ARVN Airborne Operations, and ARVN Marine Operations. The Battalion provided 2 Liaison Parties and 5 FO Parties for combined Special Forces/Regional - Popular Forces, and ARVN Marine and Airborne Operations.

(3) During the month of November the enemy activity was light in Tay Ninh Province. Tay Ninh Base Camp received 6 rounds of rockets, wounding 2 US soldiers. Dau Tieng Base Camp, in Binh Duong Province, received 30 rounds of 82mm mortars causing light damage to equipment.

(4) During the month of November the Battalion received credit for destroying 4 bridges, 34 bunkers, 60 meters of trench line, 10 foxholes, 1 hut, and damaging 2 bridges, 4 bunker complexes, 80 meters of trench line and foxholes, 3 ammunition storage bins, and silencing 3 antiaircraft positions. Fires were started at a few locations, and the Battalion was credited with 10 secondary explosions.

(5) On 7 November 1968 a practice firecracker mission by battery A, 2d Bn, 32d Artv on grid XT 137 717 was successful. The Battery expended one 8 inch round with MAJ Sitz observing.

*Firecracker Practice*

(6) During the month of December the enemy activity again was light in Tay Ninh Province. Tay Ninh Base Camp received 19 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire and 7 rounds of 82mm mortar fire which caused 8 US MIA. Dau Tieng received 11 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 6 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire causing slight damage to equipment. Battery C, 2/32 Artv, also received sniper rifle fire in their area. Camp St Barbara received 3 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, causing slight damage to equipment.

(7) On 3 December, 1968 CPT Wilkinson, Battalion Air Observer, adjusted fire on 12 VC. Results were 10 VC KBA. The aircraft took one round of small arms fire during the mission. During the month of December the Battalion got credit for 24 VC killed by artillery fire. It destroyed 57 bunkers, 3 foxholes, 170 meters of trench line, 1 ferry boat, 5 tunnels, 1 ox cart, 4 sampans, 1 bridge, damaged 5 bunkers, silenced 1 antiaircraft position, had 3 secondary explosions and started 2 fires.

(8) During the month of January the enemy activity was exceptionally light. Tay Ninh Base Camp received a few rounds of mortar fire with negative casualties or damage to equipment. Dau Tieng received a few rounds of mortar fire resulting in damage to one 2 1/2 ton truck of Battery C, 2/32 Arty.

(9) On 101350 January 1969, the 8 inch platoon of Battery B, 2/32 Arty moved to FSB Washington at XT 1456. They closed at 1430 hours without incident. Their mission was direct support to the ARVN Marines operating to the west of base camp.

(10) On 11 January 1969, Battery A, 2/32 Arty at Camp St Barbara sighted five VC with their starlight scope around the VIP helicopter pad.

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Authority: 32 CFR 1.101  
DATE: 11/10/00

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They engaged with M79's and quad 50's. At daybreak the infantry found 2 VC crawling by the resupply pad. Their ages were approximately 15 and 19 years old respectively.

RTRY A  
Results

(11) During the month of January the Battalion was credited with 40 VC KIA, the destruction of several bicycles, 5 buildings, 41 bunkers, 2 bridges, 150 meters of trench line with trap doors, and 3 antiaircraft sites. The Battalion also started 1 fire and caused 7 secondary explosions.

(12) During the reporting period Camp St Barbara was resupplied almost entirely by helicopter. The road to Camp St Barbara was opened on only two occasions for vehicle convoys.

Road  
closed

(13) The following number of missions were fired with the amounts of ammunition expended as indicated:

UNIT	MISSION FIRED	AMMUNITION EXPENDED	
		8"	175mm
Btry A	4,331	3,109	6,855
Btry B	3,587	4,568	4,558
Btry C	3,609	4,983	4,436
TOTAL	11,527	12,660	15,849

(14) The Battalion has fired a total of 294,554 rounds in support of ground operations in RVN.

## c. Training

(1) Accident prevention training continues to be a matter of command emphasis. Classes on road signs and hazards of driving in RVN received special attention.

(2) In-country orientation was conducted for all newly arrived replacement personnel by their Battery Commander during their first 7 days in the battery.

(3) On the job training and cross training continues in all units.

(4) 3 EM attended a 3 day course on PILL at II Field Forces G4 office.

(5) All newly assigned company grade officers were given an examination to determine their FDC proficiency. All passed successfully.

(6) Battalion continues to give reaction time tests to firing batteries to determine efficiency and proficiency of the unit.

## d. Intelligence

(1) No significant security or counter intelligence information was received or developed during the reporting period.

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(2) During the reporting period the Battalion VR program consisted of 170 missions flown. There were 326 significant sightings which resulted in 59 fire missions.

## e. Logistics

(1) Generally, all classes of supplies have been available in adequate quantities to all elements of the Battalion. In many instances, however, the Battalion had to hand carry requisitions to rear echelons because of non-availability of the items at forward based supply activities. The hand carry system proved highly effective and is discussed in more detail in Section 2, Lessons Learned. Items that have not been available at all or in insufficient quantities include:

- (a) Body armor (medium and large sizes)
- (b)  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks (the Battalion is short 10)
- (c) Paint (white, red, and OD)
- (d) Tools for organizational tool kits
- (e) Typewriters
- (f) Locks
- (g) General supplies such as brooms, cups, tumblers, bowls, and silverware.

(2) All higher headquarters elements are aware of shortages and are working toward obtaining the supplies.

## f. Organization

(1) During the reporting period the Battalion remained assigned to the 23d Arty Gp.

(2) Headquarters Battery, Service Battery, and Battery B were stationed at Tay Ninh, Battery A at FSB St Barbara, and Battery C at Dau Tieng.

(3) Present firing battery configuration is as follows:


Battery A - 3 - 175mm guns  
1 - 8 inch howitzer

Battery B - 2 - 175mm guns  
2 - 8 inch howitzers

Battery C - 2 - 175mm guns  
2 - 8 inch howitzers

## g. Other

(1) There were no vehicle or aircraft accidents affecting combat operations.



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(2) The Battalion surgeon and medical section organized and supervised a medical center at Cao Xa where they conducted sick call six days a week and trained 1 Vietnamese nurse and 2 Vietnamese aidmen. During the reporting period they have seen and treated 3,694 Vietnamese civilians.

## 2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendation

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operation. None.

c. Training. None.

d. Intelligence

### (1) Utilization of VR aircraft

(a) OBSERVATION - The use of the allocated VR aircraft for observation of artillery fires on the daily II Field Force Intelligence Target List has not produced any information or intelligence of a significant nature.

(b) EVALUATION - The use of the VR aircraft for observation of the above mentioned intelligence targets takes away valuable time that could have been used for visual reconnaissance or registration requirements. Due to the large area covered by these targets the VR aircraft is capable of observing only a small percentage of them any one day. In addition, the targets are scheduled to be fired at specific times as required by regulation. Due to problems in obtaining clearance to fire, the targets are normally being fired simultaneously from three different locations, making it impossible for the VR aircraft to observe all of them. It has been the experience of this battalion on observing these targets that in most cases they have already been engaged by B-52 or other types of air strikes. This results in either negative surveillance or no target to observe. A review of the results of this program indicates there were no significant sightings obtained from observing these targets and the time used to do so was detrimental to the VR program of this battalion. This can be supported by the large drop in the number of significant sightings since the observation of intelligence targets of this nature was initiated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That the VR aircraft be used exclusively for visual reconnaissance and registrations.

e. Logistics

(1) Utilization of Liaison Personnel to expedite critical items of supply.

(a) OBSERVATION - Many critical items of supply not available at forward supply activities are available through searching of depot stocks and direct coordination with rear echelon units.

(b) EVALUATION - This Battalion has experienced great difficulty in

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obtaining many critically needed supplies. This includes TO&E as well as self-service supply items. Direct coordination with forward supply units has often proven ineffective. To solve this problem, priority O2 fill or kill hand-carry requisitions are validated by local support agencies and then hand-carried through the depot or rear support agency for issue. Often the agency will have a recorded zero balance but a search of the stocks usually reveals the needed items are on hand. They can then be picked up on agency inventory and released to the unit. To aid in further expediting critical items, the support battalion Material Readiness Expediter can be coordinated with and his cooperation solicited. This Battalion is presently utilizing one liaison officer and one NCO equipped with a 3/4 ton truck for this purpose with outstanding results.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That other battalions utilize one officer and one NCO for expediting needed supplies from rear echelon support units until such time as the supply system is working properly.

f. Organization. None.


g. Others. None.

*Billy R. McDonald*  
BILLY R. McDONALD  
LTC, FA  
Commanding

## DISTRIBUTION

- 2-Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific
- 3-Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam
- 6-Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group

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316

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Authority: 316  
By: 11/18/2001  
Date: 3/16/01

AVHGC-DST (5 Feb 69) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (UIC-WA2AAA)  
Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS-CSPOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 0 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery and concurs with the report as modified by the preceding indorsements

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:  
2d Bn 32d Arty  
II FFV

C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

CONCURRENCE/NONCONCURRENCE: Appropriate comment was received from:

G3-OPS: LTC Brown/4636

ACTION OFFICER: MAJ ROBBINS/LBN 4433

COL. READ, AGOCS, G3  
RECORD COPY RETURN TO AVHGC-DST.

206-0222

2201-015

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Authority: 93-104  
DATE: 10/10/01  
BY: JHE/MLD/DAK/CHC

AVGE-C (5 February 1969) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for Period  
Ending 31 January 1969, RCS-CSPOR-65 (R1)

Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96289, 16 February 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFB-FAC,  
APO 96256

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period  
ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32 Artillery.

2. Pertinent comments follows:

a. Reference Section 1, paragraph 1b(9): Third sentence should read  
"Their mission remained GS II FFORCEV."

b. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2d(1): Nonconcur. On occasion,  
it is desirable to observe the fires on intelligence targets. This should  
only be done on a selective basis, however. The VR aircraft should be used  
primarily for visual reconnaissance, but if it is deemed appropriate by the  
Battalion or higher headquarters, the VR aircraft should be available for  
the observation of fires on intelligence targets.

c. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2e(1): Nonconcur. The system as  
employed by 2d Bn, 32d Arty has met with outstanding results. Utilization  
of a Liaison Team, by all battalions, to expedite critical items of supply  
however, would overburden the depots and rear support agencies and is con-  
sidered infeasible. A study is presently being conducted by 23d Artillery  
Group to determine the feasibility of organizing an FFE Liaison Team at  
Group level to perform functions for all battalions similar to those now  
being performed by the 2d Bn, 32d Arty Team.

3. Errors in the report have been corrected with pen and ink.

*Harold G De Arment*

Copy Furnished  
HQ, 2d Bn, 32d Arty

HAROLD G DE ARMENT  
Colonel FA  
Commanding

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6 MAR 1969

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Authority: 25 CFR 162.104  
DATE: 10/15/03  
BY: SP5 BTJ/MLD

AVTFC-RE (5 Feb 69) 2d Ind  
Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (UTC-  
442000) Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS-CSECR-65 (RI) (U)

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

FROM: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVTFC-RE, APO  
96266

1. The quarterly report of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.
2. Concur with paragraphs 2b and c, 1st Indorsement.

*B.E. Hoffman Jr.*  
B.E. HOFFMAN JR.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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15 Mar

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Authority: 1.1.1.1  
Date: 10/15/01

AVHBC-RE-H (5 Feb 69) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (UTC-WA2AAA)  
Period Ending 31 January 1969 RCS-CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 13 MAR 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOR-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-  
Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for period  
ending 31 January 1969, as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B.G. MACDONALD  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

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