


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AUTHORITY: 48 CFR 1.101
DATE: 1 FEB 1998 BY: SP4

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
2D BATTALION, 32D ARTILLERY



Quarter Ended April 30, 69

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 30 APR 69

(RCS-CSFOR-65) (R1) UIC: WA2AAA (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION, 32D ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96216

AVGE-ZC

1 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery,
Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS-CSFOR-65 (RI) (UIC WA2AAA)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) SECTION 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. Personnel:

(1) The authorized strength as of 30 April 1969 was 37 officers, 6 warrant officers, and 522 enlisted men. Assigned strength was 38 officers, 5 warrant officers, and 519 enlisted men. During the period 1 February through 30 April 1969, 7 officers, 2 warrant officers and 195 enlisted men were assigned; 6 officers, 1 warrant officer and 194 enlisted men rotated. One man was killed in action and 18 men were wounded in action.

(2) The Battalion continues to receive replacements in most required MOS's. Personnel strength has remained slightly below the authorized level throughout the period. Educational and religious opportunities remain unchanged. Support by area chaplains has been excellent in both fire support base and base camp locations.

(3) Morale of the Battalion remained high throughout the period. The R & R program has been extremely helpful in maintaining morale. During February, 7 men each went to Australia and Hawaii, 6 men went to Taipei and one each went to Bangkok and Hong Kong. During March, 8 men each went to Australia and Hawaii, 6 men went to Taipei, 7 men each went to Bangkok and Singapore, 2 men went to Hong Kong and 4 men went to Vung Tau. During April, 10 men went to Hawaii, 7 men went to Australia, 4 men went to Taipei, 2 men each went to Bangkok, Hong Kong and Singapore, one man went to Tokyo, and 3 men went to Vung Tau.

(4) During the period, personnel of the Battalion received 10 Bronze Stars, 4 Air Medals, 33 Army Commendation Medals and 18 Purple Hearts. 15 personnel were punished under the provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Battalion held one Special Court Martial and one Summary Court Martial.

(5) The Battalion has one rotary wing and one fixed wing aviator assigned. Both are attached to the Aviation Section, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group.

b. Operations:

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DDO DIR 5200.10

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*107mm overcaliber means
a larger warhead on a 107
Rocket body.*

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DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 2011
BY: 3148

(1) The Battalion remained deployed as follows: Headquarters and Service Batteries at Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT 143 522), Alpha Battery at FSB St. Barbara (XT 276 679), Bravo Battery at Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT 159 524), and Charlie Battery at Dau Tieng (XT 498 485). All batteries retained the mission of General Support II Field Force Vietnam.

(2) The Battalion provided artillery support for the 25th Infantry Division Toan Thang Phase II, which ended 16 February 1969 and Toan Thang Phase III which started 17 February 1969 and continues at this date. Fire support was also provided for the 25th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division (Limbobile) and the 1st Infantry Division during Operation Atlas Wedge. Additionally, fire support was provided for Special Forces operations, Regional/Regular Forces operations and AAVN Airborne operations.

Feb (3) During the month of February, enemy activity increased in Tay Ninh Province with the starting of the post TET offensive. During February Tay Ninh Base Camp received 95 rounds of mixed rocket and mortar fire. FSB St. Barbara received 204 rounds of mixed rocket and mortar fire during the same period.

(4) On 24 February, HNB, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery received a direct hit (107mm overcaliber) in the battery wheeled vehicle park which resulted in the complete loss of PHL and maintenance facilities, and moderate to heavy fragment damage to 9 vehicles. Another round impacted near the HNB area resulting in fragment damage to the aid station, mess hall, and PX. One round also impacted near the RPT facility resulting in damage to the generator providing power for the RPT.

(5) During the month of February the Battalion received credit for 25 KBI and damage or destruction to 92 foxholes, 7 tunnels, 4 sampans, 2 huts, 1 loading point along with 22 secondary explosions.

March (6) During the month of March, enemy activity continued at a moderate level. During March Tay Ninh Base Camp received 75 rounds of mixed rocket and mortar fire, and FSB St. Barbara received 79 rounds of mixed rocket and mortar fire which resulted in 1 US KIA.

*2 KIA
at
St. Barbara
Mar '69*

(7) During the month of March the Battalion received credit for 72 KBI, 10 probable KBI, and destruction of the following: 162 bunkers, 66 foxholes, 5 bridges, 6 anti-aircraft positions and 4 huts. In addition, 5 fires were started, and 14 secondary explosions were initiated.

April (8) During the month of April, enemy activity remained at a moderate level. Tay Ninh Base Camp received 28 rounds of mixed rocket and mortar fire. On 11 April, two 122mm rockets impacted in the Sector compound at Tay Ninh City, resulting in 2 US KIA, and the setting of the AAVN ammunition dump in the compound on fire with the loss of the following: 860 rounds 155mm, 4900 rounds 105mm, 8000 rounds 81mm, 3000 rounds 60mm, 160 tons small arms ammo, 24,800 gallons MGLS, and 9600 gallons diesel.

(9) During the month of April the Battalion received credit for 31 KBI, 2 probable KBI and the destruction of 98 bunkers, 48 foxholes, 7 anti-aircraft positions, 3 bridges, 3 sampans and 1 supply dump as well as initiating 13 secondary explosions.

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BY: [illegible]

(10) On the 21st of April, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, displaced one 8" howitzer to FSB Marlins III (XF 298 485), then to FSB Missey (XF 293 554), returning to base camp on 22 April. The howitzer and crew accounted for 12 KBA on this mission. On 25 April, B Battery displaced one 8" howitzer to FSB Washington (XF 146 568) and returned to base camp the same day. The howitzer and crew accounted for 8 KBA on this mission.

(11) The number of missions fired during this reporting period and the amounts of ammunition expended are as follows:

<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>MISSIONS FIRED</u>	<u>8"</u>	<u>175mm</u>
A Battery	2503	3947	4721
B Battery	2620	4995	3134
C Battery	<u>1733</u>	<u>4846</u>	<u>2549</u>
TOTAL	<u>6851</u>	<u>13788</u>	<u>10404</u>

(12) The Battalion has fired a total of 308,972 rounds in support of ground operations in RVN.

c. Training:

(1) Troop movements occurred on 5 days during the period. Fire Support Operations occurred on 89 days. Individual and unit training occurred on 76 days.

(2) On-the-job training and cross training continues in all batteries. Areas of particular emphasis are gunnery training and logistics. To implement these programs, qualified personnel within the headquarters have been attached to batteries which lack personnel with requisite knowledge and experience to conduct an effective training program.

(3) Newly assigned company grade officers are given an examination to determine proficiency in gunnery. New officers do not assume responsible duties until they have passed the examination. Training of these officers has been done informally by battery commanders.

(4) 3 EM attended a 5 day course on generator maintenance conducted by 23d Artillery Group. 2 EM attended a one-day course on small arms maintenance conducted by 610th Maintenance Battalion. 5 EM attended a one-day course on P.D.C maintenance conducted by 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery. Each battery's mess personnel attended a one-day class on kitchen equipment maintenance conducted by 23d Artillery Group Food Service Technician.

d. Intelligence: During the reporting period the Battalion visual reconnaissance program consisted of 110 missions flown. These resulted in 252 significant sightings and 111 fire missions. The program has improved significantly due to a modification of technique as discussed in SECTION 2.

e. Logistics:

(1) All classes of supplies are available to all elements of the Bat-

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Delivered through normal supply channels. Major shortages include:

<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Requisition No.</u>
Carrier, Cargo, Tracked M-548	2	AR 81QZ 9068-2016
Compressor, 5CFM, 175PSI	2	AT 81QZ 8250-2110
	2	AT 81QZ 8260-2004
Generator Set, 3KW 400 cycle	4	AT 81QZ 9042-2100
Headset, Microphone H-182/PT	47	AT 81QZ 8213-2022
Multimeter, AN/URM-105	5	AT 81QZ 8216-2053
Radio Set, AN/GRC-125	3	AT 81QZ 9020-2033
Radio Set AN/VRC-46	1	AT 81QZ 8269-2031
	2	AT 81QZ 8343-2005
Radio Set Control Group AN/GRA-39	6	AT 81QZ 8214-0316
	4	AT 81QZ 8216-2059
Recovery Vehicle, M-578	1	AT 81QZ 9066-2031
Rifle, 5.62mm M16A1	486	AT 81QZ 8253-2032
Telephone set, TA-512/PT	22	AT 81QZ 8313-2000
	12	AT 81QZ 9047-2061
Tool Kit, Small Arms Repair	3	AT 81QZ 8309-2011
Tool Kit, Organizational Maint	2	AT 81QZ 8327-2016
Trailer, Water, M-149	1	AT 81QZ 8343-2000

(2) The above shortages have been reported to B4, 23d Artillery Group as critical items. This unit has initiated followup action prescribed by AR 735-35 and local policies. Many shortages have been alleviated by having liaison personnel with depot and other rear support agencies. All attempts to obtain the above items have been unsuccessful.

(3) During the period, resupply of Camp Saint Barbara continued to be entirely by helicopter. The system of sending 4 - 8 daily resupply sorties to Saint Barbara has been quite successful.

f. Organization:

(1) During the reporting period, the Battalion remained assigned to the 23d Artillery Group.

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*A Btry
} Re-supply
} by Air
The road was
closed*

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(2) Present firing battery configuration is as follows:

- Battery A - 2 - 175mm guns
2 - 8" Howitzers
- Battery B - 2 - 175mm guns
2 - 8" Howitzers
- Battery C - 2 - 175mm guns
2 - 8" Howitzers

Other:

(1) There were no vehicle or aircraft accidents affecting combat operations.

(2) During the reporting period, the Battalion surgeon and medical section continued to supervise a medical center at Cao Ka (KT 126 503). Sick call is conducted six days a week with the assistance of one Vietnamese nurse and 2 Vietnamese aidmen. During the reporting period, 3084 Vietnamese civilians were seen and treated.

2. (c) SECTION 2, Lessons Learned, Commanders Observation, Evaluation and Recommendation.

a. Personnel:

(1) Enlisted FMOS Qualification

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has received a significant number of enlisted replacements who have not been qualified in their FMOS, although individual personnel records have indicated full qualification.

(b) EVALUATION: Personnel in FMOS 05C40, 05C20, 76Y30, 76T30 and 63C20 who were assigned but not competent in their FMOS have seriously degraded this unit's operational capability. The primary reasons given for lack of competence are non-MOS utilization in COMUS and promotion into a FMOS in order to use an allocation without the requisite on-the-job training. In such cases, depending upon the situation, the individuals have been subjected to a rigorous training program to increase their competence or have been assigned duties commensurate with their skills and experience.


(c) RECOMMENDATION: That DA and COMUS place particular emphasis upon proper personnel utilization and promotion criteria.

b. Operations: None

c. Training:

(1) Logistical Training

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(a) **OBSERVATION:** Unit personnel were almost totally ignorant of logistics procedures and processes.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Inability to obtain requisite items and materiel seriously degrades the mission capability of any unit. In many cases personnel were assigned to this unit to perform critical logistical functions who were untrained or poorly trained in their duties. The consequent reliance upon on-the-job training has resulted in numerous problems in the logistics area. The problem has been partially alleviated by the use of refresher courses conducted by 23d Artillery Group and by Direct Support Maintenance facilities. Rigorous on-the-job training programs have been implemented and individuals have received informal training from their counterparts at Direct Support Facilities.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That DA and COMARMC take immediate action to increase the quality and quantity of enlisted and officer personnel specifically trained to perform logistical duties at the unit level, i.e. PILL clerk, TANKS clerk, Supply clerk, Armorer, Supply SGT, Supply Officer, Motor Officer, and Truck Vehicle Mechanics.

d. Intelligence:

(1) Utilization of VR aircraft

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The use of Army aviation aircraft solely for visual reconnaissance has not produced results consistent with the flight hours used. By correlating visual reconnaissance and current intelligence information an increase in effective observed fire was made with pronounced results. Prior planning for each flight consisted of:

(i) Selection of a small area based upon current intelligence estimates and known enemy patterns of activity.

(ii) Obtaining all necessary clearances to place immediate artillery fire upon any sightings.

(iii) Briefing the pilot and firing batteries on suspected intelligence targets.


(b) **EVALUATION:** A review of the present visual reconnaissance program in comparison with previous programs shows a significant increase in fire missions and significant sightings for each hour flown. It is an excellent source of current intelligence information which, when properly used, can lead to swift fires on the enemy positions, and the destruction of his caches or hindrance of his immediate plans.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:**

(i) That Army aviation aircraft assigned to artillery units be employed primarily in correlating current intelligence information with visual reconnaissance.

(ii) That all clearances be obtained prior to arrival of the aircraft on suspected target areas.

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AVHGC-DST (1 May 1969) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, Period Ending
30 April 1969, RCS-CSPOR-65 (R1) (U) (VIC: WA2AAA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 8 JUN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.
2. a. Reference item concerning utilization of VR aircraft, section II, page 6, paragraph d(1); concur. Use of VR aircraft is an internal problem to be resolved within priorities established by the controlling headquarters. Clearances obtained prior to arrival of aircraft over suspected target areas allows more rapid delivery of artillery fire on the enemy. Unit will be advised of above comment.
- b. Reference item concerning Signal Equipment Maintenance, section II, page 7, paragraph e(1); concur. The maintenance capability of the 940th LAM Company at Tay Ninh is currently under study by 1st Logistical Command. The heavy concentration of signal equipment in that area tests the limit beyond it's capability. MTOE action has been initiated by 1st Logistical Command. Overhaul programs are authorized at depot level maintenance facilities only. Unit will be advised of above comment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
2d Bn, 32d Arty
II FFV

MFR: ORLL was staffed through:

G3-Ops: MAJ Phalen/4636

G4: MAJ Kaplan/4142

ACTION OFFICER: MAJ STEWART/LBN 4433

CONCURRENCE/NONCONCURRENCE: Not required.

Suitable for Commander's Notes. Yes No.

To meet 7 July

file con

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COL. READ, AGCFS, G3
RETURN TO AVHGC-DST

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Authority: 98 USC 1601
DATE: 11/11/2001
BY: [illegible]

AVGE-C (1 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, Period Ending
30 April 1969, RCS-CSFOR-65(R1)(U)(UIC: WA2AAA)

Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96289, 19 May 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFB-FAC
APO 96266

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period ending 30 April 1969, from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.
2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:
 - a. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2a(1): Concur.
 - b. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2c(1): Concur.
 - c. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2d(1): Concur. Recommend this information be disseminated to all field artillery battalions with visual reconnaissance aircraft.
 - d. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2e(1): Concur.
 - e. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2g(1): Concur.
 - f. Reference Section 2, Paragraph 2g(2): Concur.

W. BEINKE
Colonel, FA
Commanding

Copy Furnished
2d Bn, 32d Arty

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DATE: 11/11/2001
BY: [illegible]


AVFB-FAC (1 May 69) 2d Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266 4 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFBC-RE, APO 96266

The quarterly report of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery adequately reflects operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.


L.D. KINNARD
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding



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Authority: 25 CFR 17.104
Date: 11/11/00
By: SP5/STW/DAW

AVFBC-RE-H (1 May 69) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery,
Period Ending 30 April 1969. RCS-CSFCR-65 (RI) (UIC WA2AAA)


DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 12 JUN 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-
Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for the
period ending 30 April 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B. G. MACDONALD
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

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