


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DATE: 11/11/01  
BY: [illegible]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
2D BATTALION, 32D ARTILLERY (175MM)(SP)



PROUD AMERICANS  
UNIT CREST

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED  
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1968  
(RCS-CSPCR-65) (R1) UIC: WA2AAA (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
2D BATTALION (175MM)(SP), 32D ARTILLERY  
APO San Francisco 96216

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 32 CFR 1.5  
DATE: 10/15/2010  
BY: [illegible]

AVGE-ZC

8 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Bn, 32d Arty (UIC-WA2AAA) for Period Ending  
30 April 1968, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R1)

THRU: Commanding Officer  
23d Artillery Group  
APO 96289

Commanding General  
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery  
ATTN: AVFB-FAC  
APO 96266

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO 96558

Commander-in-Chief  
United States Army Pacific  
ATTN: GROF-OT  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section 1: Operations Significant Activities.

a. Personnel

(1) Strength as of 30 April:

<u>AUTHORIZED</u>			<u>ASSIGNED</u>		
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
32	4	519	32	5	507

*Group 4*

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
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DOD DIR 5200.10

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(2) Gains and Losses 1 February 1968-30 April 1968:

<u>GAINS</u>			<u>LOSSES</u>		
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
9	1	139	6	1	188

(3) Casualties during the period 1 February 1968-30 April 1968:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
<u>Killed in Action</u>	2
Died of Battle Wounds	0
Wounded in Action	11
Missing in Action	0
Non-Battle Deaths	0

(4) Personnel Management:

1. The battalion has received replacements in most required MOS's. There remains a need for additional EM to fill E5 MOS 94B20, E5 63C20, E7 63C40, and E8 63C50 positions.

2. Personnel strength has remained slightly below the authorized level, with fluctuations from a low of 85% to a high of 103%.

3. There were no changes in educational opportunities.

4. There were no religious problems. Religious coverage has been excellent for all batteries in both field and base camp locations.

(5) R & R

a. Out-of-Country

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u> -1968
Australia	6	7	6
Bangkok	3	6	5
Hawaii	4	9	10
Hong Kong	2	1	2

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By: 3110

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Malaysia	1	3	1
Manila	0	1	2
Singapore	3	1	2
Tai Pei	3	8	5
Tokyo	2	2	4

b. In-Country

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
Vung Tau	7	6	0

(6) Morale: The morale of the battalion continued to be high.

(7) Awards and Decorations:


<u>AWARDS</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Soldiers Medal	8
Bronze Star Medal "V"	7
Bronze Star	11
Air Medal	20
Army Commendation Medal "V"	26
Army Commendation Medal	17
Purple Heart	13

(8) Discipline, Law, and Order

Article 15	11
Summary Court-Martial	1
Special Court-Martial	3
General Court-Martial	0

(9) The battalion has one (1) rotary and one (1) fixed wing aviator assigned.

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## b. Operations

(1) The battalion provided artillery support for the following major operations: Yellowstone, (1-8 Feb) Saratoga, Wilderness, Toan Thang (Complete Victory). Numerous Special Forces and Regional/Popular Force Operations were also provided artillery support. Forward observer parties were furnished to Special Forces and Regional/Popular Forces

(2) 010431 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), received 29 rounds 82mm 5 US WIA, battery A 2/32 fired 18 rounds 175mm.

(3) 012235 February, village XT 112503, received 82mm B-40, small arms, battery A 2/32 fired 10 rounds 8 inch.

(4) 012240 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), received 74 rounds 82mm mortar and automatic weapons and small arms, battery A 2/32 fired 19 rounds 175mm, battery B 2/32 fired 43 rounds 175mm.

(5) 022200 February, village XT 011443, received 82mm, rockets and small arms, battery A fired 6 rounds 175mm.

(6) 022315 February, XT 105510, XT 102502, 200 VC reported by MACV, battery A 2/32 fired 6 rounds 8 inch.

(7) 042210 February, Soui Da Base Camp, received unknown number of mortars, battery A 2/32 fired 8 rounds 8 inch.

(8) 051145 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), received 20 rounds 82mm, battery A 2/32 fired 4 rounds 175mm.

(9) 051200 February, Tay Ninh Base Camp, battery A 2/32 march order to Cu Chi, moved to support operations south of Cu Chi.

(10) 051400 February, FSPB Knox, battery B 2/32 march order to Tay Ninh Base Camp, moved to support final phase of operation Yellowstone.


(11) 062345 February, Tay Ninh City, Sector Hq, B-32 under ground and mortar attack 100 rounds 82mm, RPG, small arms, battery B 2/32 fired 16 rounds 8 inch.

(12) 071400 February, Prek Klok Base Camp, received 6 rounds 82mm, battery B 2/32 fired 7 rounds 175mm.

(13) 070050 February, village XT 124502, received 30-82mm 16 B-40. Capt. provided 01 aviator and AO.

(14) 081930 February, XT 278518, XT 278519, 300 VC in open, battery B 2/32 fired 4 rounds 8 inch.

(15) 081150 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), received 20-82mm and 60mm mortar, battery B 2/32 fired 21 rounds 175mm.



*Btry A  
goes to  
Cu Chi*

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(16) 091259 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), estimated VC platoon, battery B 2/32 fired 8 rounds 175mm.

(17) 111610 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), received 15 rounds 82mm, battery B 2/32 fired 9 rounds 175mm.

(18) 112220 February, Trang Sup SF Camp, received 5 rounds 82mm, battery B 2/32 fired 8 rounds 8 inch.

(19) 13-15 February, AP Binh village XT 689101, 3<sup>rd</sup> platoon Battery A 2/32 fired 176 rounds fire in support of the infantry in securing the village of AP Binh.

(20) 141300 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), received SA and AV fire, battery B 2/32 fired 7 rounds 175mm.

(21) 160040 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), received 10 rounds 82mm, battery B 2/32 fired 11 rounds 175mm.

(22) 160103 February, Phu Khong District Hq, XT 238477, received ground attack and mortar attack, battery B 2/32 fired 10 rounds 8 inch.

(23) 161947 February, FSPB ORD (SF CAMP), received 10 rounds 82mm, battery B fired 6 rounds 175mm.

(24) 162035 February, FSPB Knox, received 10 rounds 82mm, battery B 2/32 fired 8 rounds 175mm.

(25) 162330 February, Tay Ninh Base Camp, received 4 rocket and mortar attacks at 2330-0042, 0045-0255, 0310-0327, battery B fired 36 rounds 8 inch.

(26) 171930 February, out post XT 020435, Out Post under mortar and ground attack, battery B 2/32 fired 10 rounds 175mm.

(27) 180430 February, Tay Ninh Base Camp, Base Camp received rocket attack from 0430-0510. Radar location XT 10095440. Battery B 2/32 fired 44 rounds 8 inch.

(28) 181300 February, FSPB at Prek Klok, FSPB received 12 rounds 82mm battery B 2/32 fired 10 rounds 175mm.

(29) 181515 February, FSPB at Prek Klok, FSPB received 12 rounds 82mm battery B 2/32 fired 12 rounds 175mm.

(30) 191318 February, village XT 0143, village received mortar attack, battery B 2/32 fired 10 rounds 175mm.

(31) 192035 February, Cu Chi Base Camp. Battery A 2/32 march order to Tay Ninh Base Camp, Battery A 2/32 returned to Battery Position.

(32) 200318 February, village XT 013439, village received mortar attack, battery B 2/32 fired 10 rounds 175mm.

*Btry A  
goes to  
Tay Ninh*

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Btry B  
goes TO  
St. Barbara

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DATE: 11/11/03

(33) 201030 February, Tay Ninh Base Camp, Battery B 2/32 march order to Camp Saint Barbara, Battery B 2/32 occupied new Base Camp at Camp Saint Barbara.

(34) 220815 February, village XT C21433, Sector reported village overrun by VC, Battery A 2/32 fired 42 rounds 8 inch and 52 rounds 175mm. Village was destroyed by artillery and air strikes.

(35) 230457 February, Out Post XT 018434, Out Post under mortar attack, Battery A 2/32 fired 4 rounds 175mm.

(36) 260215 February, village XT 12055, village under ground attack and mortar attack, Battery A 2/32 fired 11 rounds 175mm.

(37) 261040 February, XT 197591, Special Forces at Trang Sup made contact with estimated two VC companies, Battery A 2/32 fired 36 rounds 175mm.

(38) 012005 March, 012205 March, Katum SF Camp XT 33469326, SF observed lights and heard vehicles, Battery B 2/32 fired 14 rounds 175mm and 11 rounds 175mm.

(39) 051600 March, XT 024413, Special Forces at Ben Soi made contact with 30 VC in the open, Battery A 2/32 fired 13 rounds 175mm.

(40) 081553 March, Katum SF Camp, received 10 rounds 82mm, Battery B 2/32 fired 16 rounds 175mm.

(41) 101231 March, Katum SF Camp, received 12 rounds 82mm, Battery B 2/32 fired 8 rounds 175mm.

(42) 141845 March, Katum SF Camp, received 100 rounds 82mm, RPG, 122mm rocket, Battery B 2/32 fired 13 rounds 175mm.

(43) 191455 March, Tay Ninh Base Camp, 8 inch platoon of Battery A 2/32 march order to Di An, 8 inch platoon closed at Di An at 201345 March.

(44) 250330 March, Bao Don Dist. Hq, Dist. Hq received small arms and mortar attack, Battery C 2/32 fired 17 rounds 8 inch.

(45) 011300 April, Katum SF Camp, received 8 rounds 82mm, Battery B 2/32 ~~fired~~ 5 rounds 175mm.

(46) 021145 April, Katum SF Camp, received 13 rounds 82mm, Battery B 2/32 fired 6 rounds 175mm.

(47) 081715 April, Katum SF Camp, received 34 rounds 82mm, Battery B 2/32 fired 33 rounds 175mm.

(48) 090815 April, Katum SF Camp, received 34 rounds 82mm, Battery B 2/32 fired 33 rounds 175mm.

(49) 101445 April, Katum SF Camp, XT 341869, contact with VC company, Battery B 2/32 fired 16 rounds 175mm.

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AUTHORITY: 25 CFR 162.104  
 DATE: 11/19/2013  
 BY: SP-5 JLD/STP  
 REASON: 25 CFR 162.104  
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(50) 110930 April, Katum SF Camp, received 11 rounds 82mm, Battery B 2/32 fired 40 rounds 175mm.

(51) 110725 April, Katum SF Camp, received 3 rounds 82mm, Battery B 2/32 fired 8 rounds 175mm.

(52) 161615 April, Di An Base Camp, Battery A 8 inch platoon march order to Thu Duc, Battery A 2/32 platoon to Thu Duc and return to Tay Ninh.

(53) 171600 April, Tay Ninh Base Camp, Battery A 8 inch platoon closed into Tay Ninh Base Camp.

(54) 192100 April, Katum USSF Camp, observed lights on road north of camp truck convoy Vic XT 3593, and received 9 rounds of 82mm mortar and 11 rounds of 120mm mortar, Battery B 2/32 fired 6 rounds 175mm in counter mortar and expended 19 rounds 175mm engaging the VC truck convoy.

(55) 221300 April, Ben Soi USSF Vic XT 992525, made contact with 20 VC wearing white helmets, Battery A 2/32 expended 38 rounds 175mm in support. AV and aviation officer 2/32 adjusted fire.

(56) 241000 April, Tay Ninh Base Camp, Camp Saint Barbara, initiated operation change over phase I 241515 April, Battery D to Tay Ninh, Battery A to Camp Saint Barbara.

(57) 251400 April, Tay Ninh Base Camp, Camp Saint Barbara, initiated operation change over phase II 251617 April, Battery B completed move to Tay Ninh Battery A completed move to Camp Saint Barbara.

(58) 261220 April, ~~Thien~~ Ngon USSF XT 063844, contact with estimated company of VC, 2/32 aerial observer adjusted fire.

(59) 272245 April, Tay Ninh Base Camp, received CS gas in Battery Area, reported by Battery B 2/32.

(60) Elements of the battalion were engaged in combat operations throughout the period.

(61) The following number of missions were fired with the amounts of ammunition expended:

UNIT	MISSIONS FIRED	AMMO EXPENDED	
		8"	175MM
Battery A	3386	3479	3886
Battery B	4892	601	5714
Battery C	4128	1834	3145
TOTAL	12,406	9204	12,745

Btry A  
 moves to  
 St. Barbara  
 April 25  
 1968

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(62) In the near future the battalion will fire the 200,000th round in support of ground operations in RVN.

## c. Training

(1) Accident prevention training continues to be a matter of command emphasis.

(2) In-country orientation was conducted for all newly arrived replacement personnel.

(3) On the job training and individual cross training continued in all units.

(4) The battalion was issued four (4) M-18 Gun Direction Computers (RDFAC) with the 23d Arty Gp providing operator and maintenance personnel training to 7 officers and 7 EM.

(5) Gunnery tests were administered to all officers, chiefs of section, sergeants, and assistant gunners.

## d. Intelligence

No significant intelligence during this period.

## e. Logistics

(1) The following missions, listed by sorties, were flown during the reporting period:

	<u>RECON</u>	<u>FAC</u>	<u>ADMIN</u>	<u>MAINT</u>	<u>PAS</u>	<u>CGO</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
OH 13S	48	106	4	1	6	3	113 + 30
O1 D	108	74	3	1	18	0	208 + 30
TOTAL	146	180	7	2	24	3	321 + 60

(2) On 3 February O1D Ser # 57-2963 was turned into field maintenance for repairs and returned to battalion on 25 March, OH 13S Ser # 64-15398 was turned into field maintenance on 26 March for cylinder change and returned to battalion on 3 April.

## f. Organization


(1) During the reporting period, the battalion remained assigned to the 23d Artillery.

(2) Headquarters Battery, Service Battery, and Battery A were stationed at Tay Ninh. Battery B was moved to a newly constructed fire support base at Camp Saint Barbara, and Battery C was stationed at Dau Tieng.

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## (2) Morning Reports

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The physical manpower strength of the batteries must relate directly to accurate morning reports.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Accurate morning reports from each battery are essential for the proper accounting of physical strengths within the battalion. Certain problems have arisen in that all orders assigning and transferring personnel are published by the consolidated group personnel section. There is often a delay of several days between the actual assignment of an individual and his being picked up on the morning report of the gaining battery.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the group personnel section cut initial headquarters battery assignment orders and forward them to the battalion with the new member. The battalion will further assign the individual to a battery and inform group so that final assignment orders can be published. This procedure will eliminate the differences between actual assigned strength and morning report reflected strength of the battalion.

## b. Operations

### (1) Use of signal panel markers

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Forward observer parties should be equipped with signal panel markers in addition to smoke grenades to mark location of friendly elements.

(b) **EVALUATION:** It has been found that in some instances the use of smoke to mark friendly units locations cannot be accomplished due to either the desires of the maneuver element commander or the VC monitoring, the radio net and also using smoke. In instances where smoke cannot be used to mark friendly locations the signal panel marker has been used and was considered effective.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That units use signal panel markers on all forward observer parties.

### (2) Emplacement of M110, M107 on wooden gun pads with retaining walls

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The M110 and M107 self propelled 8" Howitzer and 175mm gun should be emplaced as close to the edge of the wooden pad as possible to minimize damage to the retaining wall when the weapon is fired.

(b) **EVALUATION:** It has been found that emplacing the spade of the M107, M110 as close as possible to the edge of the wooden gun pad minimizes the shock that the retaining wall receives when the weapon is fired. The spade should also be emplaced parallel to the retaining wall to insure that the shock from firing is distributed uniformly at the retaining wall.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That units utilizing wooden gun pads with retaining walls consider the method of emplacement and emplace the spade as close as possible to the edge of the wooden gun pad and parallel to the retaining wall.

*Wood Gun Pads*

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DATE: 10/10/2001  
BY: [illegible]

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## (3) Individual fighting positions at artillery fire support base camps

(a) OBSERVATION: Each individual should have a position from which to fight from in the base camp.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the adequate defense of an artillery fire support base requires that each individual soldier have a position on the perimeter berm from which he can engage the enemy. Due to the large size of the base camps and in relation to the number of personnel in the firing units, the situation may require that all individuals be utilized to defend the position. Main fighting bunkers utilizing .50 cal and 7.62mm M60 machineguns are the main strength of the position, but must be supplemented with the firepower available in the remainder of the firing battery.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units occupying artillery fire support base camps consider individual fighting positions in the initial planning and construction phase.

## (4) Employment of heavy artillery in a direct support/direct fire role

(a) OBSERVATION: Heavy artillery M110 self-propelled 8" Howitzer can be effectively utilized in the direct support/direct fire role.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found on operations at Ap Dinh, RVN during the period 13-15 Feb 68 that the M110 self-propelled 8" Howitzer could be used very effectively as a direct fire weapon in direct support of the mechanized infantry in the attack of a fortified VC position. The infantry had been held up for several days by a series of fortified hedgerow and bunker complexes and had sustained several casualties. Initially one (1) 8" Howitzer was moved forward, positioned and layed by pointing the tube at the target and then setting up the collimator. The range to the target was approximately 425 meters. All FPC computations were computed from the Tabular Firing Table using 100/R and C factor applied to the observers corrections. On the afternoon of 13 Feb 68 the one (1) 8" Howitzer fired 58 rounds at the fortified VC positions. On the morning of 14 Feb 68 two (2) 8" Howitzers were taken forward, emplaced, and fired 68 rounds into the position. On the afternoon of 14 Feb 68 the infantry assaulted the first two series of fortified hedgerows and bunkers and secured both. On 15 Feb 68 the two 8" Howitzers were again used to soften the objective prior to the infantry assault. The objective was secured and the remaining fortified area was leveled by engineer bulldozers.


(c) RECOMMENDATION: That maneuver element and artillery commanders give more consideration to the use of heavy artillery in the direct fire/direct support role when the need is indicated by the tactical situation.

### c. Training

#### (1) Training of Maintenance personnel on the M107, M110

(a) OBSERVATION: Maintenance personnel should be thoroughly trained on the specific procedures to be followed when trouble shooting the M107, self-propelled 175mm gun and the M110 self-propelled 8" Howitzer.

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(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the complex weapon system, both electrical and hydraulic, require extensive training to expeditiously determine the problem and repair the weapon. Many maintenance personnel use untimely and often ineffective trial and error methods for determining the problem.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That maintenance personnel be thoroughly trained to follow correct trouble shooting procedures as established by appropriate TM's and unit SOP's.

## d. Intelligence

### (1) Utilizing forward observer parties with small unit operations

(a) OBSERVATION: A forward observer party should be used on small unit operations to insure adequate, timely artillery support and to allow the small unit commander to control his unit to the maximum extent possible.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that by providing a forward observer party in support of the 1st Brigade's combined intelligence and reconnaissance platoon (CRIP) the platoon commander can devote his time completely to the operation of the platoon. The forward observer party being thoroughly familiar with artillery procedures can request and adjust the artillery fire in a timely efficient manner.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That forward observer parties be utilized by small unit (platoon) size operations whenever the tactical situation indicates it may be advantageous.

## e. Logistics

### (1) Heavy Artillery Fire Support Base Design and Construction

(a) OBSERVATION: Extensive detailed planning and engineer studies should be conducted before actual construction of the fire support base has started.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that a fire support base constructed for a heavy artillery battery is too small to cope properly with the concussion created by the firing of the 175MM gun. The fire support base was constructed with inner dimensions of 400' X 500' with a laterite and dirt berm 20' thick and 10' high. The personnel and fighting bunkers were built into the berm and sandbagged for protection against rockets/mortars. The concussion created by firing caused extensive damage to the bunkers and caused the sandbag walls to collapse.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When future fire support bases are constructed for heavy artillery, the minimum size considered should be 800' X 800' to insure adequate distance to protect the construction and sandbags.

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DATE: 11/13/01  
BY: [illegible]

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## (2) Field Expedients used for sandbags

(a) OBSERVATION: Sand filled 8" and 175mm cannisters and the black plastic bag inside the 175mm cannister can be used in lieu of sandbags to provide overhead and side protection to personnel and ammunition bunkers.

(b) EVALUATION: During a recent critical shortage of sandbags, the black plastic bag inside the 175mm powder cannister and the 8" and 175mm powder cannister filled with sand was used in lieu of sandbags. In construction where using all plastic bags or powder cannisters is not possible, the use of a portion saves the number of sandbags that are used.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that units constructing bunkers consider using the black plastic bag and 8" and 175mm powder cannisters in lieu of sandbags if a shortage of sandbags exists.

## (3) Barrier fence construction

(a) OBSERVATION: Placing a shell casing from a 105mm round or a 106mm round over the engineer stake will add to the speed and efficiency of driving the stake into the ground.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that a 105mm or 106mm shell casing can be placed over the top of the engineer stake when barrier fences are being constructed. The shell casing presents a large flat surface which aids in driving the stake by a 10 or 12 lb sledge hammer.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units consider using the casing over the engineer stake when constructing barrier fences.

(a) OBSERVATION: Placing an iron bar through the roll of barbed wire and placing in the hinge portion of the 3/4 tail gate allows the wire to be unrolled very rapidly.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been found that the barbed wire could be unrolled in much the same fashion as WD-1 and increase the speed with which a large double apron fence could be constructed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That unit consider this method of unrolling barbed wire when constructing fences.

## f. Organization

### (1) Organizing the perimeter defense of an artillery fire support base camp

(a) OBSERVATION: Proper division of duties among all officer's and NCO's is critical in order to accomplish the mission of defending the fire support base camp

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DATE: 11/10/01  
BY: SP5

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BY [signature]

(b) **EVALUATION:** The occupation of a newly constructed artillery fire support base camp requires detailed plans for weapon and bunker responsibility and a physical security plan prior to the actual occupation. Prior to occupation each section in the battery must be given responsibilities for berm positions, reaction force requirements and information concerning signals to be used, location of key facilities, and chain of command. Once the position is occupied the physical security plan must be rehearsed and executed as soon as possible to detect any organizational weakness in the defense.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That units consider preparation of a physical security plan and organization for defense prior to positions occupation.

## g. Other

### (1) Destruction of Abandoned Facilities by Burning

(a) **OBSERVATION:** When artillery fire support patrol bases or other facilities are abandoned and destruction has to be accomplished diesel oil should be used as the destruction agent rather than gasoline.

(b) **EVALUATION:** During a recent destruction mission for a large artillery FSB it was noted that gasoline evaporates too rapidly to satisfactorily be used as a burning agent.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** When destruction has to be accomplished diesel oil should be used as the burning agent. When the burning has destroyed the facility the holes should be covered by a bulldozer to eliminate any facility that could be used by the enemy.

### (2) Crater Analysis Procedures

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Numerous rocket/mortar attacks make timely, accurate crater analysis a must if the rocket/mortar position is to be located and silenced.

(b) **EVALUATION:** It is virtually impossible to determine the direction of attack by the normal observation of incoming mortar rounds. The individual soldier frequently hampers the location of the enemy weapon by inadvertently obliterating the shell crater while awaiting the arrival of distant teams to check the crater.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Recommend that each company/battery size unit select and train crater analysis teams, and that all personnel be familiarized with procedures so that the crater will not be disturbed until after the analysis has been completed.

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3. Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.  
Omitted in compliance with USARV Reg No: 525-15

*Darwin S. Hyde*

DARWIN S. HYDE  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 93753  
DATE: 11/11/01  
BY: [illegible]

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AVFBC-EB-H (8 May 68) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Bn, 32d Arty (BIC-12444) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (M)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 14 JUN 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHIC(DST), APO 96375  
Commander, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOR-03, APO 96358

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report - Lessons  
Learned of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery and concurs with the report,  
subject to the comments contained in the 1st and 2nd increments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*OB Fory*

1 Incl  
ns

O. B. FORY  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 25 CFR 172.164  
DATE: 10/15/03

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED  
When Separated From  
Classified Inclosures

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AVHGC-DST (8 May 68) 4th Ind (U) CPT Arnold/nga/LEN 4485  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Bn, 32d Arty (UIC-WA2AAA) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968, RGS-CSFOR-65 (R1)

a

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 18 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 2d Bat-  
talion, 32d Artillery.

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
nc

C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, AGG  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:  
HQ, II PFORCEV  
HQ, 2d Bn, 32d Arty

RECORD COPY - RETURN TO AVHGC-DST  
Korffs, G3  
LF

MFR: ORLL was not staffed due to lack of significant unresolved problem  
areas.

ACTION OFFICER: CPT ARNOLD/LEN 4485

50-800  
206-970

Handwritten initials and stamps in a box, including 'A', 'C', and 'dia'.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 48 CFR 1.101  
Date: 11/11/2001  
By: [illegible]

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: GPO  
DATE: 11/10/01  
BY: [illegible]

AVR/AC (8 May 1968) let ind  
OPER/TCR: Operational Report of 2d Bn, 13th Art (100-MA25AA) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1968, HQ-ART-65 (H)

Organization: 13th Artillery Group, APO 96269, 23 May 1968

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, AFHQ: AVF3-FAG,  
APO 96266

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period  
ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery.

2. Fortified comments follow:

a. Reference Section 2, paragraph a(1). General. The 23d Artillery  
Group information program was expanded to include additional coverage for  
the battalions. Closer coordination between group and battalion FID has  
been established to achieve desired coverage and publicity.

b. Reference Section 2, paragraph a(2). Comment. This method  
increases the possibility of an error in the morning report and pay reports.  
When a man is processed his records will reflect headquarters battery as  
his unit assignment which will then be changed upon arrival at the battalion.  
The procedure now employed is that the group personnel section notifies  
the unit when replacements arrive and request assignment instructions at  
that time. If the battalion can give a firm battery assignment, the  
individual is processed with orders to that battery. This procedure  
allows the man to process through finance with a definite battery assign-  
ment, thereby eliminating additional morning report and finance record  
entries.

c. Reference Section 2, paragraph b(1). Comment. However, emphasis  
should be placed on the proper utilization of smoke grenades by forward  
observers. Grenades must be taken when replacing the panel markers.  
They must be securely staked down to prevent them from being pulled up  
into the rotor blades of the helicopters.

d. Reference Section 2, paragraph b(2). Comment. This method of  
spade emplacement for the M107 and M110 is employed by the group heavy  
artillery units.

e. Reference Section 2, paragraph b(3). Comment. Individual fighting  
tanks are concentrated to protect critical installations and to block  
likely routes of approach. This requirement should be included in the  
sustentive plan of artillery fire support base corps.

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Authority  
By: [illegible]  
Date: [illegible]

ATPB-C (8 May 1966) 1st Ed. 23 May 66  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Bn, 32d Arty (SIG-MAZAAA) for Period  
Ending 30 April 1966, HOB-CRPO-65 (R1)

- f. Reference Section 2, paragraph d(4). Concur. No comment.
  - g. Reference Section 2, paragraph e. Concur. No comment.
  - h. Reference Section 2, paragraph d. Concur. No comment.
  - i. Reference Section 2, paragraph e(1). Concur. No comment.
  - j. Reference Section 2, paragraph e(2). Concur. No comment.
  - k. Reference Section 2, paragraph e(3). Concur. No comment.
  - l. Reference Section 2, paragraph f. Concur. No comment.
  - m. Reference Section 2, paragraph g(1). Concur. No comment.
  - n. Reference Section 2, paragraph g(2). Concur. The 33d Artillery Group SOP requires a crater analysis team in each battery. Every one should be made aware of the importance of crater analysis to preclude unnecessary damage to the craters prior to analysis.
3. Attention addresses for USARPAC should read: CPOF-DT.

HAROLD S. BELMONT  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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AVFC-PAC (8 May 68) 2nd Ltr

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (HCB-CSPUR-65)

DA, HQ, II FIVECIV Artillery, APO 96266

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266  
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, AFTR: AVFC-DST,  
APO 96375  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, AFTR: OPOP-OT,  
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery  
(UID: WAZAAA) adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned  
during the reporting period.

2. (U) Reference Section 2, paragraphs a(1), b(1), b(2), b(3), b(4),  
c(1), d(1), e(2), e(3), f(1), g(1), and g(2). Concur. Recommendations  
none can all be implemented within unit resources.

3. (U) Reference Section 2, paragraph a(2). Concur with 1st in-  
dorsement.

4. (U) Reference Section 2, paragraph a(1). Recommend: The size of  
heavy fire support bases will vary with location, terrain and enemy threat  
situation. Primary consideration must be given to the capability of  
the unit to defend its perimeter.

5. (U) Reference 1st Indorsement. Concur with comments in 1st in-  
dorsement except as noted in paragraphs 2 and 4, above.

6. (U) Paragraph 1 of 1st Indorsement should read: This headquarters  
has reviewed the Operational Report for the period ending 30 April 1968  
from Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery.

CHARLES CAMPBELL  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority  
DATE 11/10/00

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FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

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